By Sarah L. Carthy, Colm B. Doody, Katie Cox, Denis O'Hora, Kiran M. Sarma

In the field of terrorism research, the violent radicalisation of individuals towards perpetrating acts of terror has been the subject of academic enquiry for some time. One core focus by social scientists has been the role of narratives in this process. Narratives have the ability to present a socially constructed version of reality which serves the interest of the narrator(s). In the context of terrorism, by depicting violence as a viable antidote to individual vulnerabilities, the narratives purported for propagandistic purposes have the potential to thwart perceptions of instrumentality (a key characteristic of violent radicalisation). In order to prevent this from happening, researchers and counter-terrorism practitioners have increasingly sought to explore the potential for counter-narratives; targeted interventions that challenge the rationalisation(s) of violence purported in dominant narratives which, in turn, reconstructs the story. However, there is overwhelming consensus in both government and academic spheres that the concept of the counter-narrative is underdeveloped and, to date, there has been no synthesis of its effectiveness at targeting violent radicalisation-related outcomes.

The objective of this review was to provide a synthesis of the effectiveness of counter-narratives in reducing the risk of violent radicalisation.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume16, Issue3 September 2020. 37p.

By Julie Emmelkamp, Jessica J. Asscher, Inge B. Wissink, Geert Jan J.M. Stams

Juveniles who become radicalized pose a great threat for society. Although research on radicalization is accumulating, a quantitative review of risk factors for youth radicalization is lacking. Therefore, a series of metaanalyses were conducted on k = 30 studies (247 effect sizes) to examine risk factors for radicalization in youth, yielding significant effects for 15 out of 17 risk domains, ranging in magnitude from r = 0.080 to r = 0.482. Medium positive effects were found for activism, perceived in-group superiority and perceived distance to other people, while small effects were found for gender, personality, delinquency and aggression, lower educational level, negative peers, in-group identification, perceived discrimination, perceived group threat, perceived procedural injustice, perceived illegitimacy of authorities, and other, whereas the effect for poverty was very small. Moderator analyses showed that the risks of negative parenting and societal disconnection were smaller for right-wing radicalization than for religious or unspecified radicalization. The risks of personality and perceived group threat were greater for willingness to carry out extremist acts and extremist behavior than for attitude towards radicalization. Further, when the percentage of ethnic minorities in the sample increased, the risks of personality, negative parenting, and societal disconnection for radicalization were larger.

Aggression and Violent Behavior, 55, [101489].

By Sara Zeiger and Joseph Gyte

In the age of selfies, snaps, likes and shares, the internet and social media have transformed the way in which people communicate. In early 2019, global internet penetration reached 57%, or 4.4 billion users, and the overall number of mobile social media users reached 42%, or 3.2 billion people.1 This means that people are able to share ideas, communicate and interact more rapidly than ever before, including with audiences on the other side of the world. Terrorist groups have certainly leveraged these new mechanisms and platforms for communicating amongst themselves and to potential recruits. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) has been known for producing sleek videos circulated on YouTube and Twitter, and has mastered new and emerging technologies and social media platforms, such as Telegram; all to promote its messages and recruit new members in cyberspace. This chapter focuses on the prevention of radicalization on social media and the internet in this digital age. It first reviews the relevant methods and approaches that terrorists employ to spread their propaganda and recruit online. Subsequently, it looks at some of the more common and emerging prevention and preparedness strategies which address the online space. Besides reviewing the theoretical foundations to prevent radicalization on social media and the internet, this chapter will also draw upon specific examples, predominantly from three regions: Europe, Southeast Asia and East Africa, to illustrate what some countries are doing to tackle the problem of online radicalization.

From: International Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, 2023. 38p.

