By Jamie MacColl, Pia Hüsch, Gareth Mott, James Sullivan, Jason R C Nurse, Sarah Turner and Nandita Pattnaik  

   Ransomware incidents remain a scourge on UK society. Based on interviews with victims and incident responders, this paper outlines the harm ransomware causes to organisations, individuals, the UK economy, national security and wider society. • The research reveals a wide range of harms caused by ransomware, including physical, financial, reputational, psychological and social harms. • We set out a framework of: ◦ First-order harms: Harms to any organisation and their staff directly targeted by a ransomware operation. ◦ Second-order harms: Harms to any organisation or individuals that are indirectly affected by a ransomware incident. ◦ Third-order harms: The cumulative effect of ransomware incidents on wider society, the economy and national security. • Building on an existing taxonomy of cyber harms,1 this framework will enable policymakers, practitioners and researchers to categorise more case studies on ransomware incidents and to better explain new and existing types of harm to the UK and other countries. • Ransomware is a risk for organisations of all sizes. The findings from this paper highlight that ransomware can create significant financial costs and losses for organisations, which in some cases can threaten their very existence. Ransomware can also create reputational harm for businesses that rely on continuous operations or hold very sensitive data – although customers and the general public can be more forgiving than some victims believe. • The harms from ransomware go beyond financial and reputational costs for organisations. Interviews with victims and incident responders revealed that ransomware creates physical and psychological harms for individuals and groups, including members of staff, healthcare patients and schoolchildren. • Ransomware can ruin lives. Incidents highlighted in this paper have caused individuals to lose their jobs, evoked feelings of shame and self-blame, extended to private and family life, and contributed to serious health issues. • The harm and cumulative effects caused by ransomware attacks have implications for wider society and national security, including supply chain disruption, a loss of trust in law enforcement, reduced faith in public services,

and the normalisation of cybercrime. Ransomware also creates a strategic advantage for the hostile states harbouring the cyber-criminals who conduct such operations. • Downstream harm to individuals from ransomware is more severe when attacks encrypt IT infrastructure, rather than steal and leak data. There is no evidence from this research that the ransomware ecosystem is exploiting stolen or leaked personal data in a systemic way for fraud or other financially motivated cybercrimes. At present, exploiting stolen data for other activities is less profitable than extortion-based crime that takes away victims’ access to their systems and data. This finding may inform victim decision-making on when they should and should not consider paying a ransom demand. • The next paper from this project will outline what kinds of measures can reduce or mitigate many of the harms described in this paper    

  London: The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2024. 71p.   

A Storytelling Legal and Empirical Analysis of Human Trafficking Risks in Home Office Hotels Compared to Other Accommodation for Unaccompanied Children and Young People Seeking Asylum in the UK

By Sonja Ayeb-Karlsson, Tyler Valiquette,  Ella Cockbain and Laura Durán

 A recent and controversial practice development is the use of Home Office commissioned hotels to house unaccompanied children claiming asylum in the UK. From July 2021 to January 2024, seven Home Office hotels were established and finally decommissioned after the High Court in 2023 deemed their regular operation (rather than acting as ‘emergency’ accommodation) unlawful. There were concerning indications that the establishment of Home Office hotels for unaccompanied children may exacerbate risks of trafficking and various forms of exploitation. This was strengthened by media reporting over 440 missing episodes (some as young as 12 years old) among the 5,400 unaccompanied children housed from July 2021 to June 2023. It is from this background that our study explored the lived experiences and perceptions surrounding the trafficking and exploitation risks among unaccompanied children placed in Home Office hotels while seeking asylum in the UK. The legal and empirical storytelling research provides a comparative analysis of risk and protective factors for children seeking asylum between Home Office hotels and local authority care settings. The research findings guide us toward what measures can be taken to prevent trafficking and exploitation, how we can mitigate trafficking and exploitation risks associated with these children’s accommodation environments, and how to improve early intervention for unaccompanied children seeking asylum in the UK   Key Findings 1. The empirical storytelling interviews and legal analysis showed that the use of Home Office hotel accommodation for unaccompanied children seeking asylum increased the risks of both trafficking and exploitation as well as re-trafficking risk for those children having been trafficked into the country. 2. The research findings link adultification and children being placed in adult accommodation for people seeking asylum, which remains a risk after the child hotels have closed. The empirical data revealed that children seeking asylum were not only placed in and trafficked from the children’s hotels, but an increasing number of children were reportedly incorrectly deemed as adults by the Home Office and thereby face similar and other associated risks (such as trauma, abuse, and exploitation by other adults) in adult hotels. 3. The research raised particular concerns about young unaccompanied Albanian people and trafficking. Our legal and empirical analysis drawing from professional experiences repeatedly indicated that Albanian children accommodated, and in particular Albanian boys, are especially vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation, as well as experiencing an increasingly precarious situation because of the relabelling of Albania as a ‘safe country’ for removal and Albanian boys as ‘criminals’ and ‘scapegoats’ in media as in the political discourse.

