By John Power,  Sean Phillips, Stuart Carroll

The scale and volume of challenges facing the new ministerial team at the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) necessitates a significant turnaround operation to enhance NHS productivity and performance. Indeed, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care used his first public statement to reflect that “the policy of this department is that the NHS is broken”. Amid operational pressures (including long waits for care), poor patient satisfaction (at its lowest levels since the early 1980s), high-profile cases of abuse and anaemic productivity growth since the pandemic, the way that the NHS is managed and led is back firmly in the spotlight. The work of managers – particularly non-clinical, operational managers – working across the NHS is often invisible to the public, but touches almost every aspect of health and care delivery from the implementation of electronic patient records and upgrading the hospital estate to planning rotas for doctors and nurses. Yet the present debate concerning health and care management is often driven by a weak or anecdotal evidential basis. In a recent interview, the Health Secretary reflected he was “unconvinced by the majority of research…which suggests the NHS is under-managed”. A recent study concludes that “there is little existing evidence to support either this narrative or counterclaims.” As the 2015 Smith Review noted, management capacity and capability is “under examined” in healthcare planning. Politicians (of all stripes) alongside commentators in the media have in recent years blamed poor performance on “NHS managers”, whilst holding more positive opinions about “front line” staff. A recent analysis from the Policy Unit at King’s College London reveals half of the public believe there are “too many managers in the NHS”.. Some healthcare professionals also reflect this view, perceiving non-clinical managers to be a challenge to professional autonomy and authority. In the public policy debate, too much emphasis is placed on discussion about the volume of managers working in the NHS: the narrative that either simply expanding the headline numbers of ‘managers’ or in scaling back a ‘bloated bureaucracy’ will deliver the necessary service improvement and efficiency gains. A greater focus on management capability is needed, as is a deeper understanding of the permissions and incentives which enable or inhibit improved performance and productivity. We also need to re are employed between NHS England (NHSE) and DHSC. In addition to this, the recently-published Independent Review of NHS Performance, authored by Lord Darzi, finds that “regulatory type organisations now employ some 7,000 staff, or 35 per provider trust, having doubled in size over the past 20 years”. The “right balance of management resources in different parts of the structure” is needed, he concludes. Such an assessment must not fix its attention solely upon the management of hospitals (as important as this is) but must also consider the requirements of the healthcare system as a whole – particularly primary and community healthcare services whose management and leadership requirements are less frequently discussed in policy debates, but where expectations for the transformation of services are great and there are unique challenges and circumstances to be addressed given these are far more devolved and dispersed care settings. Moreover, we should not solely investigate roles, but must also consider the architecture and “organisational culture” which influences activity within the NHS as well as the NHS’s interaction with Government departments and arms-length bodies. The focus and purpose of this report, therefore, is two-fold: 1. Firstly, to present a more detailed portrait of the state of NHS management today to inform the discussion around about future reform. How is management distributed across the country and across organisations? Would a greater volume of managers overall deliver improved performance? Are there particular skillsets we are lacking? 2. Secondly, to set out the case for change and to make a series of recommendations for reform.  

London: Policy Exchange, 2024. 62p.

By Alexandre Bish, Hervé Borrion, Ella Cockbain, Sonia Toubaline,

Since the so-called ‘migrant crisis’ in 2015, there has been intense policy interest around irregular migration along the Central Mediterranean Route to Europe. Despite increased research focus on this route, the details and geographical intricacies of these migration journeys have scarcely been examined. In this study, we investigate the what, where, and how of the journeys of 71 people who traveled from Libya across the Mediterranean Sea to Malta. To do so, we break down their journeys into scripts (i.e. sequences of activities) and represent them as a composite script graph. We find that journeys were long – 18 months on average – and circuitous, involving diverse and complex geographical paths. Smuggling, brokerage, and working during transit were key aspects of most journeys. Worryingly, two-thirds of participants experienced detention and/or forced labor before reaching Malta. By pinpointing where and how harm occurs, the composite script graph can support policymakers in reducing harm, including by accounting for the possible harm that interventions may cause, directly or as a result of displacement.

Criminology & Criminal Justice, Oct. 2024.  Online first.

Edited by Ingrid Muenstermann

This book demonstrates the tide of change of immigration and emigration. Societies of the northern part of the globe, which had previously sent people to developing countries in the southern hemisphere, are experiencing a never-ceasing influx of registered and unregistered people from the southern part of the globe. In thirteen chapters written by experts from all over the world, this book explores emigration and immigration during the last three centuries.

