By Norman Abrams

During the protests that roiled campuses throughout the United States (2023-2025), many students and student organizations have extolled the Hamas organization and praised its violent attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Since 1997, Hamas has been officially designated under U.S. law as a “foreign terrorist organization.” Providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization is a serious crime under the federal criminal code.

The fact that Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist organization and occupies a central place in the student protests raises two key questions: Does praise and advocacy in support of a foreign terrorist organization amount to “providing material support” under the relevant federal criminal statutes? Would attaching criminal penalties to such utterances violate the First Amendment?

To date, the federal statutes that criminalize the providing of material-support-to-a-foreign-terrorist-organization have been reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court only once, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010). The main burden of this article is to examine those statutes and the Holder decision and its legal and practical implications for the student protest statements.

In light of the foregoing, recommendations are made: a) whether there is a legal basis and a need for a federal law enforcement investigation, and b) the general form it might take. These recommendations reflect concerns both about the possibility that a foreign terrorist organization is manipulating U.S. campus discourse and maintaining campuses as bastions of free speech, debate and tolerance of diverse opinions.

Keywords: Student protests, demonstrations, encampments, campus free speech, First Amendment, foreign terrorist organization, material support offenses

Journal of National Security Law and Policy (forthcoming), UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 25-18, 31p.

By Emily Tiry and Arielle Jackson

Gun violence and violent crime more generally impose substantial costs on communities, including in Washington, DC. The Cost of Gun Violence in Washington, DC, project examined research on the broader community-level costs of gun violence on (1) economic indicators such as business activity and the housing market and (2) educational outcomes such as test scores and graduation rates. We also summarized the extent of gun violence, economic indicators, and educational outcomes in Washington, DC, using publicly available data and, to the extent possible, we put the costs in dollar terms. This appendix outlines our methodologies for our “Economic Costs of Gun Violence in Washington, DC” fact sheet and “Educational Costs of Gun Violence: Implications for Washington, DC” brief (Jackson et al. 2022;

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 6p.

By Arielle Jackson, Emily Tiry, Paige S. Thompson, and Jesse Jannetta

Like many cities, Washington, DC, has experienced a spike in gun violence in the past few years. Gun violence and violent crime more generally impose substantial costs on communities. These include direct costs like those for health care for victims and costs for law enforcement and incarceration, but they also include indirect costs such as the effects on business activity and the housing market. Research indicates that gun violence and violent crime can negatively affect educational outcomes as well. Social and economic inequities are often at the root of community gun violence and disproportionately affect Black and Latinx communities, underscoring the importance of addressing these systemic inequities and investing in resources that will reduce gun violence and promote opportunity for young people living in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods in the District. We summarize research on this topic, situate this evidence in the context of the geography of gun violence and educational outcomes in DC, and describe implications for DC communities

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 12p.

By Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3).

A new research brief from Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) was just published affirming that Chicago CRED:

works with the highest-risk individuals.

successfully connects them with needed services.

“potentially” reduces their likelihood of being shot or arrested by 50% and 48% respectively. As always, they are cautious about suggesting direct causation, but it is nevertheless encouraging.

The report explicitly mentions that “other outreach-focused programs such as Communities Partnering 4 Peace (CP4P) and READI Chicago find similar results.”

The report also says, “for every one CRED participant, we found more than 20 other individuals with similar risk profiles who were not receiving similar services,” so the case for going to scale is real.

” Chicago CRED is a multifaceted approach to reducing gun violence that strives to create lasting change by working directly with individuals who are most likely to be involved in serious gun violence. Beginning with direct street outreach efforts, CRED invites its participants to engage in a comprehensive intervention that connects this hard-to-reach population to services, including dedicated life coaching, trauma counseling, education, and, ultimately, reliable jobs. CRED launched its efforts in 2016 and operates in communities on Chicago’s South and West Sides. The current study examines the 234 men who entered the CRED program in 2019 from Roseland and West Pullman. All of these participants are Black, the average participant age at intake is roughly 24 years old, and the average level of completed education was 11 years of school. Some 85% of participants reported a personal or familial history of gang/group involvement, 75% reported a criminal record, and 9% reported being a gunshot victim prior to intake.