By Arthur Bradley and Deeba Shadnia: Tech Against Extremism

This paper analyzes the use of terrorist and violent extremist (TVE) operated websites and platforms on the Domain Name System (DNS), as part of a multi-platform approach within terrorist exploitation of the internet. In particular, this paper situates the resurgent exploitation of internet infrastructure within the context of improved content moderation by tech companies, and a growing trend of terrorist and violent extremist dispersion across more niche online platforms, where the audience reach of these actors is limited. This paper considers how terrorist and violent extremist actors could respond to industry improvements in content removal policies on websites and self-operated platforms on the surface web, including potential migration to decentralized web hosting technologies and the dark web. It argues that counter-terrorism practitioners, researchers, governments, and the tech sector should pay more attention to terrorist and violent extremist operated websites and platforms, after several years of focusing on the exploitation of social media and messaging platforms used by the wider general public.

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2022. 26p.

Michael Wolfowicz, Gian Maria Campedelli, Amber Seaward and Paul Gill

While countries differ significantly in how they handle terrorism, in the west, criminal justice systems tend to treat terrorism similar to other crime, with police, prosecutors, judges and courts, and penal systems carrying out similar functions of investigations, apprehension, charging, convicting, and overseeing punishments respectively. While there is a robust literature on deterrent effects for crime, there is a dearth of research when it comes to terrorism. This despite evidence of significant overlaps between crime and terrorism. We address this gap in the literature with a unique dataset covering terrorism offending, arrests, charges, convictions, and sentencing over 16 years in 28 EU-member states. Applying a dynamic panel data model, we find that the probability of apprehension and punishment has an inverse relationship with terrorism offending. Conversely, the rate of charged individuals is associated with a small increase in the terrorism offending rate. The results for sentence length are less clear, with either negligible, or small iatrogenic effects. The results demonstrate that the overlap between crime and terrorism may extend to general deterrence. These findings should be informative for both the research agenda and policy discussion.

PREPRINT - 2023. 16p.

By Yael Litmanovitz, David Weisburd, Badi Hasisi, and Michael Wolfowicz

Perhaps one of the most pressing issues facing the world today is that of the threat of radicalization and terrorism. Whilst terrorism affects almost every country in the world to some extent, the threat of terrorism has increased exponentially in democratic and semi-democratic countries (especially the OECD). The most current figures state that OECD countries experienced a 650% increase in terrorism related deaths between 2014 and 2015, with many of the attacks having been linked to or inspired by the Islamic State (ISIS) (GTI, 2016). The last year has been witness to many high-profile attack in Europe, namely in Paris and Brussels. There have also been a significant number of attacks which were foiled by intelligence and security services (Europol, 2016; MFA, 2016). Terrorism affects us in many ways, not only causing death and destruction but also having negative impacts on health (Holman et-al, 2008; Deboutte, 2016), economy (Eldor & Melnik, 2004), society (Waxman, 2011) and politics (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman, 1993; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Williams et-al, 2013). Economically, there has been a steady increase in the cost of terrorism over the last decade. For example, terrorism has significant effects on markets and tourism in countries affected by it (Sandler & Enders, 2008; Thompson, 2011; Baker, 2014). The GTI (2016) estimates that in 2015 alone the cost of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion, up from US$52.9 billion in 2014 (GTI, 2015). Certainly, the impacts of terrorism are far reaching and in a sense, difficult to quantify (GTI, 2014).

Oslo: Campbell Collaboration, 2017. 23p.

By Ritzmann, Alexander

From the document: "This study demonstrates that several violence-oriented right-wing extremist (VRWE) individuals and groups in Europe and the U.S. engage in or maintain ties with organized crime (OC). Many of the identified cases have a transnational dimension, for example, through cross border activities like the acquisition of illegal drugs for distribution or parallel memberships in VRWE and transnational OC groups. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, VRWE-affiliated football hooligan groups, white supremacist prison gangs and a range of other VRWE individuals and groups are part of such transnational networks which are particularly visible in Austria, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United States. The linkages between VRWE and OC are multifaceted and vary in intensity, ranging from mere operational contacts to supply illegal materials to a full-scale transformation of VRWE structures into OC structures that follow an RWE ideology."

Washington DC. Counter Extremism Project. 2023. 139p.

