By  David Wells 

  • Over the past year and a half, the rapid expansion in the availability and accessibility of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools has prompted a range of potential national and international security concerns, including the possible abuse of generative AI by terrorists and violent extremists. Terrorists and violent extremists have already started experimenting with generative AI, including by using a variety of tools to generate propaganda material. This experiment has been relatively limited so far. • An analysis of current or imminent iterations of generative AI tools suggests that they offer terrorists and violent extremists the potential to optimize some of their existing capabilities. Most obviously, generative AI can improve a range of propaganda-related tasks, including generating or modifying images, videos, audio, and text, as well as the use of translation and transcription tools. More worryingly, it may also allow terrorists and violent extremists to evade a key counter-measure used by major online platforms — the timely removal of terrorist content using its “digital fingerprint” (hash). • In other areas of terrorist methodology, the potential benefits of generative AI appear overstated, or dependent on either a significant advancement in the technology itself or the technological skills available to terrorist actors. For example, while generative AI can theoretically speed up and enhance research into terrorist targets or methodology, the frequency with which many generative AI programs provide inaccurate or made-up information presents potential risks for terrorist users. Although early indications of violent extremists customizing basic chatbots is concerning, creating a comprehensive, fully-functioning “terrorist GPT” to radicalize and recruit would currently require processing power and technical skills beyond those of most terrorist actors. Broader factors impacting how and when terrorists adopt new technologies must also be taken into account when considering the risks of generative AI being exploited. • Although understanding (and ultimately responding to) these use cases will be important, any analysis of the potential impact of generative AI on terrorism and violent extremism must include the broader societal impacts of the technology. Many of these potential impacts — which range from significant job losses and a severely degraded information environment to a bolstering of authoritarian regimes and a large-scale perpetuation of discrimination and biases — are extremely worrying in and of themselves. But they are also likely to contribute to conditions that are conducive to radicalization, and in which terrorist and violent extremist narratives can thrive. • The breadth of these direct and indirect challenges presents a compelling argument for the urgent development of a coordinated approach. A range of responses to the broader risks posed by AI are underway at national, regional, and international levels, including draft regulation, consultations, and nascent bi- and multilateral agreements. But few have focused to any great extent on the risks associated with terrorist use of generative AI. Stakeholders must remind themselves that while generative AI technology is new, many of the challenges it poses are not; moreover, many of the lessons learned over the past two decades of counter-terrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) remain extremely relevant. These include the importance of multilateral cooperation, the centrality of both public-private partnerships and engagement with civil society organizations, and the need to respect human rights  

Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2024. 18p.  

By Stephane J. Baele and Lewys Brace

   Over the past decade, two major phenomena have developed in the digital realm. On the one hand, extremism has grown massively on the Internet, with sprawling online ecosystems hosting a wide range of radical subcultures and communities associated with both ‘stochastic terrorism’ and the ‘mainstreaming of extremism’. On the other hand, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has undergone exponential improvement: from ChatGPT to video deepfakes, from autonomous vehicles to face-recognition CCTV systems, an array of AI technologies has abruptly entered our everyday lives. This report examines ‘AI extremism’, the toxic encounter of these two evolutions – each worrying in its own right. Like past technological progress, AI will indeed be – in fact already is – used in various ways to bolster extremist agendas. Identifying the many opportunities for action that come with a range of AI models, and linking them with different types of extremist actors, we offer a clear overview of the numerous facets of AI extremism. Building on the nascent academic and government literature on the issue as well as on our own empirical and theoretical work, we provide new typologies and concepts to help us organize our understanding of AI extremism, systematically chart its instantiations, and highlight thinking points for stakeholders in countering violent extremism

Dublin:   

     VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2024. 82p.

By James Lewis, Sarah Marsden, Jmes Hewitt and Anne Peterscheck 

This report presents the findings of a systematic review of research on how, and under what circumstances, trauma might be implicated in individual journeys into, and out of, violent extremism. It builds on previous work carried out by the research team on these dynamics, including a scoping review of the literature (Lewis & Marsden, 2021), and a process of network development involving a series of workshops bringing together researchers, policymakers and practitioners to discuss the relevance of trauma and adversity to violent extremism. This process confirmed there was a nascent, but growing, body of research exploring this topic, and that there was significant practical and analytical utility in exploring these processes in greater depth. 
The analysis presented in this report develops this research programme in three ways:

1. Undertaking a systematic review of post-2000 empirical, academic research on trauma, adversity and violent extremism to better understand a) the prevalence of trauma in the life histories of violent extremists; and b) the relevance of trauma in interpreting pathways towards, and away from, violent extremism.

2. Examining the different ways in which trauma is implicated in radicalisation pathways by synthesising this research on trauma, adversity and violent extremism with radicalisation models identified in a separate systematic review. 

3. Exploring how applying a trauma-informed perspective to understanding journeys into and out of violent extremism might inform research and practice.

Overview of the Report

This report consists of eight sections. The next section provides an overview of the key concepts discussed in the report, before discussing the conceptual framework that underpins our analysis. This is followed by an overview of our methodology and by three analysis sections addressing the three objectives outlined above:

1. Section one sets out the evidence identified through the systematic review. Drawing on 159 studies, it discusses the different relationships that have been identified between trauma, adversity and violent extremism. 

2. The second section explores whether and how trauma is captured in existing radicalisation models. This draws on an analysis of 99 papers identified through a separate systematic review of radicalisation models (Corner & Taylor, 2023). 

3. The final section presents a more theoretical and conceptual analysis, reviewing the implications of these findings for research and practice. 

