By Silvia Villarreal, Rose Kim, Elizabeth Wagner, Nandita Somayaji, Ari Davis, M Cassandra Crifasi

This report outlines gun death data from 2022, the most recent year of finalized data available. All data were accessed using the Centers for Disease Control’s Underlying Cause of Death database, part of the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) database. The Underlying Cause of Death database contains data based on death certificates for U.S. residents and is the most reliable national source of gun death data available in the U.S. The gun death data used from this database depicts injury mortality by intent using the following categories: homicide, suicide, unintentional, legal intervention, and undetermined. Rates are calculated by the residence listed of decedent, not where the shooting actually took place. For simplification purposes, we created the following age categories to examine gun violence centered on youth: children (ages 1–9) and teens (10–17). For smaller, specific age ranges, we created the following categories: older teens (15–17) and emerging adults (17–19).

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2024. 23p.

By Colin Murphy

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also appearing frequently. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy-to-convert weapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN's global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms. This is an update of a briefing by Ann Neville, published in 2022.

Briefing 23-10-2024 Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2024. 12p.

By Evan D. Gumas, Munira Z. Gunja, and Reginald D. Williams II,

Firearm mortality in the United States has been well documented, and for good reason: far more Americans die of firearm-related causes than do residents of any other high-income country. Firearms are the leading cause of death for children in the U.S. and the weapon used most in interpersonal violence against women. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that nearly 49,000 Americans died from firearm-related causes in 2021, up from about 45,000 in 2020.1 In 2019, firearms accounted for 10.4 deaths for every 100,000 people in the U.S., around five times greater than in the countries with the second-and third-highest death rates, France (2.2) and Switzerland (2.1). Less publicized, however, is how gun violence burdens the healthcare system. Each year in the U.S., firearm-related injuries lead to roughly 30,000 inpatient hospital stays and 50,000 emergency room visits, generating more than $1 billion in initial medical costs. In 2020 alone, deaths from these injuries cost $290 million, an average of $6,400 per patient. Medicaid and other public insurance programs absorbed most of these costs. But the impact of gun violence reaches far beyond the hospital room. Firearm injuries leave victims with hefty medical bills. Medical spending increases an average of $2,495 per person per month in the year following the injury. Survivors are also more likely to develop mental health conditions and substance use disorders, areas in which the U.S. has poor outcomes.

New York: Commonwealth Fund, Apr. 2023. https://doi.org/10.26099/a2at-gy62

By Alice M. Ellyson, Avanti Adhia, Sandra Shanahan, Aisha Alsinai, Lisa DiMascolo, Maxmilliaan Reygers, Deirdre Bowen, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

We quantified the implementation of WA state's domestic violence (DV)-related firearm prohibitions (RCW9.41.800) by the courts and the Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit (RDVFEU), a regional approach to compliance promotion. We measured implementation, vetting, compliance, and enforcement of firearm prohibitions before (2014–2016) and after (2018–2020) the RDVFEU was implemented using a 55% random sample of granted domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs) in King County, WA (n = 3543). We evaluated differences in judicial orders to surrender firearms and other dangerous weapons (OTSWs), respondent documented compliance, and respondent weapon and/or firearm relinquishment before and after implementation. Compared to DVPOs granted prior to RDVFEU implementation, granted DVPOs after RDVFEU implementation were at least 4.5 times more likely to include an OTSW. RDVFEU implementation was also associated with at least 3.4 times the odds of respondent documented compliance and at least 3.3 times the odds of respondent relinquishment of at least one firearm and/or other dangerous weapon. These findings demonstrate RDVFEU implementation was associated with benefits at each stage of the protection order process with improvements in both judicial enforcement and respondent compliance. Overall, RDVFEU implementation was associated with improvements in granted orders to surrender weapons, respondent compliance, and relinquishment.

Policy Implications

DV-related firearm prohibitions can be supported by interdisciplinary teams within the legal system to promote respondent compliance and enhance safety planning for DV victim–survivors.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 23, Issue 4 Nov 2024 Pages 801-1017

