By Center on Extremism, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Accelerationism Research Consortium, United States of America

This report is the fourth in a series of short reports that look at the user journeys of individuals in extremist communities. This report focuses on the Active Club Network (ACN), which is a decentralised and transnational neofascist accelerationism sub‑community within the broader accelerationist movement. The accelerationist element is particularly noteworthy. This sub‑community consists of small, individually informed organisations that emphasise White fraternal brotherhood, Evolian traditionalism, and preparation for war against a perceived White genocide. The focus on the ACN is due to its presence across several social media platforms, maintaining accounts on both mainstream and alternative platforms. The focus is also partly because the user journey of its members and adherents is mostly characterised by a more robust multi‑platform experience. The study used focused groups which mainly comprised individuals who have accessed, observed and occasionally participated in the private communication channels of these accelerationist movements. The names of all communities mentioned during the focus group, including those that participants accessed, have been removed. The report highlights platform use, violence, attacks and gender dynamics. Key findings on accelerationism are: • For some of these groups such as ACN – the focus of this report – user journey is mostly characterised by a robust multi‑platform experience, in which affiliated accounts across various accounts link with each other in order to give their content maximum visibility. • Online platforms used by ACN include Instagram, Facebook, X (formerly Twitter) and YouTube. Telegram remains a central hub where Active Club members and its adherents can gather, share propaganda and coordinate among themselves. • Active Clubs intentionally eschew overtly violent tactics and activities mainly to avoid drawing the attention of law enforcement. • Within these Clubs, women are rarely spoken of, while men are expected to adhere to traditional roles as leaders and physical protectors of their families.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024, 20p.

By The Australian Federal Police, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

A jointly authored analysis of youth radicalisation by the Five Eyes security and law enforcement agencies – the first time they have collaborated on a public paper. The analysis identifies common issues and trends contributing to youth radicalisation and includes case studies from all of the Five Eyes countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The paper calls for a whole-of-society response across the nations to help identify and deal with the radicalisation of minors – especially online.

The case studies highlight the challenges of minors in counter-terrorism. Minors can pose the same credible terrorist threat as adults, with some minors attracted to violent extremist content and ideologies – especially online. Law enforcement and security agencies intervene when there is a potential threat to public safety, but these disruptions are not the only response to this issue. Several of the case studies demonstrate that diversion and countering violent extremism programs can make a difference.

There is a role to play for law enforcement, security and government agencies, the education sector, mental health and social well-being services, communities and technology companies. The analysis informs the Australian Government’s upcoming counter-terrorism and violent extremism strategy.

Key issues

Minors are ‘digital natives’ – they have grown up online and are technologically savvy. Minors often use multiple platforms and applications for different purposes.

The online environment allows minors to interact with adults and other minors, allowing them to view and distribute violent extremist content which further radicalises themselves and others. Online environments, particularly encrypted ones, provide a large degree of anonymity.

Engaging with minors is more complex than engaging with adults. The unique characteristics of adolescent development require agencies to factor in additional considerations when dealing with minors. Determining intent can be harder for minors than adults, especially for minors who spend a lot of time online.

A renewed whole-of-society approach is required to address the issue of minors radicalising to violent extremism. This is not something governments or communities can address in isolation. Mental health, community initiatives, social services, and education interventions can help to counter radicalisation before security and policing responses are required.

The ways in which vulnerability factors (not limited to mental health or neurodiversity characteristics) impact minors’ radicalisation to violent extremism is challenging.