The report concludes by summarising the key conclusions, implications, and recommendations for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners.

Lancaster, UK:  Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats  - CREST, 2024. 

By Hanna Rigault Arkhis

This report sets out the findings of research into women’s online involvement in far-right extremism analysed through the lens of the Good Lives Model (GLM). It addresses the lack of research on the gendered nature of the needs that are being met when engaging in such spaces.

The findings are based on an analysis of a women only right-wing forum hosted by Stormfront, the oldest white nationalist online community. The results highlight which goods are pursued, what needs are met, and how norms around goods are constructed.

A range of goods were identified as important and were achieved in different ways.

• Healthy living is usually fulfilled through the creation of a white family and raising children according to white nationalist ideology.

• Community is found on Stormfront and sustained through a cluster of primary goods including play, pleasure, and relatedness.

• Ways of meeting the good of creativity include cultivating one’s appearance in a way that indicates support for their ideology.

• Agency is found through a variety of roles; usually that of the stay-at-home mother or as a promoter of white nationalist ideology, either online or offline.

• Stormfront women appear to seek knowledge and work due to a desire to serve the movement better. They also advocate for a 'softer' expression of their beliefs, that distances them from violence, principally to facilitate recruitment.

By testing the applicability of the GLM to an online platform, this research affords a better understanding of the opportunities provided by online extreme communities to fulfil women's needs. It demonstrates the utility of the GLM and its ability to help interpret the goods women attain through involvement in extremist spaces.

Understanding the goods and needs that online spaces fulfil has the potential to inform gender-responsive programmes to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism (P/CVE). By highlighting the gendered nature of goods, the analysis illustrates that ‘gender blind’ programmes are unlikely to address the particular needs of women.

A GLM-informed analysis has the potential to inform P/CVE interventions by identifying the goods that might be relevant to certain communities, and the women who make them up, and using that understanding to identify interventions that make opportunities to achieve those goods in pro-social, positive ways more accessible.

Lancaster, UK:  Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats  - CREST, 2024.

By Claire Simonich, Will Tentindo, Vanessa Domenichelli, Ilan H. Meyer

  In this report, we describe findings of research conducted by scholars at the Williams Institute in collaboration with the Social Justice Legal Foundation (SJLF) that aimed to understand how transgender parole seekers fare in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) parole hearings. As a result of a public records request by SJLF, we received transcripts of 42 parole hearings that took place between January 1, 2021 – February 28, 2022, in which persons seeking parole identified as transgender. Our analysis shows that • Transgender individuals, aged 30 – 76, for whom transcripts were provided, were granted parole at approximately the same rate as the general population of parole seekers during that period: 31% of the transgender individuals in our sample (13 of 42) were granted parole as compared with 34% of all parole seekers in 2021, as reported by the CDCR. • Approximately 43% (16 out of 37 with relevant data) of parole hearings for transgender individuals included misgendering and/or insensitive or biased comments. { { Examples of insensitive or biased statements included parole commissioners questioning whether the parole seeker would remain sober because the “LGBTQ community has big parties,” and one commissioner spending several minutes discussing whether a transgender woman is able to maintain an erection. Examples of misgendering include a parole seeker’s own attorney misgendering them, stating that he felt “weird” about using his client’s preferred pronouns. One nonbinary individual asked the commissioners to be addressed by name, but the commissioners pushed the individual to choose a pronoun. • Some commissioners appeared moved when parole seekers spoke about how challenges stemming from being closeted as a transgender person (prior to transition) contributed to criminal behavior or how a transition could facilitate rehabilitation. • Other commissioners had negative reactions to the transgender individuals before them. { { For example, one commissioner doubted that the incarcerated individual’s transgender status would make life easier on the outside, suggesting that because one parole seeker had never “lived in society as a transgender woman . . . surely it’s going to be difficult.” Another commissioner stated, without prompting, “I don’t want to offend anybody, but your whole . . . , how you identify, is going to be an issue in the community. Right? I mean, that’s going to cause stress.” • Having an explicit parole housing plan was an important factor in granting parole—10 of 18 (56%) people with a housing plan were granted parole as compared with 3 out of 24 (13%) individuals who did not have an explicit housing plan. • Although finding appropriate transitional housing is extraordinarily challenging for transgender individuals, parole commissioners heavily consider this factor in their parole determination.

Los Angeles: The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 2023. 11p.

By Ayako Miyashita Ochoa,  Bianca D.M. Wilson,  Kimberly Fuentes,  Rae Jones,  Katherine Lee,  Moriah Macklin

   People who engage in sex work (PESW) are particularly vulnerable to criminalization even when seeking to report experiencing victimization. The health and safety of those engaged in sex work is further jeopardized as condoms have been historically used as evidence of sex work. California Senate Bill (SB) 233, taking effect on January 1, 2020, was meant to ensure that condoms cannot be used as probable cause for arrest nor used as evidence to prosecute a person for sex work. Nearly two years after its passage, we conducted interviews with twenty-five diverse individuals with experience engaging in sex work in Los Angeles County, a known locus for enforcement of a prior HIV felony solicitation. We sought to explore respondents’ interactions with law enforcement, their knowledge, beliefs, and experiences with the use of condoms as evidence of sex work, and their beliefs about criminalization risk and how that might impact condom possession and condom use in the context of their work. Through a group thematic review and individual coding (or categorizing) process, we identified the below key findings: • Respondents shared their perceptions about the risks of criminalization related to condoms in several ways. Some had detailed knowledge about rules and policies related to condom carrying and others had a general awareness of the possible risk of carrying condoms. • Respondents discussed that the information they received about criminalization regarding condom possession came primarily from other PESW. • Respondents discussed approaches to mitigating risk of police surveillance by either not carrying condoms at all and/or managing condom carrying through concealing techniques. • Some respondents who carried condoms, whether they tried to conceal them or not, discussed reasons for doing so, including resisting police control and reducing risk to protect their health, the health of their clients, and/or the health of their community and colleagues in sex work. • Generally, most respondents (80%) had not heard of any new law that restricted the use of condoms as evidence (SB 233). Further, reflecting the lack of awareness of the new law, condom-carrying behaviors seemed relatively unchanged. • Notably, most respondents carried condoms regardless of the risk of criminalization

Los Angeles: The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 2023. 13p.

