Bennett, Phil; Cucos, Radu; Winch, Ryan

From the document: "The intersection of AI and transnational crime, particularly its application in human trafficking, represents an emerging and critically important area of study. This brief has been developed with a clear objective: to equip policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the technology sector with the insights needed to anticipate and pre-emptively address the potential implications of AI on trafficking in persons. While we respond to the early instances of the use of AI by transnational criminal organisations, such as within Southeast Asia's cyber-scam centres, a more systemic approach is required. The potential for transnational criminal organisations to significantly expand their operations using AI technologies is considerable, and with it comes the risk of exponentially increasing harm to individuals and communities worldwide. It is imperative that we act now, before the most severe impacts of AI-enabled trafficking are realised. We have a unique time-limited opportunity--and indeed, a responsibility--to plan, train, and develop policies that can mitigate these emerging threats. This report aims to concretise this discussion by outlining specific scenarios where AI and trafficking could intersect, and to initiate a dialogue on how we can prepare and respond effectively. This document is not intended to be definitive, but rather to serve as a foundation for a broader, ongoing discussion. The ideas presented here are initial steps, and it will require innovative thinking, adequate resourcing, and sustained engagement from all sectors to build upon them effectively."

Organization For Security And Co-Operation In Europe. Office Of The Special Representative And Co-Ordinator For Combating Trafficking In Human Beings; Bali Process (Forum). Regional Support Office .NOV, 2024

By GALEOTTI, MARK

From the webpage description: "'Since 2012, Russia has strategically used criminal networks to evade sanctions, conduct intelligence, and destabilize the West. Under Putin's 'mobilization state,' illegal activities--from smuggling to cyberattacks--are seen as essential tools of warfare. This report delves into the Kremlin's alarming integration of organized crime into statecraft.' Russia's transition from a 'conscription state' to a full 'mobilization state', after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations. The report also highlights Russia's weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin's regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally. 'Gangsters at War' reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia's geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability."

GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. November. 2024. 82p.

By Colette Ashton

Developing country theorists claim that strategies should focus on human behaviour and economic incentives, not legal measures.

To remedy systemic corruption in South Africa, policymakers must look beyond the discourse of transparency and accountability to emerging anti-corruption theory. Policy research in this field should be multi-disciplinary, grounded in empirical research and informed by decolonial thought. There is a need for more research into the unique types and drivers of corruption at national, local and sector-specific levels, to inform policy reform.

Key findings There is international consensus that anti-corruption reforms often fail or backfire, particularly in developing countries. The dominant Western good governance approach should be supplemented by theory emerging from other schools of thought from developing countries. The good governance approach recommends transparency and accountability, prioritising better laws and improved enforcement as the primary solutions. Theorists from developing countries claim that where there is systemic corruption, it is more helpful to focus on human behaviour and economic incentives to prevent corruption. Legalistic measures tend to be one-dimensional, ineffective and sometimes harmful. Recommendations Government should: Reconsider policies in light of emerging theory and evidence from global anti- corruption practices. Develop a strategy for communicating alternative perspectives and approaches to heads and staff of anti-corruption agencies and other government institutions. Researchers should: 2 Conduct localised and sector-specific empirical research into corruption in South Africa. Conduct qualitative research into the social norms governing government institutions and the private sector. Critically analyse the South African anti corruption discourse through a decolonial lens. Social norms – what people expect others to do – are the unwritten rules governing institutions and are a primary driver of corruption. For many, obeying these rules is a logical response to structural conditions, including economic incentives and disincentives. Research shows that most people are inclined to behave ethically if their environment facilitates it. Reframing corruption as a collective action problem, where policy is designed to influence the behaviour of groups, is likely to result in more effective anti-corruption initiatives. Economic development that delivers more equitable distribution of opportunities and wealth is a precondition for building a state with the capacity to reduce corruption. Determine who the rule-following elites are and devise ways to incentivise them to exert pressure on non-rule-following elites. NGOs should: Develop partnerships with institutions working with alternative theoretical/policy approaches. Explore opportunities for cooperation with business and government in developing sector specific anti-corruption projects. Develop and execute a strategy for communicating alternative perspectives to civil society and media, and in doing so, highlight success stories. Develop pilot anti-corruption reform projects based on emerging alternative perspectives

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 12p.

