By Jennifer Carlson  

This review is about scholarly contributions to a hotly debated issue—gun policy. Teasing apart the politics of evidence within gun politics, it examines both how research agendas shape gun policy and politics as well as how gun policy and politics shape research agendas. To do so, the article maps out two waves of gun research, Gun Studies 1.0 and Gun Studies 2.0. Gun Studies 1.0 emphasizes scientific evidence as a foundation for generating consensus about public policy, and it includes criminological studies aimed at addressing guns as criminogenic tools, public health work aimed at addressing guns as public health problems, and jurisprudential scholarship aimed at adjudicating guns as legal objects. Reviewing how these approaches incited popular debates and public policies that, in turn, shaped subsequent conditions of gun scholarship, the article then turns to Gun Studies 2.0. Instead of taking evidence as self-evident, this body of scholarship tends to prioritize the meaning-making processes that make meaningful—or not— evidence surrounding gun policy. Accordingly, Gun Studies 2.0 unravels the political and cultural conditions of the contemporary US gun debate and broadens inquiries into gun harm and gun security. In addition to discussing areas for future study, this study concludes by encouraging gun researchers to attend to the politics of evidence as they mobilize scholarship not just to inform the gun debate but also to transform it

Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2020. 16:183–202 

By Thomas R. Simon,  Heather B. Clayton,  Linda L. Dahlberg; Corinne David-Ferdon,  Greta Kilmer,  Colleen Barbero, 

Suicide and homicide are the second and third leading causes of death, respectively, among youths aged 14–17 years (1); nearly one half (46%) of youth suicides and most (93%) youth homicides result from firearm injuries (1). Understanding youth gun carrying and associated outcomes can guide prevention initiatives (2). This study used the updated measure of gun carrying in the 2017 and 2019 administrations of CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey* (YRBS) to describe the national prevalence of gun carrying for reasons other than hunting or sport among high school students aged <18 years and to examine the associations between gun carrying and experiencing violence, suicidal ideation or attempts, or substance use. Gun carrying during the previous 12 months was reported by one in 15 males and one in 50 females. Gun carrying was significantly more likely among youths with violence-related experiences (adjusted prevalence ratio [aPR] range = 1.5–10.1), suicidal ideation or attempts (aPR range = 1.8–3.5), or substance use (aPR range = 4.2–5.6). These results underscore the importance of comprehensive approaches to preventing youth violence and suicide, including strategies that focus on preventing youth substance use and gun carrying (3). CDC’s YRBS uses an independent three-stage cluster sample design to achieve a nationally representative sample of students in grades 9–12 who attend public or private schools in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (4). The overall response rates for 2017 and 2019 were 60% (14,765) and 60.3% (13,677), respectively. After the removal of responses missing age (153; 0.5%), those indicating legal age to purchase a firearm (i.e., age ≥18 years) (3,412; 12%), and those missing sex (138; 0.5%) or gun carrying information (2,927; 10.3%), the final analytic sample included 21,812 students. Information on YRBS weighting, sampling, and psychometric properties has previously been reported (4,5). YRBS was reviewed and approved by CDC and ICF institutional review boards.

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report Weekly / Vol. 71 / No. 30 July 29, 2022 

By Clément Evroux

Manufacturing and trade in firearms for civilian purposes employs around 150,000 people in the EU. In 2020, the Commission adopted a 2020-2025 action plan on firearms trafficking to help curb the illegal flows of firearms, and ammunition, while also strengthening the legal market. The adoption of Directive (EU) 2021/555 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons in 2021 was the first legislative outcome of the plan. In October 2022, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, another legislative commitment in its action plan. The proposed regulation would pursue three main objectives: a) neutralising the risks of trafficking at import and export; b) ensuring traceability in the firearms trade, based on systematic written information; and c) promoting efficient implementation of controls. Compared to the current rules, the proposal extends the material scope to exports, provides for consistent interpretation of rules across Member States, and allows for the flow of data at EU level. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its report on 27 October 2023. It strengthens the transparency and traceability provisions contained in the proposal, whilst ensuring alignment with the directive. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023. 10p.

By Silvia Villarreal, Rose Kim, Elizabeth Wagner, Nandita Somayaji, Ari Davis, M Cassandra Crifasi

This report outlines gun death data from 2022, the most recent year of finalized data available. All data were accessed using the Centers for Disease Control’s Underlying Cause of Death database, part of the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) database. The Underlying Cause of Death database contains data based on death certificates for U.S. residents and is the most reliable national source of gun death data available in the U.S. The gun death data used from this database depicts injury mortality by intent using the following categories: homicide, suicide, unintentional, legal intervention, and undetermined. Rates are calculated by the residence listed of decedent, not where the shooting actually took place. For simplification purposes, we created the following age categories to examine gun violence centered on youth: children (ages 1–9) and teens (10–17). For smaller, specific age ranges, we created the following categories: older teens (15–17) and emerging adults (17–19).

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2024. 23p.

By Colin Murphy

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also appearing frequently. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy-to-convert weapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN's global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms. This is an update of a briefing by Ann Neville, published in 2022.

Briefing 23-10-2024 Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2024. 12p.