By Nathan Cisneros,  Moriah L. Macklin,  Will Tentindo,  Brad Sears

   The Williams Institute analyzed data from the state of Arkansas about individuals who came into contact with the state’s criminal system through allegations of HIV-related crimes. We analyzed both law enforcement arrest data and data from the state’s Department of Corrections and sex offender registries to understand the beginning and end stages of the criminalization cycle. In total, we estimate that at least 108 people have had contact with Arkansas’ criminal system because of allegations of HIV crimes. FINDINGS • There have been at least 119 charges at arrest for allegations of HIV-related crimes since 1990, including four charges for failure to disclose one’s HIV status to a medical professional. • Arrests continue to the present day, with the latest arrest in 2022—the latest year for which data were available. • Enforcement is highly concentrated by geography: { { 18% of all arrests originated with Little Rock Police Department, followed by Fort Collins Police Department (10%). Likewise, Pulaski County originated one-third of all HIV-related arrests, followed by Sebastian County with 12% of arrests, and Miller County with 5% of arrests. In contrast, most counties had one or no arrests. • The racial composition of people arrested for allegations of HIV-related crimes skews Black: Black people were 48% of all HIV-related arrests, but only 15% of the state’s population, and 43% of people living with HIV in the state: { Black men in particular were overrepresented—7% of the state’s population, 31% of people living with HIV, and 44% of HIV-related arrests. • Four in five arrests (80%) that proceeded to the prosecution phase resulted in a guilty outcome. Only one case resulted in a not guilty outcome, and the remaining cases had charges dropped or prosecutors declined to pursue the case. • The youngest person with an HIV-related conviction was 18 years old. • Fourteen people were currently on the sex offender registry for an HIV-related conviction in 2023. { Half of these people were Black men, although Black men made up only 22% of the overall sex offender registry. • Twenty-one people across two snapshots of people in Arkansas Department of Corrections (DOC) custody (in 2007 and 2023) had HIV-related convictions mandating a sentence: { { { The average sentence per count for the HIV-related conviction was 24 years. Four people only had HIV-related convictions; they had no other current or prior convictions. Black men were 57% of all people with an HIV-related DOC sentence, compared to 38% of all people in DOC custody.   

Los Angeles: The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 2023. 26p.

By  Nathan Cisneros,  Will Tentindo,  Brad Sears,  Moriah Macklin,  Donovan Bendana

   The Williams Institute analyzed data from the state of Maryland about individuals who have been prosecuted for an HIV-related offense under Section 18-601.1 of the Maryland Health Code. These data were obtained from the Maryland State Administrative Office of the Courts. While previous comprehensive attempts to analyze the level of enforcement of Maryland’s HIV crime have identified less than six cases, our analysis revealed at least 104 prosecutions in the state because of an allegation of an HIV-related crime from 2000 to 2020. FINDINGS • In total, there have been at least 104 cases and at least 148 separate charges for “knowingly transferring HIV to another” in Maryland from 2000 to 2020. Among these 104 cases, three alleged only attempted “knowingly transferring HIV to another.” • We estimate that, from 2000 to 2020, between 82 and 104 people were charged with HIV related offenses in Maryland. • Arrests continue to the present, with the latest filing date in 2020. In fact, there were more cases from 2010 to 2020 than from 2000 to 2010. • Enforcement is highly concentrated by geography: Baltimore City alone accounted for nearly a third (32%) of all HIV-related cases in the state, followed by Montgomery County (19%) and Prince George’s County (18%). These three counties combined accounted for over two-thirds (69%) of all HIV-related cases. • The youngest person with an HIV-related conviction was 21 years old, and the oldest was 59 years old. The median age was 35 years old. • Men made up the overwhelming majority (86%) of people with an HIV-related charge. Men were over-represented in these cases as compared to the state population (49%), and the population of PLWH in Maryland (66%). We were not able to identify people who are transgender among these individuals. • Likewise, Black people made up the overwhelming majority of people with HIV-related criminal cases in Maryland. Black people were 82% of all HIV-related cases, but only 30% of the state’s population, and 71% of people living with HIV in the state. People were identified only as Black or white; we are not able to confirm whether people also identify as Hispanic/ Latino or multiple races. { Black men, in particular, are overrepresented—14% of the state’s population and 44% of people living with HIV, but 68% of HIV-related arrests. • Among cases with an HIV-related criminal charge where we have clear case outcomes, only 10% resulted in a guilty outcome on at least one HIV-related charge. { However, when looking at outcomes for any charge, HIV-related or not, 41% of these cases resulted in at least one guilty outcome. Media accounts from Maryland indicated that in some instances plea deals for defendants include dropping the HIV-related charge for a guilty plea on other charges

Los Angeles: The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 2024. 22p.

