By C.J. McKinney

In 2025, the government announced that it intends to make changes to asylum appeals.1 These would include a new appeals body staffed by adjudicators, replacing the current First-tier Tribunal staffed by immigration judges.2 This briefing examines previous changes to the structure of asylum appeals over the years. A September 2025 briefing by Amnesty International captures the main shifts: In May 1969, Parliament created a two-tier system to deal with appeals against various Home Office decisions. Appeals were generally made to and decided by people called adjudicators. If permission was granted, an adjudicator’s decision could be appealed, including by the Home Office, to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. This two-tier appeals system was later formally constituted as the Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA). The rules governing appeals procedures were made by the Home Secretary, a power which was later transferred to the Lord Chancellor. On 4 April 2005, the IAA was replaced by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT). The change involved changing the title of the people who decided appeals from adjudicators to judges. The change gave the appearance of merging a two-tier system into one. However, the system remained two-tier. If permission was granted, a more senior judge could review a decision of the first tier of that system. This process was called reconsideration rather than appeal but was essentially the same. On 15 February 2010, the AIT was abolished, and its functions passed to the current appeals body. The change involved moving the judges from the AIT to the current body. The second tier of this body (the Upper Tribunal) has a higher status making it more difficult to seek judicial review of its decision to refuse permission to appeal against a decision of the first tier (the First-tier Tribunal). This appeals body also has more independence from government, including over the rules that govern the appeals for which it is responsible. 3 This briefing goes into more detail on all these developments. It does not cover changes to the substance of appeal rights over time; these are For general context: claims for asylum are usually based on the United Nations Refugee Convention, which the UK has ratified.summarised in a 2019 report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. 

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library 2026. 16p.

By Edward Carpenter

“Civilisation” is a word that evokes triumph — of human ingenuity, collective organisation, rising standards of living, the unfolding of arts and sciences, the building of cities, bridges, empires. And yet, as Edward Carpenter’s 1889 work Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure; and Other Essays demonstrates, civilisation can also be approached as a problem: as a state of society marked by dis-ease, alienation, and unsustainability. Carpenter, a socialist, poet, philosopher and social reformer, treats civilisation not simply as the progress of humankind but as a complex and ambivalent phenomenon — one that may require “cure” as much as celebration.

In this volume Carpenter brings together his earlier lectures and essays — including the eponymous essay “Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure,” along with essays on science, morality, custom, and society.The book thus serves as both a diagnosis of modern Western society and an expression of an alternative vision for humanity’s social and moral development.

In the following pages we will consider: first, the intellectual and historical context of the work; second, the major themes and arguments set out by Carpenter; third, the structure of the essays and the particular significance of the titular essay; fourth, an evaluation of the work’s place in the history of social thought; and fifth, pointers for contemporary reading, criticism and further research.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 164p.

By Gijs Kruijtzer

How do people justify what others see as transgression? Taking that question to the Persian-Muslim and Latin-Christian worlds over the period 1200 to 1700, this book shows that people in both these worlds invested considerable energy in worrying, debating, and writing about proscribed practices. It compares how people in the two worlds came to terms with the proscriptions of sodomy, idolatry, and usury. When historians speak of the gap between premodern practice and the legal theory of the time, they tend to ignore the myriad of justifications that filled this gap. Moreover, a focus on justification evens out many of the contrasts that have been alleged to exist between the two worlds, or the Muslim and Christian worlds more generally. The similarities outweigh the differences in the ways people came to terms with the various rules of divine law. The level of flexibility of the theologians and jurists in charge of divine law varied more over time and by topic than between the two worlds. Both worlds also saw the development of ever more sophisticated justifications. Amid the increasing complexity of justifications, a particular kind of reasoning emerged: that good outcomes are more important than upholding rules for their own sake.

Berlin: DeGruyter, 2024. 344p.