By Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Henry Ziemer, and Azucena Duarte

Although only 8 percent of the world lives in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the region accounts for a third of all homicides worldwide. LAC cities consistently top international rankings as some of the most violent locales outside of active conflict zones. Behind this insecurity are powerful and deeply entrenched transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) trafficking drugs and other illegal commodities, who in turn rely on a seemingly endless flow of illicit firearms to carry out their campaigns of violence and intimidation on the Western Hemisphere’s inhabitants. Arms trafficking goes well beyond a law enforcement challenge; the proliferation of semi- and fully automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and various high-caliber weapons are increasingly used by TCOs to hold at risk the very sovereignty of LAC governments. Stories from Mexico, Haiti, Ecuador, and beyond all underscore how the scourge of illicit weapons, and the groups who wield them, can plunge communities, and even whole countries, into violence.

Leveraging new data sources, this report examines the prevalence and patterns of arms trafficking within and between each of the four subregions. Recognizing the nature of the threat arms trafficking presents to the Western Hemisphere at large, the report seeks to define the contours of a new strategy to combat illegal guns, concluding with recommendations for the United States, Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean to pursue.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2024.

By Rachel Rein

This Note explores human trafficking in the United States through Disability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit). First, the Note offers background on trafficking and applicable federal law. The Note shows that not only does trafficking disable people, but that people with preexisting disabilities are especially at risk for trafficking. Next, the Note indicates that trafficking law follows a Law-and-Order framework that retraumatizes marginalized survivors. Then, the Note introduces DisCrit and justifies its use for anti-trafficking advocacy. Finally, the Note applies DisCrit. By looking at trafficking law through DisCrit, it becomes clear that trafficking law must work with—not against—survivors to end human suffering.

42 Colum. J. Gender & L. 183 (2022).

By Michele Ubaldi Matteo Picchio 

We study the effect of mass shooting exposure on individuals’ mental health by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-randomness of mass shootings in a staggered difference-in-differences design. We compare changes in mental health outcomes of individuals living in affected cities with changes in matched individuals living in non-proximal and not-affected cities. We find that mass shootings have a substantial adverse impact on mental health, which persists for up to six years. This impact is not statistically significant for Black individuals, whereas it is slightly more pronounced among women and older cohorts

Bonn, Garmany:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics  2024. 45p.

By: Erika Harrell, Jennifer L. Truman, Katherine A. Fowler, Kristin Holland, Thomas R. Simon, and Steven A. Sumner

This report examines trends and patterns in firearm violence from 1993 to 2023 using a combination of data sources to provide a broad perspective on fatal and nonfatal firearm violence in the Unites States that could not be achieved through any single source of information. It includes data on firearm type; incident location; victim and offender demographic characteristics and relationship; injury and treatment type; police notification; and victims’ self-protective behaviors.

Estimates in this report are based primarily on data from BJS’s National Crime Victimization Survey and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Vital Statistics System death certificate data queried through the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System. Additional estimates come from the CDC’s National Violent Death Reporting System, National Syndromic Surveillance Program, and Youth Risk Behavior Survey. The report is organized to present findings from each data source in separate sections.

Highlights

• The rate of nonfatal firearm violence for persons age 12 or older declined 72% from 1993 to 2023, dropping from 7.3 to 2.0 victimizations per 1,000 persons, and varied from 1.2 to 2.3 per 1,000 during 2019 to 2023.

• About 64% of nonfatal firearm violence was reported to police during 2018–2022.

• The firearm homicide rate among persons age 12 or older fluctuated between 1993 and 2023, with a decline from 1993 to 2014 (from 8.4 to 4.0 homicides per 100,000 persons age 12 or older) before rising to 7.3 per 100,000 in 2021.

• From 2018 to 2022, on average, 80% of homicides were committed with a firearm

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 41p.

By Michele Ubaldi Matteo Picchio

We study the effect of mass shooting exposure on individuals’ mental health by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-randomness of mass shootings in a staggered difference-in-differences design. We compare changes in mental health outcomes of individuals living in affected cities with changes of matched individuals living in non-proximal and not affected cities. We find that mass shootings have a substantial adverse impact on mental health, which persists for up to six years. This impact is not statistically significant for Black individuals, whereas it is slightly more pronounced among women and older cohorts

Bonn, Garmany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics 2024. 45p.

By Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Trafficking in persons is a global challenge that transcends borders, and the advent of AI technologies has the potential to amplify both its reach and complexity. It is precisely this global nature of both trafficking and AI that necessitates coordinated, regional, and international responses. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Regional Support Office of the Bali Process (RSO) have jointly developed this brief on the emerging nexus of artificial intelligence (AI), trafficking in persons, and transnational crime with a clear objective: to equip policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the technology sector with the insights needed to anticipate and pre-emptively address the potential implications of AI on trafficking in persons.