By Nathan Cisneros,  Brad Sears,  Moriah L. Macklin

   The Williams Institute analyzed data from the state of Mississippi about individuals arrested for an allegation of an HIV-related offense under Section 92-27-14 of the Mississippi Criminal Code. The data were obtained from the Mississippi Department of Public Safety. While previous comprehensive attempts to analyze the level of enforcement of Mississippi’s HIV criminal law identified approximately 15 people charged with an HIV-related crime in the state, our analysis revealed at least 43 people arrested between 2004 and 2021. Given the limited data available, we estimate this to be an absolute minimum number of people arrested for an HIV-related crime in the state. FINDINGS • In total, there were at least 47 arrests and at least 52 separate alleged HIV-related criminal offenses between 2004 and 2021. • In total, at least 43 people were arrested for an allegation of an HIV-related offense between 2004 and 2021. • Arrests for HIV-related offenses in Mississippi continue to the present, with the latest filing date in these records in 2021 and media reports of arrests continuing through 2023. In fact, half of all arrests in the data received from the state occurred during the five years between 2017 and 2021. • Enforcement of HIV-related crimes appears to be concentrated around the state’s capital and most populous city, Jackson, and near the Gulf Coast. Almost 40% of arrests were from three counties: Harrison (15%), Hinds (13%), and Lamar (11%). • The youngest person arrested was 20 years old at time of arrest, and the oldest person was 60 years old. The median age at arrest was 34 years old. • Almost three-fourths of people arrested for an HIV-related offense in Mississippi were men. Men were 49% of the state’s population in 2021 but 71% of people living with HIV (PLWH) and 72% of HIV-related arrests. { { { In all, 28% of those arrested for HIV offenses in the state were women. As with that observed in other states’ record-keeping practices, the Mississippi data do not indicate if the person arrested was cisgender, transgender, or gender non-binary. • Most people arrested for an HIV-related offense in Mississippi were Black. Black Mississippians were 37% of the state’s population in 2021 and 73% of PLWH but 63% of all HIV-related arrests. In contrast, white Mississippians were 56% of the state’s population, 19% of PLWH, and 37% of HIV-related arrests. { In a pattern observed with many other states’ records, no one in the data was reported to be Hispanic/Latino or of any other racial group. • Looking at the interaction of race and sex, Black men comprised nearly half (47%) of all HIV related arrests. Black men were also 50% of PLWH in the state, even though they accounted for only 18% of the state’s population overall. { White women were over-represented in arrests at 12%. Although they are 28% of the state’s population, they are only 4% of PLWH.  

Los Angeles: The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 2024. 19p.

HIV-related criminal incidents from 2000 to 2022

By Nathan Cisneros,  Brad Sears,  Will Tentindo

   This report provides an up-to-date look at the enforcement of HIV criminal laws in Ohio. The Williams Institute analyzed data from Ohio’s Incident-Based Reporting System (OIBRS) about HIV-related criminal incidents between 2000 and 2022. We also analyzed data on HIV-related criminal court cases between 2009 and 2022 from the Cuyahoga County courts system collected by that county’s Board of Public Health. Ohio has six laws that criminalize the conduct of people living with HIV (PLWH), including having sex without disclosing one’s HIV status, exposing others to bodily fluids more generally, engaging in sex work, and donating blood. Our analysis revealed that there have been at least 530 allegations of HIV-related criminal offenses across 447 separate incidents between 2000 and 2022 in Ohio. None of these incidents required actual transmission, the intent to transmit, or even conduct likely to transmit HIV in order to sustain a conviction. The findings presented in this report corroborate those from a recent study by staff at the Equality Ohio Education Fund and the Ohio Health Modernization Movement.1 Taken as a whole, the two reports find that from 2000 to the present, there have been hundreds of arrests and prosecutions for HIV-related crimes in Ohio. Together, they show a pattern of widespread and continued enforcement of HIV crimes. Enforcement is primarily concentrated in just a handful of counties across the state and disproportionately affects Black people and women in Ohio.  

Los Angeles: The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 2024. 41p.

By Ari Shaw,  Winston Luhur, Ingrid Eagly, Kerith J. Conron

  LGBT people face both generalized and unique vulnerabilities that cause many to leave their country of origin and seek refuge in another. Consensual same-sex conduct remains criminalized in 69 countries, and as many as 11 countries could impose the death penalty if convicted. Research shows that many LGBT people face persecution and violence, including domestic violence, rape, and murder, as well as discrimination in areas like education, employment, housing, and healthcare. Little information exists about the number and characteristics of LGBT asylum seekers in the United States. Using Asylum Prescreening System data from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), this report aims to fill these gaps. Our analysis relies upon fear interviews conducted by USCIS between January 3, 2007 and November 17, 2017 and coded as related to sexual orientation or gender identity (“LGBT status”). KEY FINDINGS • Using data about fear claims made through the defensive process, we estimate that 11,400 applications for asylum were filed in the United States between FY 2012 to 2017 by LGBT people. Among these applications were 3,899 claims on the basis of LGBT status. • Between 2007 and 2017, at least 4,385 fear claims that led to interviews by asylum officers were coded as related to LGBT status. • We estimate that 1.2% of all credible fear interviews conducted each year between FY 2008 2017 were related to LGBT status, while 1.7% of all reasonable fear interviews conducted between FY 2012-2017 were related to LGBT status. • Almost all interviews involving LGBT claims resulted in positive determinations of fear (98.4%), with most (96.3%) receiving positive determinations for fear of persecution and some meeting requirements for fear of torture (0.8%) or fear of both persecution and torture (1.3%). • Over three-fourths of asylum seekers with LGBT claims were male (73.7% of credible fear interviews and 81.7% reasonable fear interviews). • While claimants originated from 84 countries, over half (51.3%) were from the Northern Triangle region of Central America: El Salvador (28.0%), Honduras (14.9%), and Guatemala (8.4%). Significant proportions also were from Mexico (12.1%) and Ghana (7.8%). • 88.3% of LGBT asylum claims were heard through credible fear interviews, which are conducted at ports of entry or if a migrant is apprehended after crossing the border. The remaining 11.7% were heard at reasonable fear interviews, which are conducted when migrants are subjected to reinstatement of a prior removal order. • A large number of LGBT fear interviews (2,000) occurred in 2016 and 2017, proportional to an overall increase in defensive asylum claims during those years. This report illustrates the value of Asylum Prescreening System data for understanding the number and characteristics of LGBT asylum seekers in the United States. At the same time, it highlights critical gaps in data systems and underscores the need for more robust data collection and reporting about both LGBT and non-LGBT asylum seekers.  

