By Center on Extremism, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Accelerationism Research Consortium, United States of America

This report is the fourth in a series of short reports that look at the user journeys of individuals in extremist communities. This report focuses on the Active Club Network (ACN), which is a decentralised and transnational neofascist accelerationism sub‑community within the broader accelerationist movement. The accelerationist element is particularly noteworthy. This sub‑community consists of small, individually informed organisations that emphasise White fraternal brotherhood, Evolian traditionalism, and preparation for war against a perceived White genocide. The focus on the ACN is due to its presence across several social media platforms, maintaining accounts on both mainstream and alternative platforms. The focus is also partly because the user journey of its members and adherents is mostly characterised by a more robust multi‑platform experience. The study used focused groups which mainly comprised individuals who have accessed, observed and occasionally participated in the private communication channels of these accelerationist movements. The names of all communities mentioned during the focus group, including those that participants accessed, have been removed. The report highlights platform use, violence, attacks and gender dynamics. Key findings on accelerationism are: • For some of these groups such as ACN – the focus of this report – user journey is mostly characterised by a robust multi‑platform experience, in which affiliated accounts across various accounts link with each other in order to give their content maximum visibility. • Online platforms used by ACN include Instagram, Facebook, X (formerly Twitter) and YouTube. Telegram remains a central hub where Active Club members and its adherents can gather, share propaganda and coordinate among themselves. • Active Clubs intentionally eschew overtly violent tactics and activities mainly to avoid drawing the attention of law enforcement. • Within these Clubs, women are rarely spoken of, while men are expected to adhere to traditional roles as leaders and physical protectors of their families.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024, 20p.

By Primitivo III Cabanes Ragandang

This report examines online youth‐led initiatives involved in challenging violent extremism (CVE).

It focuses on the 2013–2023 online presence of 13 youth organisations, namely: KRIS (Philippines), Youth for Peace Movement Davao de Oro (Philippines), United Voice for Peace Network Inc. (Philippines), Global Peace Youth (Philippines), Students Against Violence Everywhere, Paiman Alumni Trust, Sri Lanka Unites, Youth for Peace (Cambodia), Sambisig, Team Pakigsandurot, MasterPeace, Youth for Peace Philippines Cordillera Youth Brigade and College of Youth Activism and Development.

Based on data scraped from more than 130 social media posts, the report highlights the dynamics of youth‐led CVE efforts online, and discusses strategic planning, content creation and organisational challenges.

The study identifies the dual approach of young people in CVE work across both online and offline spaces. The predominant use of digital platforms to document offline activities suggests that for many, the online platform is secondary, pointing to the challenges of internet access in certain regions of Asia.

Limited internet access in marginalised communities emerges as a significant barrier, underlining the need for more inclusive online participation. Organisational hurdles include communication issues, resource constraints, team dynamics and visibility challenges, particularly where messaging is too localised.

This report recommends that CVE youth organisations be given more training in online content creation and social media literacy. It suggests prioritising and supporting offline activities to improve sustainability, and proposes collaborative online spaces to boost engagement. The report also recommends that tech companies broaden their existing community systems to amplify and lend credibility to CVE‐related content on social media platforms.

The report shows that online youth‐led CVE initiatives in Asia are not explicitly labelled as CVE. They have a variety of names but allare geared towards challenging ideas and acts that are violent and extreme in nature.

In some initiatives, young people directly condemn violent forms and acts of extremism. Other initiatives advocate social change in a preventive sense, with young people addressing factors that contribute to violence and extremist ideas.

Another type of initiative involves Asian youths promoting positive values and behaviours as a means of CVE, advocating positive messaging, active participation and good citizenship. This approach encourages positive behaviour as a counter to extremist ideologies.

The report concludes with a recommendation that tech companies should support existing youth CVE initiatives, rather than creating new ones. This support might include establishing a support network for these initiatives and organising conferences to gather and connect young CVE advocates across the region. Strengthening communication channels with youth groups and fostering collaborative online spaces would improve coordination and content dissemination.