Vienna: OSCE, 2024. 33p.

By Chelsa L. Kenney

Some Caribbean nations, such as Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, have high rates of violence, including homicide. In 2021, Caribbean countries accounted for six of the world’s 10 highest national murder rates, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The United Nations and other organizations monitoring firearms trafficking have reported that a high percentage of the firearms used in these crimes have been trafficked from the U.S. GAO was asked to report on U.S. efforts to counter firearms trafficking to Caribbean nations. This report examines (1) what data and reporting show about the trafficking and use of firearms in Caribbean countries; (2) U.S. agencies’ efforts to disrupt firearms trafficking in these countries; and (3) agency efforts to track results of key efforts to combat firearms trafficking from the U.S. to the Caribbean. GAO reviewed federal firearms recovery and trace data, and other related U.S. agency data, analysis, and program information for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, the most recent available at the time of our review. GAO interviewed U.S. and Caribbean officials through in-person site visits in the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, and through video conferences with Barbados, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. GAO selected these countries based on geographic diversity, the percentage of recovered firearms that were of U.S. origin, and U.S. agency efforts in country to combat firearms trafficking. What GAO Recommends GAO is recommending that State update the CBSI’s Results Framework to establish firearms trafficking specific indicators. State concurred.  

Washington, DC:  United States Government Accountability Office, 2024. 55p.

By Everytown Research & Policy , Everytown for Gun Safety

The gun industry has long avoided taking responsibility for the use of its products in crimes and violence. Despite receiving notifications from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) when their guns are recovered and traced,2 manufacturers often deny knowledge of just how often their guns inflict harm upon communities.3 Instead, they continue to produce increasingly deadly weapons and lean into dangerous advertising tactics, while generating an estimated $9 billion in revenue annually.4 Meanwhile, America’s gun violence epidemic costs the country over 44,000 lives and $557 billion each year.

To combat this attempt to avoid responsibility, the Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund (Everytown) embarked on a city-by-city collection of recovered crime gun data, seeking to answer the question of which gun manufacturers’ weapons are showing up at America’s crime scenes. This data collection was made possible by Everytown’s long-standing coalition of mayors fighting to end gun violence: Mayors Against Illegal Guns. The data received included 178,218 crime guns recovered in 34 US cities over the past five years

Key findings from Everytown’s analysis include:

• Of the over 11,000 licensed gun manufacturers in the United States, four manufacturers—Glock, Taurus, Smith & Wesson, and Ruger—accounted for over 40 percent of the guns recovered in crimes in 2023.6

• Glock pistols were recovered at crime scenes twice as often as the second-leading manufacturer, Taurus.7

• Crime scene recoveries of Polymer80s—the largest producer of ghost guns today—increased nearly 1,200 percent over the past five years, finally showing signs of decline in 2023, following litigation as well as regulatory and legislative fixes.8

• Twenty cities reported recovering more than 560 machine gun conversion devices in 2023, at least two-thirds of which were “Glock switches.”

This report adds to the growing evidence about the use of gun manufacturers’ products in crimes.9 It highlights the urgency for manufacturers and policymakers to act by implementing codes of conduct, cutting off irresponsible dealers, innovating safety features, and advertising products responsibly because the best time to prevent gun violence is before it happens.

New York: Everytown Research & Policy is a program of Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024. 15p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety 

