By Maura Conway

This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) and responses to them in the 13-month period from 1 December 2018 to 31 December 2019. It is divided into two parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of the extreme right, with a particular emphasis on the Christchurch attacks, and Part II on violent online jihadism, particularly the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (hereafter IS). The Conclusion provides a summing-up and identifies issues in this realm that bear watching in 2020. Those familiar with our previous reports will know that the structuring of these was slightly different, with analysis of violent jihadi activity preceding discussion of extreme right online activity in all instances. The March 2019 Christchurch attacks and a series of subsequent attacks in the United States and Germany put extreme right online activity firmly centre stage however, which is reflected in the structuring of the present report.

Dublin: VOX-POL Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2919. 26p.

Edited by Bharath Ganesh and Jonathan Bright

Extreme digital speech (EDS) is an emerging challenge that requires co-ordination between governments, civil society and the private sector. In this report, a range of experts on countering extremism consider the challenges that EDS presents to these stakeholders, the impact that EDS has and the responses taken by these actors to counter it. By focusing on EDS, our consideration of the topic is limited to the forms of extreme speech that take place online, often on social media platforms and multimedia messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Furthermore, by focusing on EDS rather than explicitly violent forms of extreme speech online, we (as Matti Pohjonen writes in this report) ‘depart’ from a focus on violence and incorporate a broader range of issues such as hateful and dehumanising speech and the complex cultures and politics that have formed around EDS. This focus brings into view a much broader range of factors that help assemble extremist networks online.  

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  This perspective is necessary, given the role that hate speech plays in extreme right-wing networks and the complexity of Daesh propaganda which uses videos to synthesise utopic images of life in the so-called ‘Khilafa’. Following JM Berger’s recent book, Extremism (2018), we can think of EDS as a core practice that produces an archive of online extremist resources that reinforce the sense of in-group belonging across a network of geographically dispersed users, whether this be the networks of jihadists connected on Telegram, or right-wing extremists that use trolling tactics to hack mainstream opinion on Twitter. All the same, while it is well-known that EDS is prolific online, there is little understanding of what kind of impact participation in these networks actually has on the likelihood of an individual’s engagement in political violence. Moreover, very little is known about what methods are being used to challenge EDS and what solutions are  best suited for this problem. This report seeks to provide policymakers, researchers and practitioners with an overview of the context of EDS, its impact, and the responses and solutions being mobilised to counter it. In order to do this, this report assembles a set of ten brief essays intended to serve as a starting point for further exploration of a range of topics related to the management of EDS across government, civil society and the private sector.

Dublin: VOX-POL Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2019. 123p.

By  Dounia Mahlouly

Gathering empirical evidence from interviews and focus groups, this study highlights some of the ethical dilemmas faced by the academic community tasked with developing new methodological tools and conceptual frameworks for the study of violent online political extremism. At the same time, it examines how academics position themselves in relation to a broad range of non-academic stakeholders involved in the public debate about where violent extremism, terrorism and the Internet intersect. It argues that these external actors are introducing a multisectoral ‘market’ for research on online violent extremism, which creates both opportunities and limitations for the academic community. Finally, it analyses how academics from across a range of disciplines will be able to secure access to data and competitive research tools, while also engaging in a critical reflection about the ethical considerations at stake.

Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2019. 35p.

By Reem Ahmed and Daniela Pisoiu

Violent right-wing extremism is a growing threat to Western liberal democracies. At the same time, radical right-wing populist parties and figures across Europe are succeeding electorally by way of increased representation in national parliaments. These gains have been achieved against a backdrop of anti-refugee sentiment, austerity, and disillusionment with the European project, with populists on the left and right promising to deliver an alternative and using effective slogans and ‘people’ politics. Ordinarily, we differentiate between the extreme right and radical right: the former posing a threat to the democratic system with their fascist links and overt racism; the latter respecting the democratic system whilst offering a ‘sanitised’ version of far-right politics – namely, adopting a ‘new master frame’ that emphasises culture rather than race. Recent analyses of the far right, however, have indicated social and discursive overlaps between the ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ right-wing parties and groups. The findings reported herein challenge this traditional separation within the far-right spectrum, and potentially have deeper theoretical and methodological implications for how we study the far right. The Internet adds another dimension to this threat, as far-right discourse becomes more visible on social media and messaging applications, potentially attracting more people to the cause as well as mainstreaming and legitimising particular narratives prominent in the scene.

