By The  European Crime Prevention Network

This paper summarises the findings from an expert meeting on youth recruitment into organised crime held in Brussels on 26 and 27 March 2024. In this meeting, co-organised by EMPACT Cocaine, Cannabis, and Heroin (OA 7.1) and the EUCPN, twenty-one experts, representing 15 EU Member States, the European Commission, and the European Crime Prevention Network, shared the latest insights on the growing problem of youth recruitment into organised crime, the multifaceted risk factors contributing to youth involvement in organised crime, and opportunities for prevention. This report highlights key insights relevant for intervention frameworks and actionable recommendations. 

Cf. European Crime Prevention Network,2025. 16p.

By IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION | TRUSTLAW |

Environmental and natural resource-related crimes represent the third-largest illicit economy in the world in terms of the volume of money involved, ranking behind only drug trafficking and human trafficking. These are offenses that affect nature and threaten the planet’s sustainability, such as illegal logging, illicit crops, unauthorized agricultural expansion, illegal gold mining, and wildlife trafficking. These crimes are characterized by the insertion of illegally obtained natural resources into the formal economy — a process known as environmental asset laundering — which is estimated to move between US$110 and US$281 billion per year. Given the diversity and complexity of the strategies used to conceal the illicit origin of these resources, anti-money laundering systems often face challenges in identifying the dynamics of environmental crime. This report analyzes how the legislation of six Amazon Basin countries — Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela — defines environmental crimes and whether the entities required to report suspicious transactions to their national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) are adequately structured to address these crimes. It is through the action of these reporting entities that the asset laundering enforcement system — including law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors — is activated. In general, legal frameworks follow two models: one that links asset laundering to a predefined set of criminal offenses (the so-called “predicate offenses”) and another that recognizes laundering of resources from any offense (“all-crimes model”). The study is divided into two parts. The first examines whether the activities and professions most closely associated with the supply chains vulnerable to environmental and natural resource-related crimes in the Amazon are subject to mandatory suspicious transactions reporting. The second part assesses the application of anti-money laundering laws and asset recovery mechanisms. It also investigates whether national legal frameworks recognize money laundering as a crime associated with these offenses and whether they provide effective instruments for asset recovery in the context of such illicit activities. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION | TRUSTLAW | 2025. 39p.

By Sarah J. Foster, Syd J. Ascione, Francesca Santaniello, Teale N. Phelps Bondaroff

Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is a persistent and extensive threat to global biodiversity. Hundreds of marine fish species are subject to regulation under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), but it is unclear how much protection species gain from CITES because information on marine fish IWT is limited. We used online reports of seized shipments of seahorses (Hippocampus spp.) to investigate their illegal trade. Seahorses were the first genus of marine fishes to be listed under CITES. We compiled 297 unique seizure records from 192 online outlets posted from January 2010 to April 2021 and analyzed the number of seahorses seized, the value of the seized items, trade routes, and other seizure details. Dried seahorses accounted for nearly all seizures, which totaled around 5 million individuals valued at over US$21 million. The reported number of seizures and the number of seahorses seized increased over time. Reported illegal trade involved 62 countries and other jurisdictions. Seized seahorses predominantly originated in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. China was the primary destination. Seahorses were mostly intercepted in transit and in destination countries rather than source countries. Airports were the most common location for seizures, and passenger baggage represented the primary transportation method by number of seizures, but sea cargo facilitated the largest seizures. Seahorses were most commonly seized by customs, often in conjunction with other regulated wildlife products. Although seizures led to detention of actors, information on subsequent legal actions was limited. Addressing the illegal trade in seahorses requires greater enforcement in source countries and increasing the realized risks associated with smuggling. Our findings can inform intelligence-led enforcement efforts to curb seahorse trafficking and highlight data biases and gaps that should be addressed to facilitate enhanced deterrence measures.

