By FLORE BERGER

Cattle rustling is a major driver of conflict and instability in the Sahel and West Africa. The two groups posing the biggest threat in the Sahel are Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel).

These violent extremist organizations (VEOs) rely on cattle rustling as a stable source of income, using the proceeds to fund their operations and acquire necessary resources like weapons. Beyond this, they embed themselves within the broader livestock economy and, in areas where they hold significant influence, they even protect herder communities from looting by other conflict actors – gaining legitimacy in the process. Even further from their traditional operation’s zone in Mali and Burkina Faso, cattle rustling is still a critical aspect to the conflict.

JNIM in particular continues to expand further south, but it is not just territorial expansion – it’s a shift in logistics. JNIM relies on cross-border supply chains, including livestock looting and trafficking, to sustain operations and entrench their presence.

Geneva, SWIT:

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime ,

2025. 40p.

By FABIAN ZHILLA

Returning foreign fighters and military-trained individuals in the Western Balkans often come from police, military or paramilitary backgrounds. Many use their skills for criminal activities, making them a potential security threat in the region. Their role in organized crime and violent extremism varies from country to country. In Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, these individuals are primarily engaged in transactional relationships with criminal networks, driven by mutual benefit. In Kosovo and Serbia, however, they have stronger connections to radical and extremist groups. Meanwhile, in North Macedonia and Montenegro, criminal activity often intersects with radical political rhetoric. This policy brief calls for a strategic, cooperative and integrated approach to tackling this issue.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025, 31p.

By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

Violent extremism and organized crime are closely linked in the Western Balkans, but remain under-researched. This study identifies 34 criminal groups that overlap with extremism: 24 violent far-right extremist groups and 10 violent religious extremist groups. Violent far-right extremism is a better documented phenomenon because of its links to nationalist politics and high-ranking government officials. Violent religious extremism gained momentum in the 2010s, rooted in the instability that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Groups within both factions are involved in illicit activities, posing a major security threat to the region. This study highlights their criminal connections and advocates for a unified approach to tackling violent extremism and organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025. 45p.

By John Jupp, Matthew Garrod

One of the most important legacies of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and the ensuing twenty years post peace-process era, heralded by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, is the rise of complex and diverse Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups engaging in acts of terrorism and a wide range of organised criminal and cross-border activities. And yet, little scholarship has been dedicated to examining the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland or to accurately understanding the role that paramilitaries play in organised crime and their dynamic interactions with organised criminal groups. Informed by empirical evidence and qualitative interviews with government agencies in Northern Ireland, it is this increasingly important gap in scholarship that this article aims to fill. It does so by developing a new terrorism-organised crime interaction theoretical model designed specifically for application to Northern Ireland in order to shed new light on the evolution and current complex linkages between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland and beyond. The Northern Ireland model, which both builds on and departs from crime-terror models in existing scholarship, reveals a vast array of domestic and transnational ‘activity assimilation’ and ‘alliances’, as well as other forms of interactions including ‘conflicts’ and different gradations of ‘transformation’. The article concludes that national terrorism-organised crime models, and the Northern Ireland model in particular, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate local situations, are most appropriate for capturing intricate and dynamic interactions between these two phenomena across diverse environments rather than existing models that are abstract and designed for universal application. Northern Ireland presently faces a serious threat to its security and stability posed by the nexus between terrorism and organised crime, and numerous challenges need to be urgently addressed if it is to be combatted. Understanding the organised crime-terrorism nexus at the present moment could not be more vital. Indeed, Brexit and potential implications for the Irish border present by far the most important challenge to the Good Friday Agreement since its adoption and, as a corollary, ensuring that paramilitary groups do not utilise their capacity to re-engage in acts of terrorism. As part of the initial steps towards a solution to some of these challenges, the Northern Ireland model therefore represents a useful tool that could be harnessed, and built upon, by policy makers and government agencies for defining and mapping out the terrorism-organised crime nexus in Northern Ireland.

Falmer, East Sussex, UK: University of Sussex. 2023. 50p.

