By Paul Michael Reeping

Gun-free zones have the potential to increase or decrease the risk of gun crime and active shootings that occur within their borders. People who assume that gun-free zones increase gun related outcomes believe that the lack of the ability for law-abiding citizens to carry a firearm, and thus an inability to engage in defensive gun use if a threat presented itself, makes gun-free zones a soft target for crime. Those that assume gun-free zones decrease gun related outcomes believe the absence of firearms eliminates the risk of an escalation of violence to gunfire. Up until this point, there has been no quantitative research on the effectiveness of gun-free zones, despite the topic being highly controversial. This dissertation was therefore the first to: create and describe a dataset of active shootings in the United States, and assess the extent to which defensive gun use occurs during these events (Aim 1); conduct a cross-sectional ecological analysis for the in St. Louis, Missouri (2019), both city and county, comparing the proportion of crimes committed with a firearm that occur in gun-free school zones compared to gun-allowing zones immediately surrounding the gun-free zone to quantify the effectiveness of gun-free school zones and (Aim 2); conduct a spatial ecological case-control study in the United States where cases are the locations or establishments of active shootings between 2014 and 2020, to quantify the impact of gun-free zones on active shootings, and assess if active shooters target gun-free zones (Aim 3).. The results of Aim 1 of this study suggested that defensive gun use during active shootings was rare, usually does not stop the attack, and does not decrease the number of casualties compared to active shootings without defensive use. Aim 1 also thoroughly described the novel active shooting dataset. I found in Aim 2 that gun-free school zones had fewer crimes committed with a firearm than corresponding gun-allowing zones in St. Louis, MO in 2019. There were 13.4% fewer crimes involving a firearm in gun-free school zones, with a confidence interval ranging from 23.6% fewer to 1.8% fewer (p-value: 0.025). Aim 3 determined that the conditional odds of an active shooting in an establishment that was gun-free were 0.375 times the odds of an active shooting in a gun-allowing establishment with a confidence interval ranging from 0.193 to 0.728 (p-value<0.01), suggesting that gun-free zones did not attract active shooters, and may even be preventative. In conclusion, gun-free zones did not appear to increase gun related outcomes and may even be protective against active shootings. Efforts across the United States to repeal laws related to gun-free zones, due to the belief that gun-free zones are targeted for violence, are therefore not backed by data. However, these are the first quantitative studies ever conducted on the effectiveness of gun-free zones, so more research is needed to build on the results of this dissertation.

New York: Columbia University, 2022. 133p.

By Emily Tiry and Arielle Jackson

Gun violence and violent crime more generally impose substantial costs on communities, including in Washington, DC. The Cost of Gun Violence in Washington, DC, project examined research on the broader community-level costs of gun violence on (1) economic indicators such as business activity and the housing market and (2) educational outcomes such as test scores and graduation rates. We also summarized the extent of gun violence, economic indicators, and educational outcomes in Washington, DC, using publicly available data and, to the extent possible, we put the costs in dollar terms. This appendix outlines our methodologies for our “Economic Costs of Gun Violence in Washington, DC” fact sheet and “Educational Costs of Gun Violence: Implications for Washington, DC” brief (Jackson et al. 2022;

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 6p.

By Arielle Jackson, Emily Tiry, Paige S. Thompson, and Jesse Jannetta

Like many cities, Washington, DC, has experienced a spike in gun violence in the past few years. Gun violence and violent crime more generally impose substantial costs on communities. These include direct costs like those for health care for victims and costs for law enforcement and incarceration, but they also include indirect costs such as the effects on business activity and the housing market. Research indicates that gun violence and violent crime can negatively affect educational outcomes as well. Social and economic inequities are often at the root of community gun violence and disproportionately affect Black and Latinx communities, underscoring the importance of addressing these systemic inequities and investing in resources that will reduce gun violence and promote opportunity for young people living in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods in the District. We summarize research on this topic, situate this evidence in the context of the geography of gun violence and educational outcomes in DC, and describe implications for DC communities

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 12p.

By Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3).

A new research brief from Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) was just published affirming that Chicago CRED:

works with the highest-risk individuals.

successfully connects them with needed services.

“potentially” reduces their likelihood of being shot or arrested by 50% and 48% respectively. As always, they are cautious about suggesting direct causation, but it is nevertheless encouraging.

The report explicitly mentions that “other outreach-focused programs such as Communities Partnering 4 Peace (CP4P) and READI Chicago find similar results.”

The report also says, “for every one CRED participant, we found more than 20 other individuals with similar risk profiles who were not receiving similar services,” so the case for going to scale is real.

” Chicago CRED is a multifaceted approach to reducing gun violence that strives to create lasting change by working directly with individuals who are most likely to be involved in serious gun violence. Beginning with direct street outreach efforts, CRED invites its participants to engage in a comprehensive intervention that connects this hard-to-reach population to services, including dedicated life coaching, trauma counseling, education, and, ultimately, reliable jobs. CRED launched its efforts in 2016 and operates in communities on Chicago’s South and West Sides. The current study examines the 234 men who entered the CRED program in 2019 from Roseland and West Pullman. All of these participants are Black, the average participant age at intake is roughly 24 years old, and the average level of completed education was 11 years of school. Some 85% of participants reported a personal or familial history of gang/group involvement, 75% reported a criminal record, and 9% reported being a gunshot victim prior to intake.

Chicago: Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) at the Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, 2021. 5p.

By Marisa C. Ross, Erin M. Ochoa, and Andrew V. Papachristos

The past several years have witnessed increased calls for community violence interventions (CVIs) that address firearm violence while centering local expertise and avoiding the criminal legal system. Currently, little evidence exists on CVI effectiveness at the individual level. This study presents an evaluation of the impact of a street outreach-based CVI [Chicago CRED (Create Real Economic Destiny)] on participant involvement in violence. We used a quasiexperimental design with a treatment sample of 324 men recruited by outreach staff from 2016 to 2021 and a balanced comparison sample of 2,500 men from a network of individuals arrested in CRED’s service areas. We conducted a Bayesian survival analysis to evaluate CRED’s effect on individual violence-related outcomes on three levels of treatment: All enrolled participants, a subsample that made it through the initial phase, and those who completed programming. The intervention had a strong favorable effect on the probability of arrest for a violent crime for those completing the program: After 24 mo, CRED alumni experienced an 11.3 percentage point increase in survival rates of arrest for a violent crime relative to their comparisons (or, stated differently, a 73.4% reduction in violent crime arrests). The other two treatment levels experienced nontrivial declines in arrests but did not reach statistical significance. No statistically significant reduction in victimization risk was detected for any of the treatment levels. Results demonstrate that completion of violence intervention had a strong favorable effect on the probability of arrest for a violent crime for those completing the program: After 24 mo, CRED alumni experienced an 11.3 percentage point increase in survival rates of arrest for a violent crime relative to their comparisons (or, stated differently, a 73.4% reduction in violent crime arrests). The other two treatment levels experienced nontrivial declines in arrests but did not reach statistical significance. No statistically significant reduction in victimization risk was detected for any of the treatment levels. Results demonstrate that completion of violence intervention programming reduces the likelihood of criminal legal involvement for participants, despite the numerous systemic and environmental factors that impede personal success.

PNAS, Vol. 120 | No. 46, 2023. 8p.

