By Sixth Amendment Center and The Defender Initiative

In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Gideon v. Wainwright that it is an “obvious truth” that anyone accused of a crime who cannot afford the cost of a lawyer “cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” In the intervening 58 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel means every person who is accused of a crime is entitled to have an attorney provided at government expense to defend him in all federal and state courts whenever that person is facing the potential loss of his liberty and is unable to afford his own attorney. Moreover, the appointed lawyer needs to be more than merely a warm body with a bar card. The attorney must also be effective, the U.S. Supreme Court said again in United States v. Cronic in 1984, subjecting the prosecution’s case to “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Under Gideon, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is an obligation of the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State of Illinois delegates to its county boards and circuit court judges most of its constitutional obligation to ensure the provision of effective assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants in the trial courts. Yet the state does not have any oversight structure by which to know whether each county’s indigent defense system has a sufficient number of attorneys with the necessary time, training, and resources to provide effective assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal case for each and every indigent defendant. This is the first of three findings of this report. As explained in chapter I, this report is the result of a statewide evaluation of the provision of the right to counsel in adult criminal cases at the trial level, conducted at the request of the Illinois Supreme Court. Through data collection and analysis, interviews with criminal justice stakeholders, and courtroom observations, the evaluation assessed indigent defense services against national standards and Sixth Amendment caselaw that establish the hallmarks of a structurally sound indigent representation system, which include the early appointment of qualified and trained attorneys, who have sufficient time and resources to provide effective representation under independent supervision. The absence of any of these factors can show that a system is presumptively providing ineffective assistance of counsel. This evaluation focuses closely on the practices of nine counties – Champaign, Cook, DuPage, Gallatin, Hardin, LaSalle, Mercer, Schuyler, and Stephenson – which taken together illustrate the wide variations among Illinois county governments and courts in their efforts to fulfill the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The State of Illinois delegates to its counties and trial court judges the responsibility for providing and overseeing attorneys to effectively represent indigent defendants, and it delegates to its counties nearly all of the responsibility for funding the right to counsel of indigent defendants. When a state chooses to delegate its federal constitutional responsibilities to its local governments and courts, the state must guarantee not only that these local bodies are capable of providing effective representation but also that they are in fact doing so. Yet Illinois is one of just seven states that do not have any state commission, state agency, or state officer with oversight of any aspect of trial-level indigent representation services in adult criminal cases. Chapter II details the framework that Illinois has established for its county-level criminal justice systems and how that framework has been implemented in the nine sample counties. The indigent defense systems in the nine representative counties of this evaluation vary greatly. With 102 counties in the state, it is likely that any or all of those counties present even greater variations in their indigent defense systems. Without oversight, the State of Illinois cannot accurately say how many people or cases, and of what case types, require appointed counsel nor by whom the representation is being provided, if at all, and the State of Illinois cannot know how much the provision of indigent representation should cost nor how to provide it effectively in all 102 counties. Instead, policy decisions about indigent defense systems are left to anecdote, speculation, and potentially even bias. Chapters III through VII comprise the substantive assessment, which relate the basis of our second and third findings: The state’s limited framework for how county boards and circuit court judges are to establish and implement the indigent defense system in each county institutionalizes political and judicial interference with the appointed attorneys’ independence to act in the stated legal interests of their indigent clients. This lack of independence causes systemic conflicts of interest that interfere with the provision of effective assistance of counsel. 3. The indigent defense systems established in Illinois’ counties lack oversight and accountability that can result in a constructive denial of the right to counsel to at least some indigent defendants, and in some instances can result in the actual denial of the right to counsel to at least some indigent defendants. An indigent defense system’s effectiveness must be measured by the representation it provides to its appointed clients. The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Cronic that “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel” means that the defense must put the prosecution’s case through the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” For this to occur, U.S. Supreme Court case law provides that an indigent person must be represented by a qualified and trained attorney, who is appointed early in the case, and who has sufficient time and resources to provide effective representation under independent supervision.

Boston: Sixth Amendment Center, 2021. 181p.

By Russell M. Gold and Kay L. Levine

For decades police and prosecutors have controlled the public narrative about criminal law—littering the news landscape with salacious stories of violent crimes while ignoring the more mundane but far more prevalent minor cases that clog the court dockets. Defenders, faced with overwhelming caseloads and fear that speaking out may harm their clients, have largely ceded the opportunity to offer a counternarrative based on what they see every day. Defenders tell each other about overuse of pretrial detention, intensive pressure to plead guilty, overzealous prosecutors, cycles of violence, and rampant constitutional violations— all of which inflict severe harm on defendants and their loved ones. But defenders rarely show the public the world they inhabit.