By SAŠA ĐORĐEVIĆ

Over the past decade, thousands of euros in profit (both legal and illegal) have flowed into and been generated within the Western Balkans to fund violent extremism. While violent religious and far-right extremism share similarities, their financing methods differ in complexity. Cash remains the primary means of moving funds on both sides, aided by the region’s informal economy. Religious extremist groups tend to rely on simpler financial methods and are less dependent on illicit profits. In contrast, violent far-right groups use a mix of legal and illegal funding sources, employing more sophisticated financial strategies. This policy brief examines the financial foundations of violent extremism in the Western Balkans with the aim of strengthening institutional efforts to combat it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 32p.

By John P. Sullivan

Crime wars and criminal Insurgencies challenge states as they emerge at the intersection of crime and war. In many nations these conflicts involve protracted gang and drug wars. These situations of insecurity range in the level of intensity and complexity. At times the lower levels of violence result in local consequences: violence and insecurity. In others the criminal organizations challenge the state and establish alternative of parallel power structures. This short paper will discuss these issues by briefly summarizing the situation in Mexico and Colombia. This summary will then identify the need for further research and development of legal and policy approaches in these states, as well as others facing similar challenges such as Brazil and Central America.

REVISTA DO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO MILITAR, 2021.

By John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones

Transnational Organized Crime exploits the complex relationships of local and global networks comprised of a range of criminal cartels, mafias, gangs, and corrupt state actors. This article will look at the links among these criminal enterprises and state actors, at municipal, sub-state, and state levels in Latin America to frame the contours of this segment of the global illicit political economy. The networks of alliances and co-operation among criminal cartels, transnational gangs, mafias, and state actors will be assessed. This includes criminal alliances of cartels and gangs with global mafias, the presence of criminal governance, transnational (and third generation) gangs, and links with hybrid threats and influence operations involving state actors. Examples will be drawn from Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. These examples will look at global links between cartels and gangs with transnational mafia such as the ‘Ndrangheta, as well as the use of strategic crime and corruption by states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Methods include a mix of quantitative methods, such as social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative cases studies. International Journal on Criminology • Volume 11, Number 2 • Summer/Fall 2024

By Iftekharul Bashar

The recent arrests in Malaysia confirm that radicalisation within the Bangladeshi diaspora is a significant and evolving threat. This problem stems from socioeconomic factors, homeland instability, and online recruitment. A transparent, collaborative, and multi-faceted P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) approach is essential to mitigate the risk.

COMMENTARY

Malaysian authorities recently arrested 36 Bangladeshi citizens in Selangor and Johor for their involvement in a radical militant movement promoting Islamic State (IS) ideology. Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail reported that these individuals were forming recruitment cells, fundraising for terrorism, and plotting to overthrow the Bangladesh government.

Notably, the network, as detailed by police, raised funds using international fund transfer services and e-wallets, directing money to the IS group in Syria and Bangladesh. This method highlights a growing trend in terrorist financing, leveraging the speed, lower costs, and often less stringent oversight of digital platforms and cross-border money movement to facilitate illicit financial flows globally.

Of those arrested, five have been charged with terrorism-related offences, 15 face deportation, and 16 remain under investigation, with the police anticipating further arrests. Malaysian authorities estimate that 100 to 150 individuals are suspected to be involved in this network, demonstrating the scale of the threat they are actively dismantling.

These arrests are a stark reminder that the threat of extremism continues to cast a long shadow, not just within Bangladesh’s national borders but also across diaspora communities. The arrest of the 36 nationals is not an isolated incident. There have been previous cases of radicalisation of Bangladeshis in Malaysia.

In May 2019, a 28-year-old Bangladeshi mechanic was arrested in Kuala Kedah; he had possessed the necessary chemicals and expertise to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Earlier in January 2017, two Bangladeshi salesmen, aged 27 and 28, were arrested in Kuala Lumpur, reportedly for having ties with suspected IS militants in Bangladesh and for planning to join a terror cell in the southern Philippines.

