By Phil Bowen and Ellie Brown

• This briefing considers the three criminal justice Bills currently before Parliament— the Sentencing Bill; the Criminal Justice Bill; and the Victims and Prisoners’ Bill— and estimates the impact they will have on the demand placed on the prisons and on probation specifically. (In a separate briefing, we have looked specifically at how to strengthen provision for victims within the Victims and Prisoners’ Bill). We recognise our estimates include a good deal of guesswork but we have tried as far as possible to ground them in the existing Government figures in the public realm. • The backdrop of these new Bills is stark. From court backlogs, high probation service caseloads and an overcrowded and overflowing population in the adult male prisons, the adult criminal justice system is already struggling with demand. The Sentencing Bill itself was originally announced as part of a broader response to acute prison capacity issues, and included a new executive early release scheme. • Our assessment is that, taken together, the proposals to reduce demand on, and increase the capacity of, our prison system are unlikely to adequately deal with the acute pressures on the adult male prison estate in the medium term. Measures like a presumption against short sentences may delay the point at which demand outstrips supply but we estimate that, by December 2026, we are likely to reach a capacity crunch point again. • Turning to probation, a number of the measures to alleviate prison demand place do so by placing additional burdens on the probation service (we estimate 14,000 extra cases over the next four years). There is currently insufficient assurance that probation have the workforce and resources to take this on. We have concerns that the current proposal to place individuals onto Suspended Sentence Orders (SSOs) as an alternative to short prison sentences could backfire due to this lack of probation resourcing, and this may further undermine judicial and public confidence in community sentences more generally. • We suggest that the Ministry of Justice pay special attention to the recommendations of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the House of Lords report on community sentences that “Deferred sentencing can be used… to create incentives for low-level, repeat offenders to engage with more intensive rehabilitative activities.” We also recommend the Ministry of Justice extends existing alternatives to short prison sentences for women (both diversion away from the court system as well as problem-solving court alternatives for women), and ensure that the presumption against short sentences applies for people under 18 as well. • Finally, we have concerns about the measures in the Criminal Justice Bill to tackle rough sleeping and nuisance begging through new civil orders which, if breached, can result in criminal proceedings. There is a lack of credible evidence advanced for these proposals and the Government’s own impact assessment seems to ignore the considerable evidence that similar attempts to use these types of order have been ineffective, poorly implemented, disproportionately punish the most vulnerable and do so while draining resources away from evidence-based preventative measures. We are also concerned that the proposals are accompanied by no assessment of their impact on the courts or other parts of the criminal justice system

London: Centre for Justice Innovation 2023. 10p.

By Jose Pina-Sánchez, Julian V. Roberts and Jonathan Bild,

This Research Bulletin reports findings from the first comprehensive analysis of ‘sentence inflation’ in England and Wales. Unlike previous analyses, this one encompasses all years since 2005 and all offences.

In a previous research bulletin by the Sentencing Academy Pina-Sánchez et al. (2023) documented a significant increase in sentence severity in England and Wales over the last two decades. However, the extent to which this increase in sentence severity is due to a genuine process of ‘sentence inflation’ was unclear. The changing nature of crime might have affected the offence mix processed through our criminal courts. It is possible that the cases sentenced by the courts have become more serious over the period in question. To the extent that this has occurred it would constitute ‘explainable’ or natural inflation. If the cases sentenced are more serious, sentence severity should reflect this changing pattern.

The analysis relates two indices. One – the Imprisonment Index – measures sentence severity by combining the custody rate and Average Custodial Sentence Length (ACSL). The second index measures the seriousness of cases appearing for sentencing.

The Sentencing Academy’s submission to the Sentencing Review reported new analyses comparing trends of sentence severity and crime seriousness for three offence groups: sexual offences, drug offences, and criminal damage offences. In this report, we expand that preliminary analysis to include all major offence groups. This enables us to estimate the overall increase in sentence severity independent of changes in the mix of offences sentenced.