Chicago: Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) at the Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, 2021. 5p.

By Marisa C. Ross, Erin M. Ochoa, and Andrew V. Papachristos

The past several years have witnessed increased calls for community violence interventions (CVIs) that address firearm violence while centering local expertise and avoiding the criminal legal system. Currently, little evidence exists on CVI effectiveness at the individual level. This study presents an evaluation of the impact of a street outreach-based CVI [Chicago CRED (Create Real Economic Destiny)] on participant involvement in violence. We used a quasiexperimental design with a treatment sample of 324 men recruited by outreach staff from 2016 to 2021 and a balanced comparison sample of 2,500 men from a network of individuals arrested in CRED’s service areas. We conducted a Bayesian survival analysis to evaluate CRED’s effect on individual violence-related outcomes on three levels of treatment: All enrolled participants, a subsample that made it through the initial phase, and those who completed programming. The intervention had a strong favorable effect on the probability of arrest for a violent crime for those completing the program: After 24 mo, CRED alumni experienced an 11.3 percentage point increase in survival rates of arrest for a violent crime relative to their comparisons (or, stated differently, a 73.4% reduction in violent crime arrests). The other two treatment levels experienced nontrivial declines in arrests but did not reach statistical significance. No statistically significant reduction in victimization risk was detected for any of the treatment levels. Results demonstrate that completion of violence intervention had a strong favorable effect on the probability of arrest for a violent crime for those completing the program: After 24 mo, CRED alumni experienced an 11.3 percentage point increase in survival rates of arrest for a violent crime relative to their comparisons (or, stated differently, a 73.4% reduction in violent crime arrests). The other two treatment levels experienced nontrivial declines in arrests but did not reach statistical significance. No statistically significant reduction in victimization risk was detected for any of the treatment levels. Results demonstrate that completion of violence intervention programming reduces the likelihood of criminal legal involvement for participants, despite the numerous systemic and environmental factors that impede personal success.

PNAS, Vol. 120 | No. 46, 2023. 8p.

By Guillermo Vázquez del Mercado, Ruggero Scaturro, Jerome Veyret and Alex Goodwin

The illicit trade in arms and ammunition not only is a serious criminal market but also strengthens and expands other illicit economies around the globe, increasing the potential or actual use of violence in the commission of crimes. With weapons recycled from conflicts in the past, illegally produced, diverted from state or private stockpiles, or smuggled (in parts or whole) from areas in which supply is abundant, arms trafficking has become the fourth most prevalent criminal market globally, and is particularly prevalent in the Americas and Africa.1 According to the Small Arms Survey database, global firearms-related deaths have decreased by 30% between 2016 and 2020 (from 3.9 per 100 000 in 2016 to 2.7 per 100 000 in 2020).2 However, the organization also estimated that, as of 2017, there were still 857 million firearms in civilian hands worldwide, of which only 12% were registered.3 These weapons can pose enormous threats to civil society and regional stability. Illicit arms enable organized crime and underpin criminal markets. Firearms trafficking can also have a severe destabilizing effect, as the conflicts in which they are used can fuel others in a region, along with further crime and violence. For example, civil wars in Central America in the late twentieth century led to the availability of weapons in the region multiplying. Many of the 30 000 M-16 rifles and the 260 000 M-67 grenades sent to the Salvadoran authorities by the US government are still in circulation and have been used by the Mara Salvatrucha-13 and Barrio 18 gangs and criminal organizations abroad.4

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 29p.

By Jessica Davis

Illicit actors in Afghanistan, including drug traffickers, warlords, terrorist groups, and even former government officials, exploit the country to achieve their own political and economic objectives. Historical and contemporary sources demonstrate that there are patterns in how these actors raise, manage, store, move, and obscure money. This paper provides a historical and contemporary overview of illicit financing activities in Afghanistan. It uses a terrorist financing framework to explain the various mechanisms involved in how illicit actors raise, use, move, store, manage, and obscure their funds. Specific jurisdictions used for illicit finance and global financial vulnerabilities that illicit actors with a nexus to Afghanistan exploit in their financial activities are discussed, outlining the threat-agnostic capabilities that could tackle some of these illicit financial challenges.