By Evan D. Gumas, Munira Z. Gunja, and Reginald D. Williams II,

Firearm mortality in the United States has been well documented, and for good reason: far more Americans die of firearm-related causes than do residents of any other high-income country. Firearms are the leading cause of death for children in the U.S. and the weapon used most in interpersonal violence against women. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that nearly 49,000 Americans died from firearm-related causes in 2021, up from about 45,000 in 2020.1 In 2019, firearms accounted for 10.4 deaths for every 100,000 people in the U.S., around five times greater than in the countries with the second-and third-highest death rates, France (2.2) and Switzerland (2.1). Less publicized, however, is how gun violence burdens the healthcare system. Each year in the U.S., firearm-related injuries lead to roughly 30,000 inpatient hospital stays and 50,000 emergency room visits, generating more than $1 billion in initial medical costs. In 2020 alone, deaths from these injuries cost $290 million, an average of $6,400 per patient. Medicaid and other public insurance programs absorbed most of these costs. But the impact of gun violence reaches far beyond the hospital room. Firearm injuries leave victims with hefty medical bills. Medical spending increases an average of $2,495 per person per month in the year following the injury. Survivors are also more likely to develop mental health conditions and substance use disorders, areas in which the U.S. has poor outcomes.

New York: Commonwealth Fund, Apr. 2023. https://doi.org/10.26099/a2at-gy62

By Alice M. Ellyson, Avanti Adhia, Sandra Shanahan, Aisha Alsinai, Lisa DiMascolo, Maxmilliaan Reygers, Deirdre Bowen, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

We quantified the implementation of WA state's domestic violence (DV)-related firearm prohibitions (RCW9.41.800) by the courts and the Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit (RDVFEU), a regional approach to compliance promotion. We measured implementation, vetting, compliance, and enforcement of firearm prohibitions before (2014–2016) and after (2018–2020) the RDVFEU was implemented using a 55% random sample of granted domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs) in King County, WA (n = 3543). We evaluated differences in judicial orders to surrender firearms and other dangerous weapons (OTSWs), respondent documented compliance, and respondent weapon and/or firearm relinquishment before and after implementation. Compared to DVPOs granted prior to RDVFEU implementation, granted DVPOs after RDVFEU implementation were at least 4.5 times more likely to include an OTSW. RDVFEU implementation was also associated with at least 3.4 times the odds of respondent documented compliance and at least 3.3 times the odds of respondent relinquishment of at least one firearm and/or other dangerous weapon. These findings demonstrate RDVFEU implementation was associated with benefits at each stage of the protection order process with improvements in both judicial enforcement and respondent compliance. Overall, RDVFEU implementation was associated with improvements in granted orders to surrender weapons, respondent compliance, and relinquishment.

Policy Implications

DV-related firearm prohibitions can be supported by interdisciplinary teams within the legal system to promote respondent compliance and enhance safety planning for DV victim–survivors.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 23, Issue 4 Nov 2024 Pages 801-1017

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

Every gun on our streets starts somewhere, and the overwhelming majority have their origins in the legal marketplace. Understanding how guns — particularly those that have been diverted from legal commerce to the underground market — make their way to crime scenes is essential to crafting evidence-based and life-saving solutions to the American gun violence epidemic. There is — or should be — nothing controversial about this tracing approach. Epidemiologists and other scientists routinely study the origins of public health challenges in order to develop effective solutions, treatments, and preventative measures. It is a key component of the scientific method. Unfortunately, the best national data on the sources and paths of crime guns has been hidden from researchers, journalists, and the general public for nearly two decades. The gun industry successfully pushed the federal government to restrict public access to this critical gun trace data, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has aided the industry’s efforts by adopting an overly broad interpretation of those regulatory restrictions. Although some state and local law enforcement agencies have released gun UNDERSTANDING HOW GUNS — PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM LEGAL COMMERCE TO THE UNDERGROUND MARKET — MAKE THEIR WAY TO CRIME SCENES IS ESSENTIAL TO CRAFTING EVIDENCE-BASED AND LIFE-SAVING SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC. trace data in the last 20 years, the amount has been insufficient to develop the comprehensive, life-saving solutions that we need. In this report you will find an analysis of the most important gun trace dataset to be publicly available in decades. Attorney General Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania has released trace data for 186,000 crime guns from over 150 law enforcement agencies in his state, allowing the public to identify, for the first time in decades, which gun dealers appear to supply the most guns to the illegal market. This data is publicly available on the Pennsylvania Gun Tracing Analytics Platform. It is very important to note that the gun tracing dataset, while extensive, is not comprehensive. It does not include crime guns recovered by local Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies that have opted against sharing trace data. For that reason, the findings in this report are not the definitive picture of crime guns in the state. However, this dataset should nonetheless enable the public, policymakers, and law enforcement to hold the gun industry accountable for its role in supplying crime guns — and, in doing so, ultimately save lives. By focusing on the small number of gun dealers now known to be contributing to the problem, Pennsylvanians and their leaders will be able to put political, legal, and economic pressure on the irresponsible actors of the gun industry and bring about needed reforms to ensure that firearms are transferred responsibly and safely. Like all data, gun trace data has its limits; its insights, while key to understanding gun trafficking, are just one part of that process. Earlier this year, Brady unveiled an extensive — and ever-growing — database containing another piece to the puzzle: ATF compliance inspection reports detailing federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who have been issued a warning letter or more severe remedy for cited violations of gun laws. We encourage readers to also view that resource, the Gun Store Transparency Project, at www.gunstoretransparency.org. As you read through these findings, keep in mind that many of the 186,000 crime guns in the database are likely associated with one or more crime victim(s) and their families. If this were not staggering enough, the devastating ripple effects gun violence inflicts on families, neighborhoods, and communities are not captured in these numbers. Brady invites you to join us in advocating for solutions that address the supply side of gun violence. We invite researchers to study this data and build on our analysis; we implore journalists to report on not just the tragic results of gun violence incidents, but how crime guns end up in our communities; we urge lawmakers and law enforcement to adopt life-saving, supply-side solutions to gun violence; and we call on federal, state, and local authorities to be more transparent by releasing more trace data to the public. It is long past time for the gun industry as a whole to adopt meaningful supply-side solutions ensuring firearms are transferred safely and responsibility, as it is neither fair nor just to ask the communities suffering the immense harms of gun violence to also bear the burden of providing all the solutions.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence, 2022. 43p.