By Donald S. Kenkel, Alan D. Mathios, Grace N. Phillips, Revathy Suryanarayana, Hua Wang & Sen Zeng

The Food and Drug Administration has proposed to prohibit menthol cigarettes, which are smoked by almost 19 million people in the U.S. Illegal markets for menthol cigarettes could not only blunt the prohibition’s intended consequence to reduce smoking but could also lead to unintended consequences. We use data from a discrete choice experiment to estimate a mixed logit model which predicts that the prohibition of menthol cigarettes would substantially increase the fraction of menthol smokers who attempt to quit. However, our model also predicts a substantial potential consumer demand for illegal menthol cigarettes. Depending on the impact of illegality on product prices, our model predicts the potential demand-side of an illegal market for menthol cigarettes could be 59-92 percent the size of the status quo market if menthol e-cigarettes are legal, and 69-100 percent the size of the status quo market if menthol e-cigarettes are also illegal. Our mixed logit model estimated in willingness to pay space implies that the mean WTP to avoid an illegal retail market is equivalent to a tax of $8.44 per pack. In our partial cost-benefit analysis, the opportunity costs of prohibition exceed the value of the reduction in mortality risks from secondhand smoke by $15.4 billion annually.

NBER Working Paper No. 32148 February 2024

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024.

 By Charles Fain Lehman

Washington, DC, is making headlines for its crime problems. While other cities saw crime retreat in 2023, the District saw a historic spike in murders, as well as a surge in shocking carjackings, many carried out by teenage offenders. These disturbing crimes are compounded by a general decay in public order in the District, with residents complaining of rampant fare-beating, panhandling, and shoplifting. But why has crime risen in the nation’s capital? The debate around the topic focuses on either the leniency of DC’s laws or the degree to which DC has provided for its most disadvantaged citizens. Nobody can even agree, it seems, on the extent to which crime has risen, or which crimes have gone up or down, with commentators cherry-picking statistics that serve their preferred view of things. This report makes several contributions to the debate over crime in the District of Columbia. The first section presents data on crime in the District, identifying three distinct but related crime problems: a long-standing homicide and group-violence problem; adolescent crime, principally involving auto theft and carjacking; and public disorder, including fare evasion and uncontrolled unsheltered homelessness. The second section connects these trends to a systematic decline of activity in many components of DC’s crime-and-disorder control system, including reductions in police staffing and activity, in prosecution, in pretrial detention, in school attendance, in judicial staffing, and in camp clearance. These two sections, the report then argues, are related. The report calls for viewing DC’s problem through the criminal justice system “capacity” lens—the volume of manpower, attention, space, time, and other resources that the system can dedicate to its crime-fighting function. DC has experienced a comprehensive collapse in its capacity over the past four years; remediating it is the best way to get crime under control. In conclusion, this report lays out several proposals for restoring or expanding capacity, including • Federally funding Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) hiring • Expanding professional development opportunities for MPD officers • “Civilianize” certain MPD roles • Concentrate limited policing resources • Building a dedicated federal–District gang-suppression partnership • Encourage the public to fight crime through public nuisance abatement and the ability of the Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) to deny liquor licenses • Permit the DC attorney general to prosecute cases that the U.S. attorney declines • Give the Senate a time-limited veto over, rather than a confirmation responsibility for, appointments to DC’s courts • Prosecute truants engaged in criminal behavior • Clear camps without apology These steps, this report concludes, should be part of an all-of-government effort to make DC’s criminal-justice system function again—and function better. The report’s Appendix includes model federal legislation for accomplishing these goals through increased funding, expanded prosecutorial authority, and facilitating the nomination and confirmation of DC judges 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 39p.