To raise funds, illicit actors engage in the production and trafficking of narcotics, taxation and extortion activities, illegal mining and timber production, and any other activities that can generate revenues. Depending on the actor in question, management of the acquired funds might be centralised, within the purview of a financial head, or decentralised, with control vested within several stakeholders. Illicit actors store some of their funds in cash within Afghanistan and use hawalas and banks to both store and transfer wealth out of the country. Since the Taliban takeover, international sanctions have largely ended the ability of banks to transact with most aspects of the global financial sector, with the exception of regional banking relationships that remain intact. Therefore, in addition to hawalas, common methods of moving money out of Afghanistan include bulk cash couriers, the transfer of precious metals and stones, and trade-based money laundering schemes. Wealth is moved out of Afghanistan to several key jurisdictions. Much of it makes its way to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where funds are invested in businesses and real estate. Funds are also moved to Pakistan, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iran and other neighbouring or proximate countries.

The stability of illicit financing mechanisms over time and across illicit actors presents opportunities for detection and disruption. However, this also applies to limitations of disruption opportunities. Since illicit actors in Afghanistan raise most of their funds within the country, there are few opportunities to disrupt internal Afghan revenue sources in the post-August 2021 context. As such, other detection and disruption opportunities that can be used to combat illicit financing with a nexus to Afghanistan must be examined. The policy options elaborated in this report include: enhancing the monitoring of aid and donor funding entering the country, facilitating the adoption of foreign asset and beneficial ownership tracing, introducing reforms to the hawala and banking sectors, and addressing deficiencies in international sanctions regimes.

A regionally coordinated policy approach to counter illicit financing from Afghanistan can reduce the ability of illicit actors to access their wealth and fund their activities. However, without access to a cooperative government in Afghanistan, there are limits to what can be achieved. Nonetheless, many of the policy and disruption opportunities available to counter illicit Afghan finance also serve to strengthen the integrity of the global financial system, address existing policy gaps in other jurisdictions, and can generally serve to enhance international cooperation on counter-illicit financing.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 11.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 32p.

By The Counter Extremism Project, Global Strategies to Combat Extremism

In recent years, the U.S. sanctions regime has targeted the world’s most egregious human rights violators. It has done so based on the 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (the Magnitsky Act) and the 2017 Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which empower the U.S. government to impose “tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human rights abuse or engage in corruption, as well as to protect the financial system of the United States from abuse by these same persons.” Since then, the White House has used sanctions to target government organizations, officials, corporations, and private individuals engaged in the systematic violation of human rights around the globe. Such sanctions have been enacted against entities in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. Unfortunately, the crimes committed against the Yemeni people by the Houthi rebels have gone largely overlooked. Fewer than 15 Houthi officials have been sanctioned in total, and the majority of those targeted are military officials who have been sanctioned for their role in destabilizing Yemen (E.O. 13611), with minimal attention paid to Houthi violations committed against the population under their rule. This report will focus on the Houthis’ systematic abuse of women and journalists. While these are tragically common phenomena in Houthi-controlled areas, they remain poorly documented. In addition to clearly documenting these abuses, the report will also map out the Houthi mechanics of repression: from the security forces responsible for unjustly arresting and harassing vulnerable individuals to those officials in the justice and prison systems responsible for subjecting the victims to torture and sham trials. The aim of this report is to raise awareness of Houthi human rights violations and provide informational support for efforts to penalize those who can and should be targeted with sanctions for their crimes.

New York: The Counter Extremism Project, Global Strategies to Combat Extremism, 2023. 16p.