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

In January 2020, Brady advocates planned to take part in an annual Martin Luther King Jr. gun violence prevention advocacy event at the Virginia State Capitol, but state officials cautioned would-be participants that 2020 would be different: Second Amendment extremists were planning to turn out. Out of caution, Brady cancelled its official participation in the event because an estimated 20,000 individuals from across the country, armed with assault-style rifles and wearing tactical gear, descended on the State Capitol in Richmond, VA. It was a deeply troubling moment for members of the gun violence prevention movement, who saw their First Amendment right to speak and assemble quashed by gun-toting extremists. We did not know then that the events of that day were only a dress rehearsal for far worse to come. On January 6, 2021, Congress was set to certify the results of the 2020 election. But extremists, many of them armed, mounted an insurrection with violent force that resulted in death and injury and nearly derailed Congress’ capacity to confirm a president duly elected by the citizens of the United States. For Brady supporters and gun violence prevention advocates, it was both a sickening gut punch and deja vu. Although only one of the four people killed on January 6 was shot, the 2021 attack had the same roots as the 2020 Virginia State Capitol unrest: Second Amendment extremism. Second Amendment extremism arises from what’s commonly known as the “insurrectionist” construction of the Second Amendment: a false interpretation fomented by extremists, marketed by the gun lobby, and adopted by some mainstream politicians, including the 45th President of the United States. Second Amendment extremism lays the foundation for much domestic unrest and weaponized terror throughout American history, including but not limited to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the armed agitation at the Michigan State Capitol, and yes — January 6, 2021. Indeed, investigations and firsthand accounts of January 6 show that many of its agitators were armed, ready, and willing to harm lawmakers. Accordingly, officers on duty at the U.S. Capitol that day had credible reasons to fear that many rioters were armed; a number of these officers have since testified before Congress that those fears hindered their ability to control the insurrectionist mob. Yet the common narrative around January 6 often omits the role of Second Amendment extremism. Ignoring the ways in which guns, and gun mythology, fuel domestic extremism in America has been — and will continue to be — a deadly error. For these reasons, this report sets out to examine the role U.S. gun culture and policy played in laying the foundation for January 6. If we do not spend time reflecting upon our past, we are doomed to repeat it — and that we cannot do, because human lives and bedrock civic principles hang in the balance of this understanding and reckoning. At Brady, we have confronted extremism before, and we know that unless we take action, we will face it again.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence. 2022. 16p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Crimes that affect the environment cover a broad range of illegal activities that cause harm to the natural world, as a whole or in a particular geographical area.1 They include wildlife crime, illicit trafficking in timber and timber products, crimes in the fisheries sector, trafficking in waste, including hazardous substances, and the subject of the present guide: illegal mining and trafficking in metals and minerals. Some ramifications of these crimes are irreversible and can be severe enough to destroy entire ecosystems and communities, undercutting legal and ecologically viable operations and diminishing future resource alternatives. They can also deprive local communities of vital resources and limit their access to legitimate income through traditional production activity, thus perpetuating impoverishment and armed violence.2 The various negative consequences of crimes that affect the environment hinder the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 3 (healthy lives and well-being for all at all ages), Goal 6 (availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all), Goal 12 (sustainable consumption and production patterns), Goal 15 (sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainable management of forests and combating of desertification, land degradation and biodiversity loss) and Goal 16 (peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, access to justice for all and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels).3 There are many drivers of crimes that affect the environment. Among the most notable are attractive financial revenues and high demand for the goods and services generated through those crimes. Poverty situations are also regarded as a prominent enabler of crimes that affect the environment because economic hardship facilitates the recruitment of low-level offenders into organized criminal groups.4 People may be pushed into crimes that affect the environment by their income needs, especially in places where employment alternatives are not available. In its resolution 10/6, entitled “Preventing and combating crimes that affect the environment falling within the scope of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”, adopted in 2020, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime noted with concern that crimes that affect the environment had become some of the most lucrative transnational criminal activities and were closely interlinked with different forms of crime and corruption. Against that background, the Conference of the Parties reaffirmed that the Organized Crime Convention constitutes an effective tool and an essential part of the legal framework for preventing and combating transnational organized crimes that affect the environment and for strengthening international cooperation in this regard5 and asserted its resolve to protect the victims, expressing its deep concern about all those killed, injured, threatened or exploited by organized criminal groups involved in or benefiting from crimes that affect the environment and about those whose living environment, safety, health or livelihoods are endangered or put at risk by those crimes.6 The Conference of the Parties called upon States parties to the Organized Crime Convention to make crimes that affect the environment, in appropriate cases, serious crimes … as defined in article 2, paragraph (b), of the Convention, to ensure that, where the offense is transnational and involves an organized criminal group, effective international cooperation can be afforded under the Convention.7 and requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, subject to the availability of extrabudgetary resources, and within its mandate, to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to States parties, upon request, to support their efforts to effectively implement the Convention in preventing and combating transnational organized crimes that affect the environment.8 Those recommendations of the Conference of the Parties to the Organized Crime Convention are aligned with resolution 8/12 of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, entitled “Preventing and combating corruption as it relates to crimes that have an impact on the environment”, in which the Conference of the States Parties noted with concern the role that corruption can play in crimes that have an impact on the environment and that money-laundering may be used to disguise and/or conceal the sources of illegally generated proceeds, as well as to facilitate crimes that have an impact on the environment. The Conference urged States parties to the Convention against Corruption to implement the Convention by their domestic legislation and to ensure respect for its provisions, to make best use of the Convention to prevent and combat corruption as it relates to crimes that have an impact on the environment and the recovery and return of proceeds of crimes that have an impact on the environment, by the Convention.9 In 2021, the Fourteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice adopted the Kyoto Declaration on Advancing Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law: Towards the Achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.10 It underscores the commitment of Member States to the adoption of effective measures to prevent and combat crimes that affect the environment, such as illicit trafficking in wildlife, including, inter alia, flora, and fauna as protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, in timber and timber products, in hazardous wastes and other wastes and precious metals, stones and other minerals, as well as, inter alia, poaching, by making the best possible use of relevant international instruments and by strengthening legislation, international cooperation, capacity-building, criminal justice responses and law enforcement efforts aimed at, inter alia, dealing with transnational organized crime, corruption and money-laundering linked to such crimes, and illicit financial flows derived from such crimes, while acknowledging the need to deprive criminals of proceeds of crime.11 Most recently, in its resolution 76/185, adopted on 16 December 2021, the General Assembly called for a “balanced, integrated, comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach and response to address the complex and multifaceted challenges related to crimes that affect the environment”, acknowledging a need for long-term, comprehensive and sustainable development-oriented measures   