By Guillermo Vázquez del Mercado, Ruggero Scaturro, Jerome Veyret and Alex Goodwin

The illicit trade in arms and ammunition not only is a serious criminal market but also strengthens and expands other illicit economies around the globe, increasing the potential or actual use of violence in the commission of crimes. With weapons recycled from conflicts in the past, illegally produced, diverted from state or private stockpiles, or smuggled (in parts or whole) from areas in which supply is abundant, arms trafficking has become the fourth most prevalent criminal market globally, and is particularly prevalent in the Americas and Africa.1 According to the Small Arms Survey database, global firearms-related deaths have decreased by 30% between 2016 and 2020 (from 3.9 per 100 000 in 2016 to 2.7 per 100 000 in 2020).2 However, the organization also estimated that, as of 2017, there were still 857 million firearms in civilian hands worldwide, of which only 12% were registered.3 These weapons can pose enormous threats to civil society and regional stability. Illicit arms enable organized crime and underpin criminal markets. Firearms trafficking can also have a severe destabilizing effect, as the conflicts in which they are used can fuel others in a region, along with further crime and violence. For example, civil wars in Central America in the late twentieth century led to the availability of weapons in the region multiplying. Many of the 30 000 M-16 rifles and the 260 000 M-67 grenades sent to the Salvadoran authorities by the US government are still in circulation and have been used by the Mara Salvatrucha-13 and Barrio 18 gangs and criminal organizations abroad.4

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 29p.

By David Blake Johnson, Joshua J. Robinson, Daniel Semenza, and Alexi Thompson

We test the effectiveness of several common gun prevalence proxy variables against what are arguably the best measures of gun prevalence: firearm sales and concealed carry permits. With a comprehensive count of gun sales and concealed carry permits (by county and year) in the states of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, we make two main observations: First, gun sales/concealed carry permits are positively correlated with federal firearm licenses (gun dealers) per mile. Second gun sales/concealed carry permits are not significantly positively correlated with federal firearm licenses per capita or the proportion of gun suicides to total suicides. We then discuss why this occurs and the limitations of using legal gun sales as a gun prevalence measure. Last, we show how the competing measures differ in terms of their associations with gun homicide. We find our preferred measure to have a strong positive association with gun homicides while many others do not. Consequently, we advise researchers to use gun dealers as a measure of gun prevalence and specifically in a way that considers markets bleeding over arbitrary lines (e.g., county, city, or neighborhood).

Unpublished Paper, (May 25, 2022), 41p,

By Rod Campbell, Skye Predavec, Alice Grundy

Almost 30 years after the Port Arthur massacre, there are more guns in Australia than ever before, and the Howard Government’s landmark National Firearms Agreement (NFA) is falling short of its stated aims. There is no National Firearms Register and minors can use firearms in every state. This paper outlines the status of the NFA and the number of guns and gun deaths in Australia.

On 28 of April 1996, one man killed 35 people and wounded another 23 with semiautomatic rifles at Port Arthur, Tasmania. It remains the deadliest massacre in modern Australian history.

Just 12 days after the massacre, the Howard Government announced the National Firearms Agreement (NFA), a suite of measures from the federal, state and territory governments designed to strengthen Australia’s gun control laws.

The NFA was reconfirmed by all jurisdictions in 2017, however some of its resolutions remain unimplemented including the creation of the National Firearm Registry. Others have been implemented inconsistently across Australia’s states and territories, such as under 18 firearm use, hampering their effectiveness.

The paper concludes that Australians needs gun laws that live up to the Howard Government’s bravery, and right now Australia does not have them

Canberra: The Australia Institute, 2025. 9p.

By Nicole J. Johnson ,Caterina G. Roman

This study examines changes in gun violence at the census tract level in Philadelphia, PA before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Piecewise generalized linear mixed effects models are used to test the relative impacts of social-structural and demographic factors, police activity, the presence of and proximity to drug markets, and physical incivilities on shooting changes between 2017 and June, 2021. Model results revealed that neighborhood structural characteristics like concentrated disadvantage and racial makeup, as well as proximity to drug markets and police activity were associated with higher shooting rates. Neighborhood drug market activity and police activity significantly predicted changes in shooting rates over time after the onset of COVID-19. This work demonstrates the importance of understanding whether there are unique factors that impact the susceptibility to exogenous shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic. The increasing risk of being in a neighborhood with an active drug market during the pandemic suggests efforts related to disrupting drug organizations, or otherwise curbing violence stemming from drug markets, may go a long way towards quelling citywide increases in gun violence.