London: InTechOpen, 2023. 223p.

By Ray Jureidini and Said Fares Hassan

Migration and Islamic Ethics, Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship contains various cases of migration movements in the Muslim world from ethical and legal perspectives to argue that Muslim migration experiences can offer a new paradigm of how the religious and the moral can play a significant role in addressing forced migration and displacement Readership: All interested in migration movements including residence, naturalization, and citizenship; Islamic Ethics and Islamic legal debates on movements in and out of the Muslim world, including asylum seekers and refugees.

Leiden: Brill, 2019. 240p.

By Anna Ball

Forced Migration in the Feminist Imagination explores how feminist acts of imaginative expression, community-building, scholarship, and activism create new possibilities for women experiencing forced migration in the twenty-first century. Drawing on literature, film, and art from a range of transnational contexts including Europe, the Middle East, Central America, Australia, and the Caribbean, this volume reveals the hitherto unrecognised networks of feminist alliance being formulated across borders, while reflecting carefully on the complex politics of cross-cultural feminist solidarity. The book presents a variety of cultural case-studies that each reveal a different context in which the transcultural feminist imagination can be seen to operate – from the ‘maternal feminism’ of literary journalism confronting the European ‘refugee crisis’ to Iran’s female film directors building creative collaborations with displaced Afghan women; and from artists employing sonic creativities in order to listen to women in U.K. and Australian detention, to LGBTQ+ poets and video artists articulating new forms of queer feminist community against the backdrop of the hostile environment. This is an essential read for scholars in Women’s and Gender Studies, Feminist and Postcolonial Literary and Cultural Studies, and Comparative Literary Studies, as well as for those operating in the fields of Gender and Development Studies and Forced Migration Studies.

Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2021. 223p.

By Stephen Bronars i Edgeworth Economics

To the surprise of many, the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution includes an exception to the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude for criminal punishment. This “punishment clause” allows hundreds of thousands of incarcerated people to be forced to work for little to no pay — a central characteristic of enslavement — today. This study documents the fiscal costs and benefits of ending slavery and involuntary servitude in prisons and mandating fair wages for incarcerated workers. As this study shows, doing so will benefit not only incarcerated workers, but also their families, victims, and ultimately, society at large. Today, roughly 800,000 incarcerated people are forced to work for little — generally less than one dollar per hour — to no pay in federal and state prisons. About 80% are employed in facility maintenance and operations, with most of the remainder, or about 17%, employed in governmentrun businesses and public projects, and just 3% in private sector jobs. Given the low wages, these jobs are often designed to keep people busy rather than convey marketable employment skills. Yet, under the current system it is possible for incarcerated people who refuse to work to be denied family calls and visits, put in solitary confinement, and denied parole.This study assumes that after abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude, legislators will pass additional laws establishing the labor rights of incarceration, namely wage laws. Ending slavery and involuntary servitude and paying incarcerated workers fair wages is expected to change the job composition to reflect 60% of jobs in facility operations and maintenance at minimum wage, 20% in government-run businesses and public projects at prevailing wages, and 20% in the private sector also at prevailing wages. This study anticipates that the marginal fiscal costs to governments and taxpayers of this policy change, factoring in wages and other payroll costs, is between $8.5 billion to $14.5 billion per year.These new costs would be money very well invested, as the fiscal and social benefits of ending slavery and involuntary servitude and paying incarcerated workers a fair wage will far outstrip them. These new benefits from paying incarcerated workers will take time to develop fully. This study anticipates that once the adjustments to paying incarcerated workers are achieved the total fiscal benefits to incarcerated workers, their families and children, crime victims, and society at large is between $26.8 billion and $34.7 billion per year, or a net benefit of $18.3 billion and $20.3 billion per year, implying benefit cost ratios between 2.40 and 3.16.More specifically, this study projects the following benefits:• Impact on Incarcerated Workers: Incarcerated workers will directly benefit from between $11.6 billion and $18.8 billion in annual income, compared to the estimated $847 million they earn today. They will be able to meet their own basic food, hygiene, and communication needs. The valuable work experience they receive will also translate into a present value of $11.3 billion to $11.7 billion per year in additional earnings based on increased employment and earnings expectations after release.• Impact on Families and Children: Families and children will save the money they spend supporting their incarcerated loved ones, as well as receive additional financial support, through child support payments and other income, to the tune of $4.5 billion to $5.8 billion per year.• Impact on Crime Victims: The most significant impact on victims of crime will be incarcerated workers’ increased ability to pay restitution, estimated here to be $89 million per year for robberies.• Impact on Governments and Taxpayers: The federal and state governments and taxpayers will receive tax payments between $1.5 billion and $3.2 billion per year and between $308 million and $431 million per year in payments to the welfare system through child support payments from incarcerated workers. They will also receive $2.1 billion per year in additional tax payments after their release based on increased employment and earnings expectations. Finally, they are estimated to benefit from a 5% reduction in the recidivism and reincarceration rates of incarcerated workers, which will save $1.3 billion in annual incarceration costs in just the short run and $3.7 billion in annual crime costs for the U.S. economy.This study also measures the lifetime benefits, in present value, from the first ten years after ending slavery and involuntary servitude in prisons and paying incarcerated workers a fair wage, and finds that the net fiscal benefits to incarcerated workers, their families and children, crime victims, and society at large is between $171.3 billion and $189.6 billion over the first ten years after this policy is implemented.This study projects that while society overall will benefit from abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude in prison, and from paying fair wages for prison labor, those gains will fall disproportionately to groups and communities that have been most impacted by mass incarceration, specifically Black and Brown people, low-income people, and women.Finally, while this study focuses on the quantifiable fiscal benefits of prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude as criminal punishment and paying incarcerated workers fair wages, it is important to note that there are many other benefits that are difficult to quantify or for which there is little economic data but are as important as the specific ones outlined above — many which could broadly change society. Some of these benefits omitted from the fiscal analysis in this study include:• The increased physical and mental health of incarcerated people, and associated costs, from a recognition of their humanity and dignity with the granting of the basic human right to be protected from slavery and the ability to meet one’s own basic needs.• The increased physical and mental health of incarcerated people and corrections officers, and associated costs, from the reduced reliance on informal “hustles” and increased connection with 4 | Edgeworth Economics loved ones that together lower related violence and victimization in prisons.The financial relief for families and children of communication costs beyond just phone calls, namely video calls and electronic messages.• The increased economic mobility, and related physical and mental health, of incarcerated workers and their families and children stemming from increases in earnings during and after release that can have generational impacts.• The increased payment of fines and fees to governments.• The increased payment of local taxes during and after incarceration. • The reduced financial burden of formerly incarcerated workers on government welfare programs in retirement.