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 135p.

By Rachel Swaner, Elise White, Andrew Martinez, Anjelica Camacho, Basaime Spate, Javonte Alexander, Lysondra Webb, and Kevin Evans

Despite a significant decline in violent crime nationally over the last 15 years, high rates of gun violence persist among youth in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods (Children’s Defense Fund 2019). In New York City, gun violence has been increasing in specific communities, with many attributing the increase to youth gang conflicts (Sandoval 2019; Watkins 2019). Efforts to prevent young people from acquiring guns must address the reasons why they are getting guns, not just the logistics of how they are doing so. This is especially true given that young people acquire them almost exclusively through the informal economy (Webster, Meyers & Buggs 2014), likely eluding traditional policy interventions. This project investigated the experiences of New York City youth ages 16-24 who were at high risk for gun violence (e.g., carried a gun, been shot or shot at). Youth participants were recruited from three neighborhoods with historically high rates of gun violence when compared to the city as a whole—Brownsville (Brooklyn), Morrisania (Bronx), and East Harlem (Manhattan). We explored the complex confluence of individual, situational, and environmental factors that influence youth gun acquisition and use. This study is part of a broader effort to build an evidence-based foundation for individual and community interventions, and policies that will more effectively support these young people and prevent youth gun violence. Through interviews with 330 youth, we sought to answer these questions: 1. What are the reasons young people carry guns? 2. How do young people talk about having and using guns? 3. What are young people’s social networks like, and what roles do guns play in these networks? Youth were recruited through respondent-driven sampling, with initial interviews accessed through outreach at Cure Violence programs (gun violence prevention programs with credible messengers on staff), observation at outdoor public housing project “hot spots,” and ethnography at indoor gang spaces. These initial interview participants then helped recruit other eligible youth from their social networks. Participatory Methods  Participatory methods and trust-building were vital to accessing these youth. Early in the study, we faced challenges in gaining trust and candid responses from these heavily streetinvolved youth—unsurprising given the sensitive nature of our questions regarding guns, gangs, and violence. Accordingly, it was critical to employ field researchers—the people conducting the interviews and the public face of the project—with significant personal experience in the social networks of the target population. Some of our team members reflected the demographic composition of the neighborhoods and had connections to the street in such a way that research participants could, as these field researchers explain, “feel your gangsta.” Beyond merely ensuring access, this approach also led to more honest engagement from the interviewees. It further yielded more accurate analysis and interpretation, as field researchers not only conducted many of the interviews, but also helped to code and analyze the data, draw study conclusions, and develop recommendations. The importance of building trust with 16- to 24-year-olds at risk for gun violence cannot be overstated. The processes for gaining trust in each neighborhood differed significantly; this geographic specificity further played out on the micro level within specific housing developments and indoor gang spaces. New approaches had to be identified in each location. Researchers collected data in the areas gangs or housing developments “controlled,” since that was where the participants felt the most comfortable. To undertake this networking, researchers had to be consistently present and visible in spaces important to participants, showing respect for local gang politics, and acknowledging interpersonal and social trauma. The necessity of a street ethnography/participatory approach and ongoing trust-building meant the team consistently put in long hours on activities not immediately connected to the project deliverables, such as helping neighborhood youth create resumes and apply to jobs, navigate housing issues, and connect to services; providing food; and attending holiday parties and community events. Further, our research team had countless spontaneous interactions with community members such as basketball games and informal conversations about hip-hop or politics. We also found it essential to engage gang leadership in each new neighborhood we worked in. This involved our field researchers identifying and meeting with the heads of local gangs to discuss the research and answer any questions they had. During these meetings, field researchers disclosed their own past street involvement and familiarity with gang culture. Once these relationships were solidified, gang leaders gave our team permission to conduct interviews with members of their gang in the physical spaces they controlled. We would not have gotten access to the high number of young gun carriers without this engagement and relationship building with gang leaders. As we release this report, sweeping national protests against the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Rayshard Brooks by police officers, specifically, and continued police violence against people of color more broadly are pushing many jurisdictions to reexamine traditional approaches to public safety. This research—arguably the most ambitious of its kind—into why some young