Edited by Allan Nevins

Preface: Brand Whitlock, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, began keeping a diary during theGerman invasion. The diary spans over twenty notebooks, covering the Great War and its immediate aftermath, focusing on Belgium.The selection in the book ends with Whitlock’s resignation as Ambassador.The diary provides a frank account of the revictualing of Belgium, the suffering of theBelgian people under German occupation, European politics post-Armistice, and Whitlock’s personal growth. Whitlock had a dual view of Belgium: admiration for its cultural heritage and a critical perspective on its modern industrial state.He had limited time to acquaint himself with Belgium before the war, focusing initially on the aristocratic and artistic circles of Brussels.

Chapter I: The German Invasion Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914, and invaded Luxembourg and Belgium shortly after.Belgium refused Germany’s ultimatum to allow troops to pass through, leading to the German invasion on August 4.The Belgian army,under King Albert, made a heroic stand at Liege, delaying theGerman advance.Whitlock describes the mobilization of the Belgian army, the patriotic fervor, and the impact on civilians.The King addressed Parliament, emphasizing national unity and resistance.Whitlock recounts his interactions with various diplomats and the challenges faced by Americans and Germans in Brussels.The fall of Liege and the subsequent German advance are detailed, with Whitlocknoting the bravery of the Belgian soldiers and the suffering of the civilian population.

Overall, the document provides a detailed account of the early days of World War I in Belgium, the German invasion, and the establishment of relief efforts to support theBelgian population. Whitlock’s diary offers insights into the political, social, and humanitarian challenges faced during this period.

D. Appleton-Century Company, Incorporated, 1936, 734 pages

By Samuel Eliot Morison

The biography“John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography”by Samuel Eliot Morison provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the life and naval career of John Paul Jones, a prominent figure in American naval history.

John Paul Jones was born inScotland and began his seafaring career at a young age. Heapprenticed on merchant ships, gaining valuable experience.and as aMerchant Marineheworked in the West Indies trade, eventually becoming a shipmaster. His career was marked by a controversial incident in Tobago, where he killed a mutinous sailor in self-defense.Jones joined the Continental Navy in 1775, driven by a desire to fight for American Independence. He was commissioned as a lieutenant and later promoted to captain.He commanded several ships, including the Providence and the Alfred. He conducted successful raids and captured numerous British vessels, gaining a reputation for his boldtactics.As captain of the Ranger, Jones led a daring raid on Whitehaven, England, in 1778,aiming to disrupt British shipping and boost American morale.Jones achieved a significant victory by capturing the British warship Drake in a fierce battle off the coast of Ireland.

Jones’s most famous battle occurred in 1779 when he commanded the BonhommeRichard against the British ship Serapis. Despite severe damage to his ship, Jones emergedvictorious, cementing his legacy.But he faced numerous challenges, including difficulties with prize money, conflicts with other officers, and the complexities of international diplomacy.

In his final years Jones served in the Russian Navy under Catherine the Great but faced political intrigue and professional setbacks, and spent his last years in France, struggling with health issues and financial difficulties. He died inParis in 1792.

Samuel Eliot Morison’s biography of John Paul Jones offers a detailed and scholarly account of the sailor’s life, blending historical accuracy with engaging narrative. The book is enriched with visual aids, original sources, and contributions from various experts,making it a valuable resource for understanding the complexities of Jones’s character and achievements.

Naval Institute Press, 1999, 453 pages

By: Jennifer Vallentine, Roberto Forin, and Bram Frouws  

Migrant-receiving countries are increasingly focusing on return and reintegration as central elements of migration management. This briefing paper outlines key messages from research MMC has carried out on the experience of returning migrants in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe, since 2017

Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 8p.