. PLoS ONE 17(2):, 2022. e0263777

By John R. Lott and Carlisle E. Moody

The FBI tracks active shooting cases—where individuals attempt to kill people in public places, excluding those tied to robberies or gang violence. This study is the first to systematically compare how uniformed police and civilians with concealed handgun permits perform in stopping these attacks. Civilians with permits stopped the attacks more frequently and faced a lower risk of being killed or injured than police. Officers who intervened during the attacks were far more likely to be killed or injured than those who apprehended the attackers later. We also provide evidence that these numbers significantly underestimate the advantages of civilians over officers in stopping these attacks. We explore the implications of two possible identification problems. Lott, John R. and Moody, Carlisle E., Do Armed Civilians Stop Active Shooters More Effectively Than Uniformed Police?

Salt Lake City, UT: Crime Prevention Research Center, 2025. 36p.

By John J. Donohu, Samuel V. Cai, Matthew V. Bondy, Philip J. Cook

While the recent state panel data literature has broadly concluded that “right-to-carry” (RTC) concealed handgun regimes increase violent crime, there is little empirical evidence on the precise mechanisms that drive this increase. Using data from 217 US cities, we find that the effect of RTC on violent crime is concentrated to large urban centers. In cities with an average population of over 250,000 between 1979 and 2019, we find that the introduction of RTC increases violent crime by 20 percent. We then present novel estimates that RTC increases gun theft by 50 percent and lowers violent crime clearance rates by 9 percent in these large cities. Leveraging city-level heterogeneity in RTC-induced violent crime effects, we demonstrate that these two mechanisms explain a substantial portion of the RTC-induced increase in violent crime.

Working Paper 30190, 2023, 21p.

By John R. Lott, and John E Whitley

It is frequently assumed that safe storage gun laws reduce accidental gun deaths and total suicides, while the possible impact on crime rates are ignored. However, given existing work on the adverse impact of other safety laws, such as safety caps for storing medicine, even the very plausible assumption of reduced accidental gun deaths cannot be taken for granted. Our paper analyzes both state and county data spanning nearly twenty years, and we find no support that safe storage laws reduce either juvenile accidental gun deaths or suicides. Instead, these storage requirements appear to impair people?s ability to use guns defensively. Because accidental shooters also tend to be the ones most likely to violate the new law, safe storage laws increase violent and property crimes against low risk citizens with no observable offsetting benefit in terms of reduced accidents or suicides. During the first five full years after the passage of the safe storage laws, the group of fifteen states that adopted these laws faced an annual average increase of over 300 more murders, 3,860 more rapes, 24,650 more robberies, and over 25,000 more aggravated assaults. On average, the annual costs borne by victims averaged over $2.6 billion as a result of lost productivity, out-of-pocket expenses, medical bills, and property losses.

Yale Law School, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 237, 72p.

By Carlisle E. Moody, John R. Lott

A review of the literature studying the effect of right-to-carry laws shows that the weight of evidence indicates that such laws reduced violent crime. However, more recent studies, using more recent data, tend to find that these laws cause increases in various kinds of violent crime, raising the possibility that circumstances have changed since 2000, causing these laws to become detrimental. We suggest that these recent studies, which do not use all the available data, are seriously compromised because they compare states that only recently have adopted right-to-carry laws with states that have had these laws for many years, instead of comparing against states with more restrictive laws. Early adopting states experienced relatively large reductions in crime corresponding to large increases in the number of right-to-carry permits. Late adopting states passed rules making it difficult to obtain permits and exercise the right to carry concealed weapons. Ignoring the fact that these late adopting states with stricter rules on obtaining permits issue relatively few permits can produce perverse results where coefficients imply an increase in crime even though the opposite is true. We demonstrate this effect with a simple statistical test.

Academia Letters, February 2022, 6p.

By David C. Pyrooz, James A. Densley, Jillian K. Peterson

Mass shootings, defined as incidents where 4 or more people are shot with a firearm, have become a significant public health concern in the US.

