By Kristine Hamann,  Sophia Roach, and Sarah Solano Geisler

Overview of Gunshot Detection Systems GDS systems works by recording sounds on a network of audio sensors clustered around a designated location. The sensors transmit sound recordings, timestamps, and Global Positioning System (GPS) data to computers with proprietary algorithms that compare the input to known waveforms (graphic representations of sound) associated with the sound of gunfire. The mathematical calculations used to establish the location of gunfire are based on the same scientific principles that are used to locate the epicenter of an earthquake. Environmental factors may affect the accuracy of captured information, but modern GDS systems can detect 80% of gunfire in uncontrolled environments and pinpoint where shots were fired within as little as a 10-foot radius.2 Reliable GDS evidence has been admitted in nearly 200 cases and has established innocence, as well as guilt. GDS notifications can save lives through quicker response times and can help the police find suspects, victims, witnesses, and other evidence. Prosecutors seeking admission of GDS evidence must understand the scientific foundation of the technology, determine that it is accurate, and be prepared for legal objections. This is an evolving area where preparation by prosecutors is essential, as their work will impact the future admissibility of GDS. Information Captured in GDS Reports GDS reports generally contain information that can be used to further an investigation or as evidence in trial. This may include the date and time of the sound event, location of the sound, number of shots, and pattern of shots. An audio recording of the shots and plotting the shots on a map is usually also available. Gunshot Detection Systems as Evidence GDS recordings of live gunfire have been used as demonstrative evidence, usually through an expert witnesss in various ways including: § Connecting shooting events. § Proving the time, location, and number of shots. § Displaying characteristics of shots that provide relevant information about a firearm or use of more than one firearm. § Establishing the location of a crime scene, and, in some cases, a suspect. Considerations for Prosecutors Prosecutors should educate themselves about the many issues surrounding this evolving topic including: § How the specific technology used in their jurisdiction works. § How to preserve the data from GDS. § The standards for admissibility in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction and relevant case law, including these cases: o State v. Hill, 288 Neb. 788 (2014) o United States v. Rickmon, 952 F.3d 876, (7th Cir. 2020) o US v. Godinez, No. 19-3425, (7th Cir. 2021) o People v. Hardy, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) o Wisconsin v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47 (CASE No. 2020AP878-CR 2022) § The proprietary nature of algorithms used to interpret the data and existence of other trade secret concerns, that could affect discovery and admissibility. § The type of expert is needed to interpret the evidence at trial. § Why expert testimony may be inconsistent with automated interpretations of the data. § Criticisms of GDS technology and defense tactics to exclude GDS evidence or juror concerns about GDS evidence.  

Washington, DC: National Crime Gun Intelligence Center Initiative, 2023 17p.

By: Vladislav Chernavskikh

Recent advances in the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have increased state interest in leveraging AI for military purposes. Military integration of advanced AI by nuclear-armed states has the potential to have an impact on elements of their nuclear deterrence architecture such as missile early-warning systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), as well as related conventional systems.

At the same time, a number of technological and logistical factors can potentially limit or slow the adoption of AI in the nuclear domain. Among these are unreliability of output, susceptibility to cyberattacks, lack of good-quality data, and inadequate hardware and an underdeveloped national industrial and technical base.

Given the current and relatively early stage of military adoption of advanced AI, the exploration of these factors lays the groundwork for further consideration of the likely realities of integration and of potential transparency measures and governance practices at the AI–nuclear nexus.

SIPRI Background Paper, September 2024

By: Office of Intelligence and Analysis

The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats.

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland.

In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types.

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target v U.S. Department of Homeland Security ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law.

The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process.

BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises.

ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2024

By The Violence Policy Center

 Guns are rarely used to kill criminals or stop crimes. In 2019, across the nation there were only 316 justifiable homicides involving a private citizen using a firearm reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program as detailed in its Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR). That same year, there were 9,610 criminal gun homicides tallied in the SHR. In 2019, for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 30 criminal homicides. And this ratio, of course, does not take into account the tens of thousands of lives ended in gun suicides or unintentional shootings that year. This report analyzes, on both the national and state levels, the use of firearms in justifiable homicides. It also details, using the best data available on the national level, the total number of times guns are used for self-defense by the victims of both attempted and completed violent crimes and property crimes whether or not the use of the gun by the victim resulted in a fatality. Key findings of this report, as detailed in its accompanying tables, include the following. JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES WITH A GUN COMPARED TO CRIMINAL GUN HOMICIDES n In 2019, there were only 316 justifiable homicides involving a gun. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, there were only 1,453 justifiable homicides involving a gun. [For additional information see Table One: Firearm Justifiable Homicides by State, 2015-2019. In In 2019, 17 states reported no justifiable homicides (Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). [For additional information see Table One: Firearm Justifiable Homicides by State, 2015-2019.] n In 2019 for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 30 criminal homicides. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 34 criminal homicides. [For additional information see Table Two: Circumstances for Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RELATIONSHIP OF PERSON KILLED TO SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 40.5 percent (128 of 316) of persons killed in a firearm justifiable homicide were known to the shooter, 38.9 percent (123) were strangers, and in 20.6 percent (65) the relationship was unknown. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 37.6 percent (546 of 1,453) of persons killed in a firearm justifiable homicide were known to the shooter, 44.0 percent (640) were strangers, and in 18.4 percent (267) the relationship was unknown. [For additional information see Table Three: Relationship of Person Killed to Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] SEX OF SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, of the 316 firearm justifiable homicides, 87.0 percent (275) were committed by men, 10.8 percent (34) were committed by women, and in seven cases (2.2 percent) the sex of the shooter was unknown. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, of the 1,453 firearm justifiable homicides, 88.2 percent (1,282) were committed by men, 10.0 percent (145) were committed by women, and in 26 cases (1.8 percent) the sex of the shooter was unknown. [For additional information see Table Four: Sex of Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] SEX OF SHOOTER AND PERSON KILLED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, of the 316 firearm justifiable homicides, 96.8 percent (306) of the persons shot and killed were men and 3.2 percent (10) were women. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, of the 1,453 firearm justifiable homicides, 97.1 percent (1,411) of the persons shot and killed were men and 2.9 percent (42) were women. [For additional information see Table Five: Sex of Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] In 2019, 98.2 percent (270) of the persons killed by a male with a gun in a justifiable homicide were male and 1.8 percent (five) were female. For the five year period 2015 through 2019, 97.4 percent (1,249) of the persons killed by a male with a gun in a justifiable homicide were male and 2.6 percent (33) were female. [For additional information see Table Six: Sex of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 85.3 percent (29) of the persons killed by a female with a gun in a justifiable homicide incident were male and 14.7 percent (five) were female. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 94.5 percent (137) of the persons killed by a female with a gun in a justifiable homicide incident were male and 5.5 percent (eight) were female. [For additional information see Table Six: Sex of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RACE OF SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 48.7 percent (154) of the shooters who committed justifiable homicides were white, 47.5 percent (150) were Black, 0.6 percent (two) were Asian, and 3.2 percent (10) were of unknown race.7 For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 46.5 percent (676) of the shooters who committed justifiable homicides were white, 48.0 percent (697) were Black, 2.5 percent (37) were Asian, 0.5 percent (seven) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 2.5 percent (36) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Seven: Race of Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RACE OF PERSON KILLED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 41.1 percent (130) of persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide were white, 57.6 percent (182) were Black, 0.9 percent (three) were Asian, and 0.3 percent (one) were of unknown race. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 37.4 percent (543) of persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide were white, 60.8 percent (884) were Black, 1.0 percent (15) were Asian, 0.6 percent (eight) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 0.2 percent (three) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Eight: Race of Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 70.1 percent (108) of the persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide by a white shooter were white, 28.6 percent (44) were Black, 0.6 percent (one) were Asian, and 0.6 percent (one) were of unknown race. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 67.0 percent (453) of the persons killed by white shooters were white, 30.3 percent (205) were Black, 1.5 percent (10) were Asian, 0.7 percent (five) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 0.4 percent (three) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Nine: Race of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 10.7 percent (16) of the persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide by a Black shooter were white, 88.7 percent (133) were Black, and 0.7 percent (two) were Asian. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 9.0 percent (63) of the persons killed by Black shooters were white, 90.7 percent (632) were Black, and 0.3 percent (two) were Asian. [For additional information see Table Nine: Race of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] TYPES OF FIREARMS USED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES n In 2019, firearms were used in 86.1 percent of justifiable homicides (316 of 367). Of these: 72.2 percent (228) were handguns; 1.9 percent (six) were shotguns; 4.4 percent (14) were rifles; 21.2 percent (67) were firearms, type not stated; and, 0.3 percent (one) were other gun. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, firearms were used in 84.2 percent of justifiable homicide incidents (1,453 of 1,725). Of these: 74.4 percent (1,081) were handguns; 3.2 percent (47) were shotguns; 2.9 percent (42) were rifles; 19.1 percent (277) were firearms, type not stated; and, 0.4 percent (six) were other gun. [For additional information see Table Ten: Weapon Used in Justifiable Homicides, 2015-2019 and Table Eleven: Type of Firearms Used in Justifiable Homicides, 2015-2019.]    