By Pauline Moore, Jennifer T. Leschitz, Brian A. Jackson, Catherine H. Augustine, Andrea Phillips, Elizabeth D. Steiner

From the intfocustion: This study drew on a review of the literature focused on threat reporting and threat reporting systems, with particular attention to how their design and structure, as well as student- and school-level factors, can affect student willingness to report potential threats. It also drew on more than 30 interviews conducted with stakeholders across the U.S. K–12 school community to identify current approaches to encourage reporting, strategies for success, and the challenges that schools and districts face in this area. Interviews with stakeholders at the state, district, and school levels provided insight into a varied set of reporting models in place across the country at state, school district, county, and community levels.

RAND Corp. 2033. 72p.

By Daniel W. Webster, Carla G. Tilchin, Mitchell L. Doucette

  Background Safe Streets Baltimore (Safe Streets) is a community violence intervention (CVI) program designed to reduce gun violence in neighborhoods with high levels of gun violence. Frontline workers are recruited for their ability to connect with individuals at highest risk for involvement in gun violence and mediate disputes, promote nonviolent norms for settling disputes, and connect program participants to services. Baltimore has fully implemented the program in 11 neighborhoods between 2007 and 2021. Six of these sites have been fully operational for less than three years and have not been previously evaluated. Prior evaluations of Safe Streets have shown mixed results across the sites and over time. Study Methods To estimate program effects, we analyzed variation in neighborhood-level monthly counts of homicides and nonfatal shootings for the period January 1, 2003 through July 31, 2022. The primary analyses were augmented synthetic control models for each site. This method generated a “synthetic” comparison for each Safe Streets site using a weighted combination of data from neighborhoods that did not implement the program but had similar levels and trends of violence before program implementation. We calculated program effects comparing treated sites to their synthetic controls, estimating what would have happened if Safe Streets had not been implemented. Because confidence in forecasts from statistical models tends to decrease over long periods of time, we generated estimates for the first four years of program implementation for the longer running sites in addition to estimates of the entire time a Safe Streets site has been in operation. We calculated average effects across all sites and within strata of site tenure (longer running and new sites) weighted by the precision of each site’s estimated effects. Key Findings: During the first four years of program implementation across the five longer-running sites, Safe Streets was associated with a statistically significant average reduction in homicides of 32%. Over the entire study period among these longer-running sites, homicides were 22% lower than forecasted if the program had not been implemented. Three of the five sites had significant reductions ranging from 28% in McElderry Park to 48% in Lower Park Heights. In SandtownWinchester, Safe Streets implementation was associated with a significant increase in homicides. Estimates of Safe Streets effects across the six new sites varied with an average reduction of 8% that was not statistically significant. Over the entire study period across all sites, Safe Streets was associated with a statistically significant 23% reduction in nonfatal shootings. Eight of the 11 sites had program-related reductions in nonfatal shootings. Four sites had significant reductions ranging from 29% in Lower Park Heights to 84% in Franklin Square. Sandtown-Winchester’s site was associated with a 53% reduction in nonfatal shootings over a period of more than seven years

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Gun Violence Solution, 2023. 34p.

By Daniel W. Webster, | Cassandra K. Crifasi, Rebecca G. Williams, | Marisa Doll Booty  | Shani A. L. Buggs