By James Cockayne, Sophia Kagan, Fiona Ng

This report highlights significant modern slavery risks faced by temporary migrant workers in agriculture, horticulture and meat processing in rural and regional NSW. The modern slavery risks identified include debt bondage, deceptive recruiting, forced labour and, in extreme cases, servitude, sexual servitude and even human trafficking. The report examines significant vulnerabilities faced by both Pacific workers and backpackers concerning working conditions, wages and entitlements; accommodation, transport and living conditions; gendered violence and healthcare access and isolation and social marginalisation. It also highlights growing indicators that the burden of supporting these exploited migrant workers is falling on local communities and community service providers that are not adequately resourced for this task.

Recommendations 

1. Urgently initiate a trauma-informed and worker-centred investigation of modern slavery risks faced by Pacific Australia Labour Mobility workers and other temporary migrant workers working in agriculture, horticulture and meat processing in rural and regional NSW.

2. Ensure relevant NSW Government frontline agencies undertake suitable training in modern slavery, as envisaged by section 19(3)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2018.

3. Advocate for the Federal Government to review the visa settings and protection requirements for temporary migrant workers in the PALM and Working Holiday Makers programs.

4. Complement the work of the new Migrant Workers Centre to be established in NSW, with regional migrant centre hubs.

5. Ensure funding and support to local actors, including to create a more active role in the monitoring of conditions and support to temporary migrant workers.

Office of the NSW Anti-slavery Commissioner, 2024. 33p.

By The American Immigration Council

In recent months, leading politicians and policymakers have renewed calls for mass deportations of immigrants from the United States. While similar promises have been made in the past without coming to fruition—during the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, Donald Trump pledged to create a “deportation force” to round up undocumented immigrants —mass deportation now occupies a standing role in the rhetoric of leading immigration hawks. To cite just one example, former U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) director Tom Homan has promised “a historic deportation operation” should a hawkish administration return to power. While some plans have envisioned a one-time, massive operation designed to round up, detain, and deport the undocumented population en masse, others have envisioned starting from a baseline of one million deportations per year. Given that in the modern immigration enforcement era the United States has never deported more than half a million immigrants per year—and many of those have been migrants apprehended trying to enter the U.S., not just those already living here—any mass deportation proposal raises obvious questions: how, exactly, would the United States possibly carry out the largest law enforcement operation in world history? And at what cost? Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) along with publicly available data about the current costs of immigration enforcement, this report aims to provide an estimation of what the fiscal and economic cost to the United States would be should the government deport a population of roughly 11 million people who as of 2022 lacked permanent legal status and faced the possibility of removal. We consider this both in terms of the direct budgetary costs—the expenses associated with arrest, detention, legal processing, and removal—that the federal government would have to pay, and in terms of the impact on the United States economy and tax base should these people be removed from the labor force and consumer market. In terms of fiscal costs, we also include an estimate of the impact of deporting an additional 2.3 million people who have crossed the U.S. southern border without legal immigration status and were released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from January 2023 through April 2024. We consider these fiscal costs separately because we don’t have more recent ACS data necessary to estimate the total net changes in the undocumented population past 2022, or the larger impact on the economy and tax base of removing those people, an impact that is therefore not reflected in this report. In total, we find that the cost of a one-time mass deportation operation aimed at both those populations—an estimated total of at least $315 billion. We wish to emphasize that this figure is a highly conservative estimate. It does not take into account the long-term costs of a sustained mass deportation operation or the incalculable additional costs necessary to acquire the institutional capacity to remove over 13 million people in a short period—incalculable because there is simply no reality in which such a singular operation is possible. For one thing, there would be no way to accomplish this mission without mass detention as an interim step. To put the scale of detaining over 13 million undocumented immigrants into context, the entire U.S. prison and jail population in 2022, comprising every person held in local, county, state, and federal prisons and jails, was 1.9 million people. To estimate the costs of a longer-term mass deportation operation, we calculated the cost of a program aiming to arrest, detain, process, and deport one million people per year—paralleling the more conservative proposals made by mass deportation proponents. Even assuming that 20 percent of the undocumented population would “self-deport” under a yearslong mass-deportation regime, we estimate the ultimate cost of such a longer operation would average out to $88 billion annually, for a total cost of $967.9 billion over more than a decade. This is a much higher sum than the one-time estimate, given the long-term costs of establishing and maintaining detention facilities and temporary camps to eventually be able to detain one million people at a time—costs that could not be modeled in a short-term analysis. This would require the United States to build and maintain 24 times more ICE detention capacity than currently exists. The government would also be required to establish and maintain over 1,000 new immigration courtrooms to process people at such a rate. Even this estimate is likely quite conservative, as we were unable to estimate the additional hiring costs for the tens of thousands of agents needed to carry out one million arrests per year, the additional capital investments necessary to increase the ICE Air Operations fleet of charter aircraft to carry out one million annual deportations, and a myriad of other ancillary costs necessary to ramp up federal immigration enforcement operations to the scale necessary.