Washington, DC: Pasadena, CA: Edgeworth Economics, 2024. 71p.

By Derek M. Moore 

Human trafficking thrives in the shadows, and the rise of social media has provided traffickers with a powerful and unregulated tool. This paper delves into how these criminals exploit online platforms to target and manipulate vulnerable populations. A thematic analysis of existing research explores the tactics used by traffickers on social media, revealing how algorithms can be manipulated to facilitate exploitation. Furthermore, the paper examines the limitations of current regulations in tackling this online threat. The research underscores the urgent need for collaboration between governments and researchers to combat algorithmic exploitation. By harnessing data analysis and machine learning, proactive strategies can be developed to disrupt trafficking networks and protect those most at risk  

In. Laws 13: 31.

By Gabriella Soto

This article explores how undocumented border crosser (UBC) deaths are counted as well as mis- and under-counted across the US southwest, and proposes a suite of policy remediations to standardize this process. An accurate count of UBC recovered remains is vital to understanding the scope of fatalities associated with border crossing, providing evidence accounting for the reciprocal relationship between US border enforcement and the incidence of migration-related death. To meaningfully intervene, it is insufficient to advocate only for more robust individual death investigations, though this is pivotal to forensically identify UBC decedents and unite them with their loved ones. Though identification and reunification of UBCs are the elements of forensic care most commonly attributed as humanitarian, the relationship between forensic investigation and international humanitarian principles is equally about accumulating primary evidence for policy intervention and justice claims on behalf of those who wrongfully die. Even if existing counting mechanisms do not provide the means for establishing this attribution between border-crossing deaths and border enforcement policy, this article lays out an argument for why they must do so and it makes recommendations for how this can take place. Necessarily, this article begins with a critique of existing mechanisms for counting UBC deaths, from the federal observation of such deaths by Customs and Border Protection, to the bureaucratic mechanisms for the collection of vital statistics authored at the local level. It then suggests means for improving accurate counting using the US Standard Certificate of Death. It particularly explores two aspects of the certificate, Manner of Death reporting and a section that asks death filers to describe how the death occurred, sections 37 and 43 respectively. Finally, it explores historical precedent for altering the standard death form at local and then national levels, positing that select amendments to the existing death certificate would be useful for standardizing how medicolegal death filers across the border and beyond can more accurately enumerate and characterize UBC deaths.