This report is the product of the Reducing Violence, Building Trust: Data to Guide Gun Law Enforcement in Baltimore project. Researchers from the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research (JHCGPR) collected and analyzed data relevant to the enforcement of laws restricting the possession of firearms by prohibited individuals and unlawful carrying of concealed firearms to provide data-driven recommendations for more fair and effective practices. The project was designed to help inform the response to the dual crises in Baltimore—extraordinarily high rates of gun violence, and gun law enforcement practices that, in some cases, have violated the law and more generally weakened community members’ trust in the police. In 2017, Baltimore experienced its highest homicide rate on record during two out of the past three years and had the highest murder rate among cities with a population greater than 500,000 in the U.S.1 Homicides declined in 2018, but in 2019, Baltimore’s per capita homicide rate eclipsed the 2017 record, ending the year with 348 total homicides (58.6 per 100,000 population). Nine out of 10 homicides (291) in the city were committed with firearms. The number of nonfatal shootings in 2019, 771, was also higher than that seen in the past five years.2 Because illegal gun possession is often a precursor to shootings, making arrests for illegal gun possession has long played a prominent role in the Baltimore Police Department’s strategy to combat violent crime. While BPD arrests for drug-related crimes have plummeted by 70% from 2014 to 2019, arrests for weapons violations, principally illegal possession of firearms, have changed relatively little during that time period. Police units focused on illegal gun carrying in hot spots for shootings have helped to reduce shootings, but less focused enforcement practices have not always translated into measurable reductions in violence.3 Past efforts to get illegal guns off the streets and deter illegal gun possession without adequate oversight enabled civil rights violations, facilitated alarming criminal activity by BPD’s Gun Trace Task Force, and increased distrust of the police in many communities. These practices and their aftermath have lasting and harmful implications for public safety and justice. They also motivate current efforts by BDP to facilitate reforms and build trust with community members in compliance with the Consent Decree. Researchers from JHCGPR drew from a variety of sources of data from Baltimore and studies from other cities to summarize key findings concerning proactive gun law enforcement practices—legal issues, impacts of police stops and searches on individuals, impacts on gun violence, community members’ views on the appropriateness of police practices and their desire for greater police accountability, and measures some law enforcement agencies are taking to improve the effectiveness and prevent abuses from proactive gun law enforcement. The report cites prior systematic and expert reviews of relevant research, especially the 2018 report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s committee on proactive policing.a Several sources of data from Baltimore were used, including: 1) findings from a recent JHCGPR report on the effects of law enforcement and city-led strategies on gun violence (2,3) the United States Department of Justice’s City of Baltimore Consent Decree and reports from the selected Independent Monitor;  3) new data from court records on case dispositions for cases involving charges for illegal firearm possession; and 4) household surveys and focus group interviews with residents living in some of Baltimore’s neighborhoods most impacted by gun violence. The JHCGPR study team sought to identify promising models for effective and fair proactive gun law enforcement through interviews with law enforcement officials in 24 other jurisdictions. This report provides 13 specific research findings relevant to eight recommendations informed by evidence that is intended to guide future proactive gun law enforcement efforts capable of reducing crime and enhancing community confidence and trust.  

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Gun Violence Solutions, 2020. 65p.

By Nathaniel M. Lesher

With the rising threat of active shooters, armed off-duty and retired law enforcement officers may prove to be an effective tool in American homeland security. Yet, while the number of active shooter and critical incidents in the United States have continued to rise, the number of non-traditional response interventions has remained minimal. Unfortunately, the presence of armed, off-duty law enforcement officers can create other problems, often referred to as blue-on-blue encounters. This thesis examines the questions Can tools such as Hero911 mitigate some of the major risks associated with self-dispatch How can off-duty or plainclothes officers be best incorporated into active shooter response Finally, what processes can make utilization of non-traditional responders safer for all This thesis concludes that over the past 20 years of active shooter responses, first responders have missed an opportunity with respect to the use of non-traditional responders. On- or off-duty non-traditional responders serve as a force multiplier, which widens the pool of available responders. Use of any technology is not without risks, and to avoid more confusion during an active shooter event, training is paramount. Properly used, tools such as Hero911 can reduce the risks involved in non-traditional officer response.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2022. 103p.

By Robert VerBruggen

Decades ago, carrying a gun—especially a concealed gun—was a reliable indicator of criminal activity in much of the country. Police officers who noticed a civilian “packing” were justified in assuming that the individual was thereby breaking the law; in short, he was an armed criminal. Under a key 1968 Supreme Court decision, this was reason enough to both stop and frisk the suspect.