 Deaths due to firearm violence occur in alarming numbers in the United States (U.S.) each year. In 2023, over 43,000 people died from a firearm-related injury, and the majority (55%) of these deaths were from suicide (Gun Violence Archive, 2024). Young people are at heightened risk, with firearms being the leading cause of death for youth ages 13-24, and the cause of half of all suicide deaths in this age group as well (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2024; National Violent Death Reporting System, 2024). Only in the last five years did Congress allocate federal resources for firearm violence research, and the prior decades-long ban on this research has stymied information that could have been used to prevent these deaths (Hellman, 2019). This lack of research has had wide-reaching effects, including the limited understanding of how firearm violence impacts specific vulnerable populations, such as LGBTQ+ individuals. Although much progress has been made, systematic data collection efforts that assess LGBTQ+ identity and experiences have long been a challenge in the U.S., similarly limiting available research on LGBTQ+ health and wellness (Healthy People 2030, 2023). One of the most consistent findings we do know from available research, however, is that LGBTQ+ young people experience higher rates of considering and attempting suicide compared to their peers. The Trevor Project’s 2024 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young People found that 39% of all LGBTQ+ young people seriously considered attempting suicide in the past year. This finding is important in the context of what we know about firearms: they are the most lethal means used in suicide attempts; nearly 9 in 10 (89.6%) suicide attempts with a firearm result in death (Conner, Azrael, & Miller, 2019). Furthermore, though mass shootings constitute a small fraction (1.5%) of firearm deaths in the U.S., the public nature of this violence, often targeted toward members of oppressed groups, still have noteworthy impact. Mass shootings are defined by The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as any incident in which four or more people are shot and wounded or killed, excluding the shooter. Many LGBTQ+ people across the country identified with the victims of two widely publicized mass shootings that occurred at LGBTQ+ nightclubs in recent years: the Pulse shooting in 2016, and the shooting at Club Q in 2022. The mental health of survivors and directly impacted geographic communities are adversely affected by mass shootings (Lowe & Galea, 2017), and individuals not directly affected by mass shooting events can  also experience post-traumatic stress through media exposure (Thompson et al., 2019). In the instance of the Pulse shooting, those who identified as LGBTQ+ responded more strongly to media coverage and, in turn, experienced more post-traumatic stress (First et al., 2023). Everytown for Gun Safety states that not only is addressing firearms essential to any strategy to reduce suicide, but also that the effect of mass shootings extends to survivors, families, and communities. Despite the elevated risk of suicide attempts among LGBTQ+ young people, the fact that the majority of firearm deaths in the U.S. are suicides, and the high lethality of suicide attempts involving firearms, little is known about how many LGBTQ+ young people own or have access to firearms, or how experiences of mass shooting events impact suicide risk. Using data from the 2024 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young people, this brief examines relationships between access to firearms, the impact of mass shootings, and suicide risk among LGBTQ+ young people. Results Access to Firearms Overall, 40% of LGBTQ+ young people reported that there was a firearm in their home. The majority (92%) of those with a firearm in the home reported that it was not theirs. Additionally, of those who reported the presence of a firearm in their home, 63% reported that the firearm was kept in a locked place, 22% reported that it was not kept in a locked place, and 15% reported that they did not know whether it was kept in a locked place. Demographics LGBTQ+ young people ages 13-17 reported higher rates of having a firearm in their home (44%), compared to their LGBTQ+ young people ages 18-24 (36%). LGBTQ+ young people living in the South reported the highest rates of having a firearm in their home (48%), followed by LGBTQ+ young people living in the Midwest (43%), West (37%), and Northeast (25%). Cisgender boys and men reported the highest rates of living in a home with a firearm (46%), followed by transgender girls and women (43%), transgender boys and men (42%), nonbinary youth (38%), youth questioning their gender identity (38%), and cisgender girls and women (36%). Native and Indigenous LGBTQ+ young people reported the highest rates of living in a home with a firearm (58%), followed by White LGBTQ+ young people (45%), Multiracial LGBTQ+ young people (38%), Black LGBTQ+ young people (31%), Latinx LGBTQ+ young people (29%), Middle Eastern and North African LGBTQ+ young people (22%), and Asian American and Pacific Islander LGBTQ+ young people (21%). No significant differences were found in rates of having a firearm in the home when comparing LGBTQ+ youth based on their socioeconomic status  LGBTQ+ young people who reported the presence of a firearm in their home reported higher rates of having seriously considered suicide in the past year (43%), compared to their LGBTQ+ peers who did not report a firearm in their home (37%). Reporting the presence of a firearm in the home was associated with 19% higher odds of seriously considering suicide in the past year (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.19, 95% Confidence Interval [CI] = 1.11-1.28, p < 0.001), compared to LGBTQ+ young people who did not report the presence of a firearm in the home. LGBTQ+ young people who reported having a firearm in their home had higher rates of attempting suicide in the past year (13%), compared to their LGBTQ+ peers who did not report having a firearm in their home (11%). The presence of a firearm in the home was associated with 17% higher odds of reporting a suicide attempt in the past year (aOR = 1.17, 95% CI = 1.05-1.30, p < 0.01), Among LGBTQ+ young people who reported having a firearm in their home, 48% of those who did not keep it in a locked place and 46% of those who did not know if it was kept in a locked place seriously considered suicide in the last year, compared to the 40% who said the firearms were kept in a locked place (p<.001). Similarly, among those LGBTQ+ young people who reported the presence of a firearm in their home, 14% of those who did not keep it in a locked place and 15% of those who did not know if it was kept in a locked place attempted suicide in the last year, compared to the 12% who said the firearms were kept in a locked place (p<.001).

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024. 11p.