By Kevin Curran

Shakespeare’s Legal Ecologies offers the first sustained examination of the relationship between law and selfhood in Shakespeare’s work. Curran argues that law provided Shakespeare with the conceptual resources to imagine selfhood in social and distributed terms, as a product of interpersonal exchange or gathering of various material forces. Curran reveals Shakespeare’s distinctly communitarian vision of personal and political experience, the way he regarded living and acting in the world as materially and socially embedded practices. At the center of the book is Shakespeare’s fascination with questions fundamental to law and philosophy: What are the sources of agency? For whom am I responsible, and how far does responsibility extend? Curran guides readers through Shakespeare’s responses, paying attention to historical and intellectual contexts. The result is a new theory of Shakespeare’s relationship to law and an original account of law’s role in the ethical work of his writings.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2017.. 192p,

By Alex Brill, Brian J. Miller, Stan Veuger

Federal legislation to legalize, regulate, and tax cannabis could have significant impacts on the federal budget. While the specific details of any potential cannabis legalization legislation are unknown at present, such reforms are likely to affect both tax receipts and federal outlays through a wide range of mechanisms including excise tax collections, changes in the size and composition of the labor force, and the major federal health care programs. We identify the main federal budgetary implications of legalizing cannabis and estimate their likely magnitude where possible.

AEI Economics Working Paper 2023-16 Updated March 2024   Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 41p.

By Annette Idler | Frederik Florenz | Ajmal Burhanzoi John Collins | Marcena Hunter | Antônio Sampai

This paper contributes to research on the relationship between conflict and organized crime (the crime–conflict nexus), using Afghanistan as a case study. For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been plagued by internal armed conflict, influenced by local, national, regional, and international external actors, and the intricate relationships among them. To varying degrees, power, politics, and criminality informed these relationships. Organized crime provides actors in Afghanistan with significant political power, while powerful political actors are uniquely positioned to reap the profits of the country’s criminal markets. This paper gives an account of the existing literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, identifying some of the key insights that this literature has revealed. To do so, it uses a four-pronged framework, exploring how conflict has fuelled organized crime in Afghanistan; how organized crime has fuelled conflict; how conflict over the control of illicit markets has resulted; and how organized crime has contributed to the erosion of the state. By assessing the literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, the paper identifies knowledge gaps and suggests areas for future research.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 36p.

By Iffat Idris

This report gives the findings of a ‘quick scan’ review of available literature on political will and serious organized crime (SOC). It covers the five broad themes of the SOC Anti Corruption Evidence (ACE) research program: i) political will and SOC; ii) political will, SOC, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; iii) political will, SOC, and sanctions; iv) political will and trafficking; v) political will, SOC and COVID-19. Noting that political will is often used as a ‘catch all’ explanation for the failure of reforms or policies, the report begins by discussing definitions of political will. The literature generally describes it as the willingness and commitment of decision-makers to carry out reforms or implement policies to address particular problems. Malena (2009: 19) defines it as the sum of political want, political can, and political must. Reflecting the complexity of the phenomenon, political will has numerous enabling factors, notably implementation capacity, quality of governance, organizational set-up and functioning, and societal factors. With regard to the measurement of political will, there is consensus that mere statements, policies, or legislation are not enough – political will has to be manifested in concrete action. Political will and SOC: The review finds that political will is highly relevant to SOC, both because SOC and corruption often involve political leaders or government officials, and because political will is a necessary condition for effective efforts to combat SOC and corruption. Increasing recognition of the scale of SOC, and the need to combat it, is reflected in national and international commitments, frameworks, and so on. However, key implementation challenges include lack of coordination between different agencies or across different frameworks, and the fact that those tasked with implementation are often involved in SOC themselves. Measurement challenges include the clandestine nature of SOC. Capacity indicators, ‘objective’ situation indicators, and public perception indicators are three sets that can facilitate the measurement of political will to combat SOC. Political will, SOC, kleptocracy and illicit finance: The review finds that SOC is strongly connected to both kleptocracy (in which political leaders use their power to increase their wealth) and illicit financial flows (IFFs) (whereby funds are illegally transferred out of a country). The literature stresses the importance of political will to combat kleptocracy and IFFs. While there has been a rise in laws and regulatory frameworks to curb money laundering, implementation of these has been weak. The UK exemplifies this: it is one of the biggest global financial hubs and a major destination for IFFs, but despite laws and policies targeting IFFs and kleptocracy, progress has been limited. The report finds that the political will in Washington to curb illicit finance appears strong, but it is too early to assess the impact of this. Political will, SOC, and sanctions: Sanctions can be used to combat SOC, in particular transnational SOC, and by targeting individuals or groups rather than the general population, harm to ordinary citizens can be averted. However, while relatively easy to impose, the review finds that they are not the ultimate solution and a number of caveats apply to their use; for example, they are not a replacement for other law enforcement measures, and they do nothing to address root causes of SOC. The paper looks at the experience of the US, which has long used sanctions as a tool to combat SOC and human rights abuses, and of the UK, which is also making increasing use of these to target corruption, kleptocracy, and human rights abuses. Political will, SOC, and trafficking: Trafficking (for example, drugs, human trafficking for labor or sex) is one of the main forms of SOC, and traditional approaches to combat it fall into prevention, protection, and prosecution. The review finds that political will is especially relevant in combatting trafficking in two regards: a) determining the focus of efforts (supply-side versus demand-side) and b) determining which interventions are carried out. To date, the focus has been on supply-side interventions despite these showing limited effectiveness. The decision is largely a political one. The paper illustrates this by looking at approaches by the US to tackling drug trafficking, and approaches by both origin and destination countries to tackling trafficking in persons for forced labor. Political will, SOC, and COVID-19: The review finds that, as with conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, the COVID-19 pandemic has created new opportunities for SOC; for example because of increased online activities, scarcity of certain goods (such as healthcare products) and the economic downturn. Human trafficking and health sector-related crime are especially up. The paper highlights a number of factors likely to affect (diminish) political will to combat SOC related to the pandemic, including lack of public resources, and prioritization of dealing with the health impact of COVID-19. The review demonstrates the importance of political will for effectively tackling SOC, illicit finance, and transnational corruption, but also shows why it is challenging to find political will, measure it, and create demand for it.   