London: Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre , 2024. 62p.

By Adrian Usher, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO)

This learning lessons bulletin summarises the learning from Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) investigations into the deaths of those who died within 14 days of release from prison. Prison leavers often have multiple and chronic co-morbidities or risk factors, including substance misuse and mental health issues. This can present difficulties with release planning, especially when combined with external factors, such as a lack of available accommodation. Homelessness on release was a considerable issue in our investigations and has a detrimental impact on the individuals involved. Based on our period of research and reporting 32% of the prisoners who died within two weeks of release were homeless. When viewed in the context of other MOJ research, it seems that prisoners who are released homeless may be overrepresented in our post release death investigations. While we are seeing positive changes to policy and examples of positive practice, analysis of our investigations also found that of those who died within 14 days, just over 50% died within the first four days of being released. This stark finding demonstrates how acutely vulnerable prison leavers are, especially in those first few days after release. There is a desperate need for more joined-up and partnership working between HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and community services. More needs to be done to ensure that prisoners are released with suitable accommodation and that support measures (such as substance misuse or mental health services) are in place and readily available on release.

By Andrew Gilligan

   Westminster is the physical heart of the British state, a centre of the Christian faith, and the symbol of Britain to the world. Nowhere else in Europe, with the possible exception of the Eiffel Tower, is more famous, or more emblematic of its nation. Nowhere else combines those supreme symbolic qualities with being the place where actual power resides and the highest work of government is done. Yet what should be a showpiece has declined into a degree of squalor and disorder. Windows of the great public buildings, broken by protestors, are splintered or patched with duct tape. Anarchist and anti-police graffiti is painted on those buildings’ walls; some of it has been there for more than two years. Urine trickles from the corners. Protestors have privatised the pavement, illegally and for hours blasting out amplified music that hinders the often critical work being done in the offices along Whitehall. Skateboarders use the steps of the parliamentary building, Portcullis House, as a regular practice area. The experience for visitors is dispiriting and may include being cheated by con-men on Westminster Bridge. Crowds of people press round the entrances to Parliament, banging on the sides of MPs’ cars as they drive in. Parliament Square is a three and four-lane traffic roundabout. MPs are verbally abused, occasionally chased. Some parliamentarians say they feel physically afraid to leave the building. People coming to see their MPs, or keep appointments in government buildings, can’t always get in. “Broken windows” theory says that visible signs of vandalism, anti social behaviour and neglect encourage further crime and disorder. It appears to hold true amid the literally broken windows of Westminster. Between 2013/14 and 2021/22, this study finds, violent crime in the quarter-mile immediately around Parliament has risen by 168 per cent, against a 47 per cent rise in the borough of Westminster as a whole and a 67 per cent rise in London. Public order offences have risen by 252 per cent - three and a half times - versus 75 per cent in the borough as a whole and 93 per cent in London.1 Offences, particularly of violence, have fallen recently, but remain at very high levels. Even without becoming a victim of any of these crimes, someone taking the ten-minute walk from, say, Waterloo Station to Parliament could easily pass as many as half a dozen breaches of the law, from the illegal vendors and confidence tricksters on the bridge, to the pedicabs blocking the traffic, to the bellowing loudspeakers of the protestors, to the people camping in the shop doorways. None individually is serious, but  they have an important cumulative effect. The area is a mess because its governance is a mess. Control of the public spaces around Parliament is split between eight different bodies, often with different policies. Parliament Square alone is controlled by three different official agencies. The government publishes a map to show you which bits are whose, and where certain restrictions apply.2 Symbolising the muddle, key details on it are wrong, so no wonder the policing of the area is a little confused. But the area is also a mess because of a lack of confidence and consistency by those in charge. There is of course no right to urinate in the street, or cheat tourists, or vandalise, but the authorities often seem unwilling to challenge such practices. The law is often ignored around the very building where the laws are made. There is a right to protest - or rather, there are rights to freedom of speech and assembly, including around Parliament, which this paper supports. But there is an important, if not always recognised, distinction between protest that happens to cause disruption to others (for instance, because many people have gathered in the same place) and protest that aims to cause disruption to others as a principal objective (for instance, by a handful of people blocking a road, or using amplification to make it difficult or impossible to work nearby.) The disruption caused by demonstrations of thousands is part of the price of democracy. But we question the way in which much smaller numbers of people are regularly, repeatedly and illegally allowed to cause disproportionate disruption, sometimes risk, and sometimes fear to others. The right to protest has sometimes been privileged over other rights, such as the rights of others to move freely, to work, to speak, and even to be safe. The authorities should act more strongly against protest whose principal aim is to annoy, inconvenience or intimidate, rather than to convey a message. Yet if enforcement is inconsistent, another part of the problem is that decisions by the courts and Parliament have made consistent enforcement harder. Over the last two decades the law has vaccillated. The “controlled area” around Parliament - where, for instance, loudspeakers and structures are supposed to be banned - has been reduced, then enlarged, then cut to almost nothing, then gradually enlarged again. But it is still smaller than it was - it excludes, for example, the whole of Whitehall (Parliament Street, which joins Whitehall to Parliament Square, is included, however). The Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgement, which says that those obstructing the road should not be convicted if it was a disproportionate interference with their rights of protest, has made it more difficult for the police to act. Amendments currently in Parliament seek to deal with this issue. Many of these problems were raised in a report by Parliament’s own Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), more than three years ago, after high-profile mobbing incidents of MPs in the area.3 Some things have changed for the better. The protestor camps in the middle of Parliament Square went in 2013. In 2016, a new pedestrian crossing allowed the square to be reached, and reclaimed, by the public. More recently, there appears to be slightly more proactive policing in Westminster. But not enough has changed, as the crime figures show. The government took almost 18 months to respond to the JCHR report and much of its response is non-committal.4 There are plans to dramatically improve at least the physical environment, removing traffic from two sides of Parliament Square and making the Palace of Westminster safer from terrorist attack. But they have been drawn up almost in secret; and they are stalled because the various official bodies are quarrelling about who should pay for them. In all these ways, too, Westminster symbolises Britain.   