By Jennifer Carlson  

This review is about scholarly contributions to a hotly debated issue—gun policy. Teasing apart the politics of evidence within gun politics, it examines both how research agendas shape gun policy and politics as well as how gun policy and politics shape research agendas. To do so, the article maps out two waves of gun research, Gun Studies 1.0 and Gun Studies 2.0. Gun Studies 1.0 emphasizes scientific evidence as a foundation for generating consensus about public policy, and it includes criminological studies aimed at addressing guns as criminogenic tools, public health work aimed at addressing guns as public health problems, and jurisprudential scholarship aimed at adjudicating guns as legal objects. Reviewing how these approaches incited popular debates and public policies that, in turn, shaped subsequent conditions of gun scholarship, the article then turns to Gun Studies 2.0. Instead of taking evidence as self-evident, this body of scholarship tends to prioritize the meaning-making processes that make meaningful—or not— evidence surrounding gun policy. Accordingly, Gun Studies 2.0 unravels the political and cultural conditions of the contemporary US gun debate and broadens inquiries into gun harm and gun security. In addition to discussing areas for future study, this study concludes by encouraging gun researchers to attend to the politics of evidence as they mobilize scholarship not just to inform the gun debate but also to transform it

Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2020. 16:183–202 

By Thomas R. Simon,  Heather B. Clayton,  Linda L. Dahlberg; Corinne David-Ferdon,  Greta Kilmer,  Colleen Barbero, 

Suicide and homicide are the second and third leading causes of death, respectively, among youths aged 14–17 years (1); nearly one half (46%) of youth suicides and most (93%) youth homicides result from firearm injuries (1). Understanding youth gun carrying and associated outcomes can guide prevention initiatives (2). This study used the updated measure of gun carrying in the 2017 and 2019 administrations of CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey* (YRBS) to describe the national prevalence of gun carrying for reasons other than hunting or sport among high school students aged <18 years and to examine the associations between gun carrying and experiencing violence, suicidal ideation or attempts, or substance use. Gun carrying during the previous 12 months was reported by one in 15 males and one in 50 females. Gun carrying was significantly more likely among youths with violence-related experiences (adjusted prevalence ratio [aPR] range = 1.5–10.1), suicidal ideation or attempts (aPR range = 1.8–3.5), or substance use (aPR range = 4.2–5.6). These results underscore the importance of comprehensive approaches to preventing youth violence and suicide, including strategies that focus on preventing youth substance use and gun carrying (3). CDC’s YRBS uses an independent three-stage cluster sample design to achieve a nationally representative sample of students in grades 9–12 who attend public or private schools in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (4). The overall response rates for 2017 and 2019 were 60% (14,765) and 60.3% (13,677), respectively. After the removal of responses missing age (153; 0.5%), those indicating legal age to purchase a firearm (i.e., age ≥18 years) (3,412; 12%), and those missing sex (138; 0.5%) or gun carrying information (2,927; 10.3%), the final analytic sample included 21,812 students. Information on YRBS weighting, sampling, and psychometric properties has previously been reported (4,5). YRBS was reviewed and approved by CDC and ICF institutional review boards.

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report Weekly / Vol. 71 / No. 30 July 29, 2022 

By Clément Evroux

Manufacturing and trade in firearms for civilian purposes employs around 150,000 people in the EU. In 2020, the Commission adopted a 2020-2025 action plan on firearms trafficking to help curb the illegal flows of firearms, and ammunition, while also strengthening the legal market. The adoption of Directive (EU) 2021/555 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons in 2021 was the first legislative outcome of the plan. In October 2022, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, another legislative commitment in its action plan. The proposed regulation would pursue three main objectives: a) neutralising the risks of trafficking at import and export; b) ensuring traceability in the firearms trade, based on systematic written information; and c) promoting efficient implementation of controls. Compared to the current rules, the proposal extends the material scope to exports, provides for consistent interpretation of rules across Member States, and allows for the flow of data at EU level. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its report on 27 October 2023. It strengthens the transparency and traceability provisions contained in the proposal, whilst ensuring alignment with the directive. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023. 10p.

By Silvia Villarreal, Rose Kim, Elizabeth Wagner, Nandita Somayaji, Ari Davis, M Cassandra Crifasi

This report outlines gun death data from 2022, the most recent year of finalized data available. All data were accessed using the Centers for Disease Control’s Underlying Cause of Death database, part of the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) database. The Underlying Cause of Death database contains data based on death certificates for U.S. residents and is the most reliable national source of gun death data available in the U.S. The gun death data used from this database depicts injury mortality by intent using the following categories: homicide, suicide, unintentional, legal intervention, and undetermined. Rates are calculated by the residence listed of decedent, not where the shooting actually took place. For simplification purposes, we created the following age categories to examine gun violence centered on youth: children (ages 1–9) and teens (10–17). For smaller, specific age ranges, we created the following categories: older teens (15–17) and emerging adults (17–19).

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2024. 23p.

By Colin Murphy

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also appearing frequently. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy-to-convert weapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN's global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms. This is an update of a briefing by Ann Neville, published in 2022.

Briefing 23-10-2024 Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2024. 12p.