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

Every gun on our streets starts somewhere, and the overwhelming majority have their origins in the legal marketplace. Understanding how guns — particularly those that have been diverted from legal commerce to the underground market — make their way to crime scenes is essential to crafting evidence-based and life-saving solutions to the American gun violence epidemic. There is — or should be — nothing controversial about this tracing approach. Epidemiologists and other scientists routinely study the origins of public health challenges in order to develop effective solutions, treatments, and preventative measures. It is a key component of the scientific method. Unfortunately, the best national data on the sources and paths of crime guns has been hidden from researchers, journalists, and the general public for nearly two decades. The gun industry successfully pushed the federal government to restrict public access to this critical gun trace data, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has aided the industry’s efforts by adopting an overly broad interpretation of those regulatory restrictions. Although some state and local law enforcement agencies have released gun UNDERSTANDING HOW GUNS — PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM LEGAL COMMERCE TO THE UNDERGROUND MARKET — MAKE THEIR WAY TO CRIME SCENES IS ESSENTIAL TO CRAFTING EVIDENCE-BASED AND LIFE-SAVING SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC. trace data in the last 20 years, the amount has been insufficient to develop the comprehensive, life-saving solutions that we need. In this report you will find an analysis of the most important gun trace dataset to be publicly available in decades. Attorney General Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania has released trace data for 186,000 crime guns from over 150 law enforcement agencies in his state, allowing the public to identify, for the first time in decades, which gun dealers appear to supply the most guns to the illegal market. This data is publicly available on the Pennsylvania Gun Tracing Analytics Platform. It is very important to note that the gun tracing dataset, while extensive, is not comprehensive. It does not include crime guns recovered by local Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies that have opted against sharing trace data. For that reason, the findings in this report are not the definitive picture of crime guns in the state. However, this dataset should nonetheless enable the public, policymakers, and law enforcement to hold the gun industry accountable for its role in supplying crime guns — and, in doing so, ultimately save lives. By focusing on the small number of gun dealers now known to be contributing to the problem, Pennsylvanians and their leaders will be able to put political, legal, and economic pressure on the irresponsible actors of the gun industry and bring about needed reforms to ensure that firearms are transferred responsibly and safely. Like all data, gun trace data has its limits; its insights, while key to understanding gun trafficking, are just one part of that process. Earlier this year, Brady unveiled an extensive — and ever-growing — database containing another piece to the puzzle: ATF compliance inspection reports detailing federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who have been issued a warning letter or more severe remedy for cited violations of gun laws. We encourage readers to also view that resource, the Gun Store Transparency Project, at www.gunstoretransparency.org. As you read through these findings, keep in mind that many of the 186,000 crime guns in the database are likely associated with one or more crime victim(s) and their families. If this were not staggering enough, the devastating ripple effects gun violence inflicts on families, neighborhoods, and communities are not captured in these numbers. Brady invites you to join us in advocating for solutions that address the supply side of gun violence. We invite researchers to study this data and build on our analysis; we implore journalists to report on not just the tragic results of gun violence incidents, but how crime guns end up in our communities; we urge lawmakers and law enforcement to adopt life-saving, supply-side solutions to gun violence; and we call on federal, state, and local authorities to be more transparent by releasing more trace data to the public. It is long past time for the gun industry as a whole to adopt meaningful supply-side solutions ensuring firearms are transferred safely and responsibility, as it is neither fair nor just to ask the communities suffering the immense harms of gun violence to also bear the burden of providing all the solutions.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence, 2022. 43p.

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

In January 2020, Brady advocates planned to take part in an annual Martin Luther King Jr. gun violence prevention advocacy event at the Virginia State Capitol, but state officials cautioned would-be participants that 2020 would be different: Second Amendment extremists were planning to turn out. Out of caution, Brady cancelled its official participation in the event because an estimated 20,000 individuals from across the country, armed with assault-style rifles and wearing tactical gear, descended on the State Capitol in Richmond, VA. It was a deeply troubling moment for members of the gun violence prevention movement, who saw their First Amendment right to speak and assemble quashed by gun-toting extremists. We did not know then that the events of that day were only a dress rehearsal for far worse to come. On January 6, 2021, Congress was set to certify the results of the 2020 election. But extremists, many of them armed, mounted an insurrection with violent force that resulted in death and injury and nearly derailed Congress’ capacity to confirm a president duly elected by the citizens of the United States. For Brady supporters and gun violence prevention advocates, it was both a sickening gut punch and deja vu. Although only one of the four people killed on January 6 was shot, the 2021 attack had the same roots as the 2020 Virginia State Capitol unrest: Second Amendment extremism. Second Amendment extremism arises from what’s commonly known as the “insurrectionist” construction of the Second Amendment: a false interpretation fomented by extremists, marketed by the gun lobby, and adopted by some mainstream politicians, including the 45th President of the United States. Second Amendment extremism lays the foundation for much domestic unrest and weaponized terror throughout American history, including but not limited to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the armed agitation at the Michigan State Capitol, and yes — January 6, 2021. Indeed, investigations and firsthand accounts of January 6 show that many of its agitators were armed, ready, and willing to harm lawmakers. Accordingly, officers on duty at the U.S. Capitol that day had credible reasons to fear that many rioters were armed; a number of these officers have since testified before Congress that those fears hindered their ability to control the insurrectionist mob. Yet the common narrative around January 6 often omits the role of Second Amendment extremism. Ignoring the ways in which guns, and gun mythology, fuel domestic extremism in America has been — and will continue to be — a deadly error. For these reasons, this report sets out to examine the role U.S. gun culture and policy played in laying the foundation for January 6. If we do not spend time reflecting upon our past, we are doomed to repeat it — and that we cannot do, because human lives and bedrock civic principles hang in the balance of this understanding and reckoning. At Brady, we have confronted extremism before, and we know that unless we take action, we will face it again.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence. 2022. 16p.