UCLA Williams Institute, 2021. 28p.

By Stephen Pitts and Leo Tigges  

  This report describes a project to improve understanding of good practices in building probation capacity, both of new services and those already in the process of development. We found that “success” is promoted by several factors - • A collaborative, partnership approach • Creating a shared vision or aspiration regarding probation’s potential contribution to wider justice system evolution • Recognising and working with complexity and context – international and national • Building a network – engaging, involving and harnessing the expertise of critical stakeholders and partners • Technical and soft skills – an inspiring, individualised, knowledge and tools-based approach, building on strengths to foster organisational and personnel capacity and sustainability • Achieving the vision - planning and implementing through challenging steps, piloting, and review, with flexibility • Recognising and engaging with the stimulating and sustaining role of supra-national organisations and professional bodies, including through standards, data, finance, research and knowledge sharing Together with a range of project management skills we found to be especially important in international capacity building, and risks to be aware of, we propose 10 points for consideration, or implementation “Success Factors”, when building probation capacity at the national or jurisdiction level. We also offer a model (the “Domains and Enablers Model”) to support communication between actors in this field, and 5 points for deliberation by the international community which we believe may help progress the contribution of probation work globally. Our findings and recommendations are based on a study of European probation development in the 21st Century, supplemented by a review of international literature. Whilst the origins of probation work in Europe are  traceable to the 19th Century1, early pioneers having since been joined by other Western European nations, perhaps most striking has been the acceleration over the last 25 years in establishing probation organisations in Central and Eastern Europe in former Soviet republics and other countries previously within the Soviet sphere of influence. The European picture is in this sense both remarkable and successful. However, this is not the whole picture. As this study makes clear, European probation services vary greatly in their scale and focus. The Council of Europe offers a guiding basic principle2 - “Probation agencies shall aim to reduce offending by establishing positive relationships with offenders in order to supervise, guide and assist them and to promote their successful social inclusion. Probation thus contributes to community safety and fair justice process.” Aside from the inherent difficulties in measuring some of these aims and approaches, probation “success” can be hard to define for other reasons, as we discuss later, not least variation in probation service purpose and emphasis (see for example Durnescu, 2008).3 We also note some concerning aspects of European probation development, most notably “net-widening”4. Notwithstanding difficulties in defining or measuring success, our study shows that some development initiatives appear to have been more successful than others, certainly in the sense of contributing to probation organisations that today have an established and sustainable role in their country, and significant responsibilities and workload. We ask which approaches to development or methods appear to support success and consider whether the success factors, and risks, we identify in Europe are likely to be relevant in other regions of the world. We conclude that, for the most part, they are.  

 Utrecht, 

The Netherlands: Confederation of European Probation, 2023. 367p.

By Stephen Pitts and Leo Tigges 

  This report describes a project to improve understanding of good practices in building probation capacity, both of new services and those already in the process of development. We found that “success” is promoted by several factors - • A collaborative, partnership approach • Creating a shared vision or aspiration regarding probation’s potential contribution • Recognising and working with complexity and context – international and national • Building a network – engaging, involving and harnessing the expertise of critical stakeholders and partners • Technical and soft skills – an inspiring, individualised, knowledge and tools-based approach, building on strengths to foster organisational and personnel capacity and sustainability • Achieving the vision - planning and implementing through challenging steps, piloting, and review, with flexibility • Recognising and engaging with the stimulating and sustaining role of supra-national organisations and professional bodies, including through standards, data, finance, research and knowledge sharing Together with a range of project management skills we found to be especially important in international capacity building, and risks to be aware of, we propose 10 points for consideration, or implementation “Success Factors”, when building probation capacity at the national or jurisdiction level. We also offer a model (the “Domains and Enablers Model”) to support communication between actors in this field, and 5 points for deliberation by the international community which we believe may help progress the contribution of probation work globally. Our findings and recommendations are based on a study of European probation development in the 21st Century, supplemented by a review of international literature. Whilst the origins of probation work in Europe are traceable to the 19th Century, early pioneers having since been joined by other Western European nations, perhaps most striking has been the acceleration over the last 25 years in establishing probation organisations in Central and Eastern Europe in former Soviet republics and other countries previously within the Soviet sphere of influence. The European picture is in this sense both remarkable and successful. However, this is not the whole picture. As this study makes clear, European probation services vary greatly in their scale and focus. The Council of Europe offers a guiding basic principle - “Probation agencies shall aim to reduce offending by establishing positive relationships with offenders in order to supervise, guide and assist them and to promote their successful social inclusion. Probation thus contributes to community safety and fair justice process.” Aside from the inherent difficulties in measuring some of these aims and approaches, probation “success” can be hard to define for other reasons, as we discuss later, not least variation in probation service purpose and emphasis (see for example Durnescu, 2008). We also note some concerning aspects of European probation development, most notably “net widening”. Notwithstanding difficulties in defining or measuring success, our study shows that some development initiatives appear to have been more successful than others, certainly in the sense of contributing to probation organisations that today have an established and sustainable role in their country, and significant responsibilities and workload. We ask which approaches to development or methods appear to support success and consider whether the success factors, and risks, we identify in Europe are likely to be relevant in other regions of the world. We conclude that, for the most part, they are.     