By Evan D. Gumas, Munira Z. Gunja, and Reginald D. Williams II,

Firearm mortality in the United States has been well documented, and for good reason: far more Americans die of firearm-related causes than do residents of any other high-income country. Firearms are the leading cause of death for children in the U.S. and the weapon used most in interpersonal violence against women. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that nearly 49,000 Americans died from firearm-related causes in 2021, up from about 45,000 in 2020.1 In 2019, firearms accounted for 10.4 deaths for every 100,000 people in the U.S., around five times greater than in the countries with the second-and third-highest death rates, France (2.2) and Switzerland (2.1). Less publicized, however, is how gun violence burdens the healthcare system. Each year in the U.S., firearm-related injuries lead to roughly 30,000 inpatient hospital stays and 50,000 emergency room visits, generating more than $1 billion in initial medical costs. In 2020 alone, deaths from these injuries cost $290 million, an average of $6,400 per patient. Medicaid and other public insurance programs absorbed most of these costs. But the impact of gun violence reaches far beyond the hospital room. Firearm injuries leave victims with hefty medical bills. Medical spending increases an average of $2,495 per person per month in the year following the injury. Survivors are also more likely to develop mental health conditions and substance use disorders, areas in which the U.S. has poor outcomes.

New York: Commonwealth Fund, Apr. 2023. https://doi.org/10.26099/a2at-gy62

By Alice M. Ellyson, Avanti Adhia, Sandra Shanahan, Aisha Alsinai, Lisa DiMascolo, Maxmilliaan Reygers, Deirdre Bowen, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

We quantified the implementation of WA state's domestic violence (DV)-related firearm prohibitions (RCW9.41.800) by the courts and the Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit (RDVFEU), a regional approach to compliance promotion. We measured implementation, vetting, compliance, and enforcement of firearm prohibitions before (2014–2016) and after (2018–2020) the RDVFEU was implemented using a 55% random sample of granted domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs) in King County, WA (n = 3543). We evaluated differences in judicial orders to surrender firearms and other dangerous weapons (OTSWs), respondent documented compliance, and respondent weapon and/or firearm relinquishment before and after implementation. Compared to DVPOs granted prior to RDVFEU implementation, granted DVPOs after RDVFEU implementation were at least 4.5 times more likely to include an OTSW. RDVFEU implementation was also associated with at least 3.4 times the odds of respondent documented compliance and at least 3.3 times the odds of respondent relinquishment of at least one firearm and/or other dangerous weapon. These findings demonstrate RDVFEU implementation was associated with benefits at each stage of the protection order process with improvements in both judicial enforcement and respondent compliance. Overall, RDVFEU implementation was associated with improvements in granted orders to surrender weapons, respondent compliance, and relinquishment.

Policy Implications

DV-related firearm prohibitions can be supported by interdisciplinary teams within the legal system to promote respondent compliance and enhance safety planning for DV victim–survivors.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 23, Issue 4 Nov 2024 Pages 801-1017

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

Every gun on our streets starts somewhere, and the overwhelming majority have their origins in the legal marketplace. Understanding how guns — particularly those that have been diverted from legal commerce to the underground market — make their way to crime scenes is essential to crafting evidence-based and life-saving solutions to the American gun violence epidemic. There is — or should be — nothing controversial about this tracing approach. Epidemiologists and other scientists routinely study the origins of public health challenges in order to develop effective solutions, treatments, and preventative measures. It is a key component of the scientific method. Unfortunately, the best national data on the sources and paths of crime guns has been hidden from researchers, journalists, and the general public for nearly two decades. The gun industry successfully pushed the federal government to restrict public access to this critical gun trace data, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has aided the industry’s efforts by adopting an overly broad interpretation of those regulatory restrictions. Although some state and local law enforcement agencies have released gun UNDERSTANDING HOW GUNS — PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM LEGAL COMMERCE TO THE UNDERGROUND MARKET — MAKE THEIR WAY TO CRIME SCENES IS ESSENTIAL TO CRAFTING EVIDENCE-BASED AND LIFE-SAVING SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC. trace data in the last 20 years, the amount has been insufficient to develop the comprehensive, life-saving solutions that we need. In this report you will find an analysis of the most important gun trace dataset to be publicly available in decades. Attorney General Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania has released trace data for 186,000 crime guns from over 150 law enforcement agencies in his state, allowing the public to identify, for the first time in decades, which gun dealers appear to supply the most guns to the illegal market. This data is publicly available on the Pennsylvania Gun Tracing Analytics Platform. It is very important to note that the gun tracing dataset, while extensive, is not comprehensive. It does not include crime guns recovered by local Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies that have opted against sharing trace data. For that reason, the findings in this report are not the definitive picture of crime guns in the state. However, this dataset should nonetheless enable the public, policymakers, and law enforcement to hold the gun industry accountable for its role in supplying crime guns — and, in doing so, ultimately save lives. By focusing on the small number of gun dealers now known to be contributing to the problem, Pennsylvanians and their leaders will be able to put political, legal, and economic pressure on the irresponsible actors of the gun industry and bring about needed reforms to ensure that firearms are transferred responsibly and safely. Like all data, gun trace data has its limits; its insights, while key to understanding gun trafficking, are just one part of that process. Earlier this year, Brady unveiled an extensive — and ever-growing — database containing another piece to the puzzle: ATF compliance inspection reports detailing federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who have been issued a warning letter or more severe remedy for cited violations of gun laws. We encourage readers to also view that resource, the Gun Store Transparency Project, at www.gunstoretransparency.org. As you read through these findings, keep in mind that many of the 186,000 crime guns in the database are likely associated with one or more crime victim(s) and their families. If this were not staggering enough, the devastating ripple effects gun violence inflicts on families, neighborhoods, and communities are not captured in these numbers. Brady invites you to join us in advocating for solutions that address the supply side of gun violence. We invite researchers to study this data and build on our analysis; we implore journalists to report on not just the tragic results of gun violence incidents, but how crime guns end up in our communities; we urge lawmakers and law enforcement to adopt life-saving, supply-side solutions to gun violence; and we call on federal, state, and local authorities to be more transparent by releasing more trace data to the public. It is long past time for the gun industry as a whole to adopt meaningful supply-side solutions ensuring firearms are transferred safely and responsibility, as it is neither fair nor just to ask the communities suffering the immense harms of gun violence to also bear the burden of providing all the solutions.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence, 2022. 43p.