OBJECTIVE - To estimate the prevalence of direct exposure to mass shootings among US adults and identify the socio-demographic groups most affected.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - A survey was administered in January 2024 to a sample of 10 000 respondents (18 years or older) designed to be representative of US adults using a multistage matched sampling design. In addition to exposure to mass shootings, the survey also collected sociodemographic information, including age, gender, self-reported race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

EXPOSURE - Survey respondents were asked about their lifetime presence at the scene of a mass shooting, any physical injuries sustained (including being shot or trampled or experiencing a related physical injury), and the features of such incidents.

MAIN OUTCOME AND MEASURES - Multivariable logistic regression was used to generate adjusted odds ratios (AORs) of the associations between sociodemographic measures and being present on the scene of and injured in a mass shooting. All analyses undertaken to generate population and relational inferences were weighted to achieve representativeness of US adults.

RESULTS - Of the 10 000 respondents included in the analysis, 51.34% (95% CI, 50.27%-52.40%) were female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 3.04% (95% CI, 2.71%-3.38%) were Asian, 12.46% (95% CI, 11.81%-13.12%) were Black, 16.04% (95% CI, 15.10%-16.98%) were Hispanic, 62.78% (95% CI, 61.73%-63.84%) were White, and 5.67% (95% CI, 5.23%-6.11%) were other race or ethnicity. The findings indicated that 6.95% (95% CI, 6.39%-7.50%) of respondents were present at the scene of a mass shooting, and 2.18% (95% CI, 1.85%-2.50%) sustained physical injuries, such as being shot or trampled, during such incidents. A total of 54.89% of mass shootings to which respondents were exposed occurred in 2015 or more recently, and 76.15% took place in respondents’ local communities. Mass shootings were most likely to occur in neighborhoods. Younger individuals (eg, AOR for Baby Boomer and Silent generations vs Generation Z, 0.12; 95% CI, 0.09-0.18) and males (AOR, 1.55; 95% CI, 1.29-1.85) were more likely to report exposure compared with those from older generations or female individuals, respectively. Black respondents reported higher rates of being present at mass shootings (AOR, 1.87; 95% CI, 1.49-2.34), while Asian respondents reported lower rates (AOR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.19-0.66), compared with White respondents, but there were no racial and ethnic differences in injuries sustained. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings from this survey study of US adults underscore the extensive and often overlooked regular exposure to mass shootings in this country. The demographic disparities in exposure highlight the need for targeted interventions and support for the most affected groups, particularly younger generations and males. Understanding these patterns is essential for addressing the broader impacts of gun violence on public health and community well-being.

JAMA Network Open. 2025;8(3):e250283. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025, 9p.

By Andrew Willinger

On October 4, 2024, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos. The case involves claims brought by the government of Mexico against a group of U.S. gun manufacturers seeking to recover for the costs of gun violence in Mexico that the Mexican government alleges are caused by the gunmakers’ sales and distribution practices that facilitate cross-border gun trafficking.

If the Supreme Court holds that Mexico failed to allege the type of violation contemplated in the predicate exception, that could narrow the scope of predicate-exception litigation substantially to instances where the gun manufacturer itself engages in illegal conduct (rather than aiding and abetting downstream illegal conduct). And such a decision would have major consequences for domestic PLCAA litigation because the new wave of state public nuisance statutes often specifically contemplate that a gunmaker’s distribution practices can give rise to liability even after the point of sale. Another avenue by which the Court could reverse is to focus on the unique causal chain in the case that includes cross-border gun trafficking and harm caused by foreign cartels with American-manufactured firearms. This route seems less likely to broadly unsettle things at the state level, as it is at least possible for the Court to write an opinion that emphasizes how unique the facts of this case are. In most domestic litigation, there simply will not be the same number of intervening actions because the harm caused will be closer to home. That said, it will be important to watch whether the Court seems receptive to the gunmakers’ argument that Mexico’s damages are merely derivative of the harm suffered by individual people harmed by gun violence in the country. That line of argument would presumably hamstring efforts by state attorneys general to pursue predicate-exception litigation against gunmakers based on harm to the public.