That approach hasn’t stopped the carceral state from ballooning over the past fifty years; public defense budgets remain paltry, and clients suffer from too much law and too little justice in a system that disregards and dehumanizes them. This Article encourages defenders to go on the offensive, to seek transformative change toward a more just legal system. It builds on the social media literature to analyze how defenders can strategically use social networking sites to add their expertise to ongoing public debates about crime and criminal justice policy. As a few existing efforts suggest, social media enables defenders to widely share the routine injustices they observe and to engage with local grassroots organizations to build coalitions. Defenders’ strategic use of social media won’t change policies overnight, but we are hopeful that it will augment public support for defenders and their clients and build power to transform the criminal legal landscape over decades.

Gold, Russell M. and Levine, Kay L., The Public Voice of the Defender (July 14, 2023). 75 Alabama Law Review (Forthcoming), U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper #4416723, Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 23-4,

By Brandon L. Garrett and Gregory Mitchell

William Blackstone famously expressed the view that convicting the innocent constitutes a much more serious error than acquitting the guilty. This view is the cornerstone of due process protections for those accused of crimes, giving rise to the presumption of innocence and the high burden of proof required for criminal convictions. While most legal elites share Blackstone’s view, the citizen jurors tasked with making due process protections a reality do not share the law’s preference for false acquittals over false convictions.

Across multiple national surveys sampling more than 12,000 people, we find that a majority of Americans consider false acquittals and false convictions to be errors of equal magnitude. Contrary to Blackstone, most people are unwilling to err on the side of letting the guilty go free to avoid convicting the innocent. Indeed, a sizeable minority view false acquittals as worse than false convictions; this group is willing to convict multiple innocent persons to avoid letting one guilty person go free. These value differences translate into behavioral differences: we show in multiple studies that jury-eligible adults who reject Blackstone’s view are more accepting of prosecution evidence and are more conviction-prone than the minority of potential jurors who agree with Blackstone.

These findings have important implications for our understanding of due process and criminal justice policy. Due process currently depends on jurors faithfully following instructions on the burden of proof, but many jurors are not inclined to hold the state to its high burden. Courts should do away with the fiction that the reasonable doubt standard guarantees due process and consider protections that do not depend on jurors honoring the law’s preference for false acquittals, such as more stringent pretrial screening of criminal cases and stricter limits on prosecution evidence. Further, the fact that many people place crime control on par with, or above, the need to avoid wrongful convictions helps explain divisions in public opinion on important policy questions like bail and sentencing reform. Criminal justice proposals that emphasize deontic concerns without addressing consequentialist concerns are unlikely to garner widespread support.

121 Mich. L. Rev. 707 (2023).

By Ronald Wright and Jenny Roberts

This review collects and critiques the academic literature on criminal defense lawyering, with an emphasis on empirical work. Research on criminal defense attorneys in the United States has traditionally emphasized scarcity of resources: too many people facing criminal charges who are “too poor to pay” for counsel and not enough funding to pay for the constitutionally mandated lawyers. Scholars have focused on the capacity of different delivery systems, such as public defender offices, to change the ultimate outcomes in criminal cases within their tight budgetary constraints. Over the decades, however, theoretical understandings of the defense attorney’s work have expanded to include client interests outside the criminal courtroom, reaching the broader social conditions connected to the alleged criminal act. Researchers have responded by asking a broader range of questions about the effectiveness of defense counsel outside the courtroom and by using improved data to study the effectiveness of lawyers at discrete procedural stages.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2023. 6:241–64