 American Immigration Council, 2024. 52p.

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights 

Documents provided to UWCHR under FOIA reveal that despite voicing concerns about cleanliness at the NWDC multiple times over three years, ICE chose never to sanction GEO for failing to comply with its contract to operate the Northwest Detention Center. This, cross-referenced with other ICE and GEO documents UWCHR has reviewed, reveals that despite receiving credible information about conditions at the facility that threatened the health and well-being of those detained, and despite the complaints of its own employees, ICE repeatedly failed to invoke its contract enforcement mechanisms to force GEO to comply with basic cleanliness standards. Records show the situation persisted for three years and resulted in what ICE employees deemed an unsafe working environment. If ICE’s employees felt unsafe, it is unsurprising that the people forced to live in that environment have repeatedly expressed grave concern  

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights , 2023. 9p.  

By Ralph Rashleigh

The memoir has been edited from its original Victorian novel style to a more direct and vivid narrative. Ralph Rashleigh, a pseudonym, was a London apprentice who turned to crime, leading to his transportation to Australia. Rashleigh endured brutal treatment in the Australian penal system, reflecting the harsh and often sadistic practices of the time. The memoir provides a vivid account of the penal system and criminal law in the early 19th century, highlighting its brutality and inefficacy.

I929 BY JONATHAN CAPE AND HARRISON SMITH INCORPORATED

By C.M. Macinnes

The document provides a detailed history of England’s involvement in the slave trade, focusing on the pre-Emancipation period. It covers various aspects such as the rise of the slave trade, the organization and purchase of slaves, the Middle Passage, and the abolition movement. The book is based on unpublished materials and rare books from the 18th and early 19th centuries. The author expresses gratitude to several individuals and institutions for their assistance in the research and publication of the book.

J. W. ARROWSMITH LTD, 1934

By: JOSEPH CAMPBELL

“The King and the Corpse: Tales of the Soul’s Conquest of Evil,” edited by Joseph Campbell from Heinrich Zimmer’s notes, delves into the symbolic and philosophical meanings behind various myths and legends from different cultures. The book explores the eternal conflict between good and evil, using stories to illustrate the interplay between human actions, fate, and the forces of good and evil.

Key Stories and Themes:

1. Abu Kasem’s Slippers:

• Summary: A miser’s old slippers repeatedly cause him trouble, symbolizing the inescapable nature of one’s actions and the concept of karma.

• Theme: The story highlights how one’s past actions can continually affect their present and future, emphasizing the importance of change and letting go.

2. A Pagan Hero and a Christian Saint:

• Summary: This section contrasts the myth of Conn-eda, an Irish prince who undergoes trials to become a perfect king, with the legend of Saint John Chrysostom, who achieves sainthood through sin, repentance, and redemption.

• Theme: It explores the journey of self-completion through the mastery and assimilation of conflicting opposites, and the different paths to spiritual fulfillment.

3. Sir Gawain and the Green Knight:

• Summary: An Arthurian legend where Sir Gawain accepts a challenge from a mysterious Green Knight, leading to a journey of self-discovery and moral testing.

• Theme: The tale examines human flaws, the nature of true honor, and the integration of life’s dualities (life and death, male and female).