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  Existing literature has specifically examined the online sphere, and social media in particular, and these scholars have communicated interesting findings on how the social networks and discourses overlap, for example identifying the co-occurrences of certain hashtags or analysing retweets and transnational cooperation. The aim of this report is to determine the overlaps apparent in the far-right scene on Twitter, and specifically, to ascertain the extent to which different groups on the scene are indeed talking about the  same issues in the same way, in spite of apparent differences in tone and underlying ideologies. We utilise a mixed-methods approach: first, gaining a cursory insight into the extreme right-wing scene on Twitter across Europe; and then applying a detailed frame analysis to three selected groups in Germany to determine the implicit and explicit overlaps between them, thus complementing the quantitative findings to offer an in-depth analysis of meaning.   

Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, Dublin City University, 2019  209p.

By William Assanvo, Baba Dakono, Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni and Ibrahim Maïga  

This report analyses the links between violent extremism, illicit activities and local conflicts in the Liptako-Gourma region. Addressing regional instability in the long term requires empirical data that helps explain the local dynamics that fuel insecurity. This is the first of two reports, and is based on interviews conducted in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The second report assesses the measures aimed at bringing stability to the region.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2019. 24p.

Edited by Joel Busher and Lee Jerome

This open access book explores the enactment, impact and implications of the Prevent Duty across a range of educational contexts. In July 2015 the UK became the first country to place a specific legal requirement on those working in education to contribute to efforts to ‘prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. Drawing on extensive research with staff, children and young people, the editors and contributors provide new insight into how this high-profile – and highly contentious – policy has shaped educational practice in Britain today. It will be a valuable resource for researchers, policymakers and others interested in the design, implementation and on-the-ground effects of Prevent or similar programmes internationally that place education at the heart of efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 180p.

By Jon Lewis, Seamus Hughes, Oren Segal and Ryan Greer

“Basically, they’re domestic terrorists. That's why we’re here,” stated a Georgia Assistant District Attorney on February 14, 2020. The prosecutor was attempting to explain to a judge why two members of The Base, a violent white supremacist group, should not be let out on bond. Prosecuting domestic terrorists through the state court system instead of the federal system may seem unusual, but it is a result of the mosaic of different approaches federal and state prosecutors use to address the increasing threat of domestic extremism. Cases like these demonstrate the need to examine whether the government is using all the tools at its disposal to address the threat of white supremacist violence. It also underscores the need to ensure that government and law enforcement officials have the resources and knowledge they need to track the criminal activities of violent extremists and, whenever possible, prevent terrorist acts. The United States has struggled to adapt to a changing domestic terrorism landscape. In the last two months alone, more than a dozen Americans were arrested as part of wideranging investigations into a growing domestic terrorism threat stemming from individuals and groups that have a number of international ties. In response to the upsurgence of these groups, the seriousness of the threat they pose, and the manner in which they operate, U.S. officials have raised alarms. For example, Elizabeth Neumann, the Assistant Secretary for Threat Prevention and Security Policy at the Department of Homeland Security, recently told a Congressional committee that, “it feels like we

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  are at the doorstep of another 9/11…we can see it building and we don’t quite know how to stop it.” This policy paper focuses on the recent arrests of domestic extremists, as well as current efforts by law enforcement to disrupt and counter the growing influence of racially motivated violent extremist ideology—specifically white supremacy—and analyze the current state of enforcement actions against two domestic networks: The Base and Atomwaffen Division. In the accompanying policy recommendations, the authors outline administrative actions, legislative and policy changes, and other possible federal and state legal and prosecutorial powers that could allow for a more comprehensive and effective approach to countering these threats.   

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 35p.