By Gabriel Petek

Individuals charged with a crime have a right to effective assistance of legal counsel under the U.S. and California Constitutions. This is to ensure they receive equal protection and due process under the law. The government is required to provide and pay for attorneys for those individuals who are unable to afford private attorneys. This is known as “indigent defense.” Importance of Effective Indigent Defense. In addition to being a constitutional right, effective indigent defense in criminal proceedings can help mitigate or eliminate major consequences that defendants face regardless of whether they are convicted, such as losing a job due to being held in jail until their case is resolved. Effective indigent defense can also help ensure that all individuals are treated equitably in criminal proceedings, particularly lower-income individuals and certain racial groups who are at greater risk of experiencing serious consequences from being involved in the criminal justice system. Counties Primarily Responsible for Indigent Defense. In California, counties are primarily responsible for providing and paying for indigent defense. However, recent litigation suggests that the state could be held responsible for ensuring that effective indigent defense is being lawyerprovided. Indigent defense is generally provided in a combination of three ways: (1) public defender offices operated by the government, (2) private law firms or attorneys that contract with the government to provide representation in a certain number of cases and/or over a certain amount of time, or (3) individual private attorneys who are appointed by the court to specific cases. The actual provision of indigent defense services, however, varies by county. State Lacks Information to Assess Indigent Defense Service Levels. The state currently lacks comprehensive and consistent data that directly measures the effectiveness or quality of indigent defense across the state. This makes it difficult for the Legislature to ensure effective indigent defense is being provided. Analysis of Limited Data Raises Questions About Effective Provision of Indigent Defense. In the absence of consistent statewide data and metrics more directly measuring the effectiveness or quality of indigent defense, we analyzed limited available data comparing funding, caseloads, and staffing of indigent defense providers with district attorneys who prosecute cases, allowing for a rough, indirect assessment of existing indigent defense service. The identified differences are notable enough that they raise questions about the effective provision of indigent defense in California. For example, in 2018-19, spending on district attorney offices was 82 percent higher than on indigent defense. Recommend Three Key Steps for Legislative Action. We recommend three key steps that the Legislature could take to ensure it has the necessary information to determine whether a problem exists with indigent defense service levels, what type of problem exists, and how to effectively address such a problem. Specifically, we recommend the Legislature: (1) statutorily define appropriate metrics to more directly measure the quality of indigent defense; (2) require counties collect and report data to the state’s Office of the State Public Defender; and (3) use the data to determine future legislative action, such as identifying whether resources are needed to ensure effective indigent defense as well as how such resources could be targeted to maximize their impact

Sacramento: Legislative Analyst's Office, 2022. 28p.

by Duren Banks, Lynn Langton, Madison Fann, Michael G. Planty, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Brian A. Jackson, Dulani Woods

The systems that provide counsel for indigent adult and juvenile defendants in the United States vary considerably across states, localities, and judicial jurisdictions. In addition to the challenges associated with the myriad systems for providing indigent defense, there are other inherent challenges to providing effective defense counsel. These challenges include a lack of sufficient resources in general, access to investigators and other support staff, workload standards and other standards to support effective representation, strategies to support the recruitment and retention of quality counsel dedicated to indigent defense, and specialized training and other needs related to the provision of public defense with certain clients or cases.

On behalf of the National Institute of Justice, RTI International and RAND Corporation researchers conducted an environmental scan to develop a set of information gaps or research priorities that, if addressed, could advance knowledge around effective indigent defense strategies. In the scan, the researchers (1) explored the literature around the needs of the indigent defense field, (2) obtained input from leading practitioners through individual interviews, group discussion, and interactive feedback, and (3) reviewed the priorities of federal and private research and practitioner organizations.

Key Findings

• There is a lack of basic descriptive data about indigent defendants (e.g., which defendants have lawyers representing them and which are deprived of lawyers).

• Many jurisdictions are not equipped to provide pre-court or pre-charge representation.

• Excessive caseloads have an impact on the quality of representation, the ability to adhere to professional practice standards, and client-attorney relationships; that impact is not well understood.

• In some jurisdictions, there is limited or no access to attorneys with the qualifications, experience, and desire needed to represent people in criminal cases who are unable to afford counsel.

• In many jurisdictions, particularly rural communities, there is limited or inconsistent access to the nonattorney case support needed to provide quality indigent defense representation.

• It is difficult to hire qualified and diverse indigent defense attorneys.

• Because of the differing systems for assigning counsel across the United States, many defendants who are accused of misdemeanors or other lower-level crimes do not receive the assistance of counsel when facing pretrial detention or fines, fees, or other penalties associated with a guilty plea.

• There is a lack of understanding about the extent to which the racial, cultural, and socioeconomic backgrounds of indigent defense attorneys affect the experiences of the clients they serve.

• Emerging research shows that holistic defense strategies, which address co-occurring and collateral factors associated with criminal cases, hold promise for advancing justice and improving outcomes for individuals and communities.

Recommendations

• Require courts to collect descriptive data on which defendants have representation; leverage this information to answer research questions.

• Assess innovative options used in some jurisdictions to provide earlier access to a lawyer.

• Examine areas with different levels of caseloads and examine the differences across a broad variety of outcomes and impacts and for different types of clients and cases.

• Conduct research that offers a more nuanced understanding of the administration of indigent defense in small, rural areas.

• Conduct research to identify the impacts of nonattorney case support on case outcomes.

• Explore strategies for expanding access to paraprofessional expertise.

• Study other systems that are working well.

• Conduct research on the scope of rules, practices, and resource decisions that limit access to counsel.

• Obtain client perspectives on differences in the level and quality of representation received through public defense and noninstitutional representation systems; focus on reducing those differences.

• Conduct research to identify the full scope of issues that make it difficult to recruit qualified and diverse attorneys.

• Develop undergraduate and law school internship programs and defense counsel pipelines.

