Looting Mariupol: Russia’s use of illicit finance and economic crime in Ukraine

By Olivia Allison David Lewis

Russia’s siege and destruction of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol from February to May 2022 turned the city into an international symbol of the brutality and destruction of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Now Russia is attempting to turn Mariupol into a showcase Russian city to legitimise its occupation of Ukrainian territory. A huge reconstruction programme is underway in the city and Russia plans to make Mariupol the centre of a new transport network, which will ensure the resupply of Russian forces on the frontline and in Crimea. This research paper investigates this Russian programme of investment in Mariupol, which has been accompanied by the illicit seizure of thousands of Ukrainian homes, businesses and assets. There have been widespread allegations of corruption, fraud and profiteering, and new Russian business networks are emerging that benefit from Russia’s wartime economy. These economic practices in many cases constitute criminal activities and may be potential war crimes. Key points • Business seizures: Russian political and corporate interests and their proxies have seized control of thousands of Ukrainian businesses, properties and assets without compensation. • Dispossession: Many Mariupol residents have lost their homes, not only in the war, but also through an illegal programme of nationalisation, and a reconstruction programme that favours local vested interests and Russian incomers. • Profiteering and corruption: Powerful Moscow-based networks are controlling much of the reconstruction programme. Well-connected companies are benefiting from Russian spending that involves the widespread use of illicit finance and corrupt practices. • International trade: Mariupol port is at the centre of an illicit international trade in Ukrainian grain, clay and other materials. • Strategic implications: The new transport networks around Mariupol have important strategic implications, consolidating Russian control. Major Russian corporations are involved in building rail, road and maritime links. Policy implications • Rethinking strategy towards the occupation: A renewed Ukrainian and international strategy could also use political, diplomatic and economic instruments, including targeted sanctions, to raise the cost of Russia’s occupation and to challenge its long-term hold on the territory. • Sanctions: Current sanctions policy by the EU, the UK, the US and other countries towards the occupied territories is often incomplete and poorly coordinated. A more coherent approach would be more effective, particularly one that seeks to raise costs on individuals and companies leading and benefitting from the Russian occupation. EU, UK, US and other sanctions authorities could consider better coordinating their sanctions towards the occupied territories to ensure maximum impact. • Restitution: Many people from the occupied territories have lost their businesses, homes and savings. The Ukrainian government and international donors could develop mechanisms to find ways to compensate them directly for losses of homes or businesses, potentially funded with the profits from frozen Russian assets.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 35.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE), 2025. 64p.