By Sharon Dolovich

This Article is the first scholarly work to identify and describe the experience of sleep deprivation in prison—an experience that, although an inherent feature of prison life, has gone almost entirely unnoticed even by those legal scholars, advocates, and policymakers committed to ensuring humane carceral conditions. Drawing on original data from interviews with people who served time in prisons all over the country, it maps the multiple overlapping conditions that routinely prevent the incarcerated from getting anything close to adequate sleep. Sleep is a basic human need, as fundamental to human survival and adequate human functioning as access to food, water, and shelter. Yet this Article’s findings are unambiguous: chronic sleep deprivation is an intrinsic part of prison life, as constitutive of the carceral penalty as are crowded conditions, grossly inadequate medical care, inedible food, and the ongoing risk of physical and sexual assault. After providing a brief overview of the sleep science, the findings of which make plain the physical and psychological damage caused by insufficient sleep, the Article provides a rich sociological account of the experience of trying to sleep in prison. Drawing on the accounts of interview subjects, it identifies ten distinct causes of sleep deprivation inside: five concrete conditions (fiercely uncomfortable beds, hunger, extremes of heat and cold, noise, and excessive light) and five “meta-conditions” (fear of violence, trauma, poverty, overly intrusive rules enforcement, and daily humiliation). This Article then considers some of the normative implications of the phenomenon explored here, including what the reality of sleep deprivation in prison means for our understanding of prisons and of carceral punishment, the prospects for Eighth Amendment conditions claims grounded in sleep deprivation, and the policy challenges likely to confront efforts to address this problem.

 96 S.Cal.L. Rev. 95, UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 26-06

By Raoul Sumo Tayo

This report explores current and emerging maritime piracy trends and the associated flow of criminal activities in Cameroon.

Maritime piracy has become one of the most urgent security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, which is currently the second-most affected region worldwide. Cameroon’s coastline is at the centre of these dynamics, with attacks, shifting routes and an expanding set of criminal activities that both accompany and sustain piracy. Understanding these trends is essential to analysing how violence is maintained at sea, in mangrove areas and on land.

This report provides an overview of current and emerging patterns of maritime piracy and the cohabitant flows that reinforce it. It tracks the evolution of incidents on and off the Cameroonian coast, describing the methods used by individuals commonly referred to as pirates, including timing of attacks, routes, targets and operational tactics. While vessel boardings, attempted attacks, hijackings and kidnappings have generally decreased, illegal activities that generate alternative income have increased, particularly hostage-taking, extortion and illegal taxation. These criminal flows sustain pirate economies and strengthen their resilience when groups are not directly involved in kidnapping-for-ransom operations.

PretoriaL  Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 42p.

New South Wales. Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety

An interim report for the inquiry into measures to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. The report considers the Crimes and Summary Offences Amendment Bill 2025 and puts forward some considerations for Parliament when debating the Bill. The Bill was introduced on 19 November 2025, following a neo-Nazi protest outside Parliament House on 8 November 2025. The event was widely condemned.

The protest shows the current laws have been failing to prevent right-wing extremists from mobilising and recruiting. Legislative change is required to address the worrying rise of right-wing extremism.

The Crimes and Summary Offences Amendment Bill 2025 is an important step in combatting right-wing extremism. The Committee has considered the Bill in the context of a broader inquiry into measures to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. 

The Committee strongly supports the Bill as a key measure to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. At the same time, the Committee acknowledges the risk of constitutional challenge to any law that may restrict the implied freedom of political communication.

Parliament of New South Wales, 2026. 21p.