 Utrecht, 

The Netherlands: Confederation of European Probation, 2023. 30p.

by Paulette Blanc Jeffrey Gleason Ryan Jones

This report provides data on the costs associated with police misconduct in Austin, TX, during the years 2012 through early 2020. Police misconduct encompasses the violation of Austin Police Department policies or individuals' constitutional rights by police officers in their duties or the illegal or unethical actions of police officers on duty. Police misconduct can range from verbal assaults to bystanders to excessive force that results in a person's death. The goal of this report is to understand how much taxpayer dollars are spent on police misconduct. One article from an Austin NPR news radio story that discusses some of the challenges of measuring police misconduct costs said that the decision to settle a case of misconduct that early ends up saving money for attorney's fees and can result in a lower settlement.[1] Insurance policies and local budgets usually pay for judgments and claims in cases of police misconduct. 

Austin, TX: MEASURE, 2021. 11p.

On May 25, 2020, Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd by kneeling on his neck for over nine minutes. Tens of millions of people took to the streets, not only in outrage, but with a fervent hope that people coming together and demanding justice would lead to safer communities for Black Americans—and for everyone. 

From day one of the protests, police unleashed horrors on protesters. Cops dressed in riot gear fired less-lethal weapons into crowds of unarmed civilians, sometimes within seconds of arriving at the scene. The weapons were “less-lethals” but they still resulted in gruesome, and in some cases permanent, injuries. Police kettled protesters and made mass arrests for nonviolent offenses, such as violating curfews and blocking highways. In just the first two weeks of the uprising, 17,000 people were arrested. At the highest level, protests were characterized as “riots” and acts of terrorism. But the story on the ground is clear: the police escalated situations, emptied their arsenals on protesters, and violated protesters’ rights.

In this report, we analyze 132 lawsuits brought by people injured, traumatized, wrongly arrested or otherwise harmed by police during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests. We found that cities both large and small, in red states and blue, have been forced to pay out almost $150 million to protesters, journalists, legal observers, and bystanders. Cities overwhelmingly chose to settle these cases. They were unwilling or unable to defend the actions of police in court.  

Each lawsuit is the inspiring story of a person or group of people who joined with others to call out the violence and demand change. When met with the same police violence and brutality they were protesting, they refused to back down. It’s notoriously difficult to hold police accountable, but by suing cities for the indiscriminate violence and unconstitutional actions of their police, survivors can tell their stories, win restitution, and sometimes force reforms.

As our research documents, over 3,000 people were harmed by police during the George Floyd protests and have won settlements from cities across the country. Many more are still awaiting their day in court, but already, the amount of money cities have paid out is unprecedented. In some ways, these settlements bring a modicum of justice by way of monetary compensation for harm done and, in some cases, restrictions on police. Our challenge is to use the evidence of abuse documented in these cases to demand that cities and states do better. While some protesters may have smashed windows, thrown bottles, or committed arson, it was the heavily armed, massive police engagement that led to life-threatening injuries and trauma to human beings. As the lawsuits document, it was too often the police who made the situation dangerous and violent.

Based on our analysis, we recommend enacting laws and policies designed to enable the right to peaceful assembly and protect protesters. These reforms would include steps to minimize police presence at protests, prohibit the use of less lethal or other weapons against First Amendment-protected assemblies, and prohibit kettling and mass arrests, among other necessary changes to policing. 

Washington, DC: Defending Rights and Dissent, 2024. 45p.

By Malore Dusenbery, Andreea Matei, Claudia Nmai, Susan Nembhard, Marina Duane

With funding from the US Office on Violence Against Women, the Urban Institute conducted a mixed-methods, multisite study on the perceptions of justice, accountability, safety, and healing held by diverse survivors of domestic violence. The project team interviewed 54 survivors (37 of whom also completed a survey) and 42 practitioners. We aimed to understand how historically underserved survivors (specifically, survivors from immigrant, rural, LGBTQ+, and Native American communities) define justice, accountability, and safety; how they describe their needs, experiences, and preferences; and what strengths and challenges they associate with traditional and alternative approaches to justice.