London: Policy Exchange, 2023. 37p.

By Nicole D. Porter, Alison Parker, Trey Walk, Jonathan Topaz, Jennifer Turner, Casey Smith, Makayla LaRonde-King, Sabrina Pearce and Julie Ebenstein 

  The United States is an outlier nation in that it strips voting rights from millions of citizens solely on the basis of a criminal conviction.2As of 2022, over 4.4 million people in the United States were disenfranchised due to a felony conviction. This is due in part to over 50 years of U.S. mass incarceration, wherein the U.S. incarcerated population increased from about 360,000 people in the early 1970s to nearly 2 million in 2022. While many U.S. states have scaled back their disenfranchisement provisions, a trend that has accelerated since 2017, the United States still lags behind most of the world in protecting the right to vote for people with criminal convictions. The right to vote is a cornerstone of democratic, representative government that reflects the will of the people. The international consensus on the importance of this right is demonstrated in part by the fact that it is protected in international human rights law. A majority of the world’s nations either do not deny people the right to vote due to criminal convictions or deny the right only in relatively narrow and rare circumstances.  

Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2024. 55p.

By Jacqueline M. Nowicki

  Why GAO Did This Study 

 The Departments of Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing certain federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination report for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review the role of policing in schools, including the effect on students of different races. This report addresses (1) what Education’s data show about the extent to which different student groups are arrested in K-12 schools and (2) whether police presence in schools is associated with student arrests. GAO analyzed two federal Education datasets for the two most recent school years before the pandemic (2015 2016 and 2017–2018) and 2019–2020. GAO also visited three school districts, selected for factors such as high rates of arrests; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and interviewed federal officials and representatives of national education and civil rights groups. What GAO Recommends GAO is making three recommendations that Education: (1) collect arrest and referral data, by race, for students with disabilities who receive services under Section 504; (2) disclose the limitations of its 2021 2022 arrest data; and (3) clearly inform school districts about future changes to arrest and referral data in its civil rights data collection. Education generally agreed with these recommendations.   