By FATF/OECD - GAFILAT 

This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place in Brazil as at the date of the on-site visit, 13-31 March 2023. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Brazil’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings a) Brazil has a strong domestic coordination mechanism to address risks from money laundering, ENCCLA. Brazil has built a legal and structural framework largely enabling competent authorities to prevent and combat ML. More recently, Brazil has also improved its framework to fight terrorist financing (TF) by passing legislation criminalising the offence and enabling implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS). Informed by the longstanding coordination within ENCCLA and a National Risk Assessment conducted in 2021, authorities have shared and robust understanding of national ML threats, namely, corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime, environmental crimes, and tax crimes. There is a precise understanding of the ML risks and vulnerabilities linked to most threats— including informal and illicit value transfers, misuse of cash, and front companies—however, there is a lack of depth in the understanding of financial flows linked to environmental crimes. b) Through ENCCLA, since 2003, Brazil has developed and refined policies to tackle many of its higher ML risks, particularly those stemming from corruption. Brazil has taken many steps to address other higher risk areas, however, these actions are taken without longer-term, comprehensive strategies, which results in occasional disjointed efforts and misalignment of objectives and priorities (such as ML from environmental crimes where interagency cooperation is growing but limited, and where some keyauthorities lack sufficient resources). At times, structural issues inhibit effective coordination in combatting ML/TF, including cooperation between police and prosecution offices and resources to handle the complex criminal justice system. In addition, the tax authority (RFB) has a central role in the AML/CFT system given that it controls access to many pieces of relevant information, but legal obstacles frustrate its full ability to assist other authorities in tackling ML/TF and its own AML/CFT activities are not adequately prioritised. c) Brazil has successfully prosecuted high-end cases of ML, including from corruption, reflecting the capacity to conduct financial investigations and the development of supportive institutional structures. Despite important successes, there is a mismatch between the investigative input and the results seen in terms of prosecutions and convictions. Structural issues have a major impact. Among other things, ML proceedings take too long due to appeals and when convictions are obtained, sometimes a decade or more after charges, and the sanctioning regime needs major improvements. Criminal assets are generally identified and temporarily seized, and in some major cases Brazil was able to recuperate large sums of criminal money; however, there was not sufficient evidence of final confiscation and asset recovery is mainly accomplished through agreements. While there is highlevel commitment to fighting ML/TF, the resources available to competent authorities are largely insufficient, particularly those of COAF and prosecutors. Lack of resources hinders the production of deeper financial intelligence to identify a larger number of complex ML schemes and frustrate efforts to trace criminal financial networks. d) Brazil is committed to fighting terrorism and terrorist financing and has an improving understanding of its TF risks including those stemming from farright extremism. While it has expertise to investigate TF activity, the legal framework in place and the corresponding view of the authorities hinder successful prosecutions. The authorities are not always well coordinated to identify, prosecute, or prevent TF. The framework to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay for TF and proliferation financing is in place, although it remains largely untested at the time of the onsite visit as no designations had been made by Brazil and no funds or assets were frozen. Sanctions implementation by the private sector is improving particularly in the financial sector, thanks to the supervisory activity of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), and more slowly in other sectors. There is a lack of interagency coordination on issues related to the financing of proliferation and guidance is needed for the private sector. NPOs are not yet subject to risk-based measures specifically to prevent TF. e) As a major regional and global economy, Brazil has a large and diverse universe of financial and non-financial sectors with increasing sophistication. BCB is the key supervisor for the most material financial institutions and its long-standing risk-based activities have contributed to significantly improve the ability of financial institutions to detect and prevent ML and TF, particularly the largest ones. With few exceptions, other supervisors have not been able yet to take sufficient measures to ensure sufficient implementation of the AML/CFT framework. At the time of the on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with soon-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with so on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with some improvements needed in extradition and the speed of responses.

Paris, FATF, 2023. 354p.