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 56p.    SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 1. 

By  Nina Tvede Korshøj  , Thomas Friis Søgaard

Research exploring online-mediated drug dealing has gained momentum in recent years. Much existing research is characterized by a primary focus on the “online” aspects of drug sales facilitated by social media, resulting in a divide between “on”- and “offline” drug dealing. We wish to bridge this gap, by focusing on the hybridity of dealing drugs via social media and by arguing for a more holistic understanding of contemporary drug dealing. Methods: This article is based on in-depth digitally facilitated oral interviews with 25 individuals with experience in dealing drugs via social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps and on observational data from different apps and platforms. Results: We found that many sellers start by dealing offline and gradually drift into sales using social media technology. While the internet offers drug sellers new opportunities to expand their business, many sellers are not technological exclusionists but rather adopt a multichannel approach where they sell both via social media and occasionally or regularly also through in-person and technologically analog means. Additionally, many sellers do not draw clear-cut distinctions between whether they use social media, SMS, or encrypted apps, but rather see their “drug sales phone” as one medium for all sales-related communication. Findings also show that local offline power dynamics continue to influence sellers’ ability to build and expand their online business and that offline as well as online networks play a crucial role in sellers’ hiring of helpers and their bulk drug sourcing. Conclusion: We discuss how our findings have analytical, conceptual, and methodological implications for the development of a more nuanced and holistic approach in the study of drug sales involving online technologies. 

International Journal of Drug Policy. Volume 130, August 2024, 104509

By Huma Haide

Organized crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organized crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organized crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organized crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines.1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organized crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilize. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ for a criminal group and to achieve a complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthen criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organized crime groups that extend beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude, and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilize was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organized crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognized as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.   

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.2023. 88p.

By Richard Sinclair, Matthew Bland, Bradley Savage

We found that romance fraud was rising year-on-year across every region in England and Wales, increasing 55% during the 3 years between October 2018 and October 2021. Fifty percent of all the romance fraud victims in the period resided in 17% of the places where romance fraud had occurred. A total of 439 locations (outward postcode areas) were identified as the “power few” in the first year of the data set. Of these 439 locations, 162 of them recurred in both of the following years, becoming chronic “hot spot” locations containing more than one in six of all reported romance fraud victims. The demography of victims in repeat locations differed considerably, but hot spots were more frequently predominantly populated by less affluent populations. We conclude that the current national one-size-fits-all fraud prevention approach may not be the most efficient or effective way to reach those victims who most require crime prevention advice. The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, based in the City of London Police, could adopt a tailored approach to providing preventative information to local police forces based on the year-to-year patterns in crime and the associated intelligence provided by sociodemographic data sources such as Acorn.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 22, Issue 4: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Nov 2023 Pages 585-894