Main Arguments:

• Interplay of Human Actions and Fate: The stories illustrate how human actions are intertwined with fate and the cosmic battle between good and evil.

• Philosophical Insights: Zimmer’s commentary reveals deeper philosophical meanings within these myths, suggesting they reflect universal truths about the human condition.

• Moral Integrity and Self-Awareness: The tales emphasize the importance of self-awareness, moral integrity, and accepting life’s dualities.

Additional Details:

• Publication and Context: The book was prepared from Zimmer’s extensive notes after his death in 1943 and published in 1948 as part of the Bollingen Series.

• Visual and Contextual References: The editor’s foreword and the list of plates provide additional context and visual references for the stories discussed.

Overall, “The King and the Corpse” is a rich exploration of mythological narratives that delve into the complexities of human nature, the struggle between good and evil, and the quest for spiritual and moral integrity.

BOLLINGEN SERIES XI, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

By: Sarah J. Eckman and Karen L. Shanton

Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or in response to such service; interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials' exercise of their duties; and intimidation for helping voters register or cast a vote. Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws, such as prohibitions against voter intimidation or harassing or threatening interstate communications, might also apply to some conduct. Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. State legislators have established new prohibitions or protections, such as a New Hampshire law that prohibits intimidating election officials to interfere with their work and an Oregon law that extends existing privacy protections to election workers.

Library of Congress, Sep 9, 2024

Edited by Krista Lynes, Tyler Morgenstern, and Ian Alan Paul

In recent years, spectacular images of ruined boats, makeshift border camps, and beaches littered with life vests have done much to consolidate the politics of movement in Europe. Indeed, the mediation of migration as a crisis has worked to shore up various forms of militarized surveillance, humanitarian response, legislative action, and affective investment. Bridging academic inquiry and artistic and activist practice, the essays, documents, and artworks gathered in Moving Images interrogate the mediation of migration and refugeeism in the contemporary European conjuncture, asking how images, discourses, and data are involved in shaping the visions and experience of migration in increasingly global contexts.

Bielefeld : Transcript, [2020]

By The American Immigration Council

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a temporary immigration status provided to nationals of certain countries experiencing problems that make it difficult or unsafe for their nationals to be deported there.1 TPS has been a lifeline to hundreds of thousands of individuals already in the United States when problems in a home country make their departure or deportation untenable. This fact sheet provides an overview of how TPS designations are determined, what benefits TPS confers, and how TPS beneficiaries apply for and regularly renew their status.

Washington DC: American Immigration Council, 2024. 8p.

By Emily M. Brown

The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program protects migrants from deportation when their native countries have been struck by armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary upheaval. Enacted by Congress in 1990, the program largely escaped attention and controversy for many years as presidential administrations of both parties designated, extended, and terminated TPS designations at similar rates. However, beginning in 2017, then-President Trump tried to end TPS protections for 300,000 beneficiaries—more than 95% of the total. His efforts were blocked in federal district courts, and President Biden has since rescinded the terminations and issued many new designations, expanding the program to its largest size ever and protecting hundreds of thousands of vulnerable migrants. Nonetheless, the future of TPS is more uncertain than ever now that it has become as politically polarizing as many other aspects of the national immigration debate. Many TPS holders have now held the temporary status for over two decades, and they deserve a solution to enable them to reside permanently in the U.S. Some scholars have proposed legislative reforms to enable long-time TPS holders to qualify for green cards while also making modest adjustments to the program that would make it more temporary in nature for the future. But efforts to provide a path to permanent residence for long-time TPS holders through legislation are unlikely to be fruitful in the current political climate. Meanwhile, newer TPS beneficiaries, who are fleeing armed conflict and civil strife in countries like Afghanistan, Haiti, and Venezuela, are plagued by slow processing times of their applications, keeping them out of the formal labor market, and they often remain stuck in immigration removal proceedings, which is unnecessary, costly, and could put them in greater danger of removal if a future administration terminates their TPS designation. This Article argues that this and future administrations should build on the accomplishment of extending humanitarian protection to hundreds of thousands of new beneficiaries by taking additional executive actions to benefit both long-time and new TPS beneficiaries, including designating and redesignating more countries for TPS, terminating removal proceedings for those who are eligible for TPS, and creating a parole program that will help longtime TPS holders eventually attain permanent residency.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 879, Buffalo Law Review, Volume 72, pp. 101-168, 