We estimate that since 2005, sentence severity has increased by 62%, while the seriousness of crimes processed through courts has increased by only 8%. This means that 87% of the increased sentence severity over the period was due to changes in sentencing practice, or as we term it, ‘sentence inflation’. Put differently, we estimate that sentencing in England and Wales is today 54% more punitive than in 2005. This is the first analysis to provide an estimate of the overall degree of sentence inflation in this or any other jurisdiction.

Our analysis reveals that sentence inflation has been far from uniform. Whereas no discernible pattern can be detected for drug offences, or public order offences, sentence severity for offences involving violence or weapons related offences has doubled since 2005. Sentence severity for fraud offences has tripled.

London: The Sentencing Academy, 2025. 7p.

By Kaan Yilmazturk, John Williams, Sarah Sandford, Seth Reynolds

Voluntary organisations working in and with the criminal justice system (CJS) face a complex funding landscape. This report explores what funding streams from statutory and philanthropic funders exist, and how they reach voluntary organisations (predominantly charities). We believe that a better understanding of these funding flows can inform changes to funder practice that will help criminal justice voluntary organisations best support some of the most vulnerable people in our society. NPC is a think tank and consultancy for the impact sector. We were commissioned by Lloyds Bank Foundation, with feedback from His Majesty’s Prison & Probation Service (HMPPS), AB Charitable Trust and Clinks, to research the funding landscape for voluntary organisations working in and around the CJS. We adopted a mixed methods approach to this research including: • quantitative data collection on a sample of 624 charities using Charity Commission and 360Giving data • interviews with sector stakeholders (nine charities, five funders, and three advocacy and research organisations respectively) • a survey completed by 55 voluntary organisations working in and around the CJS • case studies conducted on 10 voluntary organisations working with women and racially minoritised people. Funding flows into the criminal justice voluntary sector • Statutory funding makes up double the share of income for criminal justice charities than the wider voluntary sector. 57% of the total income of our sampled criminal justice charities comes from statutory sources, compared to just 26% for the wider voluntary sector. • Almost all statutory funding goes to larger charities. 94% of statutory funding goes to charities with annual incomes above £2m. Charities with annual incomes up to £500k received only 1.42% of statutory funding. o Trusts and foundations are the main source of income for ‘small’ charities (£100k-£500k annual income) and ‘medium-sized’ charities (£500k-£1m annual income) in our sample. o Micro-charities are underrepresented criminal justice funding flows. Of the 624 charities we sampled, 46% had annual incomes of less than £100k. For comparison, 80% of the wider voluntary sector is made up of these charities. • Only 3% of total income goes to criminal justice charities working with specific ethnic groups. Just 7% of sampled charities identified ‘people of a particular ethnic or racial origin’ as the beneficiary group they focus on. o ‘Children/young people’ is the beneficiary group that has received the highest proportion of income over the previous five years. o The most common beneficiary groups selected by charities in our sample are the ‘general public’, ‘children/young people’, ‘other defined groups’, ‘older people’, and ‘people with disabilities’. • Around three-quarters (71%) of criminal justice charities in our sample work on ‘offender support and rehabilitation’. The remaining 29% are classified as ‘prevention and safety’. Education/training’ is the most common subtheme, both in number of charities and the proportion of total income.

London:: lloyds Bank Foundation, 2025. 54p.