Singapore, among other nations, has also experienced similar cases in the past, notably in 2015, 2016, and 2020, highlighting a recurring pattern of Bangladeshi diaspora members being targeted and recruited by terrorist networks, including the Islamic State.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Johanna Kleffmann, Swetha Ramachandran, Noah Cohen, Siobhan O'Neil, Mohammed Bukar, Francesca Batault, Kato Van Broeckhoven,

Key Findings • The labelling of banditry as “organized crime,” “unknown gunmen,” or, more lately, “terrorists” has distorted this multi-faceted and still poorly understood phenomenon. Likewise, some of the frames that have been applied to banditry – particularly the farmer/herder conflict or Hausa/Fulani tensions – do not appear to fully align with local communities’ understandings of today’s evolution of banditry. Simplistic categorization and narrow lenses for understanding banditry may contribute to inappropriate or insufficient policy and programmatic responses. MEAC’s survey unearths some of the lived experiences with bandits and sheds light on the nuances of the phenomenon and its profound impact on communities. • Community perceptions of bandit groups corroborate earlier research depicting them as comprised of largely distinct, organized groups, albeit with shifting configurations and subject to fragmentation. Bandit groups operate in highly mobile, armed, and largely forestbased units that use quick-strike attacks on motorbikes against communities. Their motivations are primarily perceived as economic/financial by victims, including the notable subsection of the sample of Fulanis who have been victimized by bandits. • For the surveyed communities, weapons are the most recognizable feature of bandit groups. This bears critical implications for the potential for escalation of violence, further proliferation of illicit arms and ammunition including in the neighbouring regions, community violence reduction efforts and future DDR programming. • Victimisation experiences differ considerably with gender, age, and location in the North West. While physical violence and killings disproportionately affect adult men, sexual violence appears to especially affect women and girls (although it likely remains underreported). Variations of victimization across states indicate the volatile and dynamic nature of overall banditry presence and violence. • Banditry violence has profound and pervasive effects on the physical safety, access to income-generating activities, education, and mobility of residents in the northwestern communities surveyed. The perceived intensity and frequency of attacks are on the rise, with one in three respondents reporting experiencing weekly attacks in recent years. Close to two-thirds of respondents have family members who have been attacked by bandits.

Findings Report 36,

Geneva, The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research ., UNIDIR, 2024,43p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has emerged as a major international security threat, orchestrating or inspiring attacks abroad following a Taliban clampdown on its home turf. Although its strikes have fallen in number in 2025, its offensive could resurge. Why does it matter? Despite the recent lull, IS-KP might reactivate commanders willing to carry out attacks abroad or coordinate with other ISIS branches to launch them. Even a small number of highprofile operations – such as the March 2024 mass shooting and arson in Moscow – can cause numerous deaths and have major international repercussions. What should be done? Coordination among security services has improved, particularly in intelligence sharing and rendition. There are strong reasons not to resort to military action, but more could be done in terms of collaborating with the Taliban and Syrian governments, redefining the global anti-ISIS coalition’s law enforcement role, and supporting Central Asian countries.

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°183

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 28p.

By Michelle Sydes | Lorelei Hine | Angela Higginson4 | James McEwan | Laura Dugan | Lorraine Mazerolle3

Background: Criminal justice agencies are well positioned to help prevent the radicalisation of individuals and groups, stop those radicalised from engaging in violence, and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks. This Evidence and Gap Map (EGM) presents the existing evidence and gaps in the evaluation research. Objectives: To identify the existing evidence that considers the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in preventing radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. Search Methods: We conducted a comprehensive search of the academic and grey literature to locate relevant studies for the EGM. Our search locations included the Global Policing Database (GPD), eight electronic platforms encompassing over 20 academic databases, five trial registries and over 30 government and non‐ government websites. The systematic search was carried out between 8 June 2022 and 1 August 2022. Selection Criteria: We captured criminal justice interventions published between January 2002 and December 2021 that aimed to prevent radicalisation, violent extremism, and/or terrorism. Criminal justice agencies were broadly defined to include police, courts, and corrections (both custodial and community). Eligible populations included criminal justice practitioners, places, communities or family members, victims, or individuals/groups who are radicalised or at risk of becoming radicalised. Our map includes systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials, and strong quasi‐experimental studies. We placed no limits on study outcomes, language, or geographic location. Data Collection and Analysis: Our screening approach differed slightly for the different sources, but all documents were assessed in the systematic review software program DistillerSR on the same final eligibility criteria. Once included, we extracted information from studies using a standardised form that allowed us to collect key data for our EGM. Eligible systematic reviews were assessed for risk of bias using the AMSTAR 2 critical appraisal tool. Main Results: The systematic search identified 63,763 unique records. After screening, there were 70 studies eligible for the EGM (from 71 documents), of which two were systematic reviews (assessed as moderate quality), 16 were randomised controlled trials, and 52 were strong quasi‐experimental studies. The majority of studies (n = 58) reported on policing interventions. Limited evidence was found related to courts or corrections interventions. The impact of these interventions was measured by a wide variety of outcomes (n = 50). These measures were thematically grouped under nine broad categories including (1) terrorism, (2) extremism or radicalisation, (3) non‐terror related crime and recidivism, (4) citizen perceptions/intentions toward the criminal justice system and government, (5) psychosocial, (6) criminal justice practitioner behaviours/attitudes/ beliefs, (7) racially targeted criminal justice practices, (8) investigation efficacy, and (9) organisational factors. The most commonly assessed outcomes included measures of terrorism, investigation efficacy, and organisational factors. Very limited research assessed intervention effectiveness against measures of extremism and/or radicalisation. Authors’ Conclusions: Conducting high‐quality evaluation research on rare and hidden problems presents a challenge for criminal justice research. The map reveals a number of significant gaps in studies evaluating criminal justice responses to terrorism and radicalisation. We conclude that future research should focus attention on studies that consolidate sound measurement of terrorism‐related outcomes to better capture the potential benefits and harms of counter‐terrorism programs, policies and practices which involve criminal justice agencies.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, 19(4). 2023. 53p.