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and MedicineNational Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Individuals from minoritized racial and ethnic groups continue to face systemic barriers that impede their ability to access, persist, and thrive in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) higher education and workforce. Without actively dismantling policies and practices that disadvantage people from minoritized groups, STEMM organizations stand to lose much needed talent and innovation as well as the ideas that come from having a diverse workforce. A new report from the Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences examines the backdrop of systemic racism in the United States that has harmed and continues to harm people from minoritized groups, which is critical for understanding the unequal representation in STEMM. The report outlines actions that top leaders and gatekeepers in STEMM organizations, such as presidents and chief executive officers, can take to foster a culture and climate of antiracism, diversity, equity, and inclusion that is genuinely accessible and supportive to all.

Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2023. 342p

By Heizler (Cohen), Odelia, Israeli, Osnat

Dramatic events can evoke feelings of compassion, fear, or threat, and can affect public opinion regarding controversial issues. Such an event was the drowning of 3-year-old Alan Kurdi, a Syrian boy whose body washed up on a Turkish shore, and was photographed, producing an iconic image that was seen worldwide. The image evoked empathy and compassion that neuroscience and psychological research associate with a motivation to help. This paper examines the impact of this event on four different aspects of attitudes toward immigration, some of which are more closely linked to pro-social behavior than others. The timing of the European Social Survey in Portugal allowed us to use this tragic event as a natural experiment. Our results show that Kurdi's drowning had a significant effect on emotion-related sentiments, but no such impact was detected on other attitudes. The results suggest that the event did not change the respondents' opinion regarding the possible negative consequences of immigration on the host country's economy, crime level, or culture, nor did it change their perception of the skills required by immigrants. On the other hand, the empathy induced by the tragic event increased their willingness to have a less restrictive immigration policy and their openness to having close social relationships with immigrants.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2024. 34p.

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

2019’s Keep Washington Working (KWW) Act and 2020’s Courts Open to All Act (COTA) place Washington state at the forefront of national efforts to protect immigrant rights through state law. Yet the mere passage of these laws doesn’t mean they’re actually being enforced. After 18 months of research evaluating the implementation of KWW and COTA through the analysis of practices in 13 priority counties, this first report of the University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) “Immigrant Rights Observatory” shares several key findings. Because the local police and sheriffs have historically played a significant role in bringing Washingtonians into contact with federal immigration enforcement, this report focuses on the ways in which law enforcement agencies and jails have implemented KWW. Key findings include the following:

• Law enforcement agencies across our state are dedicating energy and effort to KWW implementation—though not, for the most part, using the Attorney General Office’s model policies designed to provide guidance to local agencies on this process.

• Everyday policing still blurs into opportunities for federal immigration enforcement. Despite KWW’s prohibitions on the sharing of non-public information about immigrant Washingtonians with ICE/CBP for purposes of civil immigration enforcement, some local police and sheriff’s deputies continued to summon federal agents to the scene of traffic stops, to provide tips about the location of specific individuals, and to participate in multi-agency task force operations that include civil immigration arrests.

• Washington jails and prisons remain key points in the pipeline to immigration detention and deportation. In the booking process, some jails continued to request place of birth information that the law bars them from gathering, and to share it—as well as other information—with ICE/CBP. Detainers, or “immigration holds” which request jails keep custody of individuals beyond their release date to facilitate their apprehension by ICE/CBP, continued to be honored in multiple jurisdictions.

• Jail contracts in flux. KWW mandates Washington’s jails to cease holding immigrants in civil detention under contract with ICE/CBP by December 2021; in anticipation of this date, at least two jails have already terminated the practice. However, one other jail has indicated it expects to continue its contract with CBP beyond that date, using probable cause statements from CBP to justify the detention as criminal rather than civil detention.