Conservation Biology, volume39, Issue5

October 2025

e70047

By Kiril Sharapov, Heather Komenda

This article examines the vulnerability of Ukrainian refugees to trafficking, abuse and exploitation in Poland and Romania following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Drawing on survey data from the International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix and qualitative interviews with key informants, the study applies a multi-level, intersectional framework to assess personal, situational and contextual dimensions of vulnerability. It introduces a ‘continuum of vulnerability’ model, recognising that risks are dynamic, relational and shaped by structural inequalities. Quantitative analysis identifies financial insecurity, age and discrimination as key predictors of harm, whereas qualitative findings highlight the impact of conditional protection regimes, housing insecurity and healthcare barriers. Although few trafficking cases were officially identified, the findings suggest that a well-funded and coordinated rights-based response helped mitigate risks. The article argues that such protection frameworks must remain in place for as long as necessary and that vulnerability should be continuously monitored across all three dimensions.



International Migration
Volume 63, Issue 5

September 2025

By Audrey Macklin

Enlisting states of origin or transit to prevent exit from their own territory has become a tool of extraterritorial migration control for industrialised liberal democratic states. This article first explores the practical erosion of the right to leave any country since the demise of communism, focusing on arrangements between EU member states and select African states of origin or transit. I then document the legitimating function performed by the anti-smuggling and search and rescue regimes in effacing the human right to leave. I conclude by situating exit restrictions in a wider European project of promoting, building and supporting border infrastructure in the name of development and capacity building in select African countries. This permits reflection on what the contemporary use of exit restrictions signifies for the equation of border control and sovereignty.

International Migration, June 2025

By Angeli Romero and Oliver Fisher

This report provides a Blueprint for how to build better visa structures and migration systems. This approach was developed by drawing on the struggles and needs of migrant workers themselves, to build a framework that can work concretely in a variety of contexts.

Vulnerability is not intrinsic to migration; vulnerability is constructed. This can be through factors such as governmental agenda, bureaucratic processes, legislation or reform.

Immigration policies and systems create risks and vulnerabilities to exploitation through complex processes, ineffective safeguards, and restrictive visa conditions imposed on migrant workers. We need to deconstruct the policies that create these risks, and redesign them to enable migrant workers to access rights and enjoy decent standards of work and living conditions.

Policy-makers, employers, sponsors, unions and others can take this framework and apply it, to help bring about a safer, fairer visa structure and migration system into practice.

  London: Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX). 2025. 32p.

By Cole Anderson and Caitlin McKennie

Relative to 2015, statewide net migration (i.e., in-migration subtracted by out-migration) has declined by 52.5% as of 2025. This reflects 36,146 fewer individuals arriving in Colorado in 2025 – roughly four times the capacity of Red Rocks Amphitheatre.i Low net migration presents a growing challenge to Colorado’s economic stability and labor force sustainability. Historically, net migration – particularly among working-age individuals – has been a critical driver of the state’s labor force growth and overall economic vitality. A sustained decline in net migration reduces the inflow of skilled workers, limiting the ability of businesses to recruit talent and expand operations. This dynamic places upward pressure on wages, contributes to labor shortages, and constrains economic productivity across key sectors. Declining migration trends compound the challenges posed by Colorado’s rapidly growing 65+ population. By 2030, Colorado expects roughly 40,000 retirees per year.ii As outlined in a CSI report released in July, while this demographic is expanding, its participation in the labor force is not expected to increase meaningfully in the coming decades. Without a stronger inflow of working-age residents, Colorado’s labor market may face a growing talent shortfall, making it increasingly difficult to meet future workforce demands.  According to a recent study by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Colorado ranks 14th (not including the District of Columbia) in terms of regional price parities relative to all other states (a measurement that evaluates the differences in price levels across states for a given year).iii If these issues remain unaddressed, they could have long-term consequences for the state’s economic competitiveness and growth prospects. Evidence suggests this scenario is already emerging: Colorado’s economic growth is slowing, with job growth projected to increase by only 1.2% in 2025. During the first quarter of 2025, Colorado’s job growth ranked 26th in the nation. This deceleration is suggested to be linked to decreased net migration and an aging population, both of which pose risks to the state’s labor force capacity and overall economic dynamism.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute, 2025. 10p.   