By The Justice Policy Institute

Despite the limited evidence base for its effectiveness and the significant burden it imposes on those under supervision, jurisdictions across the United States have expanded the use of electronic monitoring (EM) – technology that tracks and sometimes restricts a person’s movements – to supervise justicesystem-involved people released to the community. EM presents an appealing alternative to judges and prosecutors who want to limit jail or prison use but seek additional security to ensure public safety. This is true in Maryland, where the use of EM to supervise pretrial clients has grown significantly over the past decade and increased sharply following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, due in part to a one-time federal allocation of resources to fund supervision by private providers. However, despite this increase, there is very little information about the use of EM to supervise people awaiting trial in Maryland. We have no idea how many people have been monitored by the technology, its impact on their lives, or how effective it is with various populations. To inform these decisions, the Justice Policy Institute conducted a study on the use of EM to supervise pretrial clients in Maryland. This report explores the day-to-day realities of electronic monitoring, its effects on individuals under supervision, and offers recommendations to enhance service delivery based on proven best practices. Research on the efficacy of pretrial EM suggests that: • EM Does Not Reliably Reduce Failure to Appear (FTA) or Recidivism in Pretrial Populations. Although the use of EM has skyrocketed across the country, there is no clear and convincing evidence that EM effectively reduces FTA rates or recidivism for pretrial supervisees. This contrasts with other strategies like court notification and reminder systems, which have much stronger evidence of efficacy in reducing FTA rates. • Best Practices in Pretrial Release, Supervision, and EM Are Grounded in Validated Risk and Needs Assessment. The central elements that comprise an evidence-based approach to pretrial justice involve: • Expanding citation and diversion options; • Implementing a legal framework with a presumption of least restrictive release; • Ensuring due process in all hearings; • Grounding all decision-making in the use of a validated pretrial risk and needs assessment instrument (PRAI); and • Strictly limiting the use of pretrial detention and other restrictive measures, including electronic monitoring, to instances where an individual is at high risk of failing to appear or reoffending. EM Imposes a Significant Burden That Must Be Considered in Policy and Practice Decisions. EM surveillance presents serious challenges for individuals and severely limits their freedom. If EM is assigned to those at low risk of FTA or recidivism and drives net-widening in the corrections system, it is likely to cause unnecessary harm. However, when implemented and monitored effectively and humanely, it can be a useful strategy when used as a true alternative to jail and to increase the number of people released to their homes. 

Baltimore, MD: The Abell Foundation, 2025. 48p.

By William J. Sabol and Thaddeus L. Jjohnson

Although significant gaps remain, disparities between Black and White people continued to narrow at nearly every stage of the criminal justice process between 2016 and 2020. In some cases, the pace of the decline slowed; in others, the disparity gap closed entirely.

These trends extend patterns from 2000 to 2016 that were identified in CCJ's first report on correctional control by race and sex. Subsequent reports will explore trends in disparity among female populations and by ethnicity, assess trends in multiple states, and seek to identify what, if any, policy changes may have contributed to reductions in racial disparities.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2022. 36p.

By Guyora Binder,and Ekow Yankah

The widely applauded conviction of officer Derek Chauvin for the murder of George Floyd employed the widely criticized felony murder rule. Should we use felony murder as a tool to check discriminatory and violent policing? The authors object that felony murder—although perhaps the only murder charge available for this killing under Minnesota law—understated Chauvin’s culpability and thereby inadequately denounced his crime. They show that further opportunities to prosecute police for felony murder are quite limited. Further, a substantial minority of states impose felony murder liability for any death proximately caused by a felony, even if the actual killer was a police officer, not an “agent” of the felony. In these “proximate cause” jurisdictions, felony murder is far more often used to prosecute the (often Black) targets of police violence, than to prosecute culpable police.

Previous scholarship on prosecution of felons for killings by police criticized such proximate cause rules as departures from the “agency” rules required by precedent. But today’s proximate cause felony murder rules were enacted legislatively during the War on Crime and are thus immune to this traditional argument. The authors instead offer a racial justice critique of proximate cause felony murder rules as discriminatory in effect, and as unjustly shifting blame for reckless policing onto its victims. Noting racially disparate patterns of charging felony murder, and particularly in cases where police have killed, the authors call on legislatures to reimpose “agency” limits on felony murder as a prophylactic against discrimination. Finally, the authors widen this racial justice critique to encompass felony murder as a whole, urging legislatures to abolish felony murder wherever racially disparate patterns of charging can be demonstrated.

17 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 157 (2022).

By The ACLU of Northern California

California was once the nation’s leader in public defense. Long before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state must provide a lawyer to poor people charged with crimes, many counties in California already did so. Yet today, after years of neglect by the state, California is in the midst of a decades-long public defense crisis. A main cause is the reliance on “flat-fee” contracts with for-profit private attorneys and firms, where lawyers are paid a set amount for a limitless number of cases. These agreements lock attorneys and their clients in a financial conflict of interest where the lawyers’ fees are pitted against quality, zealous representation for those accused of crimes. Flat-fee systems have a well-documented history of providing worse representation and fueling mass incarceration and California has been called out, decade after decade, for allowing them to flourish.