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

In January 2020, Brady advocates planned to take part in an annual Martin Luther King Jr. gun violence prevention advocacy event at the Virginia State Capitol, but state officials cautioned would-be participants that 2020 would be different: Second Amendment extremists were planning to turn out. Out of caution, Brady cancelled its official participation in the event because an estimated 20,000 individuals from across the country, armed with assault-style rifles and wearing tactical gear, descended on the State Capitol in Richmond, VA. It was a deeply troubling moment for members of the gun violence prevention movement, who saw their First Amendment right to speak and assemble quashed by gun-toting extremists. We did not know then that the events of that day were only a dress rehearsal for far worse to come. On January 6, 2021, Congress was set to certify the results of the 2020 election. But extremists, many of them armed, mounted an insurrection with violent force that resulted in death and injury and nearly derailed Congress’ capacity to confirm a president duly elected by the citizens of the United States. For Brady supporters and gun violence prevention advocates, it was both a sickening gut punch and deja vu. Although only one of the four people killed on January 6 was shot, the 2021 attack had the same roots as the 2020 Virginia State Capitol unrest: Second Amendment extremism. Second Amendment extremism arises from what’s commonly known as the “insurrectionist” construction of the Second Amendment: a false interpretation fomented by extremists, marketed by the gun lobby, and adopted by some mainstream politicians, including the 45th President of the United States. Second Amendment extremism lays the foundation for much domestic unrest and weaponized terror throughout American history, including but not limited to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the armed agitation at the Michigan State Capitol, and yes — January 6, 2021. Indeed, investigations and firsthand accounts of January 6 show that many of its agitators were armed, ready, and willing to harm lawmakers. Accordingly, officers on duty at the U.S. Capitol that day had credible reasons to fear that many rioters were armed; a number of these officers have since testified before Congress that those fears hindered their ability to control the insurrectionist mob. Yet the common narrative around January 6 often omits the role of Second Amendment extremism. Ignoring the ways in which guns, and gun mythology, fuel domestic extremism in America has been — and will continue to be — a deadly error. For these reasons, this report sets out to examine the role U.S. gun culture and policy played in laying the foundation for January 6. If we do not spend time reflecting upon our past, we are doomed to repeat it — and that we cannot do, because human lives and bedrock civic principles hang in the balance of this understanding and reckoning. At Brady, we have confronted extremism before, and we know that unless we take action, we will face it again.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence. 2022. 16p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Crimes that affect the environment cover a broad range of illegal activities that cause harm to the natural world, as a whole or in a particular geographical area.1 They include wildlife crime, illicit trafficking in timber and timber products, crimes in the fisheries sector, trafficking in waste, including hazardous substances, and the subject of the present guide: illegal mining and trafficking in metals and minerals. Some ramifications of these crimes are irreversible and can be severe enough to destroy entire ecosystems and communities, undercutting legal and ecologically viable operations and diminishing future resource alternatives. They can also deprive local communities of vital resources and limit their access to legitimate income through traditional production activity, thus perpetuating impoverishment and armed violence.2 The various negative consequences of crimes that affect the environment hinder the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 3 (healthy lives and well-being for all at all ages), Goal 6 (availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all), Goal 12 (sustainable consumption and production patterns), Goal 15 (sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainable management of forests and combating of desertification, land degradation and biodiversity loss) and Goal 16 (peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, access to justice for all and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels).3 There are many drivers of crimes that affect the environment. Among the most notable are attractive financial revenues and high demand for the goods and