Policy recommendations include the following, in order of immediacy:

• Jurisdictions across the US southwest must adopt standardized criteria for counting fatalities believed to be associated with undocumented border crossing.

• Despite some local formalization of UBC counting, current means of representing UBC status in vital records remains ad hoc across the US southwest and existing mechanisms for counting elude wider scale national recognition in vital statistics. The most straightforward and reliable method of standardization to ensure systematic representation of UBC deaths across the borderlands would be a UBC checkbox on the death certificate. This would require cooperation with state-level public health departments and legislatures. Precedent exists for changing the death form at the state level, facilitating, in some cases, for eventual inclusion of new components of the death certificate to be adopted on the US Standard Certificate of Death. This is recommended as a longer-term goal.

• Finally, there must be a means to characterize the deadly relationship between UBC fatalities and US border enforcement policy and practice in vital records where UBC Manners of Death are most often characterized as “Natural” or “Accidental.” Both are inaccurate. Unilaterally ensuring an accurate count leaves room for a trend already well underway in which agencies associated with border enforcement have cast UBC deaths as simply due to unfortunate heat-related accidents, resulting in legislation aimed to mitigate deaths that fails to address the role of border policy in causing deaths. This paper recommends that a new Manner of Death category could be useful beyond the border to represent non-capital crimes enforced by leveraging bodily harm.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 290-309

By Stephanie Leutert

For the past 25 years, the Border Patrol has tracked migrant deaths along the US-Mexico border. For nearly the same amount of time, it has also faced criticisms that it failed to capture the true number of migrant deaths in its tally. This article focuses on these undercounting criticisms and asks two questions: (1) How many documented migrant death cases are left out of Border Patrol’s official data? And (2) what factors lead to the Border Patrol’s migrant death undercounting? In particular, the article focuses on three South Texas counties: Brooks County, Kenedy County, and Maverick County. To answer the research questions, this article relies on comparative data analysis. In particular, it compares two person-level datasets: the Border Patrol’s dataset on migrant deaths from 2009 to 2017 and county-level records from the Brooks County Sheriff’s Office, the Kenedy County Sheriff’s Office, and Maverick County Justices of the Peace over the same period. It then attempts to match each county-level record to a recorded death in the Border Patrol’s dataset. Using this process, the article quantifies migrant death undercounting in South Texas, highlights geographic and temporal trends, and tracks the uncounted cases’ specific characteristics. From 2009 to 2017, this comparative data analysis confirmed that the Border Patrol was undercounting migrant deaths across the three South Texas counties. Specifically, the article finds that the Border Patrol failed to include 139 cases, which totaled 19 percent of the counties’ 749 recorded migrant deaths during the study period. This undercounting ranged from 16 percent in Brooks County to 24 percent in Maverick County and 29 percent in Kenedy County, with fluctuating rates over time. The uncounted cases also had specific characteristics. In particular, they were more likely to be skeletal remains, lack an identification, and be discovered by an external entity. These characteristics highlight the various factors behind the Border Patrol’s undercounting, such as issues with the Border Patrol’s migrant death definition, inconsistent data collection from external entities, and the agency’s low prioritization of migrant death tracking. To address and remedy the Border Patrol’s migrant death undercounting requires tackling each underlying factor. First and foremost, this article recommends that the Border Patrol fully train its agents on the agency’s migrant death definition and ensure consistent and standardized outreach to external entities. Further, it recommends that the Border Patrol improve its migrant death count’s accuracy through additional operational changes. These proposed changes include making “accurate migrant death counts” an official objective for the Border Patrol’s Missing Migrant Program, prioritizing a two-way information-sharing process with county-level officials, retroactively including missed migrant deaths in the official count, and publishing more detailed person-level data on migrant deaths.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 277-289