This report examines the actual contracts California counties use and finds that they are woefully deficient in providing necessary resources to private contractors in order for them to adequately represent their clients, they uniformly fail to limit the number of cases attorneys can handle at once, and they provide little to not oversight or supervision for the lawyers who defend people when their lives are on the line. We synthesize the decades of research from within the state and around the country that show these systems should be eliminated and recommend that California finally do just that

San Francisco: ACLU of Northern California, 2025. 27p.

By David Spencer

New guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council for judges and magistrates to follow when sentencing offenders are both significant and controversial. The Imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline, due to come into effect on the 1st April 2025, sets out the considerations for judges and magistrates when sentencing an offender who has been found or pleaded guilty in the criminal courts. The Imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline instructs courts to request and consider, prior to sentencing, a pre-sentence report before forming an opinion about sentencing. Pre-sentence reports enable the court to have as much information as possible about the offender, including the risk they pose to the public, before passing sentence. Judges and magistrates are instructed that they need not order a pre-sentence report only if they consider it unnecessary. The new guideline requires that from the 1st April 2025 a presentence report will “normally be required” when sentencing offenders from one of a whole host of different and specified groups – while some groups are included, others are excluded. In particular, those within the cohort where a pre-sentence report will “normally be required” include individuals who are from an ethnic, faith or cultural minority group. While there is nothing specifically preventing a court requesting a pre-sentence report for other offenders, those who are white or male will not, unless they can fit themselves into one of the other groupings available, qualify under the criteria that “a pre-sentence report will normally be considered necessary”. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood MP, has made clear that she does not agree with the new Imposition guideline and, given the Sentencing Council have refused to withdraw it, she is willing to legislate to prevent “two-tier justice”. On the 28th March 2025 the Lord Chancellor said: “I have been clear in my view that these guidelines represent differential treatment, under which someone’s outcomes may be influenced by their race, culture or religion. This is unacceptable, and I formally set out my objections to this in a letter to the Sentencing Council last week. I am extremely disappointed by the Council’s response. All options are on the table and I will legislate if necessary.” The Lord Chancellor is right. There must be no two-tier justice – which the new guideline represents – and the government should legislate without delay to correct the Sentencing Council’s error. In conversation with the authors at Policy Exchange, the Rt Hon Jack Straw – the former Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice who created the Sentencing Council – has expressed his strong support for Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood MP. He said: “I strongly support the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Shabana Mahmood MP, in the position she is taking relating to the new Imposition Guideline that the Sentencing Council have published. It is clear that the Government will need to take steps to correct the error. Given the crossparty support for this to be resolved, as shown by the position of the Shadow Secretary of State, Robert Jenrick, I hope that this can be done quickly.” Pre-sentence reports, typically written by a probation officer, are key to judges and magistrates deciding whether to sentence an offender to prison or to a non-custodial community order – particularly in borderline cases. As a result, deciding which defendants are to be included in the cohorts where a pre-sentence report will “normally be required”, and which don’t, can be key in deciding who goes to prison and who doesn’t. The Sentencing Council, which produced the new guideline, is an independent non-departmental body that is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice. The Labour government, under Prime Minister the Rt Hon Gordon Brown, created the Sentencing Council through section 118 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The Council commenced operations in April 2010. The framework for the creation of sentencing guidelines evolved during the period of Labour in office between 1997 – 2010. Two bodies associated with the production of guidelines for the sentencing of offenders – the Sentencing Advisory Panel and Sentencing Guidelines Council – were created (and subsequently abolished). We outline the history of this period in chapter 2 of this report. The Sentencing Council is responsible for the preparation of sentencing guidelines for judges and magistrates to follow when sentencing offenders. Section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 specifies that the Sentencing Council must prepare: “(a) sentencing guidelines about the discharge of a court’s duty under section 73 of the Sentencing Code (reduction in sentences for guilty pleas), and (b) sentencing guidelines about the application of any rule of law as to the totality of sentences” and may prepare sentencing guidelines about any other matter. We outline how the Sentencing Council is required to operate, under statute, in chapter 3 of this report. The membership of the Council is made up of both judicial and non-judicial members. Eight members of the Council are appointed by the Lord Chief Justice with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor (“judicial members”) and six members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice (“non-judicial members”). We outline the current membership of the Sentencing Council, how members (continued_

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 43p.