services generated through those crimes. Poverty situations are also regarded as a prominent enabler of crimes that affect the environment because economic hardship facilitates the recruitment of low-level offenders into organized criminal groups.4 People may be pushed into crimes that affect the environment by their income needs, especially in places where employment alternatives are not available. In its resolution 10/6, entitled “Preventing and combating crimes that affect the environment falling within the scope of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”, adopted in 2020, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime noted with concern that crimes that affect the environment had become some of the most lucrative transnational criminal activities and were closely interlinked with different forms of crime and corruption. Against that background, the Conference of the Parties reaffirmed that the Organized Crime Convention constitutes an effective tool and an essential part of the legal framework for preventing and combating transnational organized crimes that affect the environment and for strengthening international cooperation in this regard5 and asserted its resolve to protect the victims, expressing its deep concern about all those killed, injured, threatened or exploited by organized criminal groups involved in or benefiting from crimes that affect the environment and about those whose living environment, safety, health or livelihoods are endangered or put at risk by those crimes.6 The Conference of the Parties called upon States parties to the Organized Crime Convention to make crimes that affect the environment, in appropriate cases, serious crimes … as defined in article 2, paragraph (b), of the Convention, to ensure that, where the offense is transnational and involves an organized criminal group, effective international cooperation can be afforded under the Convention.7 and requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, subject to the availability of extrabudgetary resources, and within its mandate, to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to States parties, upon request, to support their efforts to effectively implement the Convention in preventing and combating transnational organized crimes that affect the environment.8 Those recommendations of the Conference of the Parties to the Organized Crime Convention are aligned with resolution 8/12 of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, entitled “Preventing and combating corruption as it relates to crimes that have an impact on the environment”, in which the Conference of the States Parties noted with concern the role that corruption can play in crimes that have an impact on the environment and that money-laundering may be used to disguise and/or conceal the sources of illegally generated proceeds, as well as to facilitate crimes that have an impact on the environment. The Conference urged States parties to the Convention against Corruption to implement the Convention by their domestic legislation and to ensure respect for its provisions, to make best use of the Convention to prevent and combat corruption as it relates to crimes that have an impact on the environment and the recovery and return of proceeds of crimes that have an impact on the environment, by the Convention.9 In 2021, the Fourteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice adopted the Kyoto Declaration on Advancing Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law: Towards the Achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.10 It underscores the commitment of Member States to the adoption of effective measures to prevent and combat crimes that affect the environment, such as illicit trafficking in wildlife, including, inter alia, flora, and fauna as protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, in timber and timber products, in hazardous wastes and other wastes and precious metals, stones and other minerals, as well as, inter alia, poaching, by making the best possible use of relevant international instruments and by strengthening legislation, international cooperation, capacity-building, criminal justice responses and law enforcement efforts aimed at, inter alia, dealing with transnational organized crime, corruption and money-laundering linked to such crimes, and illicit financial flows derived from such crimes, while acknowledging the need to deprive criminals of proceeds of crime.11 Most recently, in its resolution 76/185, adopted on 16 December 2021, the General Assembly called for a “balanced, integrated, comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach and response to address the complex and multifaceted challenges related to crimes that affect the environment”, acknowledging a need for long-term, comprehensive and sustainable development-oriented measures   