New Yorkers carry guns can be used to inform new strategies for keeping communities safe. This summary outlines our study findings, and the implications for policymakers. Major Findings Analysis of interview data revealed findings across five areas: participants’ neighborhoods, guns and violence, gangs, alternative-economy survival strategies, and the police. Key findings from each of these areas are below. Participants and Their Neighborhoods • Demographics The 330 youth in the study overwhelmingly were men (79%), living in public housing (78%), and Black or Latinx (94%). On average, participants were 21 years old. A higher percentage of the women interviewed had children (58%, v. 31% for men). • Neighborhood Perceptions Most reported it was easy to get drugs (83%), there was a lot of crime (78%), and there were regular gunshots (70% said at least monthly) in their neighborhood. Over a third (36%) reported hearing weekly about someone threatened with a gun. • Lack of Neighborhood Safety Lack of safety was reported as a major driver of gun carrying. Participants reported feeling unsafe because of beefs between rival gangs or housing projects affecting how they could “move”—i.e., where they could safely walk or go; police harassment for small infractions but lack of responsiveness for serious crime; and fear of being shot by a police officer. • Violent Victimization Violence was a near universal experience among the young people we interviewed. Eighty-one percent had been shot or shot at. Experiences with violent victimization often related to being in the wrong place at the wrong time, having fights related to romantic relationships, and getting caught up in gang-related altercations. Some participants made explicit connections between their victimization, attendant decrease in trust of others, and feeling that carrying a weapon was the only choice left to them. • Gun Carrying Practices Most participants (87%) had owned or carried a gun at some time. Participants reported being more likely to carry at nighttime. Those who carried all the time—i.e., night and day—identified the gun as central to their strategies for selfpreservation. • Carrying for Protection These communities’ lengthy histories of violent victimization at the hands of other residents and the police—whether or not participants had themselves been injured—were repeatedly cited as the backdrop against which decisions around weapons-carrying were made. Some youth reported carrying guns because of their pervasive sense of neighborhood mistrust and a feeling that they could be victimized at any time—a kind of generalized fear. Other participants felt a more localized fear— needing protection from people seeking retaliation. Finally, many participants felt a sense of overarching fear of the state, primarily in the form of law enforcement. “You gotta protect your life because the cops might shoot you.” (Black man, 24) • Gender Nuances Self-protection took on further nuances for female participants who were involved in traditionally male street activities. The women in our study indicated that their gender did not exempt them from retaliation and in some cases even increased  (continued) 

New York: Center for Court Innovation . 2020. 68p.

By Terra Wiens

Gun violence impacts all communities in the United States, though each in different ways. Communities of color are especially impacted by fatal gun violence.a While substantial research has described the disproportionate impact gun violence, specifically firearm homicide, has on Black communities, less research has been done to describe the impact on the American Indian or Alaska Native (AI/AN) community in the U.S. This study examines the impact of lethal firearm violence in the AI/AN community in the U.S. by analyzing mortality data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)b and Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) data submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While CDC mortality data capture more homicides in the U.S. compared to crime data, FBI SHR data provide additional details about homicide deaths not available in the CDC data used for this report. Therefore, this report includes CDC mortality data to describe victim demographics and the use of firearms for both homicide and suicide, while FBI SHR data describe the victim and offender relationship and circumstances for homicides  

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2024. 19p.

By Melissa M. Labriola, Nastassia Reed, Anna White Hewitt

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary's directive on human trafficking and the agency's strategy for combating human trafficking outline ambitious goals to address the harms of this criminal activity on its victims and society. However, the logistics and tactics needed to properly implement a victim-centered approach in all facets of law enforcement can be complex. The first step in implementing a victim-centered approach to countering human trafficking is to understand what is already known, what policies may hinder or promote a victim-centered approach, and what training and programming can assist law enforcement. This knowledge can assist DHS's Center for Countering Human Trafficking in both recognizing the importance of a victim-centered approach and understanding how to factor it into day-to-day duties. To address the challenges and outcomes stated above, the authors conducted a review of academic and gray literature to build out a baseline of knowledge. The authors also summarize applicable practices (external to DHS) that implement a victim-centered approach in the following key areas: victim identification and screening, training, and law enforcement operations.