By Jeffry A. Collins

Cryptocurrencies and Financial Crimes: The Role of Decentralized Cryptocurrency in Facilitating Money Laundering and the Challenges Posed on Anti–Money Laundering Regulations, 

By Jeffry A. Collins

This research examines the role of decentralized cryptocurrencies in facilitating money laundering and the challenges they pose to Anti–Money Laundering (AML) regulations through literature review and regulatory analysis. The study reveals that the decentralized, anonymous, and borderless nature of cryptocurrency enables illicit activities via cryptocurrency ATMs, mixing services, and decentralized exchanges (DEXs). For over a decade, the same regulatory problems persist today as were present at the inception of cryptocurrencies. Current AML frameworks, such as the Bank Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act, are inadequate for this decentralized ecosystem. The analysis critiques the fragmented efforts of U.S. regulatory agencies, identifying enforcement gaps and inconsistencies. To address these vulnerabilities, the paper proposes three solutions: mandating privacy–preserving technologies like zero–knowledge proofs for mixing services, requiring decentralized identity solutions for cryptocurrency ATMs and DEXs, and enhancing public education oncryptocurrency risks and safe practices. The study concludes with an urgent call for comprehensive regulatory reforms and educational initiatives to balance innovation, privacy, and security while combating money laundering in the cryptocurrency sector.

34 U. MIA Bus. L. Rev. 71 (2025).

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Bobby Boxerman and Celeste Barry
Prior criminal records account for a large share of already lengthy prison sentences, often adding years or even decades to sentences, without evidence of community safety benefits.



What’s new? Recruitment of children to fight in armed and criminal groups has boomed across Colombia over the last decade, with hundreds of minors lured into joining violent groups on false promises of wealth, status and protection. This war crime disproportionately affects Colombia’s ethnic communities and those who live in conflict zones.

Why does it matter? Armed groups rely on minors to maintain territorial control. Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping. Recruitment shatters communities’ ability to resist armed groups because locals fear their own family members will be the targets of reprisals if they speak out.

What should be done? Colombia should act promptly to identify children at risk, boost protection at schools (where recruitment often happens) and strengthen its criminal investigations into the perpetrators. Foreign donors should support police efforts to track recruiters and help strengthen communities’ ability to prevent the crime from taking place.

International Crisis Group, 2026, 28p.

By Alice Fereday

Chad’s role as a departure and transit country for northbound migration to North Africa and Europe is often overlooked, particularly in comparison to neighbouring Niger and Sudan. However, the country’s position at the crossroads of routes connecting central and eastern Africa to Libya and Niger makes it a significant transit corridor for regional migration, and its role as a bastion of relative stability in an increasingly volatile region has further increased its importance in recent years. Since 2023, the conflict in Sudan and a major influx of refugees into Chad have further shaped these mobility dynamics, making the country a major destination and transit point for Sudanese refugee displacement in the region. At the same time, Chad is navigating a fractious and contested political transition. Political violence escalated in 2024 and remains an important source of tension and political instability. The combination of these complex internal and regional dynamics, and their impact on human smuggling dynamics, make Chad a key country to monitor. A major component of human smuggling dynamics in Chad is internal movements to the country’s northern goldfields. These mobility patterns have typically been shaped by internal factors, including political instability, rebel activity and gold mining.1 This changed in 2023 with the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan and the massive influx of refugees and returnees into eastern Chad. Though northbound movements were temporarily hindered by this shift, which resulted in a relative decrease in demand for northbound travel from eastern Chad in the early months of the conflict, by the end of 2023 human smuggling had picked up again as many Sudanese began leaving refugee camps with the intention of travelling to northern Chad, Libya, Niger and Tunisia, often with the help of smugglers.2 In 2024, these movements escalated further and human smuggling between eastern and northern Chad saw significant growth, due in large part to increasing demand among Sudanese refugees for travel to northern Chad and Libya. However, the movement of Sudanese refugees through Chad also involved travel to Niger via N’Djamena or northern Chad. Northbound movements in Chad were also driven by increasing demand for travel to the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield. The flow of prospective gold miners, which began after the goldfield reopened at the end of 2022, was also facilitated by decreased restrictions on northbound travel as risks of rebel incursions in northern Chad remained contained in 2024. This encouraged the activities of passeurs, who catered to increasing demand for northbound travel, particularly from eastern Chad.Overall, Chad recorded progressively increasing movement levels in 2024 compared to previous years, presaging its emergence as an important space to watch for migrant and refugee movement, and associated protection risks. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Chad. It builds on a series of annual reports – issued since 2019 – which track the evolution of human smuggling in Chad and the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it

