By Eva Veldhuizen Ochodničanová, Alicia Heys

Despite the link between conflict and human trafficking having been globally recognized, academic inquiry investigating how the two interact continues to be limited. Given the recency of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, this lack of literature is even more pronounced in understanding how the risks of trafficking are developing in the current context. This paper examines extant academic literature to explore what is already known about the relationship between conflict and human trafficking, situating this within the theoretical framework of routine activity theory (RAT). It analyses governmental and non-governmental organization reports emerging from Ukraine to contextualize the risk that is specific to those affected by the war. The paper identifies four key drivers of risk facing those in, or fleeing, Ukraine, which can heighten their vulnerability to human trafficking, before offering a novel and innovative typology of the ways that human trafficking can manifest as a result of conflict. The typology considers the direct and indirect links between conflict and trafficking, the geographical spaces in which trafficking can occur, and the specific forms that exploitation can take. By situating the paper within RAT and contextualizing it with evidence from the war in Ukraine, the findings of this paper provide both theoretical and empirical insights that help to expand existing knowledge on how conflict situations can increase the risk of THB.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(2): pp. 26–41.2024 

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

From the document: "The United States is an Arctic nation, and the region is critical to the defense of our homeland, the protection of U.S. national sovereignty, and our defense treaty commitments. I am issuing this 2024 Arctic Strategy to guide the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in a concerted approach to preserve the Arctic as a stable region in which the U.S. homeland remains secure and vital national interests are safeguarded. Major geopolitical changes are driving the need for this new strategic approach to the Arctic, including Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the NATO Alliance, increasing collaboration between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, and the accelerating impacts of climate change. This increasingly accessible region is becoming a venue for strategic competition, and the United States must stand ready to meet the challenge alongside Allies and partners. This new DoD strategy directs the Department to enhance its Arctic capabilities, deepen engagement with Allies and partners, and exercise our forces to build readiness for operations at high latitudes. The document supports the 2022 National Security Strategy as well as the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and its lines of effort implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy direction to adopt a 'monitor-and-respond' approach to preserving stability in the Arctic. This strategy represents prudent and measured efforts to protect U.S. interests in the face of new challenges and an evolving security environment."

Washington DC. UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 21 JUN, 2024. 28p.

KATULIS, BRIAN

From the document: "[1] The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip: [a.] Support Israel's self-defense and objective of eliminating the threat posed by Hamas; [b.] Secure the safe return of hostages; [c.] Prevent a wider regional war; [d.] Protect civilians and respond to a growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza; and [e.] Create a post-war plan for reconstruction leading to a two-state solution and wider regional normalization efforts in coordination with regional and international partners. [2] Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other."

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (WASHINGTON, D.C.). 1014. 9p.

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

From the document: "Fulcrum represents the Department's ambitious Information Technology (IT) advancement strategy designed to leverage the power of technology to drive transformative change and serves as a tipping point for catalyzing digital modernization for the warfighter. To propel the Department forward, we must ensure continued success and relevance in the digital age. Fulcrum will enable achievement of the DoD mission and strategic objectives with unparalleled efficiency and effectiveness. [...] The DoD Chief Information Officer's (DoD CIO) mission is to 'connect', 'protect', and 'perform'. Fulcrum outlines a vision guided by four lines of effort (LOEs) representing a strategic shift that embraces technology as a mission enabler. [...] Fulcrum features the DoD CIO's IT goals and objectives for Fiscal Years (FYs) 2025-2029 that provide essential support to the priorities in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the supporting DoD Strategic Management Plan (SMP)."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 6 JUN, 2024

By Jessica Katzenstein

Six years after the germinal United States protests against anti-Black police violence in Ferguson, MO, and months after the 2020 police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, police in mine-resistant vehicles have once again occupied both the streets and mass public attention. In 2014, images from the Ferguson protests—of snipers pointing semi automatic rifles into crowds and officers tear-gassing unarmed civilians—prompted activists and politicians to compare the St. Louis suburb to occupied Gaza, Ukraine, or Iraq.2 During the summer of 2020, as the U.S. witnessed its largest public uprisings since the 1960s, police militarization again came under scrutiny. The Department of Homeland Security flew surveillance aircraft over protests in 15 cities, as officers on the ground deployed flash-bang grenades, sound cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas against peaceful demonstrators.3 Since protests began, at least 14 local law enforcement agencies in 10 states have received free mine-resistant vehicles built for the U.S. military.4 In response, some lawmakers have revived efforts to curtail such transfers of military equipment.5 Reform groups are advocating to demilitarize the police by limiting when and how they can use armored vehicles and camouflage uniforms.6 In this moment of potential transformation, we must analyze both the deep roots and the recent upsurge of police “militarization” in order to grasp what calls for “demilitarizing” the police could mean. This paper argues that today’s high level of police militarization is one of the cruel, complex domestic costs of recent American wars abroad. Police militarization is in a sense as old as U.S. policing itself, yet it has exploded since September 11, 2001 and its intensification must be counted among the costs of this country’s post-9/11 wars.

Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute, 2020. 20p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) has gained ground in the intra-jihadist fighting in north-eastern Nigeria, halting the previous momentum of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). In the course of 2023, JAS took most of the islands in Lake Chad, which ISWAP had controlled. 

Why did it happen? Conflict between these Boko Haram splinters stems from differences in governance and treatment of civilians. JAS kills and steals from everyone; the more bureaucratic ISWAP generally spares Muslim non-combatants. Many JAS members surrendered to authorities or continued fighting instead of joining ISWAP after the death of JAS’s

leader in 2021. 

  Why does it matter? In the last two years, JAS and ISWAP may have visited more damage upon each other than the Lake Chad states have inflicted on the jihadists. Still, the splinters pose a significant threat. ISWAP is regrouping, while the revamped JAS is set to target civilians around the lake. What should be done? The Lake Chad governments will need to do more to prevail over the jihadists. They should mitigate risks to civilians by maintaining humanitarian assistance; expanding efforts to support defectors; improving airstrike precision; and reinvigorating regional security cooperation.    

Edited by Jeff Breinholt

Initially enacted in 1992, the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §2333, provides a legal remedy for American victims killed or injured by reason of international terrorism by creating a private cause of action, with treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Since then, some 150 lawsuits have been brought under the statute against such terrorist organizations as Hamas, Hizballah, and FARC, as well as the banks and companies alleged to have assisted them. These lawsuits have generated some 600 opinions.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism. 2024, 91pg