By Michael K. Dzordzormenyoh

This study examines the determinants of public attitudes towards immigrants in Africa, using the contact hypothesis as its framework. This study evaluated how neighbourhood violence affects the acceptance of immigrants using three distinct sample groups: a full sample, a group with no foreign exposure and a group with foreign exposure. This study draws on data from 28 African countries, encompassing 28,685 respondents. Binary logistic regression analysis was employed to investigate the relationship between the independent variables and public acceptance of immigrants. The results indicate that concerns about neighbourhood violence significantly predicted negative attitudes towards immigrants in both the full sample and the group without foreign exposure but not in the sample with foreign exposure. Higher levels of education, especially post-secondary education, were found to be strong predictors of more favourable attitudes towards immigrants across all samples. Notable regional variations were observed, with the western, southern, and northern areas generally exhibiting more negative attitudes. The nation's current economic state negatively influenced attitudes in the full and no-foreign-exposure groups, whereas individual financial circumstances had a positive impact. Border control consistently emerged as a negative predictor across the samples, whereas immigration enforcement demonstrated a positive relationship in certain models. These findings offer crucial insights into the multifaceted elements that shape the public opinion of immigrants in African nations and have substantial theoretical and practical implications. This study contributes to the broader literature on public attitudes towards immigrants and the contact hypothesis from an African perspective

International Migration, Volume63, Issue 4, 

August 2025

By Giulia Bruschi

While most of the immigration towards Spain come from South American countries, the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic remain the most important mixed migration routes from Africa toward Spain, and Europe more in general.

The steady increase in irregular arrivals via the Canary Islands since 2020 has catalysed the attention of EU policymaking and has continued to strain the reception system in the Canary Islands. In 2025, crackdowns on departures from Mauritania led to a reduction in irregular crossings. However, the Atlantic remains one of the deadliest sea crossings worldwide, and the land journeys to embarkation points also remain fraught with risks.

Meanwhile, the Western Mediterranean route continues to be used by migrants from West African countries, who must cross North Africa to reach the Mediterranean shores, and also poses several risks.

In this context, throughout 2024, MMC, in partnership with UNHCR, interviewed 497 migrants recently arrived in Spain via the Canary Islands, the Mediterranean, or via the land crossing in Ceuta and Melilla. The interviews aimed to explore their migration drivers, journeys, as protection risks in transit, asylum and onward movement intentions from Spain.

Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 31p.

By The 

Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit

Over recent years, thousands of children have been wrongly treated as adults by the Home Office. These children are in the UK on their own seeking asylum. Following decisions made by UK border officials that they are “significantly over 18” they have been sent alone to adult asylum accommodation, usually hotels. This is a report about children housed in adult hotels after these decisions at the border, based on Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit’s legal and place-based expertise and experience, and on the experiences that the children we work with have shared.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “You can’t stop feeling sad. You have to feel sad and angry when someone says you are a liar. It is in your heart.” Between January 2024 and February 2025, at least 296 children were wrongly sent to adult asylum accommodation, usually hotels, in the North West. This is a report about what children experience in asylum hotels, how theyare sentthere,andthe supportthey needtoget out. We are sounding the alarm – as others have done before us – that these children are being put at significant risk. Much harm has already been done, and must be acknowledged; and the government, local authorities andaccommodationprovidersmustact now topreventfurther harm. We are sounding the alarm – as others have done before us – that these children are being put at significant risk. Much harm has already been done, and must be acknowledged; and the government, local authorities and accommodation providers must act now to prevent further harm.

Our recommendations:

To the Home Office:

• The Home Office must admit children are wrongly treated as adults at the border and suspend all “significantly over 18” decisions until investigated.

• Repeal recent changes to age assessments introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act, and end the for-profit asylum housing model.

• Meanwhile, the Home Office should notify local authorities when children are placed in hotels and publish clearer data on age disputes.