WHY THIS MATTERS

Domestic violence affects millions of people and causes serious consequences for survivors and their communities. It is also clear that survivors with certain intersecting identities experience higher rates of violence and greater barriers to seeking and receiving help. Yet the field lacks evidence of survivors’ diverse experiences and needs, and as a result, systems designed to provide safety and justice often fall short. The findings from this study can prompt stakeholders across sectors to consider how they are meeting the needs of all survivors and how they are contributing to survivors’ sense of justice.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Our goal was to highlight the diversity of survivors’ backgrounds and experiences while identifying their shared needs and perspectives regarding justice, accountability, and safety. Survivors and practitioners define justice broadly, in ways that range from punitive consequences to acknowledgement of harm. Moreover, safety is inextricably linked to perceptions of justice, as is survivors’ sense of individual recovery and economic security. All survivors need safety, healing, and justice, but aspects of their identities clearly affect their perceptions of and experiences with the different systems and professionals that are supposed to help them get safety, healing, and justice.A key recurring theme was that it takes a village to achieve justice and accountability in domestic violence cases. Service providers affect survivors’ perceptions of whether their partners are held accountable as much as the legal system helps survivors heal. And less traditional stakeholders, including health and mental health providers, religious institutions, employers, and other community groups, also play important roles.We identified actionable recommendations that stem from the participants’ desire for empowerment and choice and for practitioners to take all forms of domestic violence seriously. They are also designed to address some of the pervasive barriers we identified to achieving justice in the community or legal system, such as a lack of awareness of services or legal options among survivors and practitioners, language inaccessibility, and a lack of culturally informed and appropriate responses.Washington DC: Urban Institute, Urban Justice Center, 2024. 60p.

By The New York City Department of Investigation

  Each year, New York City issues tens of thousands of parking permits that allow the holders to park in locations around the City not available to those without permits.1 Permits are issued by the New York City Department of Transportation (“DOT”), the New York Police Department (“NYPD”), and the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”). In 2022, more than 95,000 permits were issued – over 26,000 by DOT, approximately 40,000 by NYPD, and over 30,000 by DOE. The vast majority of the City’s parking permits are issued to City employees for use while conducting City business. Some permits are issued to non-City employees, including employees of other government agencies, people with disabilities, and certain not-for-profit organizations. DOT, NYPD, and DOE issue parking permits to their own employees. DOT also issues permits to several dozen other agencies and members of the public; NYPD also issues permits to other law enforcement agencies. DOT’s permits issued to City agencies and staff, including DOT staff, allow parking in specified areas not available to the general public for limited periods of time while conducting City business. NYPD issues similar parking permits. DOT, NYPD, and DOE also issue parking permits for parking in certain on-street spaces that have been specifically designated for use by agency parking permit holders, typically near City office buildings, precincts, and schools. Permit abuse is a subject of long-standing concern in the City. Such abuse includes illegal parking while displaying a valid permit, use of permit “stand-ins” such as business cards or work vests, by individuals who may not have a valid permit, and the proliferation of fraudulent permits. There are limited designated spaces for City employees to park and the number of parking permits issued to City employees far exceeds such spaces. Illegal parking while displaying a valid permit is therefore common and can cause dangerous conditions and contribute to traffic congestion in already crowded streets. Illegal parking by permitted vehicles, seemingly without sanction, is widely documented on social media, drawing attention to a form of corruption that erodes the public trust in municipal government  Past administrations have sought to address these problems, generally without success. In 2008, Mayor Michael Bloomberg reduced the number of parking permits issued to City employees, cutting by 20 percent the approximately 70,000 permits that the City estimated it had issued. While Mayor Bill de Blasio was required to issue 50,000 new permits to DOE employees as a result of an arbitration ruling, in 2017 he announced the implementation of new controls; stricter enforcement, including the creation of a dedicated NYPD enforcement unit; and harsher penalties in an effort to combat parking permit fraud and abuse. In 2019, he announced a plan to eliminate fake permits, involving the phase-out of physical placards and creation of an Integrated Parking Management System, including Pay-By-Plate parking meters. He announced a three strike policy to permanently revoke permits after three instances of misuse and a dedicated DOT placard abuse enforcement team. Many of these reforms did not materialize or have since been abandoned. The DOT enforcement unit was never created, and the NYPD unit was disbanded due to COVID-19 related budget cuts. Components of the Integrated Parking Management System were implemented and the deployment of Pay-By-Plate Meters was delayed and is slated to begin in April 2024. In December 2019, the New York City Council passed a package of legislation intended “to crack down on the improper use of City-issued parking permits, known as placards” and “to rein in misuse of placards.” Local Law 6 of 2020 was a part of that package and required that NYPD evaluate weekly, for a six-month period, at least 25 blocks or intersections that experienced a prevalence of improper use of parking permits and at least 25 blocks that experienced parking that obstructed street infrastructure, such as bicycle or bus lanes or fire hydrants. The law required NYPD to submit a monthly report to the New York City Department of Investigation  

New york: New York City Department of Investigation, 2024. 47p.