GAO-24-106294

Washington, DC:  United States Government Accountability Office, 2024. 67p.

By Thomas Costa

  Why GAO Did This Study Millions of Americans struggle with substance misuse. Some pursue treatment and recovery at over 3,660 residential facilities, according to 2020 HHS data. Some of these facilities may require residents to work. GAO was asked to review work practices at these facilities. This report examines (1) the prevalence of facility work and pay practices, (2) selected stakeholders’ views on the role of work in substance misuse treatment and recovery, and (3) the extent to which federal guidance and enforcement address work and pay at facilities. In March to June 2023 GAO surveyed a statistical sample of facilities and obtained generalizable responses from 96 licensed treatment facilities and 48 certified recovery residences. GAO visited facilities, some covertly, selected for geographic variation and other considerations; interviewed HHS and Department of Labor officials and selected stakeholders such as state substance misuse agency officials and researchers; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that HHS (1) develop a process to consult state substance misuse agencies about their guidance needs for incorporating work into treatment and recovery and (2) state in SUPTRS Block Grant documents if and when work requirements are acceptable as a condition of accessing services in residential treatment and recovery facilities. HHS agreed with GAO’s recommendations.   

Performance audit report

BY THE Queensland Auditor-General

This report focuses on serious repeat offenders and the work entities are doing to address crime by high-risk and serious repeat offenders and assessed whether youth justice strategies and programs are effective in reducing crime by serious repeat offenders and improving community safety. 

Youth crime is complex and has been a growing public concern in recent years. It can have significant impacts – physical, emotional, psychological, and economic – for victims and the wider community. Most young offenders only commit a small number of offences and are diverted away from the youth justice system. However, a small proportion reoffend and commit serious offences. As the underlying causes of youth crime are multi-faceted, effectively addressing the problem requires a whole-of-system approach.

Key findings

• System leadership has improved, but needs to be more effective

• Better system-wide analysis is required to inform investment

• Better system-wide analysis is required to inform investment

• Entities need to better implement their new youth justice strategy

• More can be done to monitor and rehabilitate serious repeat offenders

• The department needs to better manage a young offender’s transition from detention to the community

The report makes recommendations for the Departments of Premier and Cabinet, and Youth Justice, as well as the Queensland Police Service. 

  (Report 15: 2023–24)

Brisbane: Queensland Audit Office, 2024. 70p.

By The Regulatory Institute

Corruption remains one of the foremost challenges faced by countries worldwide. Its destructive effects impact societies, economies, and individuals globally, with developing nations bearing the brunt of this widespread issue. While many countries have implemented anti-corruption regulations, their effectiveness may be limited. To address this gap, the Regulatory Institute has developed this model law on corruption.

This model law serves as a comprehensive guide for regulatory practitioners in drafting and implementing robust anti-corruption measures tailored to their specific legal and cultural contexts.

The model law aims to provide a clear and comprehensive framework, outlining responsibilities, defining offences, and establishing stringent penalties for corrupt activities. It is divided into six chapters, each addressing a critical aspect of the fight against corruption.

Drawing on a wide range of solutions from anti-corruption laws around the world, the model law highlights the importance of robust investigation and enforcement mechanisms to deter and address corruption effectively.

The purpose of the Regulatory Institute’s model laws is to facilitate the tasks of regulatory practitioners, be they working for administrations or parliaments, to improve the quality of laws by triggering more conscious choices. These model laws should be used as a toolbox, a checklist or the basis for the development of an adapted law, and optimised as such. The model laws are not intended to be used exactly as they are drafted. They try to point to important decisions to be taken by regulatory practitioners without preempting respective choices. Therefore, they often present choices, be they alternatives or add-on modules, that can be kept or deleted.

In view of that specific task, the model laws of the Regulatory Institute offer so many possibilities for differentiation that no jurisdiction will use all of them. Consequently, once a decision has been taken regarding the possibilities for differentiation to be used, the law can and should be simplified.

Brussels: Regulatory Institute, 2024. 62p.