64 South Texas Law Review 97 (2025), 5p.

By Lily Robin, Josh Fording, Travis Reginal, Paige Thompson, Andreea Matei, Jerome Louison, Ramik Jamar Williams

Since the peak of violent crime in the early 1990s, New York City has experienced a sustained decline in violence but, like many cities across the country, has seen an increase in violent crime since 2019. In the 67th Precinct in particular, where the East Flatbush neighborhood is located, there were 34.5 shootings per 100,000 people in 2022. There are several community-led, government-led, and law enforcement–led initiatives in East Flatbush and surrounding areas to address violent crime and gun violence. This report examines gun violence and gun violence prevention and intervention initiatives in the 67th Precinct and surrounding neighborhoods.

WHAT WE FOUND

• Community organizations employ a holistic approach to violence prevention that addresses root causes of violence using a multifaceted approach to mitigate and address violence and diffuse tension between communities and law enforcement.

• Community members had negative views of criminal legal system actors and generally lacked awareness of community-based organizations involved in violence prevention work.

• Several barriers exist to community-led anti–gun violence, including limited funding, a lack of supports for staff, a lack of visibility in the community, and a lack of housing for people in crisis.

We make the following five recommendations:

• Rely on evidence to target research, funding, and initiatives to the areas most in need.

• Leverage and grow the existing strengths of communities.

• Identify and address drivers of gun violence.

• Develop funding opportunities for gun violence prevention and intervention programs that encourage collaboration and visibility in the community.

• Invest in community engagement and cultural competency for law enforcement and other criminal legal system actors.

HOW WE DID IT

With funding from the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ), Urban, in partnership with the Kings Against Violence Initiative (KAVI), investigated gun violence and gun violence prevention and intervention initiatives in the 67th Precinct and surrounding neighborhoods through a review of existing literature, analysis of crime and shooting data, and interviews and focus groups with gun violence prevention and intervention initiative staff and community members.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2025. 44p.

By Oluwole Ojewale and Raoul Sumo Tayo

This study presents evidence on the dynamics of cattle rustling in border regions of Cameroon and Chad. It identifies the drivers and enablers of the phenomenon and the networks of actors engaged in the criminal economy. The ungoverned spaces of border regions pose security challenges and accentuate the illicit economy of cattle rustling. Addressing cattle rustling in southern Chad and northern Cameroon requires a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach due to the complex interplay of economic, social and security dynamics in the regions. Key findings • The primary enablers of cattle rustling include transhumance and child labour, multiple conflicts, failure of governance, environmental factors, porous borders, cultural perception and social acceptance, corruption and ineffective justice system. • The link between cattle rustling and other forms of organised crime manifests through terrorism financing, cross-border smuggling, arms trafficking, abduction and money laundering. • In addition to the traditional cattle rustlers, the dominant actors perpetrating cattle rusting are ISWAP (71.4%), Boko Haram (9.5%), separatist groups (8.1%) and unidentified armed groups (5.4%).

ENACT, 2025. 36p.

   By John Lindsay-Poland. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton and Giffords  

  The iron river of weapons transiting from the United States to Mexico and Central America that empowers criminal organizations and accelerates forced migration originates from hundreds of gun manufacturers and passes through thousands of local U.S. gun dealers, every year. In reaction to the flow of illicit weapons, a firearms race has developed, in which gun companies export more and increasingly militarized weapons to Mexican police and military forces. But the number of lives lost or disappeared through violence in Mexico continues to increase, while migrants fleeing through Mexico have become understandably more desperate to get to safety. Political discourse focuses on the U.S.-Mexico border. But the unregulated, massive and militarized U.S. gun market that feeds the violence, drug trafficking, and displacement is growing – and often ignored. The Stop US Arms to Mexico project obtained finely grained data, never before disclosed, on the origins of guns trafficked and exported to Mexico and Central America from the United States since 2015. We are publishing this data, in conjunction with this report, at stopusarmstomexico.org/iron-river  Gun violence in Mexico has spiraled in the last two decades since the expiration of the U.S. federal assault weapons ban in 2004 and the 2007 declaration of the drug war in Mexico with U.S. support. A modest decline in gun homicides since 2019 has not reduced violence even to the elevated levels of 2010-2011. Moreover, the growing number of forced disappearances, primarily carried out by criminal organizations armed with U.S. weapons and sometimes with collusion of Mexican security forces, has nullified the modest decline in gun homicides