Angela R. Riley & Sarah Glenn Thompson

The Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees no individual will be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. But, pursuant to the dualsovereignty doctrine, multiple prosecutions for offenses stemming from the same conduct do not violate the Clause if the offenses charged arise under the laws of separate sovereigns, even if the laws are otherwise identical. The doctrine applies to tribal prosecutions, but its impact in Indian country is rarely studied. Such an inquiry is overdue, particularly as the scope of crimes potentially subject to dual tribal and federal prosecutions has broadened in recent years. This Article is the first to undertake a preliminary examination of the dual-sovereignty doctrine in the tribal–federal context and describe the complex interplay between the doctrine and the rest of the criminal law fabric in Indian country. Perhaps most significantly, it includes an original typology highlighting when a defendant may be subject to the doctrine, which sovereigns have the authority to prosecute, pursuant to what source of power each sovereign operates, and when and how the sequence of prosecutions matters, if at all. This leads to the Article’s central thesis: Indian tribes are separate sovereigns with inherent sovereignty, and, under current conditions, the dual-sovereignty doctrine plays a central role in ensuring safety in Indian country. The doctrine’s application in Indian country, however, creates unique complexities that may threaten tribal sovereignty and raise issues of unfairness for defendants. This Article offers numerous reforms—some highly ambitious and others more modest—to address these issues.

122 Colum. L. Rev. 1899 (2022).

By Hayli Millar, Megan Capp, Raelyn O’Hara

Bail law reform has become a highly politicized issue in Canada, reflecting polarizing demands to both lessen and increase restrictions in granting bail. While some scholarly literature assesses and critiques bail and remand law and processes, there is exceptionally limited gender-disaggregated data and research on adult women’s bail and remand experiences.1 When assessing women’s interactions with the criminal justice system (CJS), most scholarly research and government publications speak about women’s unique offence patterns and gendered pathways to criminalization and then jump to assessing women’s imprisonment experiences, largely excluding any consideration of women’s pre-trial and trial experiences. In 2023-2024, we gathered and assessed the available literature on women and bail and women and remand in Canada. We engaged with primary data in the form of government-published statistics, select case law and secondary research, reviewing more than 250 sources including some comparative international research. With this literature review, we present our key findings. The annotated bibliography below captures some of what we know about women’s bail and remand experiences within the Canadian context. Our contribution builds on the work we have previously done through the International Center for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR) on the rights of criminal justice-involved parents, especially women and their children. In brief, the 31 annotations focus attention on the urgent need for primary research on how seemingly neutral bail laws and practices uniquely impact women, especially due to intersecting identities such as race, parenthood, and other social factors. Our contribution is crucial and timely. In Canada, the national remand rate for women now surpasses that of men, with women making up over 75% of provincial and territorial custody admissions in 2022/2023. Our literature review and the annotations illustrate the importance of not only addressing the social determinants of women’s criminal justice involvement but also investing in more effective community-based alternatives for women, with a focus on mental health and substance use services. This is of particular importance when one considers the mainly non-violent offences that women commit and that many justiceinvolved women have complex, overlapping, and unmet social, economic, parenting, and physical and mental health needs, which are often compounded by trauma.

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy , 2025. 59p.

By Roseanna Sommers and Kate Weisburd

Fifth Amendment case law (including Miranda v. Arizona) requires that individuals assert their right to counsel or silence using "explicit," "clear," and "unambiguous" statements - or, as some dissenting judges have lamented, using "legally magic" words. Through a survey of 1,718 members of the U.S. public, we investigate what ordinary people believe it takes to assert the right to counsel and the right to silence. We then compare their perceptions against prevailing legal standards governing invocation.