Modifying search engine functions would make it easier to identify relevant groups. Using community systems to endorse CVE‐related content would boost credibility, while supporting regulatory duties with AI (artificial intelligence) capabilities would make content moderation easier. Strengthening proactive measures to safeguard online spaces and reduce harmful influences requires addressing emerging threats such as domestic terrorism and extremist ideologies.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) , 2024. 44p.

By Helen Young and Geoff M. Boucher

Digital publishing, sale and distribution of books have contributed significantly to the dissemination and mainstreaming of far‐right extremist (FRE) material in the 21st century. Historical and contemporary books that espouse politically and ideologically motivated violence circulate widely and easily online, in both FRE and mainstream spaces. Such books include, but are not limited to: the speeches of Adolf Hitler, William L. Pierce’s The Turner Diaries, Theodore Kaczynski’s Industrial Society and its Future (The Unabomber Manifesto), James Mason’s Siege, and anthologies produced by the Iron March forum and Terrorgram Collective.

Commercial book publication, sales, distribution and sharing platforms play a significant role in enabling the circulation of FRE material, as this report details through analysis of Amazon, Google Play, Rakuten Kobo, Goodreads, and Scribd and its e‐book‐platform, Everand. An autoethnographic ‘snowball’ methodology was used, exploiting the features of commercial book platforms, such as search functions and algorithmically driven recommendations. FRE books were quickly and easily located on all platforms analysed.

There are two principal ways that major e‐book sites enable the circulation of FRE material:

Distribution: of self‐publications by FRE authors (through Amazon Kindle, for example), access for ideologically motivated small presses to large marketplaces, and users’ sharing of FRE material including manifestos (on Scribd, for example)

Recommendation algorithms on all platforms directing users from one FRE title to another, or from Far‐Right material that does not meet the threshold of extremism to that which does.

Recommendation algorithms are particularly problematic because they have the capacity to direct users who have not yet encountered extremist material towards FRE books and to actively reinforce extremist perspectives.

Technology companies have already taken steps to remove some of the most notorious FRE books from sale, distribution and discussion. In the case of extremist novels, such as The Turner Diaries, searches typically meet a dead end and return purchasing recommendations of books on anti‐racism and de‐radicalisation rather than hate fiction.

This report recommends that the companies surveyed extend this practice to other FRE materials documented below, using available techniques to understand and interrupt the formation of a network of recommendations which leads individuals towards publications advocating political violence. The report also recommends the use of available techniques (such as machine learning) to scrutinise the nature of self‐published materials, with the aim of preventing reproductions of materials that are refused classification from being published spuriously under misleading titles or pseudonyms.

The report is agnostic on whether such companies should stock the speeches of Adolf Hitler, for instance, focusing instead on potential problems in the way the affordances of search technologies provide ready‐made FRE libraries.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology, 2023. 36p.

By The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ISCR), King’s College London, United Kingdom

This report is the sixth in a series of short reports that look at the user journeys of individuals in extremist communities. This report focuses on the extremist chan culture, which refers to a collection of online platforms. The existence of chans is in stark opposition to mainstream social media, where users are usually encouraged to share their personal content and use their real identities. Strong group identity within chans is mostly established by the use of in‑jokes and subcultural slang, despite the anonymous online setting. The decision to focus on extremist chan culture in this report is informed by the continued threat posed to broader society by chan sites, which foster a climate in which extremism is the norm and in which violence is often openly encouraged. These chan sites continue to represent a particular kind of extreme online hate which requires moderation in order to curtail the rise and spread of extreme far‑right communities. On the report’s methodology, the study used focus groups, involving individuals who have accessed, observed and occasionally participated in the private communication channels of these extremist communities. The names of all communities mentioned during the focus groups, including those that participants accessed, have been removed. Key findings on extremist chan culture are: • While there are non‑English language chan sites which attract large audiences in many countries, the most popular is 4chan, with more than 22,000,000 users. Since its inception, 4chan has been a haven for violence. • Newcomers are generally only able to find new chan sites through word of mouth, with more informed users periodically posting lists of links to more obscure chans on popular forums like 4chan. • The existence of smaller chan sites further implies their links to other such sites based on shared ideology and in some instances a sense of camaraderie. • Misogyny and queerphobia remain rife on extremist chan sites, with different chan sites varying slightly in their attitudes towards women.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024. 20p.