Five Eyes Insights, 2024. 8p

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Guidelines for the Dismantling of Clandestine Laboratories (ST/NAR/56) is one in a series of similar UNODC publications dealing with clandestine manufacture of substances under international control, and the safe handling and disposal of chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. These manuals form part of a programme pursued by UNODC since the early 1980s to enhance the operational capacity of law enforcement personnel and drug testing laboratories, to improve the quality of their performance, and to promote standardization of working practices. This is to ensure that both scientific and non-scientific personnel have comprehensive information on risks of exposure and appropriate controls, precautions for evidence searching and handling as well as emergency medical and overdose responses. The target audience for this manual are law enforcement personnel that may encounter clandestine laboratories in their duties, crime scene and forensic experts that may have to collect evidence, process and dismantle these facilities, and also, the judiciary and policymakers and other stakeholders who may benefit from a greater understanding of the risks involved in dismantling clandestine laboratories. Furthermore, the manual underlines the importance of the development of national capacity, inter-agency cooperation and national legal frameworks in order to effectively respond to challenges encountered in laboratories where substances under international control are clandestinely manufactured.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024. 81p.

By Sora Park, Tanya Notley, T. J. Thomson, Aimee Hourigan, Michael Dezuanni

The rapid uptake of social media, which Australians now use more than any other type of media, presents many opportunities for accessing information, but also presents the highly significant challenge of misinformation. The sheer volume of information online can be overwhelming and very difficult to navigate. As a result, bad actors seek to undermine democratic processes and target individuals. This has been widely recognised as a global problem. However, Australians lack the confidence and ability to verify misinformation.

This report is based on analysis of four linked datasets and finds that the vast majority of adult Australians want to be able to identify misinformation and are trying to do so. It also finds that many adult Australians overestimate their ability to verify information online.

The research findings illustrate the need for media literacy initiatives. These might include videos that show people how to fact check online or how to identify high-quality news sources, quizzes or games that help people develop their digital media knowledge and skills, explainers that show how platform business models operate and how this relates to the spread of misinformation, or in-person media production training that can help people think critically, and accurately represent people, places and ideas.

Penrith, AUS: News and Media Research Centre, Western Sydney University, 2024, 82p.

By Dr Ben Collier, Dr Morgan Currie, & Dr Benedetta Catanzariti

We are a team of researchers at the University of Edinburgh’s department of Science, Technology, and Innovation Studies, with a broad range of expertise and experience relating to digital technologies. The Scottish Parliament has commissioned us to conduct this research study evaluating the potential threats, risks, and mitigations to parliamentary business associated with novel generative AI technologies. We have been asked to consider particularly the threat of deepfaked video to the integrity of the Parliament video livestream and archived recordings of parliamentary business - a phenomenon which one of our participants dubbed ‘chamberfakes’. Scottish Parliament makes its live streamed and archived video of chamber and committee business widely accessible to major broadcasters and to the public directly through its website and on major social media platforms. Parliamentary video is produced as a neutral record of parliamentary business, and its accessibility serves a core democratic function of making the Scottish Parliament visible to the public. At the same time, this broad accessibility could lead to security vulnerabilities, including deepfake attacks. The report identifies three main deepfake-related risks: 1. Hacking the video livestream, either through a cybersecurity breach or by compromising a live participant dialing in through Zoom 2. Disseminating deepfakes on social media platforms 3. Creating deepfakes using parliamentary video material as a training resource for online harassment and abuse of MSPs While deepfake technologies are part of concerning broader trends in the proliferation of misinformation, abuse, and organised political interference, they do not generally represent a step change in capabilities for most hostile actors in the context of Parliamentary video. Instead, they generally offer small-to-medium scale reductions in barriers to entry for some existing forms of harm. Scottish Parliament has no formal processes in place to respond to these deepfake threats. However, Parliament’s strong institutional resilience - particularly the deep knowledge and experience of its staff - can play a current role in preventing or mitigating threats. The broadcasting team has multiple people who monitor both the live transmitted video and online video stream, ensuring the video transmission chain proceeds correctly. Parliament’s strategic risk register is already set up to respond to cybersecurity and personal online security threats to MSPs. The Official Report of Parliament, the transcript of all the Parliament's public proceedings, offers a record to check video suspected of tampering. Beyond current practices of risk management there are several technical, educational and legal solutions that could be adopted as future mitigations to deepfake risks. Considering deepfakes in relation to a broader constellation of risks and finding an optimistic picture of the resilience of Parliament to these threats, this report focuses its recommendations on several key institutional solutions that Scottish Parliament could adopt. Recommendations: 1. Develop formal intervention plan and reporting procedures for a deepfake or misinformation attack, involving the assignment of responsibility for this process to a specific individual via the risk register and establishing reporting procedures to UK Parliament and ministers and to MSPs 2. Institute further material and human-in-the-loop checks, including having cameras dump a live feed to file locally straight from the recording apparatus itself, authentication checks for participants dialling in to give evidence, and retaining an in-house staff to monitor the feed in comparison with live proceedings 3. Establish a communications team (or hire a small number of dedicated communications staff) within the broadcasting unit to support to MSPs who encounter or are victims of misinformation, track how parliamentary content is being circulated and used, and promote the use of parliamentary video through communications campaigns and direct engagement with broadcasters and platforms