By Rachel Swaner, Elise White, Andrew Martinez, Anjelica Camacho, Basaime Spate, Javonte Alexander, Lysondra Webb, and Kevin Evans

Despite a significant decline in violent crime nationally over the last 15 years, high rates of gun violence persist among youth in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods (Children’s Defense Fund 2019). In New York City, gun violence has been increasing in specific communities, with many attributing the increase to youth gang conflicts (Sandoval 2019; Watkins 2019). Efforts to prevent young people from acquiring guns must address the reasons why they are getting guns, not just the logistics of how they are doing so. This is especially true given that young people acquire them almost exclusively through the informal economy (Webster, Meyers & Buggs 2014), likely eluding traditional policy interventions. This project investigated the experiences of New York City youth ages 16-24 who were at high risk for gun violence (e.g., carried a gun, been shot or shot at). Youth participants were recruited from three neighborhoods with historically high rates of gun violence when compared to the city as a whole—Brownsville (Brooklyn), Morrisania (Bronx), and East Harlem (Manhattan). We explored the complex confluence of individual, situational, and environmental factors that influence youth gun acquisition and use. This study is part of a broader effort to build an evidence-based foundation for individual and community interventions, and policies that will more effectively support these young people and prevent youth gun violence. Through interviews with 330 youth, we sought to answer these questions: 1. What are the reasons young people carry guns? 2. How do young people talk about having and using guns? 3. What are young people’s social networks like, and what roles do guns play in these networks? Youth were recruited through respondent-driven sampling, with initial interviews accessed through outreach at Cure Violence programs (gun violence prevention programs with credible messengers on staff), observation at outdoor public housing project “hot spots,” and ethnography at indoor gang spaces. These initial interview participants then helped recruit other eligible youth from their social networks. Participatory Methods  Participatory methods and trust-building were vital to accessing these youth. Early in the study, we faced challenges in gaining trust and candid responses from these heavily streetinvolved youth—unsurprising given the sensitive nature of our questions regarding guns, gangs, and violence. Accordingly, it was critical to employ field researchers—the people conducting the interviews and the public face of the project—with significant personal experience in the social networks of the target population. Some of our team members reflected the demographic composition of the neighborhoods and had connections to the street in such a way that research participants could, as these field researchers explain, “feel your gangsta.” Beyond merely ensuring access, this approach also led to more honest engagement from the interviewees. It further yielded more accurate analysis and interpretation, as field researchers not only conducted many of the interviews, but also helped to code and analyze the data, draw study conclusions, and develop recommendations. The importance of building trust with 16- to 24-year-olds at risk for gun violence cannot be overstated. The processes for gaining trust in each neighborhood differed significantly; this geographic specificity further played out on the micro level within specific housing developments and indoor gang spaces. New approaches had to be identified in each location. Researchers collected data in the areas gangs or housing developments “controlled,” since that was where the participants felt the most comfortable. To undertake this networking, researchers had to be consistently present and visible in spaces important to participants, showing respect for local gang politics, and acknowledging interpersonal and social trauma. The necessity of a street ethnography/participatory approach and ongoing trust-building meant the team consistently put in long hours on activities not immediately connected to the project deliverables, such as helping neighborhood youth create resumes and apply to jobs, navigate housing issues, and connect to services; providing food; and attending holiday parties and community events. Further, our research team had countless spontaneous interactions with community members such as basketball games and informal conversations about hip-hop or politics. We also found it essential to engage gang leadership in each new neighborhood we worked in. This involved our field researchers identifying and meeting with the heads of local gangs to discuss the research and answer any questions they had. During these meetings, field researchers disclosed their own past street involvement and familiarity with gang culture. Once these relationships were solidified, gang leaders gave our team permission to conduct interviews with members of their gang in the physical spaces they controlled. We would not have gotten access to the high number of young gun carriers without this engagement and relationship building with gang leaders. As we release this report, sweeping national protests against the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Rayshard Brooks by police officers, specifically, and continued police violence against people of color more broadly are pushing many jurisdictions to reexamine traditional approaches to public safety. This research—arguably the most ambitious of its kind—into why some young New Yorkers carry guns can be used to inform new strategies for keeping communities safe. This summary outlines our study findings, and the implications for policymakers. Major Findings Analysis of interview data revealed findings across five areas: participants’ neighborhoods, guns and violence, gangs, alternative-economy survival strategies, and the police. Key findings from each of these areas are below. Participants and Their Neighborhoods • Demographics The 330 youth in the study overwhelmingly were men (79%), living in public housing (78%), and Black or Latinx (94%). On average, participants were 21 years old. A higher percentage of the women interviewed had children (58%, v. 31% for men). • Neighborhood Perceptions Most reported it was easy to get drugs (83%), there was a lot of crime (78%), and there were regular gunshots (70% said at least monthly) in their neighborhood. Over a third (36%) reported hearing weekly about someone threatened with a gun. • Lack of Neighborhood Safety Lack of safety was reported as a major driver of gun carrying. Participants reported feeling unsafe because of beefs between rival gangs or housing projects affecting how they could “move”—i.e., where they could safely walk or go; police harassment for small infractions but lack of responsiveness for serious crime; and fear of being shot by a police officer. • Violent Victimization Violence was a near universal experience among the young people we interviewed. Eighty-one percent had been shot or shot at. Experiences with violent victimization often related to being in the wrong place at the wrong time, having fights related to romantic relationships, and getting caught up in gang-related altercations. Some participants made explicit connections between their victimization, attendant decrease in trust of others, and feeling that carrying a weapon was the only choice left to them. • Gun Carrying Practices Most participants (87%) had owned or carried a gun at some time. Participants reported being more likely to carry at nighttime. Those who carried all the time—i.e., night and day—identified the gun as central to their strategies for selfpreservation. • Carrying for Protection These communities’ lengthy histories of violent victimization at the hands of other residents and the police—whether or not participants had themselves been injured—were repeatedly cited as the backdrop against which decisions around weapons-carrying were made. Some youth reported carrying guns because of their pervasive sense of neighborhood mistrust and a feeling that they could be victimized at any time—a kind of generalized fear. Other participants felt a more localized fear— needing protection from people seeking retaliation. Finally, many participants felt a sense of overarching fear of the state, primarily in the form of law enforcement. “You gotta protect your life because the cops might shoot you.” (Black man, 24) • Gender Nuances Self-protection took on further nuances for female participants who were involved in traditionally male street activities. The women in our study indicated that their gender did not exempt them from retaliation and in some cases even increased  (continued) 