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 135p.

By Rachel Swaner, Elise White, Andrew Martinez, Anjelica Camacho, Basaime Spate, Javonte Alexander, Lysondra Webb, and Kevin Evans

Despite a significant decline in violent crime nationally over the last 15 years, high rates of gun violence persist among youth in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods (Children’s Defense Fund 2019). In New York City, gun violence has been increasing in specific communities, with many attributing the increase to youth gang conflicts (Sandoval 2019; Watkins 2019). Efforts to prevent young people from acquiring guns must address the reasons why they are getting guns, not just the logistics of how they are doing so. This is especially true given that young people acquire them almost exclusively through the informal economy (Webster, Meyers & Buggs 2014), likely eluding traditional policy interventions. This project investigated the experiences of New York City youth ages 16-24 who were at high risk for gun violence (e.g., carried a gun, been shot or shot at). Youth participants were recruited from three neighborhoods with historically high rates of gun violence when compared to the city as a whole—Brownsville (Brooklyn), Morrisania (Bronx), and East Harlem (Manhattan). We explored the complex confluence of individual, situational, and environmental factors that influence youth gun acquisition and use. This study is part of a broader effort to build an evidence-based foundation for individual and community interventions, and policies that will more effectively support these young people and prevent youth gun violence. Through interviews with 330 youth, we sought to answer these questions: 1. What are the reasons young people carry guns? 2. How do young people talk about having and using guns? 3. What are young people’s social networks like, and what roles do guns play in these networks? Youth were recruited through respondent-driven sampling, with initial interviews accessed through outreach at Cure Violence programs (gun violence prevention programs with credible messengers on staff), observation at outdoor public housing project “hot spots,” and ethnography at indoor gang spaces. These initial interview participants then helped recruit other eligible youth from their social networks. Participatory Methods  Participatory methods and trust-building were vital to accessing these youth. Early in the study, we faced challenges in gaining trust and candid responses from these heavily streetinvolved youth—unsurprising given the sensitive nature of our questions regarding guns, gangs, and violence. Accordingly, it was critical to employ field researchers—the people conducting the interviews and the public face of the project—with significant personal experience in the social networks of the target population. Some of our team members reflected the demographic composition of the neighborhoods and had connections to the street in such a way that research participants could, as these field researchers explain, “feel your gangsta.” Beyond merely ensuring access, this approach also led to more honest engagement from the interviewees. It further yielded more accurate analysis and interpretation, as field researchers not only conducted many of the interviews, but also helped to code and analyze the data, draw study conclusions, and develop recommendations. The importance of building trust with 16- to 24-year-olds at risk for gun violence cannot be overstated. The processes for gaining trust in each neighborhood differed significantly; this geographic specificity further played out on the micro level within specific housing developments and indoor gang spaces. New approaches had to be identified in each location. Researchers collected data in the areas gangs or housing developments “controlled,” since that was where the participants felt the most comfortable. To undertake this networking, researchers had to be consistently present and visible in spaces important to participants, showing respect for local gang politics, and acknowledging interpersonal and social trauma. The necessity of a street ethnography/participatory approach and ongoing trust-building meant the team consistently put in long hours on activities not immediately connected to the project deliverables, such as helping neighborhood youth create resumes and apply to jobs, navigate housing issues, and connect to services; providing food; and attending holiday parties and community events. Further, our research team had countless spontaneous interactions with community members such as basketball games and informal conversations about hip-hop or politics. We also found it essential to engage gang leadership in each new neighborhood we worked in. This involved our field researchers identifying and meeting with the heads of local gangs to discuss the research and answer any questions they had. During these meetings, field researchers disclosed their own past street involvement and familiarity with gang culture. Once these relationships were solidified, gang leaders gave our team permission to conduct interviews with members of their gang in the physical spaces they controlled. We would not have gotten access to the high number of young gun carriers without this engagement and relationship building with gang leaders. As we release this report, sweeping national protests against the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Rayshard Brooks by police officers, specifically, and continued police violence against people of color more broadly are pushing many jurisdictions to reexamine traditional approaches to public safety. This research—arguably the most ambitious of its kind—into why some young New Yorkers carry guns can be used to inform new strategies for keeping communities safe. This summary outlines our study findings, and the implications for policymakers. Major Findings Analysis of interview data revealed findings across five areas: participants’ neighborhoods, guns and violence, gangs, alternative-economy survival strategies, and the police. Key findings from each of these areas are below. Participants and Their Neighborhoods • Demographics The 330 youth in the study overwhelmingly were men (79%), living in public housing (78%), and Black or Latinx (94%). On average, participants were 21 years old. A higher percentage of the women interviewed had children (58%, v. 31% for men). • Neighborhood Perceptions Most reported it was easy to get drugs (83%), there was a lot of crime (78%), and there were regular gunshots (70% said at least monthly) in their neighborhood. Over a third (36%) reported hearing weekly about someone threatened with a gun. • Lack of Neighborhood Safety Lack of safety was reported as a major driver of gun carrying. Participants reported feeling unsafe because of beefs between rival gangs or housing projects affecting how they could “move”—i.e., where they could safely walk or go; police harassment for small infractions but lack of responsiveness for serious crime; and fear of being shot by a police officer. • Violent Victimization Violence was a near universal experience among the young people we interviewed. Eighty-one percent had been shot or shot at. Experiences with violent victimization often related to being in the wrong place at the wrong time, having fights related to romantic relationships, and getting caught up in gang-related altercations. Some participants made explicit connections between their victimization, attendant decrease in trust of others, and feeling that carrying a weapon was the only choice left to them. • Gun Carrying Practices Most participants (87%) had owned or carried a gun at some time. Participants reported being more likely to carry at nighttime. Those who carried all the time—i.e., night and day—identified the gun as central to their strategies for selfpreservation. • Carrying for Protection These communities’ lengthy histories of violent victimization at the hands of other residents and the police—whether or not participants had themselves been injured—were repeatedly cited as the backdrop against which decisions around weapons-carrying were made. Some youth reported carrying guns because of their pervasive sense of neighborhood mistrust and a feeling that they could be victimized at any time—a kind of generalized fear. Other participants felt a more localized fear— needing protection from people seeking retaliation. Finally, many participants felt a sense of overarching fear of the state, primarily in the form of law enforcement. “You gotta protect your life because the cops might shoot you.” (Black man, 24) • Gender Nuances Self-protection took on further nuances for female participants who were involved in traditionally male street activities. The women in our study indicated that their gender did not exempt them from retaliation and in some cases even increased  (continued) 

New York: Center for Court Innovation . 2020. 68p.