By Alice Fereday ̵and Alexandre Bish

Human smuggling in Chad mostly involves northbound movements linking southern and eastern areas of the country to the north, in particular the gold mining areas in the Tibesti mountains, and to Libya. As a result, these dynamics are often connected to and impacted by the situation in northern Chad, where decades of political unrest, successive rebellions, intercommunity conflict, and deeply entrenched illicit economies and transnational organized crime dynamics are key factors of instability. Chadian authorities have long responded to these risks through securitization, including, in recent years, tight control over key routes and hubs, and a ban on travel to the north, further increasing demand for smuggling services among Chadians travelling to the goldfields or further afield to Libya, and in some cases, Europe. In 2022, human smuggling activity in Chad continued to be heavily affected by the political and security developments that followed the incursion led by the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for change and concord in Chad – FACT) and ensuing death of President Idriss Déby, the country’s long-time leader, in April 2021. This upheaval interrupted what had been a broader rise of human smuggling from and through Chad, which, despite being illegal, had increased since 2016. This rise was in part due to the displacement of smuggling routes from Niger and Sudan, following anti-smuggling interventions in those two countries, which led to the use of Chad as a transit hub for human smuggling networks. Despite the displacement of routes, the number of migrants transiting the country still paled in comparison to the numbers that continued transiting Sudan and Niger. The most significant human smuggling itinerary in Chad remains the transport of migrants, both Chadian and foreign, to the gold mining economy along the country’s northern border with Libya. Since their discovery in 2012 and 2013, goldfields in the north have developed into major economic hubs attracting mostly poor migrants from across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic and linked travel restrictions in 2020 had little impact on movement to the goldfields. Rather, following the October 2020 ceasefire in Libya, the arrival of former mercenaries previously engaged in Libya to Kouri Bougoudi resulted in an uptick in gold mining, which in turn fuelled demand for workers. This development caused a surge in the movement of Sudanese and Chadian miners towards the goldfield since mid-2020.

By the United Nations.  High Commissioner for Human Rights

UN Human Rights is calling urgent attention to the continuing and critical need for a human rights solution to a particularly “wicked problem” - the complex crisis of trafficking in persons, slavery and other serious human rights violations and abuses that are taking place in South-East Asia in the context of extensive criminal operations set up to perpetrate cyber-enabled fraud. This report centers the lived experience of victims subjected to abuses within these scam operations and who in many cases continue to suffer human rights harms after their release. Through a behavioural science and systems analysis lens, the report also seeks to understand the barriers and enablers that lead victims into these operations through fraudulent recruitment pathways. The report concludes with key messages which call on States, and where relevant other stakeholders, to ensure a human rights-based response to this multidimensional issue, placing the rights, dignity, safety, and well-being of victims of trafficking at its core including through ensuring full respect of the non-punishment principle.