Key Findings

There is limited research in peer-reviewed articles and gray literature on how to improve victim identification and screening for human trafficking in a law enforcement setting

• Most victim identification screening tools are implemented in clinical settings by clinical providers or social workers.

• Understanding the risk factors, accepting how an individual's exposure to trauma affects cognition, and recognizing common symptoms of trauma can inform agents in their daily work.

Effective training programs can create a workplace with a common understanding of trauma

• Building a workforce capable of using trauma-informed and victim-centered approaches relies on effective training programs to build knowledge, capacity, and skills.

• Key skills to develop through training include avoiding retraumatization, building relationships with survivors, working with a diverse population, and conducting effective interviews with survivors.

• During training, alternatives to standard lectures can be valuable to encourage participation and skill retention.

Organizational change is needed to implement a victim-centered approach in law enforcement operations

• Implementation of a victim-centered approach requires organizational change and an overarching framework that affects every step and person within the system.

• A victim-centered approach is centered in a culture of continuous learning and collaboration.

• The depth of knowledge about human trafficking, including prevalence rates and successful intervention methods, points to the difficulties in operationalizing an evidence-based, victim-centered approach.

• According to the literature review, individual police agencies and service agencies are prioritizing some operations that can possibly be adopted and adapted to a federal law enforcement setting.

Recommendations

• DHS law enforcement's best course of action would be to take an informal approach to screening and prioritize identifying trauma symptoms during law enforcement’s brief interactions with potential victims.

• Law enforcement personnel should educate themselves on myths and stereotypes about victim behavior and the cultural backgrounds and unique challenges faced by trafficking victims from different communities, including cultural differences and language barriers.

• Cultural sensitivity; acknowledging cultural norms, beliefs, and languages; and rapport-building would support victims in sharing their stories.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 28p.

By Andrew R. Morral, Rosanna Smart, Terry L. Schell, Brian G. Vegetabile, Emma Thomas

Measures of the proportion of individuals living in households with a firearm (HFR), over time, across states, and by demographic groups are needed to evaluate disparities in firearm violence and the effects of firearm policies. OBJECTIVE To estimate HFR across states, years, and demographic groups in the US. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In this survey study, substate HFR totals from 1990 to 2018 were estimated using Bayesian multilevel regression with poststratification to analyze survey data on HFR from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System and the General Social Survey. HFR was estimated for 16 substate demographic groups defined by gender, race, marital status, and urbanicity in each state and year. EXPOSURES Survey responses indicating household firearm ownership were analyzed and compared with a common proxy for firearm ownership, the fraction of suicides completed with a firearm (FSS). MAIN OUTCOME AND MEASURE HFR, FSS, and their correlations and differences. RESULTS Among US adults in 2018, HFR was significantly higher among married, nonurban, non-Hispanic White and American Indian male individuals (65.0%; 95% credible interval [CI], 61.5%- 68.7%) compared with their unmarried, urban, female counterparts from other racial and ethnic groups (7.3%; 95% CIs, 6.0%-9.2%). Marginal HFR rates for larger demographic groups also revealed important differences, with racial minority groups and urban dwellers having less than half the HFR of either White or American Indian (39.5%; 95% CI, 37.4%-42.9% vs 17.2%; 95% CI, 15.5%-19.9%) or nonurban populations (46.0%; 95% CI, 43.8%-49.5% vs 23.1%; 95% CI, 21.3%-26.2%). Population growth among groups less likely to own firearms, rather than changes in ownership within demographic groups, explains 30% of the 7 percentage point decline in HFR nationally from 1990 to 2018. Comparing HFR estimates with FSS revealed the expected high overall correlation across states (r = 0.84), but scaled FSS differed from HFR by as many as 20 percentage points for some states and demographic groups. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE This survey study of HFR providing detailed, publicly available HFR estimates highlights key disparities among individuals in households with firearms across states and demographic groups; it also identifies potential biases in the use of FSS as a proxy for firearm ownership rates. These findings are essential for researchers, policymakers, and public health experts looking to address geographic and demographic disparities in firearm violence.  

JAMA Open, 2024.

By Rebecca Pfeffer, Melissa M. Labriola, Lynn Langton, Duren Banks, Dulani Woods, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Brian A. Jackson

Human trafficking is a complex and nuanced social problem that continues to be difficult to combat in the United States and around the world. The lack of understanding of how many people experience trafficking is a pervasive issue with implications for resource allocation, policy response, and intervention programming. Over the years, there have been many attempts to determine the prevalence of trafficking; however, the hidden nature of such exploitation continues to be problematic. Measuring the prevalence of trafficking may have utility for practitioners and other key stakeholders who are assessing the level of need and resources necessary to engage in outreach, prevention, and intervention with suspected or identified victims. However, there is neither a clearly defined set of indicators that have utility for measuring prevalence nor a standard practice for using prevalence studies to fill information gaps that can improve service provision. This report presents findings and recommendations from an expert workshop that focused on the type and level of information (national, state, local) related to the prevalence and characteristics of trafficking that are most useful for practitioners working with trafficking survivors. The workshop culminated in the creation of a prioritized list of the key gaps in understanding the scope of labor and sex trafficking, solutions to begin to fill those gaps, and key indicators that should be considered as part of a broader effort to better classify types of trafficking.