New York: Center for Court Innovation . 2020. 68p.

By Travers Barclay Child, Kai Gehring, Sarah Langlotz, Austin Wright, and Rossella De Sabbata

This paper leverages granular survey data from within the conflict theater of Afghanistan to investigate how plausibly exogenous exposure to Islamic State (IS) propaganda in-fluences views towards local and international forces. We study two mediums of ter-rorist propaganda, exploiting high-frequency time variation in global distribution of IS videos and plausibly exogenous signal penetration of a prominent IS radio tower in Afghanistan. Our findings suggest violent video and radio content undermines public support for IS and its key opponents, while increasing demand for international forces to remain in the country. By contrast, videos depicting a capacity for IS governance boost their support.

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2024-121
Chicago: University of Chicago, The Becker Friedman Institute for Economics (BFI) , 2024. 59p.

By Terra Wiens

Gun violence impacts all communities in the United States, though each in different ways. Communities of color are especially impacted by fatal gun violence.a While substantial research has described the disproportionate impact gun violence, specifically firearm homicide, has on Black communities, less research has been done to describe the impact on the American Indian or Alaska Native (AI/AN) community in the U.S. This study examines the impact of lethal firearm violence in the AI/AN community in the U.S. by analyzing mortality data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)b and Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) data submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While CDC mortality data capture more homicides in the U.S. compared to crime data, FBI SHR data provide additional details about homicide deaths not available in the CDC data used for this report. Therefore, this report includes CDC mortality data to describe victim demographics and the use of firearms for both homicide and suicide, while FBI SHR data describe the victim and offender relationship and circumstances for homicides  

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2024. 19p.