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2023. 29p.

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Kieran McConaghy

State Dynamics in Counter-Terrorism: The book challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, emphasizing the importance of intra-state dynamics and the individual identities of state personnel in shapingcounter-terrorism responses.

Case Studies: It provides comparative analyses of Spain, France, and theUnited Kingdom, highlighting how state responses to terrorism are influenced by historical and cultural contexts.

Emotional and Political Impetus: The book discusses how emotional reactions and political motivations of state personnel impact counter-terrorism strategies, sometimes leading to actions driven by revenge or political gain.

Recommendations for Future Research: It suggests that future studies on counter-terrorism should consider the complexities of the state and the emotional and organizational factors that influence stateactions.

Springer, Aug 22, 2017, 182 pages

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ozgur Nikbay & Suleyman Hancerli

Understanding TerrorismThis section delves into the psychological profiles of terrorists, theuse of the internet by terrorists, the potential threat of bioterrorism, and the socio-economic factors contributing to terrorism. It emphasizes the importance of education in combating terrorism and understanding the true motives behind terrorist acts.

Suicide Attacks, Radical Terrorism, and Case StudiesThis part examines the characteristics and motivations behind suicide attacks, the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet states, and includes case studies of terrorist incidents. It also explores the financing of terrorism through narcoterrorism and the spatial patterns of terrorist incidents.

Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings, andKidnappingsThis section discusses various strategies and tactics for handling terrorist hostage situations, including negotiation strategies, the psychological aspects of kidnappings, and the importance of proper training and preparation for law enforcement agencies.

Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the FutureThe final section explores different counter-terrorism policies and strategies, such as situational crime prevention, democratic policing, the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism, and the need for international cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining public trust and preventing the radicalization of individuals.

IOS Press, 2007, 431 pages

By Everytown Research and Policy

On average, more than once per day in the United States, a tragedy occurs where a perpetrator kills an intimate partner, and then dies by suicide themself. Of these incidents, 93 percent involved a gun, and 95 percent had women killed by their male partners. To document the circumstances and bring attention to the effects of these incidents, in 2024, Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund conducted focus groups with 43 survivors of intimate partner homicide-suicide. The focus group participants were people who survived an attempted intimate partner homicide-suicide, family members, and individuals closely involved with the incident. Through these survivor interviews, we show the importance of understanding the risk factors for intimate partner homicide-suicide and ensuring effective implementation of laws that disarm domestic abusers. The focus groups were approved by the Pearl IRB Institutional Review Board (IRB) to protect the rights, welfare, and confidentiality of participants. Participants in this study were recruited from Everytown for Gun Safety’s database of volunteers and through partner organizations that support survivors of gun violence. Participants received IRB-approved recruitment materials, such as the flyer with the study information, through email and text message. All participants signed a consent form, which included their rights, such as the ability to withdraw from the study at any time. In addition, the researchers provided mental health resources and a licensed clinician on staff with Everytown was on the call to provide emotional support for participants. Following the focus group, every participant received a $25 prepaid Mastercard gift card for their participation in the study. Before the focus groups, participants were asked to complete a survey with demographic and experience questions regarding their race, gender, sexuality, and geographic location in the United States. Participants then attended one of the five focus groups conducted by the researchers. Previous studies have shown that three focus groups are sufficient to capture nearly all themes. Thus, five focus groups provided an adequate sample size to identify a range of themes, and researchers documented theoretical saturation5 at this stage. A focus group methodology was chosen as the most appropriate means to explore gun violence survivors’ experiences and thoughts on trauma. This methodology involves asking a group of participants open-ended questions in a supportive environment that encourages people to share their experiences and views. There are many advantages to focus group research. The method can yield detailed, in-depth information to study social processes, provide insights into complex social phenomena, and facilitate openness among participants as they provide their language to describe their experiences—this is particularly relevant for survivors who share experiences of gun violence. Thus, the focus group approach was used to gain a deeper understanding of the intersections of gun violence and trauma. All focus groups were conducted by a trained researcher and a trauma-informed expert who has some training and experience in running focus groups. The focus groups were conducted and recorded on Zoom. Each participant was asked to rename themselves to protect their anonymity. Each session was also attended by an assistant who observed the focus group to aid in subsequent analysis. Focus groups lasted approximately one hour to one hour and 15 minutes. Data collected from the focus groups were professionally transcribed and then professionally analyzed using Nvivo qualitative coding software. A line-by-line analysis was completed to develop theoretical codes, and three to four focus groups were analyzed at a time to determine themes, categories, and connections across categories and themes. Following the approach of researchers Tiggemann, Gardiner, and Slater, each theme from the focus groups was rated on frequency, intensity, extensiveness, specificity, and level of agreement. These approaches subjected the data to a systematic analysis of themes and concepts.