By Appleseed Mexico

The updated 2024 recommendations for Appleseed Mexico’s “Children at the Border” report focus on improving the treatment of Mexican Unaccompanied Children (UACs) at the U.S.-Mexico border. Key findings highlight deficiencies in current practices, such as inadequate training for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel, unsuitable facilities for holding children, and insufficient communication with Mexican authorities. Recommendations include transferring TVPRA screening responsibilities to USCIS, improving care and facilities, providing free legal representation, and enhancing data tracking and reporting. These changes aim to align U.S. practices with child protection principles and ensure better outcomes for UACs.

Washington DC: Appleseed,  2024. 123p.

By Melanie Baak, Joel Windle, Emily Miller

The University of South Australia (UniSA) and Australian Refugee Association (ARA) entered into an agreement for UniSA researchers to conduct an evaluation of the Youth Connect program. The evaluation sought to explore the processes and impacts of the Youth Connect program in relation to social participation, economic independence, personal wellbeing and at-risk or anti-social behaviour. Formal data collection for the evaluation took place from mid-2023 to early 2024. Evaluation of the project focused on consideration of the effectiveness and impact of the project and whether expectations and program outcomes were met. The research used qualitative and quantitative approaches with youth participants from the Youth Connect program and qualitative approaches with participating school staff and ARA staff members.

To understand the views and experiences of youth participants, the research team undertook four focus groups with youth participants in the program. Three focus groups were conducted at ARA venues and one at a school. In total, 44 young people participated in evaluation focus groups. In addition, to capture the breadth of experiences of young people who had participated across the full range of Youth Connect programs, researchers undertook an online survey using Qualtrics software.

The Youth Connect program offered support for young people facing a series of interconnected challenges. Young people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds often experience difficulty in engaging with the wider community and building connections.

The program initially aimed to engage young people aged 15-25 years from African, Afghan and Syrian backgrounds, with young people aged from 12-25 ultimately engaging in the program. Other young people from CALD refugee and migrant backgrounds were also included throughout program activities.

Adelaide: University of South Australia 2024.

Proposing the domestic violence threat assessment centre

By Timothy Cubitt, Anthony Morgan, Christopher Dowling, Samantha Bricknell and Rick Brown

    Intimate partner homicide (IPH) is one of the most common forms of homicide in Australia. Despite rates falling over time, it remains the most common homicide threat for Australian women, who are the victims of three quarters of all IPH incidents. Recent research has viewed some IPH perpetrators as being motivated by fixation and grievances. These fixated perpetrators hold an intense preoccupation with an individual, which may be driven by a grievance, during the acute phases of risk. In this paper we propose a trial of the Domestic Violence Threat Assessment Centre (DVTAC). Modelled on the Fixated Threat Assessment Centres, the DVTAC could offer a multi-agency approach to information gathering, monitoring and intervention among high-risk domestic violence offenders during periods of acute risk

Research in practice no. 48.

 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 14p.

By HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

 Close supervision centres (CSCs) are small, specialist units located within six of the high security prisons. With capacity for 66 adult men, 44 were being held in the centres at the time of this thematic inspection. An additional nine were being held in ‘designated cells,’ located in some segregation units within the long-term and high security estate (LTHSE). They were located there following their removal from association due to their active and presenting risks in a CSC, or following their transfer to another prison to attend court or access visits with their family and friends. Most men selected for a CSC were serving indeterminate sentences, many were category A, and the selection criteria, which in our view were applied proportionately and based on evidence, indicated very clearly that all had committed serious, often repeated, acts of violence against others while in prison. As such, the CSC system is effectively the deepest form of custody that exists in the country, managing some of the most dangerous men in the system. During this inspection we adopted a slightly different approach, which, although informed by our healthy prison structure, applied tests that better reflected the priorities and processes of the CSC system: management of the centres, progression, safety, and respect. We judged outcomes to be good, our highest assessment, in three tests and reasonably good in the test of progression. These assessments reflect the success and effectiveness of the CSC system, as well as some improvement to the safety of the units since we last conducted an inspection in 2017. In general, we found that units were remarkably stable with infrequent incidents of violence, no self-inflicted deaths and low levels of self-harm. The quality of relationships between staff and prisoners were good, with staff evidencing commendable resilience in their dealings with prisoners. Most units were clean and well equipped, except for the Wakefield unit which needed investment and development. Daily routines were applied reliably but the amount of time men were able to spend out of their cells varied. There was not enough to do on the units and a lack of work and education was unhelpful given this was a target in some progression plans. There were also variations in practice between the units, including prisoner access to services and privileges, that were not explained or justified logically. The quality of multidisciplinary working, and the individualised support and planning offered to each man was, however, impressive. Progress, no matter how small, was acknowledged and those selected for the units were given every opportunity to address their risks and move on from the CSC, including into other types of dedicated intervention in the prison system or to the health sector. The quality of leadership, at both national and local level, was coherent and effective. Leaders and staff knew what they were doing and should be congratulated on their achievements.