• Areas unaddressed by the law remain cause for concern. These include regular DOC-ICE release notifications, local/federal database interoperability, and other ways in which immigrants with criminal recormcnairds—not necessarily even convictions—experience law enforcement and the justice system in dramatically different ways than other Washingtonians, solely because of their citizenship.

Seattle: University of Washington, Center for Human Rights. 2021

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

In 2019, the Washington state legislature passed a landmark “sanctuary” law aimed at safeguarding immigrant rights, the Keep Washington Working Act (KWW). In doing so, it prohibits many once-routine practices that, in the past, funneled many Washington state residents into contact with federal immigration enforcement. While many migrant justice organizations worked hard to secure the law’s passage, in achieving victory they also faced an important challenge. The law’s requirements are sweeping, but the provisions for its enforcement – its “teeth” – are quite modest. Unlike the Sanctuary Promise Act subsequently passed in Oregon, Keep Washington Working does not task any agency with monitoring or responding to violations of the law. And it does not contain a private right of action, which would incentivize efforts to secure compliance by allowing individuals or organizations to recover damages from jurisdictions that violate the law. Indeed,  in the early days of the law, some jurisdictions openly indicated their intention to flout its provisions, signaling that implementation challenges were likely ahead. Since 2020 the UWCHR has examined the law’s implementation, both in policy and practice, across Washington. In this context, it is not easy to know whether the law has accomplished the changes it promised for Washington’s communities. For this reason, since 2020 the UWCHR has examined the law’s implementation, both in policy and practice, across Washington. While real-time monitoring of conditions in communities across the state exceeds our capacity, we conducted this work by sampling areas and practices identified as high priority concerns by partner organizations, including the Washington Defender Association, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, ACLU of Washington, Columbia Legal Services, OneAmerica, and Washington Immigrant Solidarity Network, and using public records requests to document patterns of concern.6 We also rely on analysis of quantitative data obtained from ICE through requests and litigation under the federal Freedom of Information Act to track enforcement trends in our state in ways that shed light on shifting practices. (We anticipate publication of a full report on those trends in the weeks ahead.) Our first report on KWW’s impact, “Protecting Immigrant Rights: Is Washington’s Law Working?”, was published in August 2021, and identified areas of progress as well as concern. Today, we offer an update on the law five years after its entry into force. While concerns about lack of compliance remain, and we note some of these below, we also highlight some of the behind-the-scenes ways that advocates in civil society and government have acted to ensure the law is effectively securing protections for the rights of migrants in Washington. 

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights 2024. 20p.