Washington, DC: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024.

By James Black, Mattias Eken, Jacob Parakilas, Stuart Dee, Conlan Ellis, Kiran Suman-Chauhan, Ryan J. Bain, Harper Fine, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Melusine Lebret, et al.

Artificial intelligence (AI) holds the potential to usher in transformative changes across all aspects of society, economy and policy, including in the realm of defence and security. The United Kingdom (UK) aspires to be a leading player in the rollout of AI for civil and commercial applications, and in the responsible development of defence AI. This necessitates a clear and nuanced understanding of the emerging risks and opportunities associated with the military use of AI, as well as how the UK can best work with others to mitigate or exploit these risks and opportunities.

In March 2024, the Defence AI & Autonomy Unit (DAU) of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) jointly commissioned a short scoping study from RAND Europe. The goal was to provide an initial exploration of ways in which military use of AI might generate risks and opportunities at the strategic level – conscious that much of the research to date has focused on the tactical level or on non-military topics (e.g. AI safety). Follow-on work will then explore these issues in more detail to inform the UK strategy for international engagement on these issues.

This technical report aims to set a baseline of understanding of strategic risks and opportunities emerging from military use of AI. The summary report focuses on high-level findings for decision makers.

Key Findings

One of the most important findings of this study is deep uncertainty around AI impacts; an initial prioritisation is possible, but this should be iterated as evidence improves.

The RAND team identified priority issues demanding urgent action. Whether these manifest as risks or opportunities will depend on how quickly and effectively states adapt to intensifying competition over and through AI.

RAND - Sep 6, 2024

By: KELSEY DAVENPORT

From the document: "This report makes several assessments. [1] Structural factors in the existing array of organizations and treaty bodies focused on disarmament have prevented bold, creative action to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These factors include inadequate or overly broad membership, overreliance on consensus-based decision-making, and limited high-level political engagement. [...] [2] The NSS [nuclear security summit] process offers a model for creating a new series of disarmament summits designed to inject momentum into current efforts to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear arsenals. Certain characteristics of the NSS process contributed to its success. [...] [3] A nuclear disarmament summit process modeled off the NSS process could provide a forum better suited to address new challenges that the existing forums have struggled to tackle in the current geopolitical environment. Like the NSS process, states would be encouraged to make national commitments ('house gifts') and work in partnership to make multinational commitments ('gift baskets') that exceed least-common denominator, consensus-based decision-making. Reporting within the summit process could drive accountability, and high-level political participation could create pressure for leaders to make ambitious but achievable commitments that advance disarmament. This report also argues how a high-level disarmament summit process would complement, not replace, existing initiatives and treaties that form the disarmament architecture."

Sep 2024 ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

By Lieba Faier 

 In The Banality of Good, Lieba Faier examines why contemporary efforts to curb human trafficking have fallen so spectacularly short of their stated goals despite well-funded campaigns by the United Nations and its member-state governments. Focusing on Japan’s efforts to enact the UN’s counter-trafficking protocol and assist Filipina migrants working in Japan’s sex industry, Faier draws from interviews with NGO caseworkers and government officials to demonstrate how these efforts disregard the needs and perspectives of those they are designed to help. She finds that these campaigns tend to privilege bureaucracies and institutional compliance, resulting in the compromised quality of life, repatriation, and even criminalization of human trafficking survivors. Faier expands on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the “banality of evil” by coining the titular “banality of good” to describe the reality of the UN’s fight against human trafficking. Detailing the protocols that have been put in place and evaluating their enactment, Faier reveals how the continued failure of humanitarian institutions to address structural inequities and colonial history ultimately reinforces the violent status quo they claim to be working to change.