To accommodation providers:

• Immediately refer to the local authority when staff become aware that a potential child is in adult asylum accommodation.

• Take all possible measures to safeguard potential children.

• Update training for hotel staff so they are aware of the high likelihood of children being treated as adults.

To local authorities: 

• Ensure social workers’ decisions and training include an understanding of the child’s experience in the UK, including being traumatised by Home Office age assessment practice.

• Ensure that potential children are not held to higher thresholds in assessments when local authority capacity is stretched.

• Do not refer children to the National Age Assessment Board (NAAB).

Manchester, UK: Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit, 

2025. 49p.

By Cayley Russell, Geoff Bardwell, Matthew Bonn, Jade Boyd, Elaine Hyshka, Jurgen Rehm, Farihah Ali

 On January 31, 2023, BritishColumbia (BC) launched a 3-year pilot initiative decrim-inalizing the possession of up to 2.5 g of select illegal drugs. The policy aims to reduce stigma, address racial disparities in drug law enforcement, and improve police relations with people who use drugs (PWUD). As part of a national evaluation, we conducted qualitative inter-views with 100 PWUD who reported using drugs at least three times a week across BC between October 2023 and February 2024. Participants, diverse in sociodemograph-ics, drug use patterns, and police interaction histories,largely reported an adversarial relationship with police,marked by historical mistreatment and the targeting of individuals based on aspects of their social iden-tity, such as ethnicity, housing status, and other visible markers. Despite police generally adhering to the pol-icy, some participants reported unlawful drug seizures,reinforcing mistrust. Although some noted reduced fear of police, most felt their negative perceptions persisted post-decriminalization, highlighting a need for further police education and training to address stigma and inconsistent enforcement.Policy Implications: Our findings underscore the need for improved police education and training through bet-ter standardization, with an emphasis on promoting consistency and increased transparency, particularly in the use of discretion. Training should also address the impact of systemic racism and discriminatory policing practices to foster equitable interactions with PWUD.Further consideration of alternative nonpunitive legal approaches, alongside expanded harm reduction ser-vices, treatment options, social supports (such as hous-ing), and community-based initiatives, could be highly beneficial. Continued monitoring and evaluation of the policy's impact on PWUD is essential.

Criminology & Public Policy. Volume 24, Issue 3 Aug 2025

By Eric L. Piza, Brandon C. Welsh, Savannah A. Reid, David N. Hatten

A long-standing critique of place-based crime prevention interventions has been that any reductions in crime are often short-lived. If researchers do not carry out longer-duration follow-ups, we cannot know for sure if the effects of these interventions will persist, decay, or even strengthen. Using a rigorous micro synthetic control design, we evaluated the long-term impacts of a large-scale, public-area closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance project in Newark, New Jersey. Results show that the CCTV project was associated with a statistically significant reduction of auto theft in the intermediate term (3–4 years). The reduction of auto theft approached statistical significance (p = 0.08) during the short term (1–2 years). The analysis also observed potential displacement effects, with displacement of robbery (p = 0.09) in the short term (1–2 years) and theft from auto (p = 0.06) in the long term (9–11 years) approaching statistical significance.

Policy implications

The results of this study may suggest the potential for a slightly modified view of deterrence decay. The CCTV project's effect on auto theft grew from approaching significant to statistically significant between the short-term and intermediate-term periods. Such “sleeper effects” suggest that an extended period was necessary for CCTV to generate deterrence. The deterrence decay during the long-term period did not occur until after these sleeper effects emerged, which may be understood as deterrence attenuation. Although only approaching statistical significance—and not as pronounced as the reduction of auto theft—the potential displacement of robbery and theft from auto indicates that static CCTV target areas may facilitate offenders taking advantage of nearby crime opportunities while appearing inconspicuous within CCTV viewsheds. In sum, policymakers should be mindful that research evidence limited to short-term impacts may fail to detect nuanced effects relevant for policy and public guidance.