Edinburgh: The Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR), 2024. 29p.

By The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ISCR), King’s College London, United Kingdom

This report is the sixth in a series of short reports that look at the user journeys of individuals in extremist communities. This report focuses on the extremist chan culture, which refers to a collection of online platforms. The existence of chans is in stark opposition to mainstream social media, where users are usually encouraged to share their personal content and use their real identities. Strong group identity within chans is mostly established by the use of in‑jokes and subcultural slang, despite the anonymous online setting. The decision to focus on extremist chan culture in this report is informed by the continued threat posed to broader society by chan sites, which foster a climate in which extremism is the norm and in which violence is often openly encouraged. These chan sites continue to represent a particular kind of extreme online hate which requires moderation in order to curtail the rise and spread of extreme far‑right communities. On the report’s methodology, the study used focus groups, involving individuals who have accessed, observed and occasionally participated in the private communication channels of these extremist communities. The names of all communities mentioned during the focus groups, including those that participants accessed, have been removed. Key findings on extremist chan culture are: • While there are non‑English language chan sites which attract large audiences in many countries, the most popular is 4chan, with more than 22,000,000 users. Since its inception, 4chan has been a haven for violence. • Newcomers are generally only able to find new chan sites through word of mouth, with more informed users periodically posting lists of links to more obscure chans on popular forums like 4chan. • The existence of smaller chan sites further implies their links to other such sites based on shared ideology and in some instances a sense of camaraderie. • Misogyny and queerphobia remain rife on extremist chan sites, with different chan sites varying slightly in their attitudes towards women.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024. 20p.

By Joshua J. Reynolds, Victoria Estrada-Reynolds , Scott Freng, Sean M. McCrea,

Police officers must rely on the available information when investigating crimes. One cue police sometimes rely on is suspect movement (e.g., furtive movements and headlong flight). The courts have explicitly allowed officers to use this information to support warrantless searches. Yet, there is scant empirical evidence examining whether suspect movement is associated with guilt. Using 141 participants in an experimental design, we examined whether individuals who were made guilty (experimentally) would be more likely to avoid a police representation in a social distance paradigm. We also examined a second legal perspective, that racial minorities or individuals who have low police legitimacy would be more likely to avoid the police. Using Bayesian statistics and information criteria we found that neither guilt nor race was associated with avoidance, but feeling guilty was positively associated with avoidance

Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2021, 16p.

By JEN HOLLIS AND STUART MATHEWS

To most Australians, fire danger forecasting is embedded within our cultural identity and history. It’s as Australian as kangaroos, the Holden Ute and the Sydney Opera House.

For the last six decades Australians have relied heavily on the pioneering work of Alan McArthur who developed the Forest Fire Danger Index and Grassland Fire Danger Index. The system has served Australians well and with only minor adaptations to meet local needs, it remains largely unchanged. The most significant adjustment came after the 2009 Black Saturday fires in the state of Victoria which, in one afternoon, burned through more than 450,000 hectares and resulted in the devastating loss of 173 lives.

Following a Royal Commission investigation into the fires, it was recognised that McArthur’s system was being applied well beyond the original design. As a result, categories were added, including one at the top end of the fire danger scale reflecting conditions beyond the existing maximum of 100. Importantly, it was also recognised that there was a need to incorporate new science and technological developments (for example, remote sensing, landscape mapping, higher computational capability) into calculating and interpreting fire danger.