Nils Duquet & Maarten Van Alstein

On a regular basis, news stories appear in the media about public shootings where shooters use their guns to open fire and kill people in shopping malls or on school campuses. Mostly these stories deal with incidents in the United States. Over the last years, however, a number of European countries have experienced similar public shooting incidents. Notable cases were the shootings at Tuusula and Kauhajoki in Finland (2007 and 2008), the killings in Cumbria in the UK (2010), the Utøya attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway (2011), and the shootings at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands and Liège in Belgium in 2011. Public shootings draw a high level of media attention. Less striking in the public eye, but not less significant – not least in quantitative terms –, are the numbers of people in Europe killed by firearms in the context of gun-related crime or in domestic shootings. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010, over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter were killed by firearms in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). Every year, over 4000 suicides by firearm are registered in the EU. This means that, on average, there are 0.24 homicides and 0.9 suicides by firearm per 100,000 population in Europe every year.

Compared with the US or other countries around the globe, the rates of gun-related violent death in Europe are rather low, certainly where the homicide rates are concerned. This does not mean, however, that the problem of gun violence has not appeared on the European policy radar in recent years. On the contrary, the attention devoted to the problem by law enforcement agencies and policy-makers has been growing. Reacting not only to shooting incidents such as those mentioned above, but also to warnings by police and law enforcement agencies that criminals are increasingly willing to use (heavy) firearms and that illegal trafficking in firearms is on the rise, a number of European countries have announced policy interventions targeted at reducing levels of gun-related violence and crime. The European Commission has also become an active actor in firearms policy. In October 2013 it announced a plan to reduce gun violence in Europe, in which it defined the misuse of firearms, whether legally-owned or illicitly manufactured or acquired, as “a serious threat to the EU’s security from both an internal and external perspective”. One of the major problems the Commission identified in its initial policy papers was the problem of a lack of sound and adequate knowledge about firearms in Europe. The commission noted that “a lack of solid EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy and operational responses”.. One of the ambitions of the EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy is, therefore, to address the gaps in knowledge concerning gun violence.

An additional problem is that the lack of reliable and comprehensive information on firearms in Europe is not limited to the sphere of law enforcement and policy-making. European scholarly research focusing specifically on firearms availability, gun control and gun-related violence is scarce. There is a research community in Europe focusing on small arms and light weapons (SALW), but it is predominantly concerned with the export of firearms and the connections between these arms flows and violence in developing, transitional or fragile states outside Europe. Scientific research on firearms and gun-related violence in the domestic European context is much less advanced. The scanty research efforts made in this field by epidemiologists, criminologists and legal scholars remain fragmented, and suffer from the fact that there is no integrated scholarly community dealing with gun-related issues. Language barriers, moreover, often prevent the wider dissemination of research results. Given this relative lack of European firearms research, American studies are still clearly dominant at present in research on the links between the availability of firearms and gun-related violence. Greene and Marsh have calculated that out of the 665 studies on firearms and violence that they reviewed, 64% were about the USA. Of the remaining studies not on the USA, 13% concerned cross-national comparisons or articles in which the geographical focus was unspecified (such as reviews), while 8% were about developing countries. Only 15% concerned other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, the UK and Germany. Given the particularities of the American context, and more specifically the fact that the US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths and crime among industrialized democracies, simply transposing the results of American research to the European context is problematic.

What are the levels of firearms availability in Europe? Are there links between the levels of gun ownership in European countries and these countries’ rates of violence and violent death? And what is the impact of European gun laws on public safety and health? The absence of evidence specifically for the European context makes it difficult for policy-makers and researchers to find impartial and unbiased answers to these questions. Hence the pressing need for research that specifically focuses on gun-related violence in the European context: and with the present report, we would like to make a contribution to that effort. As we are moving into largely uncharted territory, our analysis of the European situation will necessarily be exploratory. Our primary ambition is to collect and take stock of the fragmented evidence that is available on gun-related violence in Europe. Our geographical coverage will be broader than the EU and encompasses a group of approximately 40 European countries, although in some instances we will limit our analyses to the EU28.