Criminology & Public Policy, Volume 24, Issue 3, Aug 2025, Pages307-497

By Chris van der Borgh and Wim Savenije

This paper analyses a government-facilitated truce, begun in 2012, between El Salvador’s three principal street gangs. Using field theory and securitisation theory, it maps the evolution of the truce, distinguishing between the three related processes of making the deal, keeping the truce, and resisting it. It analyses the complex and intriguing political processes in which various actors, such as gang leaders, government officials and international organisations, interacted with each other and made deals about the use and visibility of violence and ways of diminishing, preventing or hiding it.  

  Journal of Latin American Studies (2019), 51, 905–928 doi:1

By Jonathan Gilbert  · Michael Levi

 This article examines the role of organised crime groups (OCGs) in the organisation and commission of mortgage and property related frauds. Whilst conventionally in criminological and policing studies, serious and organised crime has been associated with the commission of violent, gang and drug-related crimes, there is an increasing focus on the collective and facilitative role that motivated ofenders and ‘professional enablers’ like lawyers and accountants have in the commission of fnancial crimes for gain. This article utilises case studies and social network analysis (SNA) of police-defned OCGs to identify the ties criminal actors have with other ‘members’ and broader connections. It considers causal agency and the social relations that exist within the OCG that support highly organised and sophisticated operational dynamics necessary to the commission and reproduction of organised fraud. In addition to a review of the current literature, empirical data was collected from regulatory enforcement proceedings, criminal prosecution fles, trial transcripts, witness statements and interviews with law enforcement, regulators, victim-lender participants and lead members of mortgage and property fraud OCGs. SNA is used to show how members collectively share motivations to plan and co-ordinate criminal behaviour for fnancial gain, communicate and collaborate on both an ongoing enterprise and individual project basis, and how recruitment strategies, based on kinship, support resilience and the ability to reproduce organised fraud. Examining the social network of mortgage fraud OCGs, including biographies, roles, responsibilities of members, including professional enablers and straw persons and the ties and interactions between them, will assist in understanding mortgage fraud. In particular, they will show how these individual, proximal and causal factors ft within the broader, macro- crime facilitative environment in which mortgage and property related frauds are organised and are capable of being reproduced. 

By Sharon Dolovich

This Article is the first scholarly work to identify and describe the experience of sleep deprivation in prison—an experience that, although an inherent feature of prison life, has gone almost entirely unnoticed even by those legal scholars, advocates, and policymakers committed to ensuring humane carceral conditions. Drawing on original data from interviews with people who served time in prisons all over the country, it maps the multiple overlapping conditions that routinely prevent the incarcerated from getting anything close to adequate sleep. Sleep is a basic human need, as fundamental to human survival and adequate human functioning as access to food, water, and shelter. Yet this Article’s findings are unambiguous: chronic sleep deprivation is an intrinsic part of prison life, as constitutive of the carceral penalty as are crowded conditions, grossly inadequate medical care, inedible food, and the ongoing risk of physical and sexual assault. After providing a brief overview of the sleep science, the findings of which make plain the physical and psychological damage caused by insufficient sleep, the Article provides a rich sociological account of the experience of trying to sleep in prison. Drawing on the accounts of interview subjects, it identifies ten distinct causes of sleep deprivation inside: five concrete conditions (fiercely uncomfortable beds, hunger, extremes of heat and cold, noise, and excessive light) and five “meta-conditions” (fear of violence, trauma, poverty, overly intrusive rules enforcement, and daily humiliation). This Article then considers some of the normative implications of the phenomenon explored here, including what the reality of sleep deprivation in prison means for our understanding of prisons and of carceral punishment, the prospects for Eighth Amendment conditions claims grounded in sleep deprivation, and the policy challenges likely to confront efforts to address this problem.

 96 S.Cal.L. Rev. 95, UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 26-06

By Raoul Sumo Tayo

This report explores current and emerging maritime piracy trends and the associated flow of criminal activities in Cameroon.