By The Not Invisible Act Commission

There is a crisis in Tribal communities. A crisis of violence, a crisis of abuse, and a crisis of abject neglect affecting Indian Women & Men, Indian Children, and Indian Elders. The federal government must act now; not tomorrow; not next week; not next month; and not next year. Once and for all, the federal government must end its systematic failure to address this crisis and react, redress, and resolve this. We call on the federal government to declare a Decade of Action & Healing to address the crisis of missing, murdered, and trafficked Indian people. -- The Not Invisible Act Commissioners _____________________________________________________________________________ With each passing day, more and more American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) persons are victimized due to inadequate prevention and response to the MMIP and HT crisis. Our recommendations encompass actions that must be undertaken without delay to provide AI/AN people and communities with the same sense of safety and security that other communities in the United States take for granted. The United States government’s failure to fulfill its trust responsibilities to Tribal nations, coupled with historic policies that sought to disconnect AI/AN people from their land, language, and culture, have given rise to a public health, public safety, and justice crisis in Tribal communities. The crisis is most notably reflected in the federal government’s failure to effectively prevent and respond to the violence against AI/AN people, particularly in the context of missing, murdered, and trafficked AI/AN people. Despite the best efforts of many individuals across law enforcement (LE), the judiciary, and social services, long-standing institutional failures must be acknowledged and addressed. Calls for action and funding to address these issues have been made repeatedly.1 Although there has been a growing awareness of the high rates of missing, murdered, and trafficked AI/AN people in recent years, and several federal initiatives have been launched,2 addressing the needs in Tribal communities continues to generally be underprioritized by the federal government. Until this changes, violence against AI/AN individuals and on Indian and Alaska Village lands will persist. The Commission believes that the circumstances that have created the crisis of MMIP and HT are not intractable. In fact, to see them so is to continue the unjust past. With resolve and an appropriate investment of resources, these issues can, and must, be effectively addressed. While it is imperative that the federal government take immediate and concerted action, thescale and severity of this issue, and the need for long-term healing and justice, also demand a comprehensive and sustained response. Therefore, we call upon the federal government to declare a Decade of Action and Healing dedicated to addressing this crisis effectively for future generations. Such a declaration would underscore the urgency of the matter and signify a long-term commitment to combatting the deeply rooted issues that perpetuate continued violence against AI/AN individuals and supporting individuals and communities in their healing as they seek justice. This Decade of Action and Healing must involve partnership with Tribal communities, Tribal governments, and relevant organizations, focusing on improving safety, prevention, justice, support services, and healing for AI/AN communities through increased funding, policy reform, action-oriented programs, and training and technical assistance.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice, 2025. 212p.

By Emmanuel Arthur - Ewusie

Ghana's child street crime is a complicated issue that calls for striking a careful balance between protecting national security, respecting human rights, and applying the law. The term "streetism" describes the situation where children live and labor on the streets, frequently without access to basic supplies and at risk from different sources. To address the underlying causes of streetism, safeguard vulnerable children, and maintain social well-being, it is imperative to strike a balance between these objectives. The basic idea of human rights is at the center of the problem. Every child is entitled to education, a secure and supportive home, and defense against abuse and exploitation. But these rights are frequently violated by child streetism in Ghana, where children are put at risk of exploitation, abuse, and neglect. As a result, the protection and realization of children's rights must be given top priority in any strategy to combat streetism, and this strategy should be informed by both Ghanaian law and international human rights norms. Regarding child streetism, criminal law is also very important. It's important to distinguish between criminal behavior and the circumstances that lead to streetism, even though some youngsters may participate in criminal activity while living on the streets. Penalties by themselves may worsen the cycle of poverty and vulnerability and are insufficient to address the root causes of streetism. Instead, social initiatives that deal with family dissolution, poverty, and limited access to healthcare and education should be used in conjunction with criminal law enforcement. In addition, when tackling child streetism, national security implications are considered. Streetism has the potential to worsen social unrest and jeopardize public safety, especially in cities where a high proportion of youngsters live on the streets. Thus, combating streetism involves preserving community stability and security in addition to upholding individual rights. But rather than using punitive tactics, security measures must be put into place in a way that upholds human rights and encourages long-term solutions. This essay aims to present a thorough examination of youth street crime in Ghana, looking at its effects on national security, criminal law enforcement, and human rights. It attempts to contribute to a fuller knowledge of the complex issues faced by child streetism and to inform evidence-based methods for addressing this important issue in Ghana by examining legal frameworks, policy responses, and grassroot activities. In Ghana, the issue of children living and working on the streets creates difficult problems where criminal law, national security, and human rights intersect. This study looks at the causes, prevalence, and effects of child street behavior, considering how it affects children's rights and welfare, the application of the law, and maintaining national security. The research investigates legislative frameworks, policy responses, and grassroots activities targeted at resolving child streetism in Ghana using a multidisciplinary analysis. Additionally, it assesses the efficacy of the current strategies and makes recommendations for a fair and rights-based strategy that puts the child's best interests first while maintaining public safety and security.

Unpublished Paper 2024. 19p.