Durham, NC; London:  Duke University Press,  2024

By Peter M. Swartz

COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS: LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Recent events off the Horn of Africa have once again involved the US Navy in counter-piracy operations. The Navy has been involved in operations against piracy since the 18th century. We quickly reviewed these operations and found several relevant lessons for today’s operations.

PIRACY ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE CENTURIES

We identified three distinct eras relating to piracy: the era of privateering, the era of Western imperialism, and the era of terrorism.

THE ERA OF PRIVATEERING: 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES

Privateers were civilians licensed by their sovereigns to seize upon the high seas vessels, cargoes, and crews of other nations against whom their own nation was at war. Pirates also operated for their own financial benefit on the high seas, but with no government authorization, and against the ships, cargoes, and crews of any nation. The Law of Nations allowed the forces of any nation to capture, try, and hang them. In the 18th and 19th centuries, however, it was often difficult to differentiate legal privateering from illegal piracy. During this period the American merchant marine became second only to that of Great Britain in size. As one of the world’s leading shipping powers, the United States had a vital interest in the safety of American ships, crews, cargoes, and profits. This was the principal mission set of the Navy through most of this period. This was the era of the Barbary pirates and the Caribbean anti-piracy campaign.

THE ERA OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM: 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

The nineteenth century saw an explosion of European and American global commerce, and a concomitant increase in attacks on that commerce worldwide. Some of these attacks were sponsored by political entities: decaying empires, petty states, local warlords, and insurgent groups. Others were clearly conducted by independent bands of true pirates. Western naval operations to suppress piracy usually involved landings and assaults ashore. These anti-piracy   CNA Historical Paper Series (2006) ii operations were sometimes hard to distinguish—especially in the minds of local rulers—from the various other forms of European colonial land-grabs then underway throughout the world.

Arlington VA: CNA, 2006. (published 2021) 21p.

By Mitchell L. Doucette, Cassandra K. Crifasi, Alex D. McCourt, Julie A. Ward, Rebecca L. Fix, Daniel W. Webster

Research Summary: We utilized the synthetic difference-in-difference method to estimate the impact of adopting a permitless Concealed Carry Weapons (CCW) law on rates of assaults, robberies, and homicides committed with a firearm and by other means, as well as weapons arrests, from 1981 to 2019. We stratified permitless CCW laws by whether they previously prohibited violent misdemeanants from obtaining a CCWpermitorpreviouslyrequiredlive firearm training to obtain a permit prior to law adoption. Findings robust to sensitivity analyses suggest that states that lost a training requirement to obtain a CCW permit had 21 additional gun assaults per 100,000 population (SE =5.2) (32% increase). Policy Implications: In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, states should implement CCW permitting law provisions that may reduce the risk of firearm violence. Requiring live firearm training prior to carry aconcealedweaponmayattenuatenegativehealth impacts of deregulation associated with permitless CCW laws. 

Criminology and Public Policy, 2023

By Alicia Schmidt

This report outlines a conceptual model of the social and economic impacts of money laundering and terrorism financing. Drawing on a comprehensive literature review and stakeholder interviews, it identifies possible economic, societal and sectoral impacts. Economic impacts are those that affect the economy at a macro level and include reductions in economic growth and foreign direct investment and the distortion of exchange and interest rates. Societal impacts include changes in crime levels—predicate offences which generate illicit proceeds that are then laundered, crimes financed using laundered funds and crimes attracted to areas where money laundering occurs—and the associated costs to the community. They also include the consequences of terrorism enabled by terrorism financing, including the costs of terrorist attacks and the impact on national reputation. Sectoral impacts include damage to the reputation of the financial sector and other regulated entities, the crowding out of legitimate competitors, artificial increases in prices (eg real estate prices), and lost tax revenue. Importantly, not all impacts are harmful; potential benefits of money laundering include the recovery of proceeds of crime from the enforcement of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime, the profitability of certain sectors that facilitate or enable money laundering, and the growth of the AML/CTF industry. Having identified these impacts, this report assesses their significance in the Australian context and sets out a path towards quantifying the impacts identified as both relevant and measurable.