In the report’s first chapter, we briefly dwell on one of the most crucial variables in research on gun control and violence: the level of gun ownership in society. Although the prevalence or availability of firearms is a key variable, collecting adequate data on levels of gun ownership can be troublesome. In chapter 1 we therefore devote some space to a critical assessment of the available statistics for Europe. Next, in chapter 2, we look at gun-related violence in Europe. Given the absence of good data on gun-related violence in general, including information not only on mortality but also on injuries and other forms of firearms-related victimization, we will focus exclusively on violent deaths – which seems a legitimate methodological choice for exploratory purposes. We urge the reader, however, to keep in mind that gun-related violence is a much more complex phenomenon than this focus might suggest. As is normal in research dealing with gun control not only from a public safety but also a public health perspective, we shall look both at gun-related homicides and at suicides. Taking the analysis further, we then ask in chapters 3 and 4 whether rates of gun possession and violent death in Europe are correlated: do high levels of gun possession in European countries correlate with high levels of homicide and suicide? The results of probing that question lead us to suggest that research into gun possession and violent death should also factor in the effects of firearms legislation. Specific European research into this question is scarce, which makes it difficult at the moment to arrive at conclusions for the whole of Europe. In chapter 5 we therefore focus on the results of three recent studies on the effects of stricter gun legislation on violent death rates in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland.

Flemish Peace Institute Report June 2015

By Ivan Katchanovski

This open-access book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Maidan massacre in Ukraine. It uses a theoretical framework of rational choice, moral hazard, state-repression backfire, and Weberian ideas about rational action to explore the massacre. The book draws on publicly available videos, photos, and audio recordings of the massacre in English, Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and other languages, along with several hundred individual testimonies and revelations from the Ukrainian investigation and a trial and its verdict. By examining which parties were responsible for the massacre, the book analyses its implications for not only Russia’s war on Ukraine but also political developments across the globe.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 266p.

By Kacper Rekawek  

The field of terrorism studies has traditionally been focused on non-state perpetrators of violence, such as different jihadi organizations which have been active in the West in the last three decades. Things looked different, however, during the Cold War, when state actors actively involved themselves in terrorism by, for example, supporting terrorist organizations operating abroad. This report takes stock of Russia's return to such a paradigm in the 21st century in general and after 2022, the onset of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine, in particular. Russia not only terrorizes its population into submission but also uses homegrown terrorists for Vladimir Putin's regime's domestic ends, deploys terrorist tactics while fighting against Ukraine, and seems increasingly willing and able to use those tactics as part of its foreign policy toolbox in its "political warfare" against the broader West. For this reason, it is argued that one could seriously consider labeling Russia a "state terrorist" or a "state sponsor of terrorism." The report concludes that this might prove challenging in 2024, but also offers a way forward for prosecuting, sentencing, and arresting individuals involved in Russian state terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)    2024. 27p.

Edited by Alex P. Schmid

This document compiles 35 chapters and over 1000 pages and thereby aims to provide an authoritative resource on terrorism prevention and preparedness. The Handbook is structured into five parts, comprising 32 chapters, next to the two introductory chapters and a concluding chapter by the editor followed by a comprehensive bibliography as follows: Part I: Lessons for Terrorism Prevention from the Literature in Related Fields (4 chapters); Part II: Prevention of Radicalization (6 chapters); Part III: Prevention of Preparatory Acts (7 chapters); Part IV: Prevention of, and Preparedness for, Terrorist Attacks  (10 chapters); Part V: Preparedness and Consequence Management (5 chapters

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) , 2020.1312p.

By Mark T. Berg, Ethan M. Rogers and Hannah Rochford

Background

Describe trends in perpetrator characteristics and firearm use in pediatric homicides across the United States.

Methods

Multiply-imputed data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1976–2020 Supplementary Homicide Reports were used to estimate perpetrator characteristics (sex, age, and relationship to victim) and firearm use in pediatric homicides. Descriptive analyses were stratified by victim age group, sex, race, and five-year periods.

Results

Family members were the most common perpetrators of infant and toddler (ages 0–4) and child (ages 5–12) homicides, whereas acquaintances accounted for the majority of adolescent (ages 13–19) homicides. Perpetrator characteristics vary across victim sex and race, particularly among adolescents. Despite overall stability, there were changes in perpetrator characteristics from 1976 to 2020. There was a sustained increase in the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm. In 2016–2020, the proportion of firearm-involved homicides was an all-time high for infants and toddlers (14.8%), children (53.1%), and adolescent victims (88.5%).

Conclusions

Policy interventions that improve family stability and well-being may be most effective at preventing infant, toddler, and child homicides, whereas programs that target peer and community relationships, as well as policies that focus on firearm access, maybe more crucial for preventing adolescent homicides.

Injury Epidemiology volume 11, Article number: 37 (2024) 

By The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

The National Crime Gun Intelligence (CGI) Governing Board leverages the collective experience of Federal, State, and local experts working in forensics, law enforcement, and criminal law to ensure that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) receives valuable input on national programs relating to CGI. As part of this mission, the Governing Board created this best practice guide to help our law enforcement partners successfully use a CGI model to reduce violent crime.