International Association of Wildfire. 2022.

Heather Kreidler, Rapporteur; Board on Environmental Change and Society; Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Over the past two decades, wildfires in western North America have significantly increased in frequency, magnitude, and severity. Scientists have documented three leading causes: a century of suppression and inadequate forest management that has led to overly dense, fuel-rich forests; climate change, which has turned woodlands and grasslands into hot, dry tinderboxes; and the spread of urbanization, which has increased the probability of man-made ignitions. Less well known are the environmental and social implications associated with the acceleration of these trends.

To explore these concerns and to identify possible policy responses, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's Board on Environmental Change and Society, in partnership with the Royal Society of Canada, convened a workshop in June 2024, "The Social and Ecological Consequences of Future Wildfire in the West". Over two days, two dozen wildfire experts and a hybrid audience of over 200 participants explored the history, current state, and anticipated future of wildfire science and policy across the western United States and Canada. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions of the workshop.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Social-Ecological Consequences of Future Wildfires and Smoke in the West: Proceedings of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27972.

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, US. Department of Justice

• Tulsa Race Massacre: Violent attack on Black community of Greenwood, Oklahoma, May 31-June 1, 1921.
• Massive Destruction: 10,000 white Tulsans destroyed homes, businesses; hundreds of Black residents killed.
• Law Enforcement’s Role: Deputized white residents participated in violence, looting, and arson.
• Failure of Justice: Authorities failed to help survivors; legal attempts for reparations were unsuccessful.
• Historical Reckoning: DOJ review acknowledges massacre’s impact, despite expired statutes of limitations.
• Legal Analysis: Modern laws could have prosecuted hate crimes, but were unavailable in 1921.
• Insurance Denials: Black residents denied compensation due to “riot clause” in policies.
• Federal Investigation: DOJ’s Cold Case Unit reviewed the events under the Emmett Till Act.
• Government’s Role: White officials obstructed rebuilding efforts, imposed restrictive fire codes.
• Survivors’ Plight: Left without resources, faced systemic racism and state-sanctioned brutality.
• Historical Documentation: Review includes survivor accounts, primary materials, and past investigations.
• Confrontation Trigger: Arrest of Dick Rowland and sensationalized newspaper article incited violence.
• Continued Efforts: Work to ensure future generations understand the massacre’s magnitude continues.

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, US. Department of Justice. 2025. 126p

By K. Viswanath, Tiffany E. Taylor, and Holly G. Rhodes, Editors; Committee on Understanding and Addressing Misinformation About Science; Board on Science Education; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Our current information ecosystem makes it easier for misinformation about science to spread and harder for people to figure out what is scientifically accurate. Proactive solutions are needed to address misinformation about science, an issue of public concern given its potential to cause harm at individual, community, and societal levels. Improving access to high-quality scientific information can fill information voids that exist for topics of interest to people, reducing the likelihood of exposure to and uptake of misinformation about science. Misinformation is commonly perceived as a matter of bad actors maliciously misleading the public, but misinformation about science arises both intentionally and inadvertently and from a wide range of sources.

NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS. 2024. 409p.

United States. Department Of Defense;

From the document: "This report covers unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) reports from May 1, 2023 to June 1, 2024 and all UAP reports from any previous time periods that were not included in an earlier report. The All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) received 757 UAP reports during this period; 485 of these reports featured UAP incidents that occurred during the reporting period. The remaining 272 reports featured UAP incidents that occurred between 2021 and 2022 but were not reported to AARO until this reporting period and consequently were not included in previous annual UAP reports. AARO resolved 118 cases during the reporting period, all of which resolved to prosaic objects such as various types of balloons, birds, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). As of May 31, 2024, AARO has an additional 174 cases queued for closure, pending a final review and Director's approval. As of the publishing date of this report, all 174 cases have been finalized as resolved to prosaic objects including balloons, birds, UAS, satellites, and aircraft. Many other cases remain unresolved and AARO continues collection and analysis on that body of cases. It is important to underscore that, to date, AARO has discovered no evidence of extraterrestrial beings, activity, or technology. None of the reports AARO received during the reporting period indicated that observers suffered any adverse health effects."