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

As the United States enters the height of the 2024 electoral season, a familiar pattern is at the forefront of campaign rhetoric: Democrats and Republicans alike declare themselves ever tougher on “the border,” making claims about “record” numbers—of arrests, deportations, border crossings—to bolster their arguments. The deep politicization of immigration policy provides incentives for the data to be used misleadingly by both sides. In fact, the reality of how immigration policy is carried out is more complex: against the backdrop of shifting local and national policies, raw numbers do not necessarily capture what is happening on the ground in actual communities, and may in fact obscure our understanding of the human rights implications of immigration enforcement. This report dives into the question of what shifting trends in immigration enforcement – nationally and locally – mean for communities here in the Pacific Northwest (PNW).1 Drawing on various collections of data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including some datasets we release here for the first time, as well as on data from immigration courts and insights from immigrant-serving organizations, we examine three central questions: • How is immigration enforcement happening in the PNW? • How does our region’s experience compare to national trends? • What are the implications of these trends for human rights? We find that recent changes in state and local   In this report, we refer to the “Pacific Northwest” or “PNW” as shorthand for the states of Oregon and Washington. These two states, plus Alaska, make up ICE’s “Seattle Area of Responsibility.” Because there is comparatively little immigration enforcement in Alaska, we do not address the circumstances in that state here. policy have contributed to important gains for migrant justice here in the PNW, many of which are highlighted in our recent report “Paths to Compliance: The Effort to Protect Immigrant Rights in Washington State”. This is reflected in changing arrest patterns across the PNW: whereas in past years, local and state law enforcement helped channel migrants into the custody of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the wake of “sanctuary state” legislation in Oregon and Washington, this happens much less frequently. And while ICE officials warned that they would compensate for curtailed collaboration in sanctuary jurisdictions by conducting more “at large” arrests on the streets and in communities, this does not appear to have been the case in recent years. Instead, Biden administration policies have attempted to alleviate bottlenecks at the US/ Mexico border by shifting the processing of new arrivals to the interior of the country and opening up new pathways for some migrants seeking asylum. For the most part, the growing enforcement numbers we have seen in the PNW reflect this, as migrants arriving here from the southern border are arrested at subsequent check-ins while following instructions from CBP and ICE, rather than in community raids. This is not to suggest that enforcement has been lax. Quite the contrary: recently-arrived migrants, many of them families with small children, and from communities with fewer established support networks in the PNW, face dire conditions and deep challenges defending their rights. And although reports of workplace raids or community-based arrests appear to have waned, such practices could return under a more overtly repressive administration;  thanks to DHS’ growing use of public and private databases, tracking technologies, and digital detention, data on migrant communities is readily available to ICE and CBP, here as elsewhere in the country. At the same time, analysis of court data shows that in fact, outcomes of immigration court cases brought in Washington and Oregon are markedly worse than the national average. This means that although our communities have taken important steps to protect the rights of immigrants, there is no firewall between the “progressive” PNW and national anti-immigrant practices. The border is, in this sense, everywhere: our neighbors continue to be separated from their families in our courts, held under abysmal conditions in ICE detention, and deported through our airports; in some ways, in fact, migrants fare worse here than in other parts of the country. We have a lot of work to be done before the PNW can truly consider itself a “sanctuary” for immigrants.    

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights 2024. 24[p.

The Australian Human Rights Commission

The treatment of children in the criminal justice system, some as young as 10 years old, is one of the most urgent human rights issues facing Australia today. Numerous inquiries and reviews, including Royal Commissions, as well as UN Committees, have highlighted serious breaches of rights and systemic problems with our child justice and related systems over many years. However, Australia continually fails to implement evidence-based reforms to our child justice systems which would reduce offending behaviour and make our communities safer. This report investigates opportunities for reform of child justice and related systems across Australia, based on evidence and the protection of human rights. It is the result of a project undertaken by the National Children’s Commissioner (NCC) in 2023–24. The project included a submissions process, consultations with children and young people, families, community members, and interviews and roundtables with government and non government stakeholders across Australia.

Canberra: The Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024. 195p.

By Ruth Ellen Wasem

This article uses a multidisciplinary approach — analyzing historical sources, refugee and asylum admissions data, legislative provisions, and public opinion data — to track the rise and fall of the US asylum and refugee policy. It shows that there has always been a political struggle between people who advocate for a generous refugee and asylum system and those who oppose it. Today, the flexible system of protecting refugees and asylees, established in 1980, is giving way to policies that weaponize them.

It offers a historical analysis of US refugee and asylum policies, as well as xenophobic and nativist attitudes toward refugees. It places Trump administration refugee policies in three categories: those that abandon longstanding US legal principles and policies, most notably non-refoulement and due process; those that block the entry of refugees and asylees; and those that criminalize foreign nationals who attempt to seek asylum in the United States.

The article concludes with an analysis of public opinion research to square the growing public support for refugees and asylees shown in polling data with the subgroup popularity of Donald Trump’s harsh xenophobic rhetoric and policies. These seemingly contradictory trends are consistent with research on right-wing populism. It argues that the restoration of generous humanitarian policies requires robust civic engagement and steadfast legislative efforts.

Journal on Migration and Human Security Volume 8, Issue 3, September 2020, Pages 246-265