Key Findings

• There is a lack of consensus on indicators and definitions of trafficking.

• Prevalence estimates are aggregate; disaggregation is important for better understanding risk (e.g., to inform instrument and sample design).

• There is limited focus on how prevalence estimates can be used to assess the effectiveness of various interventions and preventions.

• Prevalence is measured without any discussion of what to do with those estimates or how to use them to better serve people who experience trafficking.

• Different industries, populations, political landscapes, and forms of exploitation require different methodologies for estimating prevalence.

• Implicit bias is a problem for reporting, identification, recruiting, data collection, and service provision (e.g., some practitioners know to look for white female victims only).

Recommendations

• Establish and validate a standard set of indicators and then apply those indicators to legal definitions of trafficking.

• Create a guide with best practices on instrument design, sampling approaches, testing, open data, and dissemination practices to allow for appropriate disaggregation (while protecting privacy).

• Encourage funders and researchers to gather information during the prevalence stage that can be applied to programs, interventions, and subsequent effectiveness assessments.

• Recommend that research funders and researchers use, at a minimum, a co-creation model, but, ideally, they should use a rigorous community-based participatory action research approach.

• Establish, design, and co-create the research design and implementation with researchers and the affected community (including those with lived experience).

• Ensure that prevalence research includes underrepresented subpopulations by using designs that employ community-based approaches that will identify diverse perspectives in communities.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 20p.

By Leslie M. Barnard, Rachel L. Johnson, Sara Brandspigel, Lauren A. Rooney, Megan McCarthy, Frederick P. Rivara, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Christopher E. Knoepke, Ryan A. Peterson & Marian E. Betz 

Background: Temporary, voluntary storage of firearms away from the home is a recommended option for individuals with a risk of suicide, but it may also be used in other situations (e.g., long trips). Prior work has explored the availability of storage options and the views of storage locations. Little is known about out-of-home storage practices among those who live in homes with firearms (including owners).

Methods: We surveyed English-speaking adults (18 or older) in two states (Colorado and Washington) living in a home with a firearm (June-July 2021).

Results: Among the final sample of 1029, most respondents were white (88.1%) and non-Hispanic (85.0%); half were female (50.8%), and the most common age group was ages 35-44 (25.5%). Just over one quarter (27.3%) of respondents indicated they had stored a firearm away from their home/car/garage in the last 5 years. The place most respondents said they were somewhat or very likely to consider was at a family member’s home (62.7%) or at a self-storage facility (52.5%).

Conclusion: Out-of-home firearm storage is a relatively common practice and endorsed by many gun owners, suggesting out-of-home storage is feasible for firearm owners as an approach to suicide prevention.

Inj Epidemiol. 2023 Mar 13;10(1):15. doi: 10.1186/s40621-023-00426-9. PMID: 36915179; PMCID: PMC10012481.

Nils Duquet & Maarten Van Alstein

On a regular basis, news stories appear in the media about public shootings where shooters use their guns to open fire and kill people in shopping malls or on school campuses. Mostly these stories deal with incidents in the United States. Over the last years, however, a number of European countries have experienced similar public shooting incidents. Notable cases were the shootings at Tuusula and Kauhajoki in Finland (2007 and 2008), the killings in Cumbria in the UK (2010), the Utøya attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway (2011), and the shootings at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands and Liège in Belgium in 2011. Public shootings draw a high level of media attention. Less striking in the public eye, but not less significant – not least in quantitative terms –, are the numbers of people in Europe killed by firearms in the context of gun-related crime or in domestic shootings. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010, over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter were killed by firearms in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). Every year, over 4000 suicides by firearm are registered in the EU. This means that, on average, there are 0.24 homicides and 0.9 suicides by firearm per 100,000 population in Europe every year.

Compared with the US or other countries around the globe, the rates of gun-related violent death in Europe are rather low, certainly where the homicide rates are concerned. This does not mean, however, that the problem of gun violence has not appeared on the European policy radar in recent years. On the contrary, the attention devoted to the problem by law enforcement agencies and policy-makers has been growing. Reacting not only to shooting incidents such as those mentioned above, but also to warnings by police and law enforcement agencies that criminals are increasingly willing to use (heavy) firearms and that illegal trafficking in firearms is on the rise, a number of European countries have announced policy interventions targeted at reducing levels of gun-related violence and crime. The European Commission has also become an active actor in firearms policy. In October 2013 it announced a plan to reduce gun violence in Europe, in which it defined the misuse of firearms, whether legally-owned or illicitly manufactured or acquired, as “a serious threat to the EU’s security from both an internal and external perspective”. One of the major problems the Commission identified in its initial policy papers was the problem of a lack of sound and adequate knowledge about firearms in Europe. The commission noted that “a lack of solid EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy and operational responses”.. One of the ambitions of the EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy is, therefore, to address the gaps in knowledge concerning gun violence.