London:  HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2024. 43p.

By Counter Extremism Project

The Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska motståndsrörelsen, or NRM) is a transnational, neo-Nazi organization with official chapters operating in Sweden, Finland, and Norway. The NRM also draws support from neo-Nazis in Denmark and has some registered members in Iceland, though the group has failed to establish formal branches in those countries. NRM-Sweden has grown more than one-third in size since 2015. Formed by neo-Nazi nationalists in Sweden in 1997, the NRM seeks to merge all Nordic countries into a single, nationalist-socialist state, either by elections or through revolution. The group is openly racist, anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, and pro-Hitler—and has carried out violence targeting gay people, ideological opponents and, more recently, Muslim refugees. Since the start of 2015, NRM’s branch in Sweden (NRM-Sweden) has grown more than one-third in size by advocating against Sweden’s open-door policy to Muslim asylum seekers. That chapter registered as a political party in July 2015, and and held its largest rally in September 2017—convening more than 600 demonstrators in the streets of Gothenburg. Many of the NRM’s co-founders and early members came from the now-defunct White Aryan Resistance (Vitt Ariskt Motstand, or VAM) and its offshoot National Youth (Nationell Ungdom). The VAM, a network of Swedish neo-Nazis formed in the early 1990s, was notorious for carrying out attacks against immigrants and gay people and for funding its violence through bank robberies. The group splintered into several white-power groups in or around 1995, among them National Youth, which would go on to serve as the NRM’s youth movement.  

NRM [has] carried out attacks targeting gay people, Muslims asylum seekers, and [others]... using smoking flares, pepper spray, tear gas, knives, and guns. At its founding in 1997, the NRM was known as the Swedish Resistance Movement (Svenska motståndsrörelsen)—though the group expanded from a Swedish-centered group to one spanning the Nordic region and adopted the name NRM after establishing Finnish and Norwegian chapters in 2008 and 2011, respectively. Media outlets and government officials, however, at times refer to NRM-Sweden as the Swedish Resistance Movement; NRM-Norway as the Norwegian Resistance Movement; and NRM-Finland as the Finnish Resistance Movement.5 The group itself identifies as the “Nordic Resistance Movement,” and may refer to its various chapters as the “Swedish branch of the Nordic Resistance Movement,” for example. NRM members have been responsible for the murder of at least three individuals—two in Sweden and one in Finland. Future NRM-Sweden co-founder Klas Lund was convicted in 1986 of killing anti-racist campaigner Ronny Landin who, according to authorities, had intervened to stop an assault on three immigrants by Lund and other neo-Nazis. In 1999, three men connected to National Youth, NRM-Sweden’s youth movement, shot to death trade unionist Björn Söderberg outside of his Stockholm apartment. According to reports, the shooting was revenge for a tip Söderberg had given a local newspaper regarding the identity of one of the NRM members. More recently, in December 2016, key NRM-Finland member Jesse Torniainen was handed a two-year prison sentence for aggravated assault in connection to the murder of 28-year-old Finnish man Jimi Joonas Karttonen. According to reports, Torniainen and others had violently beaten Karttonen that September after the latter openly expressed disapproval of the group during one of its rallies. Karttonen died one week later from his wounds. In November 2017, a Finnish district court banned the NRM and its affiliated chapters. An appeals court upheld the decision in September 2018, but the NRM has since sought permission to appeal its case to the Supreme Court and remains legal in Finland until all options for appeal are exhausted. A decision is expected for fall 2019. 

Sweden: Counter Extremism Project, 2024. 20p.

