By Holger Anders
This Briefing Paper looks at sources and pathways through which al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked extremists in Mali obtain their arms, ammunition, and explosives. This review includes an analysis of the materiel’s origins, types, and ages. The Briefing Paper presents the author’s assessment of some 800 arms and 12,000 ammunition casings that national and international authorities recovered and granted access to following extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022. Introduction - By 2022, Mali had faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by violent extremists. Since 2015, this violence has also spread from northern to central and southern parts of Mali, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. This Briefing Paper investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used by al-Qaeda- and IslamicState linked extremists (‘extremists’) as ‘tools of violence’ used in their attacks from 2015 to 2022. It provides an update on findings previously published by the Small Arms Survey concerning the proliferation and trafficking of illicit materiel in northern Mali prior to 2015. Specifically, this Briefing Paper focuses on military materiel legally produced and transferred by state actors before being diverted to extremist use in Mali.2 In so doing, the Briefing Paper examines three topics: 1. continuity in extremist procurement of their ‘tools of violence’; 2. changes in illicitly trafficked materiel and their sources; and 3. extremist network connections identified by the monitoring of this material. A confidential database maintained by the author provides the basis for the technical information concerning extremist-used arms and other material in this Briefing Paper.3 That database contains information about some 400 extremist attacks occurring across Mali between 2015 and 2022 from sites in which national and international authorities recovered extremist-used materiel that was made available for inspection by the author. The database also contains some 200 entries of extremist propaganda claims—documented in videos and texts on social media—relating to extremist attacks in Mali from 2012 to 2022. Interviewees included in this Briefing Paper are not uniformly identified for reasons of security and confidentiality. All information presented in graphs, illustrative maps, and tables is based on the author’s work and information contained within the database. The Briefing Paper first looks at security developments in Mali since 2015.5 It then looks at extremist-held armaments in Mali prior to 2015 and at continuity and change in these armaments after that. The discussion is supplemented with insights into network connections between extremist groups in Mali.6 Key findings Extremists continue to have access to arms and other materiel—including material of recent production— through capture from armed forces and illicit trafficking from the subregion. Libya remains a prominent source for illicitly trafficking military materiel to Mali; however, other sub-regional sources exist. These sources include components for commercial explosives used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mali. Established extremist groups use materiel to support the creation of new cells, which is a key mechanism in the spread of violent extremism in Mali.
Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 16pg