Things have changed. Over the past several decades, most states have radically liberalized their gun-carrying laws, first by granting concealed-carry permits on a “shall-issue” basis, which means that anyone who meets certain requirements, such as training and a clean background check, is entitled to a permit. Now, more than 20 states no longer require a permit at all. And in June 2022, the Supreme Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, held that all states must allow law-abiding citizens to carry guns, invalidating New York’s requirement that applicants for a carry license must show a special need to carry, beyond the basic desire for self-defense.

Particularly during a time in which cities across the country have experienced rising gun violence, the court’s decision raises certain issues that need to be resolved. Chief among them: How can police continue to get illegally possessed guns off the street when it is legal—and, indeed, a constitutional right—for many individuals to carry guns on the street?

This report summarizes the legal landscape surrounding stops and frisks. It also investigates—using data from New York City’s stop-and-frisk program—how pedestrian stops of armed individuals tend to play out in practice. The goal here is not to take stances on guns or policing practices. Instead, it is to map out the legal status quo, highlight the tensions among competing priorities, and lay out options that judges and states with different sets of values might consider.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2023. 17p.

By Alex Schmid

From the introduction: The need for a Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness needs little explanation in the light of the fact that the dominant approach of counterterrorism, based largely on heavy-handed military action, has been such a failure - especially in the Middle East. The traditional military instrument of deterrence has not worked against enemies who have, in most cases, no fixed territorial basis while claiming to love death more than life. The decapitation of terrorist organizations by killing their leaders in drone strikes has created martyrs rather than broken their organization’s will to fight. The collateral damage of military strikes has often turned family members, friends and other witnesses near and far into avengers. For many societies, the “cure” of militarized counterterrorism has been worse than the “disease” of terrorism.

Netherlands. The Hauge.ICCT Press. 2021.

By Alex P. Schmid

From the Introduction: While “terrorism” is one of the most widely used terms in adversarial political discourse, there is still no international consensus about its exact meaning.1 The discussion about the definition of terrorism has been going on for more than half a century and has led to a large number of publications (see bibliography at the end). The purpose of this article is to revisit and review some conceptual approaches in academia, government and international organisations to enable the reader to familiarise her-/himself with the current state of affairs, building on, and expanding, some of the author’s previous conceptual work.

Netherlands. The Hague. ICCT. March 2023. 50p.

By United States. Government Accountability Office

From the document: "Prior to and during the events of January 6, 2021, federal, state, and local entities were responsible for identifying and sharing information on potential threats to inform security measures and ensure the safety of the U.S. Capitol. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review the January 6, 2021 attack. This is the seventh in a series of reports and addresses (1) how federal agencies identified threats related to the events of January 6, 2021; (2) the extent to which federal agencies took steps to process and share threat information prior to the events of January 6, 2021; and (3) how federal agencies identified threat information for the events of January 6, 2021 compared to other large demonstrations in Washington, D.C. [...] In the January 2023 report, GAO made 10 recommendations to five agencies to, for example, assess internal control deficiencies related to processing or sharing information. The agencies concurred with the recommendations."

Washington DC. nited States. Government Accountability Office. 2023. 122p.

By United States. White House Office

From the document: "The United States has made significant progress toward achieving the President's affirmative vision for a digitally-enabled future, but emerging trends are creating both new opportunities for further advancement and new challenges to overcome. Malicious actors threaten our progress toward a digital ecosystem that is inclusive, equitable, promotes prosperity, and aligns with our democratic values. […] Deep and enduring collaboration between stakeholders across our digital ecosystem will be the foundation upon which we make it more inherently defensible, resilient, and aligned with U.S. values. This strategy seeks to build and enhance collaboration around five pillars: (1) Defend Critical Infrastructure, (2) Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors, (3) Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience, (4) Invest in a Resilient Future, and (5) Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals. Each effort requires unprecedented levels of collaboration across its respective stakeholder communities, including the public sector, private industry, civil society, and international allies and partners. The pillars organizing this strategy articulate a vision of shared purpose and priorities for these communities, highlight challenges they face in achieving this vision, and identify strategic objectives around which to organize their efforts. To realize the vision these pillars lay out, we will make 'two fundamental shifts' in how the United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace. In realizing these shifts, we aspire not just to improve our defenses, but to change those underlying dynamics that currently contravene our interests."