By Pete Simi

A hypothetical “lone gunman” walks into a reproductive health care clinic spraying bullets from his assault rifle screaming that “abortion is murder!” and “the Army of God seeks revenge for the unborn fetuses murdered every year!” The shooting rampage leaves three individuals dead and 11 others injured. Additional weapons and explosives are discovered in the shooter’s van parked outside the clinic. Inside the van, a slew of literature explains how abortion is part of a liberal, feminist initiative to “enslave white Americans.” During the shooter’s interview with law enforcement later that day, he explains his motive was to “intimidate the general public by enforcing God’s law while sending a message to any other abortion killers that they might want to find another line of work.” In the days following the attack, scattered media coverage describes the gunman as “deranged,” “crazed,” and “unstable.” Few, if any, note the clear political and religious motivation nor do any of the articles describe the incident as “terrorism” or the shooter as a “terrorist.” What should we conclude about this scenario? The fact that the shooter was driven by ideological concerns seems obvious, yet the response suggests the link is apparently not so obvious. Understanding the relationship between ideas and violence presents several substantial challenges. These challenges are magnified given our tendency toward employing a highly inconsistent assessment of when and how ideas influence violence.

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  We tend to perceive a close connection between ideas and violence when the incident involves a Muslim perpetrator, while relying on a far different metric when the perpetrator is not Muslim. And the consequences are tremendous with major differences in terms of public perceptions and legal treatment.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 12.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Blyth Crawford, Valentin Wutke

Salafi-jihadism and right-wing white supremacist extremism are two of the most visible, active, and threatening violent extremist movements operating in the West today, responsible for dozens of attacks throughout North America and Western Europe. With the increased threat of white supremacist terrorism in the West have also come questions about its relationship to jihadist terrorism. This study provides an assessment of the ideological similarities between the two movements, concluding that they share key traits and political outlooks, some of which have become increasingly widespread over recent years in the Western world and beyond. Firstly, these forms of extremism are the most violent iterations of their respective movements. Jihadists are the ideological fringe of the wider Islamist movement, while white supremacist extremists emerge from more mainstream, right-wing white identity and supremacist politics. They are both reactionary political movements. They treat any form of social or political progress, reform, or liberalization with great suspicion, viewing these chiefly as a threat to their respective ‘ingroups’. In this sense, jihadists too are extreme right-wing actors even if they are rarely referred to in such terms. Both movements share a similar underlying diagnosis for the ills of their respective societies, placing blame primarily on the forces of liberal progress, pluralism, and tolerance.  

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 103p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

The boogaloo movement has risen to national prominence as a new and dangerous subset of the extreme right in the United States. Boogalooers focus on and fantasize about a supposedly imminent second civil war, referred to as the “boogaloo,” wherein the corruption they see in the political system will be overthrown. This is still an emergent movement, but its ideological core centers around guns and distrust of authority, whether that be the government, police, or political institutions. The movement originated on the internet forum 4chan, and adherents to the boogaloo movement continue to be active online in various forums and social media platforms. Many media portrayals have focused on the seemingly quixotic traits of boogalooers, like their habit of wearing Hawaiian shirts, communicating via internet memes, or their name being derived from the 1984 break-dancing movie Breakin’ 2: Electric Boogaloo. But make no mistake, the boogaloo movement is inherently violent, well armed, and organized around preparations for a civil war purportedly coming to America’s streets. Individuals tied to the boogaloo movement have already plotted attacks and committed violence, and intelligence and law enforcement agencies have pointed to a growing threat emanating from the movement. As previous research from Everytown has demonstrated, an entire extreme-right ecosystem serves as a breeding ground for individuals aliated with far-right movements such as the boogaloo, providing both inspiration and motivation—whether political, conspiratorial, or racist—for them to act.

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2021.   10p.

By Hans-Georg Betz 

Radical right-wing populist parties have been a fixture of Western European party systems for several decades. Once considered “flash parties” they have become part of the political establishment. A number of factors account for their staying power. For one, radical rightwing populist parties offer an attractive mixture of anti-establishment rhetoric (populism) and an exclusionary policy program (nativism) which appeals to a diverse range of constituencies. At the same time, they evoke and play to a range of strong emotions engendered by large-scale structural changes, which threaten to disrupt the lives of a substantial number of citizens in advanced capitalist societies. When in a position of power, however, these parties largely fail to meet the needs of their core constituencies.  

London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, 2020. 42p.

By Gary LaFree

In this overview, we report on the purpose of the grant, the data collected, the project design and methods, the data analysis, the findings and the implications for criminal justice policy in the United States. The grant proposal included three data analysis sections: (1) a large-N analysis of extremist hate offenders and other political extremists from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and the Profiles of Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) data; (2) a set of original case studies on individuals either connected to hate crime or politically motivated extremism; and (3) the social media experiences of more than 25 offenders who have engaged in violent and non-violent activities in hate groups and more than 25 offenders who have engaged in either violent or non-violent activities in extremist political groups. We review the contributions of each before closing with a brief set of conclusions.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2019. 13p.

By Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

While there are almost certainly more, the following is an inventory of white supremacist prison gangs that the ADL Center on Extremism has created by working with correctional institutions and law enforcement, reviewing case files and news stories and tapping its own extensive body of information of white supremacist prison gang activities. Key Points: ■ For nearly four decades, white supremacist prison gangs have constituted one of the primary segments of the white supremacist movement, though they are different in many ways from “traditional” white supremacist groups. ■ Though they typically originate and are active in jails and prisons, most of these gangs are just as active on the streets as behind bars—including involvement in violence and other criminal acts. ■ Though they are white supremacist in nature, these prison gangs are usually a form of organized crime and frequently prioritize profit over ideology. ■ Most white supremacist prison gangs allow only men as full members, but women play important roles in most such gangs, including in criminal activity. ■ There are currently more than 75 different white supremacist prison gangs in at least 38 states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, as well as in major county jails. They range from relatively small local gangs all the way to multi-state gangs with a thousand or more members. ■ The crimes committed by white supremacist gang members include traditional criminal activities such as running major drug dealing operations as well as ideologically motivated crimes such as hate crimes. Most white supremacist gangs also

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  have a high association with violence—which includes violence directed even at their own members and associates.

 New York: Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism, 2022. 46p.

Daniel L. Byman and Mark Pitcavage

White supremacists have been a leading source of terrorist violence in the United States in the last decade, responsible for 40 plots or attacks from 2011 to 2020. We argue that the threat is dangerous but also that the white supremacist movement as a whole has many weaknesses, some of which can be exploited. In contrast to jihadist groups like al-Qaida at its peak, American white supremacists lack a haven from which to operate; their international ties are also weaker than those of jihadist organizations. The white supremacist movement is also highly divided, and members disagree as to who their primary enemies are and how they should attack them. In addition, they enjoy little public support, and their violence usually backfires, making the movement less popular.

Overall, the movement’s capabilities are low, unable to match its grandiose ambitions. These weaknesses hinder recruitment and operations, make movement members vulnerable to prosecution and disruption, and otherwise limit their strength. Many of these weaknesses stem from existing counterterrorism and civil society pressure; continued and at times increased efforts by government, technology companies, and civil society officials is vital. Political leaders of both parties must also consistently condemn white supremacy, ensuring that the movement remains marginalized.

Washington, Dc:Brookings Institution,2021. 12P.

By Hernan Mondania and Tina Askanius, etc.

Women have generally been treated as “side shows” in the literature on war, terrorism and violent extremism and have thus been given scant scholarly attention. In mainstream media discourse, when the role of women is in fact raised, they tend to be framed as unwitting, passive agents or brainwashed victims pulled into violent extremist movements only through the relations of their husbands, boyfriends, or fathers. The lack of attention to female actors in violent extremism limits our ability to understand these movements and deforms theoretical understandings of the processes whereby individuals become radicalized. Ultimately this undermines efforts to design effective strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism. This report presents a quantitative assessment of women in violent extremism in contemporary Sweden. Specifically, we study women in violent Islamic extremism, violent far-right extremism, and violent far-left extremism. The analyses are based on data compiled from Swedish governmental registers on crime, mental health, education, child welfare intervention, labor market attachment, and information from the Swedish Police and Swedish Security Service about known affiliation to violent extremist milieus. The longitudinal data covers the period 2007–2016 and affiliation data from the Swedish Police and Swedish Security Service is a cross-section from 2017. We use descriptive statistics and network analysis to compare women in violent extremism to three reference groups: biological sisters, men that belong to the three violent extremist milieus, and women that belong to other antagonistic milieus.

Copenhagen: Nordisk Ministerråd, 2021. 53p.

By Alexis De Tocqueville.

“Amongst the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions. I readily discovered the prodigious influence which this primary fact exercises on the whole course of society, by giving a certain direction to public opinion, and a certain tenor to the laws; by imparting new maxims to the governing powers, and peculiar habits to the governed.”

London. Saunders and Otley (1835) 487p.