• Evaluate training opportunities; determine whether training is effective and under what circumstances.

• Conduct research on the complexities that public defense attorneys face and the support and resources needed to successfully manage these complexities.

• Engage with defendants to get their perspectives on what quality counsel means and how it is operationalized.

• Conduct research to connect outcomes with what indigent defense attorneys are doing to understand the types of engagement that are most effective.

• Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023. 20p.

Used book-may contain mark-up

By Alan M. Dershowtiz

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed that "hard cases make bad law." In Taking Liberties, Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz writes for the layperson about the hard cases and thorny issues that come before our courts today. Should parents be compelled to testify against their own children? Can your employer force you to submit to a random drug test, even if you never have used drugs? Does the government have the right to find out what home videos you have rented? Should an otherwise qualified nominee to the Supreme Court be rejected solely on grounds of his ideology? Where is the line between vigilantism and self-defense? Does the jury have the final say on matters of truth? How should the victims of AIDS be treated in the workplace and in the schools? To scores of questions like these, each arising from the issues of an actual case or controversy, Dershowitz offers incisive and often surprising an- swers. Outspoken, thought-provoking, Taking Liberties is a book to savor and enjoy--a rare opportunity to watch one of America's foremost legal minds at work.

New York. Contemporary Books. 1988. 348p.

By Ronald Wright and Jenny Roberts  

This review collects and critiques the academic literature on criminal defense lawyering, with an emphasis on empirical work. Research on criminal defense attorneys in the United States has traditionally emphasized scarcity of resources: too many people facing criminal charges who are “too poor to pay” for counsel and not enough funding to pay for the constitutionally mandated lawyers. Scholars have focused on the capacity of different delivery systems, such as public defender offices, to change the ultimate outcomes in criminal cases within their tight budgetary constraints. Over the decades, however, theoretical understandings of the defense attorney’s work have expanded to include client interests outside the criminal courtroom, reaching the broader social conditions connected to the alleged criminal act. Researchers have responded by asking a broader range of questions about the effectiveness of defense counsel outside the courtroom and by using improved data to study the effectiveness of lawyers at discrete procedural stages

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2023. 6:241–64 

By Ronald Wright and Jenny Roberts

This review collects and critiques the academic literature on criminal defense lawyering, with an emphasis on empirical work. Research on criminal defense attorneys in the United States has traditionally emphasized scarcity of resources: too many people facing criminal charges who are “too poor to pay” for counsel and not enough funding to pay for the constitutionally mandated lawyers. Scholars have focused on the capacity of different delivery systems, such as public defender offices, to change the ultimate outcomes in criminal cases within their tight budgetary constraints. Over the decades, however, theoretical understandings of the defense attorney's work have expanded to include client interests outside the criminal courtroom, reaching the broader social conditions connected to the alleged criminal act. Researchers have responded by asking a broader range of questions about the effectiveness of defense counsel outside the courtroom and by using improved data to study the effectiveness of lawyers at discrete procedural stages.

Annual Review of Criminology. Vol. 6:241-264 (Volume publication date January 2023)

By Reid Griffith Fontaine

In American criminal law, if a defendant demonstrates that they lack certain psychological capabilities, they may be excused of blame and punishment for wrongdoing. However, criminal defense law often fails to consider the developmental science of individual differences in ability and functioning that may inform jurisprudential issues of rational capacity and responsibility in criminal law. This book discusses the excusing nature of a range of both traditional and nontraditional criminal law defenses and questions the structure of these defenses based on scientific findings from social and developmental psychology. This book explores how research on individual differences in the development of social perception, judgment, and decision making explain why some youths and adults develop psychological tendencies that favor criminal behavior, and considers how developmental science can guide the understanding of criminal excuses and affirmative defense law.

Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 282p.

By Forbes Winslow.

“This treatise was one of the first attempts to outline criteria through which to determine the legitimacy of an insanity plea. This issue would be resolved later that year with the establishment of the McNaghten Rules, which this work undoubtedly influenced, and which are still applied in England today.”

London : H. Renshaw, 1843. 78p.

By Arlie Loughnan.

Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law. Whether it is a question of the age below which a child cannot be held liable for their actions, or the attribution of responsibility to defendants with mental illnesses, mental incapacity is a central concern for legal actors, policy makers, and legislators when it comes to crime and justice. Understanding mental incapacity in criminal law is notoriously difficult; it involves tracing overlapping and interlocking legal doctrines, current and past practices of evidence and proof, and also medical and social understandings of mental illness and incapacity. With its focus on the complex interaction of legal doctrines and practices relating to mental incapacity and knowledge - both expert and non-expert - of it, this book offers a fresh perspective on this topic.

Oxford (2012) 307 pages.