By Molly Miranker

This paper explores how qualitative information may be used to enhance understanding and inform recommendations for improved accounting of migrant deaths along the Texas-Mexico border. While border crossing related deaths affect jurisdictions throughout the US’s Southwestern border states and Northern Mexican states, Texas has unique challenges that merit specific examination. In short, the management and investigation of unidentified migrant decedents in Texas is severely fragmented and often noncompliant with Texas Criminal Code Procedure. I explore a way to improve accounting of migrant deaths leveraging qualitative information, local newspaper articles from South Texas and Northern Mexico, by using descriptive summaries coupled with Sankey Diagrams and a programmatic technique, qualitative spatial representation (QSR). QSR enabled me to identify under-recognized stakeholders (South Texas locals, Mexican consulates) and under-supported counties (i.e., those with migrant deaths that do not share a border directly with Mexico). I found that local English-language newspapers obscured the prevalence of migrant deaths and that their narrative tone of “business as usual” normalized the occurrence of such deaths. The Spanish-language articles better represented the diversity of agencies and individuals that were involved in the various aspects of migrant remains management and forensic investigation, most notably residents of South Texas themselves (or situational participants who first found the remains) and Mexican consulates. Finally, I noted that the collaborations among Texas counties and between Texan and Mexican jurisdictions, when they were described in the newspapers, highlighted that the phenomenon of migrant deaths penetrates beyond the dividing line of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo River. Migrant deaths must be accounted for in a way that reflects a regional experience in which people may perish as far as ~100 miles into Texas’ interior. Considering these observations, I have two policy recommendations. First, the Office of the Texas Governor should establish funds distinct from the Operation Lone Star program for the management of unidentified human remains. Currently, grants through the Operation Lone Star Program are the only funds available in Texas to support identification of migrant decedents. However, this program is explicitly designed to further border security operations in the state of Texas, which can contradict efforts around recovery and identification. The documentation and forensic investigation of the unidentified deceased can be eclipsed or neglected under the larger deterrence aims of Operation Lone Star. Second, to improve accounting and increase documentation of migrant deaths, a Regional Identification Center should be established in South Texas. Not every county in Texas has or has access to a Medical Examiner’s office, including the means to transport and pay for autopsy or other forensic services. The Center would provide training, store extra equipment such as mobile refrigerated morgues, and hire personnel to inventory cases, and report information to the state (e.g., vital statistics) and to foreign consulates. A Regional Identification Center would counteract the challenges highlighted in the local newspaper summaries and QSR by decreasing the isolation of counties experiencing migrant deaths and serve as a documentary and communication hub for stakeholders in Texas and Mexico.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 204-225

By Abby Córdova, Jonathan Hiskey, Mary Malone and Diana Orcés

U.S. efforts to control unauthorized crossings of its southwest border have long rested on the idea of deterrence — if migrants know that a border is dangerous to cross and the likelihood of deportation is high, they will be dissuaded from trying in the first place. Despite the seemingly intuitive logic of this strategy, and the billions of dollars invested in it, deterrence efforts largely have failed, with the number of border crossings in recent years exceeding those of 30 years ago. To understand why this decades-old, bipartisan deterrence strategy has proven ineffective, we focus on individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who have previous migration experience, with a vast majority of them seeking entry into the U.S. These individuals have direct knowledge of the difficulties and dangers a border crossing poses, yet many report plans to try to cross the border again. To understand why they persist, we rely on survey data specifically collected to better understand the root causes of international migration. We find that citizens with previous migration experience are significantly more likely to report plans to emigrate, in particular women, younger cohorts, and those at the bottom of the economic ladder. In contrast, family reunification does not appear to play a significant role in driving the migration intentions of those with a prior migration experience. Further, deportation does not deter migrants from trying again, as individuals who have been deported are just as likely to report plans to emigrate again as those who returned to their home countries voluntarily and those who never reached their destination. Most importantly, our research indicates that human insecurity is at the core of why Central Americans who have migrated in the past are more likely to report migration plans for the future. Both the threat of violence and food insecurity are central drivers of their persistent predisposition to embark on the journey again. Individuals remain undeterred in their efforts to escape their country because upon returning to that country, they confront the same conditions that led them to attempt to flee in the first place. We draw two main policy implications from our research. First, the U.S. government should continue its prioritization of investments in tackling the root causes of forced migration through the empowerment of civil society organizations and the channeling of foreign aid to marginalized communities affected by human insecurity, such as those suffering food insecurity or fearing violence. The main objective of these investments should be to improve the living conditions of individuals, giving them a viable option of remaining in their country. Second, the U.S. must invest greater resources in its immigration system to reduce the current backlog of asylum cases, and expand H2-a and -b visa programs to provide a more expansive legal path to migration. Facilitating a legal pathway to immigrants who face heightened human insecurity, like the potential repeat migrants in our study, would prevent further deaths that lay at the hands of a border policy focused on deterrence.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 160-181