Consultancy Report Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 117p.

By Eli Ben-Michael , Mitchell L. Doucette , Avi Feller , Alexander D. McCourt, and Elizabeth A. Stuart

Gun violence is a critical public health and safety concern in the United States. There is considerable variability in policy proposals meant to curb gun violence, ranging from increasing gun availability to deter potential assailants (e.g., concealed carry laws or arming school teachers) to restricting access to firearms (e.g., universal background checks or banning assault weapons). Many studies use state-level variation in the enactment of these policies in order to quantify their effect on gun violence. In this paper, we discuss the policy trial emulation framework for evaluating the impact of these policies, and show how to apply this framework to estimating impacts via difference-in-differences and synthetic controls when there is staggered adoption of policies across jurisdictions, estimating the impacts of right-to-carry laws on violent crime as a case study. 

Unpublished paper 2024.

By John J. Donohue

Substantial evidence has documented a powerful “instrumentality” effect: the more lethal the weaponry employed, the greater the likelihood that death will result from any given assault. This finding provides the foundation for the subsequent findings that a variety of measures that restrict the prevalence or limit the permissible types of lethal weaponry can lower the costs of gun violence. The literature has advanced to the point that there is a sufficient empirical basis to call for the elimination of right-to-carry laws, to reestablish bans on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, to maintain restrictions on youthful access to guns, and to repeal stand-your-ground laws. The Supreme Court’s recent decision expanding the scope of the Second Amendment in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen shows a concerning disinterest in the importance of these empirical findings.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 704, Issue 1, November 2022, Pages 92-117

By Kerri M. Raissian, Jennifer Necci dineen, and Cassandra Crifasi

America has both the highest gun death rate (12 per 100,000 persons) and the highest gun circulation rate (about 121 firearms in circulation for every 100 persons) of any developed country. Taken together, these statistics might lead one to assume that high gun death rates in America are all but a certain outcome. However, gun death rates vary substantially across America suggesting that a range of solutions to reduce gun death and injury exist. This transdisciplinary volume contains a novel collection of articles that overview the evolution of American gun policy, presents evidence on the efficacy of both policy and non-policy interventions, and provides insight on where we go from here given American culture, norms, and legal structures.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 704, Issue 1, November 2022, Pages 7-17

By Rebecca Valek, Julie A. Ward, Vanya Jones & Cassandra K. Crifasi 

U.S. firearm sales surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many purchases by first-time firearm owners. The 2023 National Survey of Gun Policy sought to understand the public health implications of this surge by comparing the purchasing motivations and firearm policy views of pandemic-era first-time purchasers to prior gun owners. We fielded a nationally representative public opinion survey of U.S. adults (n = 3096) from 1/4/23 to 2/6/23. We oversampled for gun owners and Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. Survey weights were applied to generate representative estimates. New gun owners were identified through affirmative responses to: “Have you bought any guns since January 1, 2020?” and “Did you buy your first gun after January 1, 2020?” Recent purchasers were additionally asked whether concerns of 1) political or 2) racial violence motivated their purchase. Purchase motivations and gun policy support were examined among new and prior gun owners (n = 1002) and compared using logistic regression and predictive probabilities. Overall, 11% of respondents reported purchasing a gun since 1/1/20, 35% for the first time. Among recent purchasers, larger proportions of Democrat, Black, Asian, and Hispanic respondents were new gun owners than Republican or white respondents. Compared to prior owners, odds were 4.5-times higher that new gun owners’ recent purchase was motivated by racial violence and 3.2-times higher for political violence. Majority support was found for protective gun policies, with few differences by purchase recency or motivations. The only policy for which support by new and prior gun owners differed significantly was the permit-to-purchase policy (76% v. 63%, respectively). Similarly, few significant differences in support were observed when stratifying by purchase motivation. Notably, both those who reported recent purchase motivations of racial violence and of political violence expressed significantly higher support for a “stand-your-ground” policy compared to those who did not report such motivations.Racial and political violence appear to be larger concerns among new gun owners, motivating purchasing among demographic groups with traditionally lower gun ownership rates. These findings suggest a need for safety assurances amid racial and political tensions and growing gun ownership. Gun owners’ support for such policies remains strong.