With respect to the right to counsel, the survey results indicate that members of the public have a uniformly lower threshold for invocation than do courts. Statements that courts have deemed too ambiguous (e.g., "I'll be honest with you, I'm scared to say anything without talking to a lawyer.") are perceived by a large majority of survey respondents as invoking the right to counsel. With respect to the right to silence, the survey results suggest that people overwhelmingly believe that remaining silent for several hours constitutes invocation of the right to silence and expect that their silence cannot be used against them - including in situations where, in fact, it can be. Across an array of fact patterns and demographic subgroups, respondents consistently set the bar for invoking Fifth Amendment rights lower than courts.

The stark disconnect between what the public takes as sufficient to invoke these rights and what courts hold as sufficient suggests that the rights to counsel and silence are largely inaccessible to ordinary people. Notably, standard Miranda warnings do not include instructions regarding how one must speak in order to invoke those rights. We conclude that when courts set the threshold for invocation above where the average citizen believes it to be, they effectively place key procedural rights out of reach.

119 Northwestern University Law Review 637 (2024), 52p.

By Adam M. Gershowitz  

Prosecutors are often seen as the villains of the criminal justice system. And the most villainous thing a prosecutor can do is to commit an intentional Brady violation by withholding favorable and material evidence from the defense. Not surprisingly, there is a wide literature criticizing prosecutors for flagrant misconduct. But not all Brady violations are intentional. Prosecutors sometimes—perhaps often—commit accidental Brady violations by inadvertently failing to recognize favorable evidence. Because many prosecutors are inexperienced, overworked, and under-trained, they do not recognize exculpatory or impeachment evidence when it is in their files. Additionally, prosecutors also fail to disclose evidence that is in the hands of police, sheriffs, crime laboratories, and other government agencies. Because the criminal justice “system” is riddled with communication breakdowns, prosecutors are sometimes unaware of Brady evidence that they were obligated to disclose. The breadth of the Brady doctrine and the dysfunction of the criminal justice system do not make Brady violations acceptable or harmless. To the contrary, Brady errors are serious violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights. To reduce future violations, however, we cannot simply condemn prosecutors for intentional misconduct. Instead, it is important to understand why accidental Brady violations occur. Drawing on nearly two-dozen recent cases, this article builds a typology of situations where accidental Brady violations occur, and it sets forth solutions for reducing accidental violations in the future.   

  12 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 533 (2025)., 59p.

By Anna Skeels

This report is the first part of a two-part series based on research conducted by Dr Alicia Heys, a Senior Lecturer in Modern Slavery at the Wilberforce Institute at the University of Hull and – on behalf of it – a Co-Investigator of the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre (PEC) at the University of Oxford, as part of the research strand focused on the effectiveness of legal enforcement measures. The first part focuses on barriers to successful modern slavery prosecutions, whilst the second part focuses on financial investigations as a method of pursuing modern slavery offenders. Both reports, when published, will be available on the PEC website at modernslaverypec.org/resources/prosecutions-modern-slavery-act.  The Modern Slavery Act (MSA) 2015 was introduced to strengthen the UK’s response to human trafficking and modern slavery, providing comprehensive tools to identify offenders, secure convictions, and protect victims.1 However, while the number of victims identified and referred to the National Referral Mechanism2 has continued to increase, prosecution and conviction rates under the Act remain notably low, raising questions about barriers to its implementation. This report examines some of these barriers, drawing on insights from practitioners directly involved in modern slavery cases, as well as academic and grey literature on the subject. The original research informing this report aimed to explore how financial investigations could improve prosecution and conviction rates under the Modern Slavery Act. Fifteen in-depth interviews were conducted with specialists including seven police officers based in English forces, three lawyers, three financial experts, one international cyber-crime expert, and one NGO representative with lived experience of modern slavery. All interviews were anonymised, transcribed, and analysed thematically. Given the breadth and depth of the data collected, the key findings are presented in a two-part series. The first part, summarised in this report, focuses on identifying and analysing key barriers to successful prosecutions and convictions under the Modern Slavery Act. By integrating practitioner perspectives with academic and grey literature, this report aims to inform efforts to strengthen the enforcement of modern slavery legislation in the UK.3 The second part will build on the same interview data, but with a specific focus on financial investigations as a method of pursuing modern slavery offenders.4 

Oxford, UK: Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre (PEC) at the University of Oxford , 2025. 41p.