Maritime piracy has become one of the most urgent security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, which is currently the second-most affected region worldwide. Cameroon’s coastline is at the centre of these dynamics, with attacks, shifting routes and an expanding set of criminal activities that both accompany and sustain piracy. Understanding these trends is essential to analysing how violence is maintained at sea, in mangrove areas and on land.

This report provides an overview of current and emerging patterns of maritime piracy and the cohabitant flows that reinforce it. It tracks the evolution of incidents on and off the Cameroonian coast, describing the methods used by individuals commonly referred to as pirates, including timing of attacks, routes, targets and operational tactics. While vessel boardings, attempted attacks, hijackings and kidnappings have generally decreased, illegal activities that generate alternative income have increased, particularly hostage-taking, extortion and illegal taxation. These criminal flows sustain pirate economies and strengthen their resilience when groups are not directly involved in kidnapping-for-ransom operations.

PretoriaL  Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 42p.

New South Wales. Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety

An interim report for the inquiry into measures to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. The report considers the Crimes and Summary Offences Amendment Bill 2025 and puts forward some considerations for Parliament when debating the Bill. The Bill was introduced on 19 November 2025, following a neo-Nazi protest outside Parliament House on 8 November 2025. The event was widely condemned.

The protest shows the current laws have been failing to prevent right-wing extremists from mobilising and recruiting. Legislative change is required to address the worrying rise of right-wing extremism.

The Crimes and Summary Offences Amendment Bill 2025 is an important step in combatting right-wing extremism. The Committee has considered the Bill in the context of a broader inquiry into measures to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. 

The Committee strongly supports the Bill as a key measure to combat right-wing extremism in New South Wales. At the same time, the Committee acknowledges the risk of constitutional challenge to any law that may restrict the implied freedom of political communication.

Parliament of New South Wales, 2026. 21p.

By FATF/OECD - GAFILAT 

This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place in Brazil as at the date of the on-site visit, 13-31 March 2023. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Brazil’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings a) Brazil has a strong domestic coordination mechanism to address risks from money laundering, ENCCLA. Brazil has built a legal and structural framework largely enabling competent authorities to prevent and combat ML. More recently, Brazil has also improved its framework to fight terrorist financing (TF) by passing legislation criminalising the offence and enabling implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS). Informed by the longstanding coordination within ENCCLA and a National Risk Assessment conducted in 2021, authorities have shared and robust understanding of national ML threats, namely, corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime, environmental crimes, and tax crimes. There is a precise understanding of the ML risks and vulnerabilities linked to most threats— including informal and illicit value transfers, misuse of cash, and front companies—however, there is a lack of depth in the understanding of financial flows linked to environmental crimes. b) Through ENCCLA, since 2003, Brazil has developed and refined policies to tackle many of its higher ML risks, particularly those stemming from corruption. Brazil has taken many steps to address other higher risk areas, however, these actions are taken without longer-term, comprehensive strategies, which results in occasional disjointed efforts and misalignment of objectives and priorities (such as ML from environmental crimes where interagency cooperation is growing but limited, and where some keyauthorities lack sufficient resources). At times, structural issues inhibit effective coordination in combatting ML/TF, including cooperation between police and prosecution offices and resources to handle the complex criminal justice system. In addition, the tax authority (RFB) has a central role in the AML/CFT system given that it controls access to many pieces of relevant information, but legal obstacles frustrate its full ability to assist other authorities in tackling ML/TF and its own AML/CFT activities are not adequately prioritised. c) Brazil has successfully prosecuted high-end cases of ML, including from corruption, reflecting the capacity to conduct financial investigations and the development of supportive institutional structures. Despite important successes, there is a mismatch between the investigative input and the results seen in terms of prosecutions and convictions. Structural issues have a major impact. Among other things, ML proceedings take too long due to appeals and when convictions are obtained, sometimes a decade or more after charges, and the sanctioning regime needs major improvements. Criminal assets are generally identified and temporarily seized, and in some major cases Brazil was able to recuperate large sums of criminal money; however, there was not sufficient evidence of final confiscation and asset recovery is mainly accomplished through agreements. While there is highlevel commitment to fighting ML/TF, the resources available to competent authorities are largely insufficient, particularly those of COAF and prosecutors. Lack of resources hinders the production of deeper financial intelligence to identify a larger number of complex ML schemes and frustrate efforts to trace criminal financial networks. d) Brazil is committed to fighting terrorism and terrorist financing and has an improving understanding of its TF risks including those stemming from farright extremism. While it has expertise to investigate TF activity, the legal framework in place and the corresponding view of the authorities hinder successful prosecutions. The authorities are not always well coordinated to identify, prosecute, or prevent TF. The framework to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay for TF and proliferation financing is in place, although it remains largely untested at the time of the onsite visit as no designations had been made by Brazil and no funds or assets were frozen. Sanctions implementation by the private sector is improving particularly in the financial sector, thanks to the supervisory activity of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), and more slowly in other sectors. There is a lack of interagency coordination on issues related to the financing of proliferation and guidance is needed for the private sector. NPOs are not yet subject to risk-based measures specifically to prevent TF. e) As a major regional and global economy, Brazil has a large and diverse universe of financial and non-financial sectors with increasing sophistication. BCB is the key supervisor for the most material financial institutions and its long-standing risk-based activities have contributed to significantly improve the ability of financial institutions to detect and prevent ML and TF, particularly the largest ones. With few exceptions, other supervisors have not been able yet to take sufficient measures to ensure sufficient implementation of the AML/CFT framework. At the time of the on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with soon-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with so on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with some improvements needed in extradition and the speed of responses.