By Donald Kerwin and Daniel E. Martínez

The International Organization of Migration has characterized the US-Mexico border as the world’s deadliest land migration route. By August 2024, a minimum of 5,405 persons had died or gone missing along this border since 2014, with record high numbers since 2021. Migrant deaths occur despite decades of: US Border Patrol search and rescue initiatives; public education campaigns targeting potential migrants on the dangers of irregular migration; dozens of academic publications and reports highlighting the root causes of these deaths; efforts by consular officials, local communities, and humanitarian agencies to locate, identify, and repatriate human remains; and desperate attempts by families to learn the fate of their missing loved ones. This paper introduces a special edition of the Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS), which draws on original research and the expertise of medical examiners, forensic anthropologists, social scientists, and humanitarian organizations to examine this persistent human tragedy. Many of the authors investigate migrant deaths in their professional capacities. They identify the dead, return remains to family members, and champion reforms to prevent deaths and better account for the dead and missing. This JMHS special edition represents a collaboration between the University of Arizona’s Binational Migration Institute, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMSNY), and the Working Group on Mapping Migrant Deaths along the US Southwest Border. The Working Group includes scholars and practitioners from California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and New York who have met monthly since October of 2021. The special edition examines in granular detail the causes of migrant deaths, US border enforcement strategies and tactics, migrant death statistics, and the resource and capacity challenges faced by US counties along and leading from the US-Mexico border in investigating these deaths. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and many public officials attribute the deaths to the predations of human smugglers, the victims’ ignorance or assumption of risk, and the harsh “natural” conditions to which migrants finally succumb. This special issue also documents the underlying non-natural causes of this enduring tragedy, and offers both overarching and more targeted solutions to preventing and minimizing migrant deaths. The issue builds upon and extends seminal research on migrant deaths first featured in CMSNY publications more than two decades ago.Section I introduces the issue of migrant deaths by posing the question: Why should we care? Section II describes the genesis of “prevention through deterrence”—a border enforcement theory and strategy—and its evolution through subsequent Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Border Patrol strategic plans. It describes the immense enforcement infrastructure built around this idea by successive administrations and Congresses, and it explains why it has failed to stem irregular migration and how it has contributed to migrant deaths. Section III reviews the main causes of migrant deaths—forced migration, the combined effects of prevention through deterrence and border enforcement tactics, the denial of access to asylum, the border wall, the “naturalization” of migrant deaths, and the dominant vision of the border as a site of danger and exclusion. Section IV reviews the legislative standards for identifying, investigating, and reporting on migrant decedents. It also details the deficiencies of Border Patrol and county-level sources of data on deaths, and it outlines ways to strengthen data collection. Section V discusses the burdens placed on communities along and leading from the border in investigating deaths and their need for greater resources and capacity to address this problem. Section VI outlines the anomalies and challenges related to the Border Patrol’s migrant rescue program. Section VII describes international legal standards to guide the investigation of migrant deaths and two model programs. Section VIII sets forth policy recommendations to prevent migrant deaths and to honor and account for the dead.Journal on 

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 127-159

Edited by Lara Momesso, Polina Ivanova

This edited volume fills a gap in current research on asylum seekers and refugees. By focusing on two East Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan, this volume offers material for comparison and reflection on an area of the world in which this theme is still relatively underdeveloped. By approaching the theme through the different perspectives of human rights, social construction through media representation and public opinion, and lived experiences, the book offers a multifaceted and sophisticated analysis of the phenomenon. The main aim of this collection is to expand current scholarship on refugee studies and offer policy recommendations on the timely topic of refugees and asylum seekers in East Asia.

Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 

Edited by: Stephan Conermann , Youval Rotman , Ehud R. Toledano and Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz

 Over the last two decades, social scientists, legal scholars, human rights activists, and historians, have sought common conceptual grounds in the study of enslavement, thus forging a new perspective that comprises historical and contemporary forms of slavery. This has also intensified awareness of enslavement as a global phenomenon. In this volume, the authors give tentative answers to the question on what global enslavement means.

Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2023. 223p.

By Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

This open-access short reader investigates how migration has become an increasingly important issue in international relations since the turn of the 21st century. It investigates specific aspects of this migration diplomacy such as double citizenship or bilateral agreements on border controls which can become important tools for bargain or pressure. This short reader also discusses the intersections between migration and international relations concerning issues of global governance such as conflicts and refugees, development and mobility, or environmental migration. The book thereby shows the extent of bargaining involved in migration and international relations, the so-called “soft diplomacy of migrations” as seen in the EU/Turkish agreement on borders in 2016, or the EU negotiations with Maghreb or Sub-Saharan countries on readmissions against development programs and visas. As such this reader provides a must-read to students, academics, researchers policy makers, and everyone who wants to learn more about the international relations aspects of migration governance.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2023. 98p.

By Chris Jones , Romain Lanneau , Yasha Maccanico u.a.

For at least three decades, the EU and its Member States have engaged in a process of “externalization” – a policy agenda by which the EU seeks to prevent migrants and refugees from setting foot on EU territory by externalizing (that is, outsourcing) border controls to non-EU states. The EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, published in September 2020, proposed a raft of measures seeking to step up operational cooperation and collaboration to further this agenda. This report aims to contribute to public and political debate on the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the externalization agenda. It contains a series of case studies on three key target states for the EU – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Morocco, and Niger – based on information received in response to access to documents and freedom of information requests submitted to institutions within those countries, as well as within the EU itself.

Brüssel:  Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union, December 2022. 48p.

By Mitch Morrissey  and DJ Summers

Aurora, Colorado’s third-largest city, has made local and national headlines recently for criminal activity in apartment buildings allegedly related to members of a Venezuelan gang. City officials, media commentators, and the public have debated at length the reputed presence of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua and the extent of the gang’s criminal activity across the Metro Denver area. Although crime in Aurora and Denver is still above its pre-pandemic baseline, neither has experienced city-wide elevated crime levels in the last 12 months. However, several areas throughout the cities with documented elevated migrant populations have seen dramatic upticks in crime in 2023 and 2024. Importantly, these trends are not uniform across all centers of migrant populations. The isolated crime that is being committed in the areas in question at apartments on Dallas Street, Nome Street, and 13th Avenue is borne by the surrounding areas, most of which are neighborhoods with lower socioeconomic status. There are economic costs associated with this rise in crime.

Key Findings:

Aurora’s violent crime is not rising as a whole. Violent crime in both Aurora and Denver has decreased since a 2022 peak, though in 2023 annual crime remained elevated from crime in 2019.

Identifying crime trends is difficult among noncitizens, as reporting is lower. Cities are estimated to have a 6% decrease in violent crime reporting and 1% decrease in property crime reporting for every 1% increase in noncitizen residents. The recent migrant surge has resulted in a 12% increase in the number of noncitizens in the Denver metro area.

Publicly available geolocated crime maps do not show a consistent trend of rising crime in the Denver or Aurora locations known to house high numbers of migrants. However, they do show a localized spike in police-reported crime at three Aurora complexes.

The apartments at 1218 Dallas Street in Aurora have seen crimes and citations more than double since 2022, from 31 to 80.

The apartments at 1568 Nome Street in Aurora have seen crimes and citations more than double since 2022, from 33 to 76.

The apartments at 15483 E 13th Avenue Aurora have seen crimes and citations nearly double since 2022, from 29 to 44.

Elevated crime has higher costs in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. The major crimes in 2024 at just the Dallas Street apartments alone have led to $700,000 in tangible and intangible costs. These do not include crimes not reported to police.

Greenwood Village, CO:Common Sense Institute, 2024. 10p.

By Trey Walk, and Maria Burnett,

  Since 2021, political leaders in the US state of Florida have reshaped K-12 schools through laws and policies that censor, distort, and discriminate. Such efforts include passing laws restricting classroom instruction about race in US history, sexual orientation and gender identity, banning books available to students, and setting inaccurate and misleading civics and history standards. “Why Do They Hate Us So Much?” documents the impacts on students of Florida’s denial of access to accurate information about Black history, systemic racism, and about their health, when related to sexual orientation or gender identity. Florida leads the United States in the number of books banned from classrooms and school libraries, primarily literature written by or about LGBTQ people and people of color. Students and teachers report that new legal and curriculum changes have created an environment more conducive to harassment and discrimination in the classroom on the basis of race, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Parents and teachers describe the difficulty of providing children with an education free from discrimination in the increasingly hostile environment. Human Rights Watch, Florida Rising, and Stanford Law School Rule of Law Impact Lab call on Florida to rescind its discriminatory policies and promote a curriculum that counters discrimination and prepares students to live healthy lives in a diverse society. They also call for a bold federal response to address this civil and human rights crisis in US public schools.  