By Jodie Wrigley

While scholarly debate continues about possible causal links between climate events and violent extremism, the evidence suggests that these events make communities more vulnerable to recruitment, provide fertile ground for anti-democracy sentiment, and erode trust in institutions and governments. It is recognised that many of these challenges play out in and leverage the on- and offline public sphere. Strategic communication, therefore, is an essential tool to utilise in this space to help prevent and counter violent extremism. This Policy Brief provides a starting point to explore further the potential nexus between climate events, violent extremism, and strategic communication. It explores a whole-of-society view of the potential strategic communication challenge and what actions practitioners could implement now to help address or minimise this existing or potential emerging threat . For the latest updated statistics on wildlife crime visit the World Animal Foundation website.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT, 2024. 30p.

ByThomas D. Akoensi, Justice Tankebe

Using an experimental vignette design, the study inves-tigates the effects of criminal records on the hiring deci-sions of a convenience sample of 221 human resource(HR) managers in Ghana. The HR managers were ran-domly assigned to read one of four vignettes depicting job seekers of different genders and criminal records:male with and without criminal record, female with and without criminal record. The evidence shows that a criminal record reduces employment opportunities for female offenders but not for their male counter-parts. Additionally, HR managers are willing to offer interviews to job applicants, irrespective of their crim-inal records, if they expect other managers to hire ex-convicts. The implications of these findings are dis-cussed.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, online first, May 2024

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By Ben Grunwald and Jeffrey Fagan

In 2000, the Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Wardlow that a suspect’s presence in a “high-crime area” is relevant in determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. Despite the importance of the decision, the Court provided no guidance about what that standard means, and over fifteen years later, we still have no idea how police officers understand and apply it in practice. This Article conducts the first empirical analysis of Wardlow by examining data on over two million investigative stops conducted by the New York Police Department from 2007 to 2012. Our results suggest that Wardlow may have been wrongly decided. Specifically, we find evidence that officers often assess whether areas are high crime using a very broad geographic lens; that they call almost every block in the city high crime; that their assessments of whether an area is high crime are nearly uncorrelated with actual crime rates; that the suspect’s race predicts whether an officer calls an area high crime as well as the actual crime rate; that the racial composition of the area and the identity of the officer are stronger predictors of whether an officer calls an area high crime than the crime rate itself; and that stops are less or as likely to result in the detection of contraband when an officer invokes high-crime area as a basis of a stop. We conclude with several policy proposals for courts, police departments, and scholars to help address these problems in the doctrine.

California Law Review 345-404 (2019

By Billy Kyte | Giulia Roncon

With the aim to support individuals in building resilient communities working to prevent, counter, and limit the damage of environmental crime, this handbook documents the challenges faced by defenders working in the environmental crime field and provides guidance to support their resilience.

The first section of the handbook analyzes definitional understandings of environmental crime and explores the impacts and harms it can perpetuate. The second section assesses the risks and challenges commonly faced by environmental defenders, including an assessment of their needs, and explores emergent regional issues that may play a part in such vulnerabilities. The final section presents a repository of best practices and tools that can help stakeholders to access available resources and to mitigate the potential risks they face.

The handbook draws from consultations involving nearly 100 prominent figures from civil society and media across Africa and Asia. Whilst findings are therefore geographically specific to some extent, our work confirms that the challenges experienced by environmental defenders in these regions were replicated globally as well. Although each country and regional context is different, the handbook outlines strategies that could be broadly implemented to support the community of stakeholders dedicated to tackling environmental crime worldwide.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). 2023.

By Amir Rotami

In this policy brief, based on published and forthcoming studies, author Amir Rostami outlines the changing nature of crime in Sweden, with a focus on organised crime, specifically lethal violence and fraud. What are the lessons learned from the Swedish crime paradox, namely the rise in organised crime, but not an equivalent rise in general crime, and what needs to be implemented to counter organised crime? The reaction to the question can be divided into two components: local and global/

European Liberal Forum Policy Paper . Brussels: European Liberal Forum, 2021. 19p.