By Noemi Magugliani | John Trajer | Jean-Pierre Gauci

, 

In light of these developments, the report addresses the following research questions: - - What has been the impact of the operationalised NABA measures on the identification and wellbeing of people with lived experience of modern slavery, and are these impacts in line with the stated objectives of the legislation? What has been the impact of the operationalised NABA measures on the modern slavery sector more broadly? Given the timing of this report, the analysis is restricted to the impacts of Part 5 of NABA in the year following its implementation (covering the period from the first quarter of 2023, when      most of the key provision entered into force, up to the fourth quarter of 2023).1 It is hoped that this analysis will inform any future research on the impacts of this Act, as well as the impacts of other legislation adopted in this area (in particular, the Illegal Migration Act 2023).

London: British Institute of International & Comparative Law, the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group and the Human Trafficking Foundation, 2024. 74p.

World Health Organization;

The Global status report on alcohol and health and treatment of substance use disorders presents a comprehensive overview of alcohol consumption, alcohol-related harm and policy responses as well as treatment capacities for alcohol and drug use disorders worldwide. The report is based on data collected by WHO from Member States and organized in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals health target 3.5 which calls on countries to strengthen “the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol”. The chapter on alcohol and health continues the series of WHO global status reports on alcohol and health and presents the latest available data on the status of, and trends in, alcohol consumption, as well as estimates of the alcohol-attributable disease burden and descriptions of policy responses worldwide. On the basis of data collected from countries on the treatment of substance use disorders the report describes the status of key components of treatment responses to alcohol and drug use disorders and proposes a new service capacity index for these disorders as an additional contextual indicator for monitoring progress in this domain of SDG health target 3.5. The report concludes with broad directions for international action to accelerate progress towards achievement of SDG health target 3.5. 

World Health Organization, 2024. 335p.

By William Foote Whyte

Research Background: The study was supported by various fellowships and guided by experts from Harvard and the University of Chicago.

Cornerville's Social Structure: The district is highly organized withdistinct social groups, despite being perceived as chaotic by outsiders.

Methodology: The author used participant observation, immersing himself in the community to understand its dynamics.

Community Impact: The research aimed to help Cornerville, with significant contributions from local residents and key informants.

University of Chicago Press, 2012, 364 pages

By Lloyd W. Klemke

Sociological Perspective: The book delves into the sociological aspectsof shoplifting, exploring its occurrence, techniques, and the profiles ofshoplifters.

Research and Theories: It examines various research studies andtheoretical frameworks related to shoplifting, including typologies andbehavioral theories.

Security and Prevention: The text discusses methods for detecting,apprehending, and preventing shoplifting, as well asthe role of storesecurity personnel

Legal and Social Responses: It addresses the legal system's response to shoplifting and the societal implications of this deviant behavior.

The document provides a comprehensive analysis of shoplifting from multiple angles within the field of criminology and sociology

Bloomsbury Academic, 1992, 159 pages

By Luis J. Rodriguez

Author's Background: Luis J. Rodriguez shares his personal experiencesgrowing up in gang-infested neighborhoods in Los Angeles andChicago, highlighting the challenges and violence he faced.

Gang Life: The book delves into the structure and culture of gangs,including the initiation rituals, the sense of belonging, and the violentconflicts between rival groups.

Family Struggles: Rodriguez discusses the impact of gang life on hisfamily, particularly his efforts to prevent his son from following the samepath.

Redemption and Change: The narrative emphasizes the author'sjourney towards self-improvement and his attempts to break free fromthe cycle of violence through education and activism.

Simon and Schuster, 2005, 260 pages

 By Maya Szilak

The rise in homicide rates that began in 2020 continues to be a major source of public concern. Law enforcement agencies need effective strategies to deal with this issue without unduly burdening taxpayers or asking more of already cash-strapped state and local governments. Issuing citations to non-violent offenders who commit low-level crimes and present low flight risk is one method by which law enforcement agencies can address increased homicides. For instance, officers may summon offenders to appear in court at a later date and release them at the scene, in lieu of placing them under custodial arrest or jailing offenders. The use of citations in lieu of arrest enhances law enforcement capacity to address violent crime by reducing time and energy spent on low-level arrests. Reducing low-level arrests through citations can also lessen risk of harm to officers and citizens in street encounters, improve community relations and reduce overall recidivism. While the use of citations in lieu of arrest presents potential drawbacks, largely centered around increased rates of failure to appear and net widening effects, negative impacts can be minimized through data collection by law enforcement agencies to identify problems in citation programs and facilitate the development of practices to address these issues.

Policy Study No 251

Washington, DC: R Street, 2022. 8p.