By Corwin,Edward S

L^he history of American liberty is far more complicated than most people would at first blush have imagined. Indeed, until Professor Corwin, out of a lifetime of study devoted to American public law, distilled into a volume of modest compass the essential ingredients of American liberty, there was, to my knowledge, no one book to which the citizen might turn to learn its fascinating story. The story starts, as do so many of the great things of life, with the Greeks and the Romans. The wisdom of the political philosophers, ancient and modem, in their search for the foundations of human liberty is presented in its relation to the crucial events of English and American political experience, particularly such great documents as Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the federal Constitution and our State constitutions.

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1948, 222p.

Barnbay C. Keeney

This monograph originated as a dissertation prepared under the patient and understanding direction of Professor Charles H. McIlwain at Harvard University. Although I had (and still have) the temerity to challenge his views on judgment by peers and institutions connected with it, the influence of his teaching and scholarship are apparent throughout.

For the fellowships that made my studies possible, I am deeply grateful to the Department of History at Harvard University, and to the donors of the funds for those fellowships. Unfortunately, the Sheldon Traveling Fellowship that was to have enabled me to search for unpublished documents was of little use for this purpose because of the outbreak of the European war in 1939, and I have had to depend almost entirely on published material. After the war, a John Simon Guggenheim Post-Service Fellowship enabled me to complete and revise this work in 1945-46.

Had the great work of Marc Bloch (La Societe jeodale, 2 vols., Paris, 1939-1940), as well as the studies of Sanchez-Albornoz (En torno a los origenes del jeudalismo, Mendoza, 1942) been available when I was preparing the first section, I should have been spared much labor.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, HARVARD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS, 1952, 198p.

By MAHESH K. NALLA, DAE H. CHANG, LISA SUTTER, and WAYNE W. DUNNING

In 2001, the Universidade Catolica Portuguesa3 published a report regard- ing victimization in the city of Lisbon. The survey was requested by the mayoral office as a means to examine crime rates in the city. Previous research had depended entirely on official police reports4, and it was felt that these failed to adequately measure victimization in the city. In a study of 3,505 residents, the victimization rate was relatively low; approximately 17% of the respondents had been victimized during 2001. Comparatively, the fear of crime was higher. Respondents were asked about how safe they felt in Lisbon and in their neighborhoods. More than 60% of respondents reported feeling unsafe to very unsafe in the city, and over one third of the respondents report- ed feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods. With such a low rate of victimiza- tion, what contributed to these feelings regarding respondents' safety? In their multi-level theory of victimization, Wilcox et al. (2003) posit that contextual factors, and more specifically measures of social disorganization in addition to victimization, influence an individual's fear of crime.

However, given the low victimization rate in Lisbon, where there is little racial heterogeneity° , it is arguable that conditions of social disorganization as stipulated by Shaw and MacKay (1942), Sampson and Groves (1989), and more recently Sampson et al. (1997) exist in Lisbon. Therefore, a different perspective needs to be adopt- ed to explain the observed relationship between victimization and fear of crime.

Official Journal for the American Society of Criminology, Division of International Criminology, Volume 30, Number 1, Spring 2006, 143p.

By HM Prison and Probation Service and Ministry of Justice (UK)