An additional problem is that the lack of reliable and comprehensive information on firearms in Europe is not limited to the sphere of law enforcement and policy-making. European scholarly research focusing specifically on firearms availability, gun control and gun-related violence is scarce. There is a research community in Europe focusing on small arms and light weapons (SALW), but it is predominantly concerned with the export of firearms and the connections between these arms flows and violence in developing, transitional or fragile states outside Europe. Scientific research on firearms and gun-related violence in the domestic European context is much less advanced. The scanty research efforts made in this field by epidemiologists, criminologists and legal scholars remain fragmented, and suffer from the fact that there is no integrated scholarly community dealing with gun-related issues. Language barriers, moreover, often prevent the wider dissemination of research results. Given this relative lack of European firearms research, American studies are still clearly dominant at present in research on the links between the availability of firearms and gun-related violence. Greene and Marsh have calculated that out of the 665 studies on firearms and violence that they reviewed, 64% were about the USA. Of the remaining studies not on the USA, 13% concerned cross-national comparisons or articles in which the geographical focus was unspecified (such as reviews), while 8% were about developing countries. Only 15% concerned other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, the UK and Germany. Given the particularities of the American context, and more specifically the fact that the US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths and crime among industrialized democracies, simply transposing the results of American research to the European context is problematic.

What are the levels of firearms availability in Europe? Are there links between the levels of gun ownership in European countries and these countries’ rates of violence and violent death? And what is the impact of European gun laws on public safety and health? The absence of evidence specifically for the European context makes it difficult for policy-makers and researchers to find impartial and unbiased answers to these questions. Hence the pressing need for research that specifically focuses on gun-related violence in the European context: and with the present report, we would like to make a contribution to that effort. As we are moving into largely uncharted territory, our analysis of the European situation will necessarily be exploratory. Our primary ambition is to collect and take stock of the fragmented evidence that is available on gun-related violence in Europe. Our geographical coverage will be broader than the EU and encompasses a group of approximately 40 European countries, although in some instances we will limit our analyses to the EU28.

In the report’s first chapter, we briefly dwell on one of the most crucial variables in research on gun control and violence: the level of gun ownership in society. Although the prevalence or availability of firearms is a key variable, collecting adequate data on levels of gun ownership can be troublesome. In chapter 1 we therefore devote some space to a critical assessment of the available statistics for Europe. Next, in chapter 2, we look at gun-related violence in Europe. Given the absence of good data on gun-related violence in general, including information not only on mortality but also on injuries and other forms of firearms-related victimization, we will focus exclusively on violent deaths – which seems a legitimate methodological choice for exploratory purposes. We urge the reader, however, to keep in mind that gun-related violence is a much more complex phenomenon than this focus might suggest. As is normal in research dealing with gun control not only from a public safety but also a public health perspective, we shall look both at gun-related homicides and at suicides. Taking the analysis further, we then ask in chapters 3 and 4 whether rates of gun possession and violent death in Europe are correlated: do high levels of gun possession in European countries correlate with high levels of homicide and suicide? The results of probing that question lead us to suggest that research into gun possession and violent death should also factor in the effects of firearms legislation. Specific European research into this question is scarce, which makes it difficult at the moment to arrive at conclusions for the whole of Europe. In chapter 5 we therefore focus on the results of three recent studies on the effects of stricter gun legislation on violent death rates in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland.

Flemish Peace Institute Report June 2015

By Ivan Katchanovski

This open-access book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Maidan massacre in Ukraine. It uses a theoretical framework of rational choice, moral hazard, state-repression backfire, and Weberian ideas about rational action to explore the massacre. The book draws on publicly available videos, photos, and audio recordings of the massacre in English, Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and other languages, along with several hundred individual testimonies and revelations from the Ukrainian investigation and a trial and its verdict. By examining which parties were responsible for the massacre, the book analyses its implications for not only Russia’s war on Ukraine but also political developments across the globe.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 266p.

By Mark T. Berg, Ethan M. Rogers and Hannah Rochford

Background

Describe trends in perpetrator characteristics and firearm use in pediatric homicides across the United States.

Methods

Multiply-imputed data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1976–2020 Supplementary Homicide Reports were used to estimate perpetrator characteristics (sex, age, and relationship to victim) and firearm use in pediatric homicides. Descriptive analyses were stratified by victim age group, sex, race, and five-year periods.

Results

Family members were the most common perpetrators of infant and toddler (ages 0–4) and child (ages 5–12) homicides, whereas acquaintances accounted for the majority of adolescent (ages 13–19) homicides. Perpetrator characteristics vary across victim sex and race, particularly among adolescents. Despite overall stability, there were changes in perpetrator characteristics from 1976 to 2020. There was a sustained increase in the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm. In 2016–2020, the proportion of firearm-involved homicides was an all-time high for infants and toddlers (14.8%), children (53.1%), and adolescent victims (88.5%).

Conclusions

Policy interventions that improve family stability and well-being may be most effective at preventing infant, toddler, and child homicides, whereas programs that target peer and community relationships, as well as policies that focus on firearm access, maybe more crucial for preventing adolescent homicides.

Injury Epidemiology volume 11, Article number: 37 (2024) 

By The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

The National Crime Gun Intelligence (CGI) Governing Board leverages the collective experience of Federal, State, and local experts working in forensics, law enforcement, and criminal law to ensure that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) receives valuable input on national programs relating to CGI. As part of this mission, the Governing Board created this best practice guide to help our law enforcement partners successfully use a CGI model to reduce violent crime.

Washington, DC:  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Firearms Operations Division, 2020. 77p.