By John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones

Transnational Organized Crime exploits the complex relationships of local and global networks comprised of a range of criminal cartels, mafias, gangs, and corrupt state actors. This article will look at the links among these criminal enterprises and state actors, at municipal, sub-state, and state levels in Latin America to frame the contours of this segment of the global illicit political economy. The networks of alliances and co-operation among criminal cartels, transnational gangs, mafias, and state actors will be assessed. This includes criminal alliances of cartels and gangs with global mafias, the presence of criminal governance, transnational (and third generation) gangs, and links with hybrid threats and influence operations involving state actors. Examples will be drawn from Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. These examples will look at global links between cartels and gangs with transnational mafia such as the ‘Ndrangheta, as well as the use of strategic crime and corruption by states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Methods include a mix of quantitative methods, such as social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative cases studies. International Journal on Criminology • Volume 11, Number 2 • Summer/Fall 2024

By Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman

This report provides an analysis of black-market and gray-market sources of small arms, explosives, equipment, and material that are available to terrorist and insurgent organizations in Columbia with particular attention given to the sources and methods used by covert and/or illegal suppliers and purchasers to acquire, sell, buy, transfer, ship, and receive these items.

The extent and type of weaponry currently available to terrorists, insurgents, and other criminals are enormous. These groups have exploited and developed local, regional, and global supply channels to traffic in munitions and equipment worldwide. In the country of Columbia, the drug trade, a protracted insurgent conflict, nationwide corruption, and small arms proliferation have contributed to the political instability and violence in the country over the past century with small arms proliferation among the most serious of the problems.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. 208p.

By International Crisis Group

Once regarded as a minor hub in Mexico’s criminal economy, Veracruz is now confronting the harrowing truths from over a decade of violence and grand corruption. At least 2,750 people are believed to have disappeared in a state whose former governor is wanted for embezzlement on numerous counts. The murders of seventeen journalists from 2010 onwards are the most notorious examples of a whirlwind of killings that targeted, among others, legal professionals, police officers, potential witnesses to crimes and any civilians who dared check the ambitions of a multitude of criminal organisations and their political accomplices. A new governor from the opposition National Action Party (PAN) has promised to clean out the state and prosecute wrongdoers, fostering hopes that peace can be restored. But as economic turbulence threatens the country, and bankruptcy looms over Veracruz, strong international support will be crucial to bolster initiatives aimed at finding the bodies of the disappeared, investigating past crimes, and transforming the state’s police force and prosecution service. Veracruz is emblematic of the challenges facing the country as a whole. Threats by the new U.S. administration to curb Mexican imports and fortify the border to keep out undocumented immigrants imperils its southern neighbour’s economic prospects. Similarly, President Trump’s predilection for armed force to combat cartels ignores the harm produced by the militarisation of public security as well as its proven ineffectiveness. But Mexican voices demanding a stronger national response are hamstrung by the extreme unpopularity of political leaders and public estrangement from government. Corruption and perceived criminal complicity have undermined the legitimacy of the Mexican government at all levels, especially at the tier of the country’s 31 regional states. Baptised “viceroys” as a result of the extraordinary powers granted them during Mexico’s transition from one-party regime to multiparty democracy, state governors have also become some of the country’s most disreputable public authorities. Since 2010, eleven state governors have come under investigation for corruption. In Veracruz, an alliance between criminal groups and the highest levels of local political power paved the way to an unbridled campaign of violence through the capture of local judicial and security institutions, guaranteeing impunity for both sides. Strengthening institutional probity and capacity in Veracruz, as in the rest of Mexico, will require federal and state levels to deliver on vows to work in partnership to staunch corruption, and on their willingness to abjure short-term political and electoral advantage. With the election of the new governor, Miguel Ángel Yunes Linares, the once hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost power in the state for the first time in over 80 years. But the PRI remains in control at the federal level and has shown wavering commitment to Yunes’ reformist plans, not least because of the importance of securing votes from the region, the country’s third most populous, in the 2018 presidential election. The state’s budgetary crisis and the new governor’s two-year mandate make it highly unlikely that the state government could accomplish sweeping reform to Veracruz’s institutions without sustained federal backing.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 41p.