Why should the Criminal Justice System be concerned with the mental health of those passing through the system? We know that rates of mental ill-health are high among those who pass through the CJS. Around a third of people11 who find themselves in police custody have some form of mental health difficulty, as do 48 per cent of men and 70 percent of women in prison. Some 38 per cent: of people on probation supervision are recorded as having a mental health issue. But why does this matter? First, because people with a mental illness need and deserve treatment. Entry into the CJS can provide a second chance for people who have been missed by other services to access that treatment and an incentive for them to take up that offer. Second, because mental illness and the symptoms associated with it can trigger criminal behaviour and therefore bring a person into contact with the CJS. Decisions then need to be made on whether a criminal charge is in the public interest or whether an alternative disposal (such as diversion into mental health treatment) would be more appropriate. Third, mental illness, particularly the more severe forms, can affect an individual’s ability to understand and participate in the criminal justice process. They may need additional support to understand the questions put to them during an investigation or at trial or they may lack the mental capacity to plead or stand trial. Fourth, the criminal justice process itself, for example the experience of custody, can have a severe and negative impact on someone’s mental health, particularly if they are already suffering a mental illness. In these circumstances, there is a duty of care to try to mitigate these wherever possible. This includes a duty to reduce the risks of suicide and self-harm, which we know to be high in criminal justice populations. For all these reasons, it is essential that those with a mental health condition or disorder are identified as early as possible in their journey through the CJS, particularly where that problem is severe. Once the mental health issue is identified, information relevant to that issue must be shared between agencies so that appropriate support and treatment can be offered, and the right decisions made at each step of the journey from arrest to sentence and post-sentence supervision in custody or in the community. This inspection, the first on this topic to involve all of the criminal justice inspectorates, and to consider post-sentence supervision, as well as the period leading up to trial, focuses on these critical issues: • Are people with a mental illness identified when they first come into the CJS? • Is this information passed on through the rest of the system from the police and defence lawyers to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the courts or from the courts to the probation and prison services so that the right decisions can be made about next steps? • Are people with a mental illness entering the CJS being properly assessed and then referred for help or treatment where this is identified as necessary? • What is the quality of support they are getting? Is it timely and adequately resourced or are people having to wait many months to get it? • Are the most seriously mentally ill people being looked after in appropriate settings and places of safety, or is custody still having to be used?

Manchester, UK: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation November 2021 117p.

By Matthew DeMichele,  Ian Silver,  Ryan Labrecque

This study provides a rigorous assessment of the public safety outcomes of pretrial detention by estimating the criminogenic and punitive effects of spending at least one week in pretrial detention across three jail systems in two states. Jails are a unique criminal justice contact point because they hold individuals at different stages of case processing, including individuals awaiting trial, and those serving shorter sentences or waiting to be transferred to prison. Pretrial incarceration is arguably one of the most consequential decisions in case processing for an individual. A small body of research has emerged to show that pretrial detention is both criminogenic (i.e., leads to higher arrest rates) and punitive (i.e., leads to higher conviction rates). In this paper, we use a doubly robust difference-in-differences design to assess the relationship between pretrial detention with court appearances, new arrests prior to adjudication, and convictions for the instant offense. The findings of this research study provide strong evidence that pretrial detention leads to increased likelihood that individuals will miss court and be arrested for new crimes

Unpublished paper, 2023, 57p.

By Washington Office of Latin America. United States of America

Venezuela is the only country in Latin America with an open investigation before the International Criminal Court (ICC). The case has been the object of disinformation on behalf of Venezuelan authorities and the language surrounding the ICC can at times be confusing for those who are unfamiliar with international law. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) believes that it is important to bring this process closer to the international community, to decision-makers in Washington D.C., to Venezuelans, and to those who follow what is happening in Venezuela. That is why, through a series of questions and answers written in plain English, we are bringing you an easy-to-understand publication on the ICC investigation on Venezuela.

The following sections describe what the International Criminal Court (ICC) is and answers each of the following questions:

1. What is the International Criminal Court?

   Why did the ICC initiate an investigation on Venezuela and what is the current status of the process?

   What decision did the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court adopt on May 4, 2023?

   The Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement about the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of May 4, 2023. Why is that statement false?

   Why did the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber authorize the Prosecutor to resume his investigation on Venezuela?

   What is actually happening then?

   What does the recent visit of ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan to Venezuela and the ICC’s decision to open an office there mean?

   What are the victims and human rights organizations working on these cases doing?

Washington Office of Latin America. United States of America 2023. 15p.

By Saba Kassa

Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. This report discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery. It also provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically with the goal of developing adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts. The Assessment and Monitoring Framework presented here is a state-of-the-art methodology to think and work politically to strengthen rule of law systems. It draws on the experience and insights of ICAR staff working with anti-corruption institutions across the globe. It responds to a gap in the existing toolbox of anti-corruption practitioners, given that existing political economy methodologies have not sufficiently focused on the contextual factors that impinge on the performance effectiveness of the different anti-corruption institutions constituting the justice chain.

Working Paper 52,

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance, 2024. 24p.