By Raneeta Mutiara

Digitalisation of the activities of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been a longstanding issue in Southeast Asia. In recent years, the nature of this threat has become more widespread and complex. In countries like Indonesia, where radicalisation is primarily offline, online platforms still play a role in spreading extremist ideas and maintaining ideological networks. The phenomenon of online radicalisation can erode social cohesion, highlighting the need for strategic measures to counter its destabilising impact.

Indonesia has made several attempts to combat online radicalisation. The National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia (BNPT) initiated the Duta Damai Dunia Maya campaign to counter harmful content on the Internet. Other online initiatives, such as BincangSyariah and Islamidotco, have also been promoting Islamic literacy, moderating religious interpretations, and correcting misleading narratives.

Nevertheless, Indonesia still encounters online radicalisation cases. In July 2024, Indonesia’s elite counterterrorism unit, Densus 88, detained a 19-year-old student who had expressed allegiance to ISIS through social media and was believed to be planning attacks on religious sites before he was caught.

The swift progress of Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially in areas of machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP), presents both opportunities and challenges in combating online radicalisation in Indonesia. AI, generally defined as machines mimicking human intelligence, enables systems to recognise patterns, analyse content, and produce outputs in text, images, and videos. Within this AI landscape, ML allows models to enhance themselves through data, while NLP, as a specific ML application, deals with understanding and generating human language. These advancements provide possibilities for creating early detection systems, content moderation tools, and sentiment analysis tools that can spot and counter extremist messages online.

For the research, the author conducted interviews with fifteen experts across different fields, including law enforcement officers, academics, representatives from civil society organisations (CSOs), and employees of AI start-ups in Indonesia. The qualitative data collected from this process have been analysed through thematic analysis, and the preliminary findings reveal that AI can indeed complement the conventional CVE (countering violent extremism) methods in the country, albeit not without challenges

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

Edited by Michele Grossman

With contributions from a range of regions and disciplines, this open access volume offers theoretically compelling and empirically rich new insights on the relationship between religion and violent extremism. The role of religion and religiosity in processes of radicalisation to violence has been at the forefront of debates around terrorism and extremism for decades. The events of 9/11 gave new impetus to these debates, cementing assumptions about the role of Islam as the key driver for religiously inspired violent radicalisation, and defining the way in which radicalisation to violence is understood. The years since 9/11 have seen a striking diversification in the terrorist and violent extremist landscape, yet the treatment of how religious beliefs, concepts and histories are entangled with established and emergent violent ideologies and social movements has changed far less. By looking beyond Islamist-inspired or attributed terrorism, this volume explores how violent extremists instrumentalise religion and religiosity in unexpected ways, from Orthodox Christianity and Hindutva to ‘conspirituality’, far-right extremism, and single-issue social movements. The eBook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2025. 312p.