San Francisco, CA:  Stop US Arms to Mexico, 2024. 12p.

By John Lindsay-Poland

The U.S. firearms market is generating growing storms of violence in neighboring countries. From Mexico – where traffickers in fentanyl and other criminal businesses are armed with thousands of U.S.- sourced assault weapons and .50 caliber rifles – to Haiti, where gangs armed with rifles easily purchased and smuggled from Florida and Georgia dominate and terrorize broad swaths of territory – the permissive, militarized and enormous gun trade in the United States is driving thousands of families to flee their homelands, arming the men who disappear people and commit femicide, empowering traders in narcotics that take thousands more lives, and looting economies. The damage is not limited to Mexico and Haiti. Firearms homicides – just one indicator of gun harms – have grown in Jamaica, Barbados, Central America and other nations, in tandem with the retail proliferation of U.S. weapons. In Guatemala, the exponential growth of exports of U.S. pistols has fed weapons trafficking and homicide rates. The United States is not exempt, of course: there were more shootings in U.S. schools in the last three years than any prior year.1 The concept frequently used for this violence is that of a pandemic: the health consequences of gun violence are severe and growing, with firearms and bullets as vectors and agents, respectively.2 But gun violence also behaves like a storm system in its violence and shattering effects. And the islands in which people may imagine that they are safe from these storms of gun violence are shrinking.

San Francisco, CA Stop US Arms to Mexico, 2025. 9p

By William R. Slomanson

An estimated quarter- to half-million guns are smuggled from the U.S. into Mexico each year. Seventy percent of guns recovered at Mexican crime scenes are traced back to the U.S. Many of these weapons are military-styled assault rifles, shipped into Mexico by U.S. drug gangs. This pipeline endangers citizens of the four U.S. border states, many of the nation’s counties, and the police who are outgunned by cartels. According to the complaint, 'tens of thousands of Mexico’s citizens have been wounded and killed.'

The typical precursor is sloppy or illegal practices in the manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer-buyer distribution chain. Data available to the gun industry could be used by its members to substantially reduce sales of guns to 'bad apple' retailers.

Mexico’s unique law suit  is the first whereby a foreign government has sued American gun makers. If ultimately successful, the trial judge has hinted that this novel filing would encourage similar litigation−in the U.S. and other nations.

Estados Unidos Mexicanos is not a lawsuit against the Second Amendment. Mexico instead hopes to trigger an exception to the federal statute that generally bars such suits against the U.S. gun industry. The plaintiff relies on lower U.S. court cases that have either interpreted that immunity from suit−in a way that allows such suits to proceed−or have considered this federal statute unconstitutional.

Mexico filed in the U.S. for several presumptive reasons. It seeks stratospheric damages of 'billions of dollars each year'. A large recovery is more likely in an American court than in Mexico. Securing the appearance of these U.S. corporations in a Mexican venue would be beyond wishful thinking. Mexico’s other major hurdle is whether a U.S. court can exercise personal jurisdiction, when all of the alleged harm has occurred in Mexico.

The case is now in the trial court. After that result is appealed, and case-split certiorari is sought, the reviewing courts may dismiss this case because: (1) it does not trigger the key exception to federal immunity from suit; and/or (2) the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants.

56 Suffolk University Law Review (forthcoming 2022), 35p.