Paris, FATF, 2023. 354p.

By Jeffry A. Collins

Cryptocurrencies and Financial Crimes: The Role of Decentralized Cryptocurrency in Facilitating Money Laundering and the Challenges Posed on Anti–Money Laundering Regulations, 

By Jeffry A. Collins

This research examines the role of decentralized cryptocurrencies in facilitating money laundering and the challenges they pose to Anti–Money Laundering (AML) regulations through literature review and regulatory analysis. The study reveals that the decentralized, anonymous, and borderless nature of cryptocurrency enables illicit activities via cryptocurrency ATMs, mixing services, and decentralized exchanges (DEXs). For over a decade, the same regulatory problems persist today as were present at the inception of cryptocurrencies. Current AML frameworks, such as the Bank Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act, are inadequate for this decentralized ecosystem. The analysis critiques the fragmented efforts of U.S. regulatory agencies, identifying enforcement gaps and inconsistencies. To address these vulnerabilities, the paper proposes three solutions: mandating privacy–preserving technologies like zero–knowledge proofs for mixing services, requiring decentralized identity solutions for cryptocurrency ATMs and DEXs, and enhancing public education oncryptocurrency risks and safe practices. The study concludes with an urgent call for comprehensive regulatory reforms and educational initiatives to balance innovation, privacy, and security while combating money laundering in the cryptocurrency sector.

34 U. MIA Bus. L. Rev. 71 (2025).

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Bobby Boxerman and Celeste Barry
Prior criminal records account for a large share of already lengthy prison sentences, often adding years or even decades to sentences, without evidence of community safety benefits.



What’s new? Recruitment of children to fight in armed and criminal groups has boomed across Colombia over the last decade, with hundreds of minors lured into joining violent groups on false promises of wealth, status and protection. This war crime disproportionately affects Colombia’s ethnic communities and those who live in conflict zones.

Why does it matter? Armed groups rely on minors to maintain territorial control. Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping. Recruitment shatters communities’ ability to resist armed groups because locals fear their own family members will be the targets of reprisals if they speak out.

What should be done? Colombia should act promptly to identify children at risk, boost protection at schools (where recruitment often happens) and strengthen its criminal investigations into the perpetrators. Foreign donors should support police efforts to track recruiters and help strengthen communities’ ability to prevent the crime from taking place.

International Crisis Group, 2026, 28p.