United States. All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office. 14 NOV, 2024. 18p.

By Hilary Pilkington

The book uses interviews, informal conversations and extended observation at EDL events to critically reflect on the gap between the movement's public image and activists' own understandings of it. It details how activists construct the EDL, and themselves, as 'not racist, not violent, just no longer silent' inter alia through the exclusion of Muslims as a possible object of racism on the grounds that they are a religiously not racially defined group. In contrast activists perceive themselves to be 'second-class citizens', disadvantaged and discriminated by a 'two-tier' justice system that privileges the rights of 'others'. This failure to recognise themselves as a privileged white majority explains why ostensibly intimidating EDL street demonstrations marked by racist chanting and nationalistic flag waving are understood by activists as standing 'loud and proud'; the only way of 'being heard' in a political system governed by a politics of silencing. Unlike most studies of 'far right' movements, this book focuses not on the EDL as an organisation - its origins, ideology, strategic repertoire and effectiveness - but on the individuals who constitute the movement. Its ethnographic approach challenges stereotypes and allows insight into the emotional as well as political dimension of activism. At the same time, the book recognises and discusses the complex political and ethical issues of conducting close-up social research with 'distasteful' groups.

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2016. 328p.

By Meka Beresford , The Alliance for Racial Justice 

This paper draws on the knowledge exchanged at a series of roundtable events held by the Alliance of Racial Justice in April 2024, to form recommendations on strengthening the ability to challenge and end institutional racism. It takes a look at existing equality legislation – namely the Equality Act 2010 – and calls on government to make updates to this key part of the UK’s commitment to tackle racism in public bodies.

London: Action for Race Equality, 2024. 16p.

By Emily M. Farris, Mirya R. Holman

Background: During the COVID-19 crisis, sheriffs across the country vocally refused to implement mask mandates.

Objectives: In this note, we argue that resistance to mask mandates emerged out of successful efforts to recruit sheriffs into right-wing extremism (RWE) and its foundations in white supremacy, nativism, and anti-government extremism.

Methods: We draw on upon historical analysis and a national survey of sheriffs

Results: We show how RWE movements recruited sheriffs and that a substantial share of sheriffs adopted RWE attitudes. We argue that this radicalization of county sheriffs primes them to resist a core component of federalism: mandates by supra governments. We identify a relationship between sheriffs. RWE attitudes and their resistance to enforcing COVID-19 mask mandates.

Conclusion: Our work demonstrates the importance of considering the implications of violent extremism in the United States, particularly as it aligns with local law enforcement.

Social Science Quarterly, Volume104, Issue2 March 2023, Pages 59-68

Edited by Linda Schlegel and Rachel Kowert

Charting the increase in the use of games for the dissemination of extremist propaganda, radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization, this book examines the "gamification of extremism." Editors Linda Schlegel and Rachel Kowert bring together a range of insights from world-leading experts in the field to provide the first comprehensive overview of gaming and extremism. The potential nexus between gaming and extremism has become a key area of concern for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners seeking to prevent and counter radicalization and this book offers insights into key trends and debates, future directions, and potential prevention efforts. This includes the exploration of how games and game-adjacent spaces, such as Discord, Twitch, Steam, and DLive, are being leveraged by extremists for radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization. Additionally, the book presents the latest counterterrorism techniques, and surveys promising preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) measures currently being utilized in the gaming sphere, and examines the ongoing challenges, controversies, and current gaps in knowledge in the field. This text will be of interest to students and scholars of gaming and gaming culture, as well as an essential resource for researchers and practitioners working in prevention and counter-extremism, professionals working at gaming-related tech companies, and policymakers.

New York; London: Routledge, 2024. 235p.