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 107p.

By Heather Rolfe, Sunder Katwala and Steve Ballinger

The Ipsos MORI immigration attitudes tracker offers one of the most authoritative and rigorous sources on what the public thinks about immigration, conducted in 12 waves to date across the last seven years. This latest wave of the tracker was a nationally representative survey of 4,000 adults across Great Britain aged 18+, conducted online between 18 June and 10 July 2021. It examines public attitudes across a range of issues, with some questions having been asked in each wave of research since 2015 to enable comparison. Immigration attitudes have softened significantly over the last seven years, with public sentiment becoming more positive after the 2016 EU referendum and sustaining at that level ever since. The public is now more likely to see the contribution of immigration as positive (46%) than negative (28%) overall, in a reversal of the pattern when this tracker series began in 2015. There is an opportunity for more light and less heat in the immigration debate, though different political challenges remain for both sides of the political spectrum. Anyone seeking to affect change will need to engage with the politics and attitudes of immigration as they are now in 2021, in this new context, and this tracker report offers useful insight. A changing debate The latest Ipsos MORI Issues Index, which measures the issues of greatest concern to the UK public, found that immigration had slid to eighth position as of August 2021. Only 12% of people now regard it as a key issue of concern, but salience has been falling steadily over the last four years. Around four in ten people (42%), however, still feel that we don’t talk about immigration enough. A quarter (25%) feel that it’s discussed the right amount, and 17% say we talk about it too much. Since the immigration attitudes tracker began in 2015, it has asked respondents to give a 0-10 score to indicate whether they feel immigration has had a positive or negative impact on Britain. The scores in this latest wave continue a trend of positive sentiment, with 47% giving a positive score of 6-10, compared to the 28% who give a negative score of 0-4. The survey taken at the time of the May 2015 general election, by comparison, found only 35% were positive and 42% were negative. Respondents to each wave of the survey have also been asked if they would prefer immigration to the UK to be increased, decreased or to remain the same. Reflecting these gradually warming attitudes, this latest survey found the lowest ever support for reducing immigration and the highest ever support for immigration to be increased. While 45% would still prefer reductions in immigration, some 29% would prefer it to stay at the current levels and 17% would like it to increase  Public satisfaction with the current Government’s performance on immigration remains very low, with only 1 in 8 (12%) saying they are satisfied with how the Government is dealing with immigration – the same proportion as in November 2020 (and a similar level of satisfaction to that of the two previous governments). More than half the public (55%) say they are dissatisfied. The immigration debate over the last few parliaments was focused on numbers, with repeated failures to meet the government’s net migration target. With that target now dropped there is an opportunity to move the debate on. Our survey asked whether people would prefer an immigration system that prioritises control, regardless of whether numbers go up or down; or whether they would prefer an approach that focuses on reducing immigration numbers. It found that people were almost twice as likely to prioritise control (44%) over reducing numbers (24%). Survey respondents were also asked about the EU Settled Status scheme, which was put in place allow European citizens, who arrived before December 31st 2020, to continue to live and work in the UK post-Brexit. The deadline for applications for Settled Status lapsed at the end of July this year. Almost half (48%) of respondents say that eligible EU citizens should be allowed to make a late application, while just under a third (32%) would not support late applications being accepted.  

Lonson: British Future, 2021. 47p.

By Sunder Katwala, Steve Ballinger, Heather Rolfe and Jake Puddle

Conducted straight after the general election, this report examines shifting public attitudes to immigration and asylum, including the differences in attitudes between Labour, Conservative, Lib Dem and Reform voters and what that means for the politics of immigration in the new parliament.

The research also examines public attitudes on a series of key issues:

• The role of immigration in the 2024 general election.

• Public priorities for the new government.

• Public trust in the main political parties on immigration, and trust in leading politicians on the issue.

• Public perceptions of immigration: do people think net migration will fall or increase? Which flows do people think make up most immigration to the UK?

• Public satisfaction with the government’s handling of immigration.

• Do people want immigration numbers to reduce, increase or stay the same?

• Attitudes to migration to fill different roles: would people cut the numbers of doctors, care workers, lorry drivers or hospitality staff coming to the UK?

• Asylum, Channel crossings and legal routes

London: British Future, 2024. 74p.