United States. White House. 2023. 39p.

By United States. Government Accountability Office

From the document: "Domestic terrorism investigations have more than doubled since 2020, according to the FBI. FBI and DHS are the main federal entities charged with preventing terrorist attacks in the U.S. FBI has lead responsibility for federal domestic terrorism investigations and domestic intelligence efforts. DHS is responsible for producing terrorist threat information in coordination with federal, state and local government agencies, and private entities. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review domestic terrorism threats, incidents, and related federal cases and charges. This report addresses, among other objectives, the extent to which the FBI and DHS I&A [Office of Intelligence and Analysis] (1) track domestic terrorism investigations and incidents, and (2) followed leading collaboration practices in their efforts to counter domestic terrorism threats."

United States. Government Accountability Office. Report Number .GAO-23-104720. 2023.

By Tapia, Daniel; Warren, Kristin; Burns, Jacqueline Gardner; Holynska, Khrystyna; Reimer, Jordan R.

From the document: "Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism is becoming an increasingly common occurrence in the United States. Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE)-related terrorism has consequences beyond loss of life: It undermines the sense of safety that targeted groups feel in their country and unravels the social fabrics of trust that are necessary for society to function. Further still, REMVE attacks can motivate other like-minded attackers to follow up with their own attacks, as was apparently the case with the May 14, 2022, mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, by a self-avowed, internet-radicalized white supremacist whose manifesto drew heavily from the March 15, 2019, Christchurch mosque mass shootings, which also inspired a mass shooting in El Paso, Texas. Two key challenges for those who observe online spaces in which radicalization occurs are the sheer volume of data and the idiosyncrasies of online communities. Website-specific language and memes are difficult to track and parse; even if emerging terms are detected, defining them can be difficult."

Rand Corp. 2023. 102p.

By Haydar Karaman

All terrorist groups need finance to operate. It is a means for certain groups to accomplish their objectives; for others, it is the aims itself per se. Terrorist groups are therefore involved in different levels of organized crime. One of them is illicit drug trafficking, which has a nexus with organized crime and terrorist groups. This study aims to demonstrate a better understanding of the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) evolution into an organized criminal organization and its funding sources. From this point of view, the PKK is classified as a narco-terrorist organization with strong financial motives in this paper. As it will be analyzed on paper, its financial motivations frequently have weighed in the same level as its political motivation. It began to act as a hybrid organization through transnational offences, and it has steadily strengthened its criminal capabilities. Its members retain their deceptive political rhetoric to perform their illegal operations more easily. The organization can also be defined as a hybrid transnational organized crime group by UN standards, given the severity of its crimes and its criminal network spanning the Middle East, Turkey, and Europe    

Manas Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, 10(4), 2513-2527. 2021. 15p.

By Leonard Cole and Nancy D. Connell

Local Planning for Terror and Disaster gives voice to experts in key fields involved with local preparedness, assessing the quality of preparedness in each field, and offering directions for improvement. Introductory chapters provide overviews of terror medicine, security and communications, which are indispensable to successful preparedness, while subsequent chapters concentrate on a particular field and how responders from that field communicate and interact with others during and after an event. Thus, a chapter by a physician discusses not only the doctor's role but how that role is, or should be, coordinated with emergency medical technicians and police. Similarly, chapters by law enforcement figures also review police responsibilities and interactions with nurses, EMTs, volunteers and other relevant responders.

Developed from topics at recent Symposia on Terror Medicine and Security, Local Planning also encompasses aspects of emergency and disaster medicine, as well as techniques for diagnosis, rescue, coordination and security that are distinctive to a terrorist attack. Each chapter also includes a case study that demonstrates preparedness, or lack thereof, for a real or hypothetical event, including lessons learned, next steps, and areas for improvement in this global era which increasingly calls for preparedness at a local level.

ISBN: 978-1-118-11286-1 October 2012 Wiley-Blackwell 274 Pages