By Marcelo F. Aebi, Edoardo Cocco & Lorena Molnar

  This report summarises key findings from the 2022 Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics on Prison Populations, better known as SPACE I, an acronym derived from its French name, Statistiques Pénales Annuelles du Conseil de l’Europe. A total of 48 out of the 51 prison administrations (PAs) across the 46 Council of Europe member states responded to the 2022 SPACE I questionnaire, thus contributing to this year’s survey. This signifies a 94% participation rate. The sole administrations that refrained from replying were those of San Marino and two of the three administrations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically the State PA and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina PA. Not all administrations responded to every question and, as far as the longitudinal analyses in this report are concerned, not all administrations have responded every year to the SPACE I questionnaire. Consequently, when interpreting the Figures of this report or comparing them with those of previous years, readers must consider the total number (N) of PAs included in each Figure and indicated in its title0F 1 . For example, the European average for the same indicator will vary from one Figure to another when the number of PAs included is not the same. Additionally, the Russian Federation's exclusion from the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022 results in its absence from the SPACE data collection from this survey onwards, impacting trend analyses. As a reminder, on 31 January 2021—the reference date for stock figures in the preceding SPACE I report—Europe housed 1,414,172 inmates, one third of which (478,714 inmates, or 34% of the total) were accommodated in Russian penal institutions. Furthermore, approximately 14% of the total budget expended by European PAs during the preceding year was accounted for by Russia. Thus, to maintain consistency in trend analyses, we also excluded the Russian Federation from the longitudinal analyses presented herein, recalculating all European average and median rates taken from prior reports. The Figures featured in this report use ratios, percentages, and rates per 100,000 inhabitants, rather than relying solely on absolute numbers. These metrics are influenced not only by fluctuations in inmate counts, but also by natural population changes. Researchers from the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital have summarised the European population trends from 2000 to 2020 as follows: “Europe remains divided by long-term population trends. This division mostly follows the past geopolitical cleavage between Europe’s East and West. Countries in the comparatively rich regions —the West, South, and North— continue to experience rising population, due to a combination of minor natural population increase and higher level of immigration than emigration. In contrast, almost all countries in Central, South-Eastern, and Eastern Europe saw substantial population declines, due to a combined effect of natural population decrease and emigration.”1F 2 Thus, while a PA's inmate count may remain constant over time, its incarceration rate will fluctuate based on the country's natural population changes. Similarly, prison data for Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine exclude territories that are not under government control; however, their general population figures, which are used as a proxy for the population at risk of incarceration when calculating rates per 100,000 inhabitants, may not accurately account for this exclusion. Last year's SPACE I report (2021) was notably affected by the global movement restrictions imposed to curtail the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, particularly the lockdowns. These limitations altered the structure of opportunities to commit crimes, resulting in a decline in most offline offences2F 3 and a surge in certain types of online offences3F 4 ; additionally, they disrupted the functioning of prosecution services and courts. These factors led to a reduction of the number of individuals entering penal institutions (flow of admissions). Coupled  with the preventive measure of inmate release in some countries—whether temporary or permanent—this significantly reduced the number of inmates (stock) in detention during 20204F 5 , resulting in lower prison populations on 31 January 2021 compared to one year earlier5F 6 . However, with the easing of movement restrictions in 2021, the structure of opportunities was largely restored, and the criminal justice system enabled to operate in a relatively normal way. As evident in this report, this resulted in an overall increase in the flow of admissions during 2021 and the number of inmates held in penal institutions as of 31 January 2022. Rates and percentages are presented as rounded numbers unless they fall below 10. A few exceptions to that rule were introduced when we considered that the addition or subtraction of decimals could help the comprehension of the indicator under study. The original data, with one decimal point, can be consulted in Tables 3 and 4 of Section 7. In our analysis, we employ the arithmetic mean (average) and the median as indicators of the central tendencies observed in Europe. Our focus is primarily on countries with populations exceeding 1,000,000 when highlighting significant deviations from these indicators. In that perspective, we have distinguished the description of the data from their plausible interpretations by putting the latter in bullet points [•]. We did the same for some specific methodological issues that can help readers when interpreting the data. For a more comprehensive explanation, please refer to the Methodology section at the end of this report    

Strasbourg and Lausanne : . Series UNILCRIM 2023/2. Council of Europe and University of Lausanne. 35p.

By Alex NowrAsteh

  Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Whether policies are sensible depends on the risks that terrorism poses, the harms that terrorism inflicts, and the costs of anti-terrorism policies. This risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism is a crucial step in evaluating anti-terrorism policies related to immigration. A total of 230 foreign-born terrorists were responsible for 3,046 murders on US soil from 1975 through the end of 2023. The chance of a person perishing in a terrorist attack committed by a foreigner on US soil over that 49-year period was about 1 in 4.5 million per year. The hazard posed by foreigners who entered in different ways varies considerably. For instance, the annual chance of being murdered in an  attack committed by an illegal immigrant was zero. The federal government has an important role in screening foreigners who enter the United States and excluding those who pose a threat to the national security, safety, or health of Americans, as foreign-born terrorists explicitly do. This policy analysis does not make predictions about foreign-born terrorism on US soil; it merely analyzes the past risk posed by foreign-born terrorists on American soil. The past is the only source of data and information available about foreign-born terrorists on US soil, but foreign-born-terrorist trends could change, and there is no guarantee that past trends will continue. Still, the data and information in this focused terrorism risk analysis can aid in the efficient allocation of scarce government resources to best counter the small threat of foreign-born terrorists.  

   Policy Analysis no. 972

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2024.  28p.

By Fatima Dakalbab and Qassim Nasir

The security of a community is its topmost priority; hence, governments must take proper actions to reduce the crime rate. Consequently, the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in crime prediction is a significant and well-researched area. This study investigates AI strategies in crime prediction. We conduct a systematic literature review (SLR). Our review evaluates the models from numerous points of view, including the crime analysis type, crimes studied, prediction technique, performance metrics and evaluations, strengths and weaknesses of the proposed method, and limitations and future directions. We review 120 research papers published between 2008 and 2021 that cover AI approaches for crime prediction. We provide 34 crime categories researched by researchers and 23 distinct crime analysis methodologies after analyzing the selected research articles. On the other hand, we identify 64 different machine learning (ML) techniques for crime prediction. In addition, we observe that the most applied approach in crime prediction is the supervised learning approach. Furthermore, we discuss the evaluation and performance metrics, as well as the tools utilized in building the models and their strengths and weaknesses. Crime prediction AI techniques are a promising field of study, and there are several ML models that researchers have applied. Consequently, based upon this review, we provide advice and guidance for researchers working in this area of study.

Social Sciences & Humanities Open

Volume 6, Issue 1, 2022, 100342