Washington, DC:  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Firearms Operations Division, 2020. 77p.  

By Emily Ann Greene-Colozzi  and Jason R. Silva

In this commentary, we propose a unifying public mass shooting definition that captures the generally conceptualized phenomenon but also expands the inclusion to all incidents regardless of casualty count. We suggest that public mass shootings be broken down into four outcome categories – completed, attempted, failed, and foiled – which have unique incident outcomes but share a common thread of mass intent. We argue for the importance of a no-minimum casualty count definition (thus including zero casualties) that emphasizes mass intent rather than the completion of the shooting. We highlight the value of and rationale for this definition by discussing the limitations of current victim criteria, and we conclude with a proposed strategy that emphasizes objective indicators of mass intent.

Journal of Mass Violence Research, 2022 Volume: 1, Issue: 2, September 2022: Pages 27-41 

By  Emily Ann Greene-Colozzi

This dissertation used environmental theoretical frameworks to understand how public mass shooting incidents are impacted by aspects of the crime situation and opportunity. Predatory, public shootings perpetrated by individuals with evidence of mass intent were examined in the United States between 1966 and 2019. This project progressed in several distinct steps with discrete aims: (1) establish an open source database of public mass shooting incidents meeting definitional criteria; (2) perform statistical analysis, including latent class analysis, regression modeling, and structural equational modeling to assess research questions; and (3) perform comparative case studies and crime script analysis to assess situational crime prevention failure or success in eight purposively selected cases. Two research questions, guided by pathway to violence literature, rational choice perspective, and situational crime prevention, were examined: (1) can public mass shooting perpetrators be sorted into meaningful classes according to preparatory and warning signs behaviors?; and (2) how do the built environment and situational guardianship structure of the public mass shooting location influence incident casualties and severity outcomes? Results from this mixed methods study indicate that public mass shooting perpetrators fall into three distinct behavioral classes characterized by different probabilities of warning signs behaviors. Next, there is a protective role of holistic situational crime prevention for mitigating harm of public mass shooting incidents. Protective environmental design exerted a contradictory effect on incident outcomes, mediated by perpetrator and victim behaviors during the shooting. Case studies revealed that failure is often due to human error in implementation of established SCP protocols, rather than a lack of SCP protocols. Implications for prevention and harm mitigation are discussed.

New York: CUNY, 2022. 365p.

By: Vladislav Chernavskikh

Recent advances in the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have increased state interest in leveraging AI for military purposes. Military integration of advanced AI by nuclear-armed states has the potential to have an impact on elements of their nuclear deterrence architecture such as missile early-warning systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), as well as related conventional systems.

At the same time, a number of technological and logistical factors can potentially limit or slow the adoption of AI in the nuclear domain. Among these are unreliability of output, susceptibility to cyberattacks, lack of good-quality data, and inadequate hardware and an underdeveloped national industrial and technical base.

Given the current and relatively early stage of military adoption of advanced AI, the exploration of these factors lays the groundwork for further consideration of the likely realities of integration and of potential transparency measures and governance practices at the AI–nuclear nexus.

SIPRI Background Paper, September 2024

By: Office of Intelligence and Analysis

The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats.

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland.

In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types.

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target v U.S. Department of Homeland Security ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law.

The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process.

BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises.

ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2024

By The Violence Policy Center

 Guns are rarely used to kill criminals or stop crimes. In 2019, across the nation there were only 316 justifiable homicides involving a private citizen using a firearm reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program as detailed in its Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR). That same year, there were 9,610 criminal gun homicides tallied in the SHR. In 2019, for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 30 criminal homicides. And this ratio, of course, does not take into account the tens of thousands of lives ended in gun suicides or unintentional shootings that year. This report analyzes, on both the national and state levels, the use of firearms in justifiable homicides. It also details, using the best data available on the national level, the total number of times guns are used for self-defense by the victims of both attempted and completed violent crimes and property crimes whether or not the use of the gun by the victim resulted in a fatality. Key findings of this report, as detailed in its accompanying tables, include the following. JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES WITH A GUN COMPARED TO CRIMINAL GUN HOMICIDES n In 2019, there were only 316 justifiable homicides involving a gun. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, there were only 1,453 justifiable homicides involving a gun. [For additional information see Table One: Firearm Justifiable Homicides by State, 2015-2019. In In 2019, 17 states reported no justifiable homicides (Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). [For additional information see Table One: Firearm Justifiable Homicides by State, 2015-2019.] n In 2019 for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 30 criminal homicides. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 34 criminal homicides. [For additional information see Table Two: Circumstances for Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RELATIONSHIP OF PERSON KILLED TO SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 40.5 percent (128 of 316) of persons killed in a firearm justifiable homicide were known to the shooter, 38.9 percent (123) were strangers, and in 20.6 percent (65) the relationship was unknown. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 37.6 percent (546 of 1,453) of persons killed in a firearm justifiable homicide were known to the shooter, 44.0 percent (640) were strangers, and in 18.4 percent (267) the relationship was unknown. [For additional information see Table Three: Relationship of Person Killed to Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] SEX OF SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, of the 316 firearm justifiable homicides, 87.0 percent (275) were committed by men, 10.8 percent (34) were committed by women, and in seven cases (2.2 percent) the sex of the shooter was unknown. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, of the 1,453 firearm justifiable homicides, 88.2 percent (1,282) were committed by men, 10.0 percent (145) were committed by women, and in 26 cases (1.8 percent) the sex of the shooter was unknown. [For additional information see Table Four: Sex of Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] SEX OF SHOOTER AND PERSON KILLED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, of the 316 firearm justifiable homicides, 96.8 percent (306) of the persons shot and killed were men and 3.2 percent (10) were women. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, of the 1,453 firearm justifiable homicides, 97.1 percent (1,411) of the persons shot and killed were men and 2.9 percent (42) were women. [For additional information see Table Five: Sex of Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] In 2019, 98.2 percent (270) of the persons killed by a male with a gun in a justifiable homicide were male and 1.8 percent (five) were female. For the five year period 2015 through 2019, 97.4 percent (1,249) of the persons killed by a male with a gun in a justifiable homicide were male and 2.6 percent (33) were female. [For additional information see Table Six: Sex of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 85.3 percent (29) of the persons killed by a female with a gun in a justifiable homicide incident were male and 14.7 percent (five) were female. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 94.5 percent (137) of the persons killed by a female with a gun in a justifiable homicide incident were male and 5.5 percent (eight) were female. [For additional information see Table Six: Sex of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RACE OF SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 48.7 percent (154) of the shooters who committed justifiable homicides were white, 47.5 percent (150) were Black, 0.6 percent (two) were Asian, and 3.2 percent (10) were of unknown race.7 For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 46.5 percent (676) of the shooters who committed justifiable homicides were white, 48.0 percent (697) were Black, 2.5 percent (37) were Asian, 0.5 percent (seven) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 2.5 percent (36) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Seven: Race of Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RACE OF PERSON KILLED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 41.1 percent (130) of persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide were white, 57.6 percent (182) were Black, 0.9 percent (three) were Asian, and 0.3 percent (one) were of unknown race. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 37.4 percent (543) of persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide were white, 60.8 percent (884) were Black, 1.0 percent (15) were Asian, 0.6 percent (eight) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 0.2 percent (three) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Eight: Race of Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 70.1 percent (108) of the persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide by a white shooter were white, 28.6 percent (44) were Black, 0.6 percent (one) were Asian, and 0.6 percent (one) were of unknown race. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 67.0 percent (453) of the persons killed by white shooters were white, 30.3 percent (205) were Black, 1.5 percent (10) were Asian, 0.7 percent (five) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 0.4 percent (three) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Nine: Race of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 10.7 percent (16) of the persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide by a Black shooter were white, 88.7 percent (133) were Black, and 0.7 percent (two) were Asian. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 9.0 percent (63) of the persons killed by Black shooters were white, 90.7 percent (632) were Black, and 0.3 percent (two) were Asian. [For additional information see Table Nine: Race of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] TYPES OF FIREARMS USED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES n In 2019, firearms were used in 86.1 percent of justifiable homicides (316 of 367). Of these: 72.2 percent (228) were handguns; 1.9 percent (six) were shotguns; 4.4 percent (14) were rifles; 21.2 percent (67) were firearms, type not stated; and, 0.3 percent (one) were other gun. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, firearms were used in 84.2 percent of justifiable homicide incidents (1,453 of 1,725). Of these: 74.4 percent (1,081) were handguns; 3.2 percent (47) were shotguns; 2.9 percent (42) were rifles; 19.1 percent (277) were firearms, type not stated; and, 0.4 percent (six) were other gun. [For additional information see Table Ten: Weapon Used in Justifiable Homicides, 2015-2019 and Table Eleven: Type of Firearms Used in Justifiable Homicides, 2015-2019.]    

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2023. 29p.