Injury Epidemiology 11, Article number: 48 (2024)          

By Eric L. Piza, George O. Mohler, Nathan T. Connealy, Rachael Arietti & Jeremy G. Carter 

Objectives -  This study explores the level to which Gunshot Detection Technology (GDT) leads to increased arrests and stops as compared to shots fired calls for service (CFS) in Chicago, Illinois. Methods A two-process Knox test and point process test are applied to measure the level to which GDT alerts and CFS cluster with arrests and stops in space and time. Both tests are first applied to the aggregate arrest and stops data. We then disaggregate arrests and stops by type as well as suspect race/ethnicity to measure any disproportionate effects across GDT and CFS. Results Both GDT alerts and CFS are significantly associated with arrests and stops occurring in close spatial and temporal proximity. The relative effect of GDT and CFS was consistent across race in the majority of instances. The small number of instances with disparate effects did not exhibit any clear patterning. For some racial groups and arrest/stop types, GDT was associated with heightened enforcement while CFS had a null effect, with the opposite relationship observed for other racial groups and arrest/stop types. Conclusions:  Overall, the results indicate that GDT systems may not generate racial disparities in arrests and stops above and beyond what results from the standard police response to gunfire. Racial disparities resulting from police responses to reported gunfire likely relate to aspects of the reporting and dispatch processes generally rather than as they relate specifi cally to GDT.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology July 2024

By Brittni Lambing, Ron Frandsen, Jennifer Karberg, and Joseph Durso

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) requires a background check on an applicant for a firearm purchase from a dealer who is a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL). During the permanent Brady Act period, from 1999 through 2018, background checks were conducted on over 237 million applicants for firearm transfers or permits. During this period, nearly 3.5 million applications for firearm transfers or permits were denied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or by state and local agencies. This report summarizes the number of applications for firearm transfers and permits, denials that resulted from background checks, reasons for denial, rates of denial, appeals of denials, and arrests of denied persons during the permanent Brady Act period. Statistics are presented at the FBI, state, and local levels. The report also provides a summary of significant changes in federal and state laws and regulations related to firearm sales. Statistical highlights are presented in the body of the report, and complete details are included in an appendix.

St. Louis, MO: Regional Justice Information Service (REJIS), 2024. 29p.

By Kerry Mulligan and Daniela Gilbert

 Vera’s Redefining Public Safety initiative works with local governments and community leaders to build community-centered and coordinated approaches to creating safety. This includes expanding non-police response to 911 crisis calls, investing in civilian-led approaches to violence prevention and intervention, and building and institutionalizing public safety infrastructures outside the criminal legal system. To be sustainable and effective, these infrasctructures should adopt a public health framework, leverage data-informed decision-making, and focus on community-centered strategies. Gun violence problem analysis (GVPA) can be an important component of this work. Traditionally, GVPA refers to the analysis of data on fatal and non-fatal shootings to establish a common understanding of local violence dynamics and inform the development and implementation of violence reduction strategies.1 Although there is variability in the scope and process of GVPA, it generally involves identifying the characteristics of, and relationships between, people involved in recent fatal and non-fatal shootings. People involved in shootings are, by definition, at greatest risk of future interpersonal violence and gun violence. Therefore, jurisdictions generally use GVPA to inform near-term violence intervention strategies— including group violence intervention strategies, focused deterrence, and fellowship/mentorship programs that focus on people at highest risk of violence.2 This concept paper proposes an expanded version of GVPA that can inform the system changes and strategies necessary for more comprehensive and sustained improvements in public safety. Like a traditional GVPA, this expanded approach analyzes data to guide the development. Expanded gun violence problem analysis can help develop interventions to reduce gender-based violence and violence associated with economic and housing insecurity, inform prevention and system transformation, and prioritize capacity building for sustainability. of community violence reduction strategies. However, unlike traditional GVPA, the expanded approach also illuminates the social-structural factors that drive violence, such as economic and housing insecurity. While traditional GVPA is designed to inform strategies for near-term community violence intervention, this expanded approach can help develop longer-term strategies to support violence prevention efforts. These include strategies to improve access to economic opportunity, housing, and healthcare. It also prioritizes comprehensive strategy development and capacity-building for sustainability.  

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2024. 4p.