By Faith Honor , Amanda Shaverand Devin Thorne

The trafficking of pangolins and their scales drives corruption, undermines the rule of law, creates public health risks, and even threatens local and regional security. Additionally, the illicit pangolin trade may have even played a role in onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 Critically, the trade—and all of its related challenges—appears to be growing: between 2015 and 2019, 253 tonnes2 of pangolin scales were confiscated, and the annual quantity of pangolin scales seized increased by nearly 400%. To expose the logistics of how these scales are trafficked internationally, Tipping the Scales uses publicly available seizure data and investigative case studies. The global plight of pangolins is increasingly well-known, but less understood are the opaque supply chains that enable pangolin trafficking. To trace this illicit system from consolidation hubs in West and Central Africa to China’s consumer markets, Tipping the Scales analyses 899 pangolin seizures. Drawing on C4ADS’ Wildlife Seizure Database, law enforcement partner seizure data, official government documents, corporate data, and expert interviews, the report details how traffickers nest their activities within licit systems of trade and commerce. To disrupt this trade, C4ADS identifies opportunities for intervention and capacity building.

In Section I, the report finds that pangolin scale traffickers have co-opted bushmeat supply chains and legal breeding programs for their illicit activities. Bushmeat scale trafficking supply chains are particularly prominent in Central and West Africa; 72% of African scale seizures over the last five years have come from those regions. Growing demand for pangolin meat and scales has made pangolins a dual-transaction good3 that relies on transport networks between rural areas and urban and coastal distribution hubs. Further, the report finds that pangolin breeding programs in sub-Saharan Africa obscure the lines between poaching, conservation, and science. In Section II, the report finds that bulk pangolin scale shipments often exit the continent through coastal countries in Central and West Africa. While 70% of intercontinental trafficking instances tied to Africa rely on the air transport sector, 81% of the total weight of pangolin scales are trafficked intercontinentally via the maritime transport sector. China and Hong Kong are the trade’s most prominent destinations. Since 2015, 42% of the 195 tonnes of pangolin scales seized throughout Asia originated in Africa and were seized in or bound for China or Hong Kong. In Section III, the report finds that there are more than 1,000 companies, hospitals, and other entities participating in China’s legal market for medicinal pangolin products. In this market, which allows companies to privately stockpile pangolin scales, traffickers exploit lax regulations to sell scales from Africa and Asia. Government-reported pangolin scale consumption quotas, geo-tagged company data, and seizures suggest that Guangdong and Hunan provinces have relatively high levels of exposure to both the legal pangolin market and pangolin trafficking. Based on these findings, Tipping the Scales makes 10 recommendations to increase detection of and improve enforcement against transnational criminal networks operating in Africa and Asia (see page 58).

Washington, D: C4ADS, 2020. 60p.

By Insight Crime

This present study on Bolivia was led by InSight Crime. The findings and analysis are based on one year of open-source and fieldwork investigation in the cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz, and desk research, phone, and face-to-face interviews with environmental experts, government and security officials, members of local communities, academics, and others.1 The report provides a snapshot of the complex web of actors (state and non-state) and relationships fueling environmental crime in the Bolivian Amazon. Rather than just diagnosing the issue, the study aims to raise new dialogue and intervention opportunities regarding environmental crime in the region. This study addresses long-standing issues of securing land rights to traditional communities in the Amazon, many of which currently face new forms of land grabbing and land trafficking, notably by export companies extracting natural resources. It also includes ideas for reforming and strengthening structurally weak and corruption prone public institutions in the Bolivian Amazon, notably those related to land, environmental, and security issues. Finally, the report also sheds light on the transnational and cross-border dynamics of environmental crime in Bolivia in activities such as wildlife trafficking and illegal mercury trafficking for river-gold mining and illegal logging exports. The complexity of increasingly globalized supply chains initiating in or cutting through the Bolivian Amazon call for more and stronger regional and international cooperation to dismantle environmental crime and protect the forest and its people

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 73p.