By Laura Winkelmuller-Real, Kacper Rekawek, Thomas Renard

How do counter-terrorism services assess the threat in Europe? What trends do they notice? What are their most pressing concerns? Experts and observers regularly discuss the evolution of the terrorist threat, but what do counter-terrorism professionals have to say about this? This report aims to bring to the fore the perspectives of those that are in the first line to assess or respond to terrorism. Compared with some other initiatives focused on key terrorism trends (such as terrorism databases or indexes),1 this report focuses more strictly on a counter-terrorism perspective. While some reports on counter-terrorism already exist, they are largely drafted by and for governments. This includes notably the assessments conducted by the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED), which are unfortunately not in the public domain. In Europe, Europol’s TE-SAT annual reports constitute a very useful publicly available resource, although very much focused on a law-enforcement perspective. This report constitutes, therefore, an innovative attempt to monitor counter-terrorism efforts, with a focus on European Union (EU) Member States. It focuses on original sources, such as reports published by security services, a treasure of information largely neglected by scholars. It covers various dimensions, namely: 1. National threat levels (related to terrorism and/or extremism); 2. Discussion on the main types of terrorist and extremist threats perceived; 3. National security contexts in which the aforementioned threat levels and threat assessments were produced; 4. New legislative efforts designed and introduced to help CT and P/CVE efforts; 5. Main challenges to CT or P/CVE activities encountered by the EU MS; 6. Major CT operations conducted in Europe; 7. Main efforts in countering the financing of terrorism by different EU MS; 8. Key developments with regard to terrorism sanctions and proscriptions; 9. Communication and transparency efforts related to CT and P/CVE; To conduct this research, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) compiled and analysed more than 70 official counter-terrorism and security reports published by the EU Member States (MS) in 2024 and 2023, which it combined with a survey distributed among European counter-terrorism officials. More details on the methodology of this report are available in the appendix. By combining practitioner perspectives gathered through the survey with detailed, structured narratives from national security documents, the report captures both operational realities and strategic priorities.  . These insights were used to develop specific themes for analysis, and to effectively describe the state of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Europe, as described by security services themselves. Overall, this report, while combining new material with data from the aforementioned secondary sources, offers original insights into the secretive world of counter-terrorism and highlights interesting trends. Furthermore, it could serve as a basis for further investigations into counterterrorism efforts, in Europe or elsewhere, including with a view to their being evaluated.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 2025. 34p.

By David Blake Johnson, Joshua J. Robinson, Daniel Semenza, and Alexi Thompson

We test the effectiveness of several common gun prevalence proxy variables against what are arguably the best measures of gun prevalence: firearm sales and concealed carry permits. With a comprehensive count of gun sales and concealed carry permits (by county and year) in the states of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, we make two main observations: First, gun sales/concealed carry permits are positively correlated with federal firearm licenses (gun dealers) per mile. Second gun sales/concealed carry permits are not significantly positively correlated with federal firearm licenses per capita or the proportion of gun suicides to total suicides. We then discuss why this occurs and the limitations of using legal gun sales as a gun prevalence measure. Last, we show how the competing measures differ in terms of their associations with gun homicide. We find our preferred measure to have a strong positive association with gun homicides while many others do not. Consequently, we advise researchers to use gun dealers as a measure of gun prevalence and specifically in a way that considers markets bleeding over arbitrary lines (e.g., county, city, or neighborhood).

Unpublished Paper, (May 25, 2022), 41p,

By Rod Campbell, Skye Predavec, Alice Grundy

Almost 30 years after the Port Arthur massacre, there are more guns in Australia than ever before, and the Howard Government’s landmark National Firearms Agreement (NFA) is falling short of its stated aims. There is no National Firearms Register and minors can use firearms in every state. This paper outlines the status of the NFA and the number of guns and gun deaths in Australia.

On 28 of April 1996, one man killed 35 people and wounded another 23 with semiautomatic rifles at Port Arthur, Tasmania. It remains the deadliest massacre in modern Australian history.

Just 12 days after the massacre, the Howard Government announced the National Firearms Agreement (NFA), a suite of measures from the federal, state and territory governments designed to strengthen Australia’s gun control laws.

The NFA was reconfirmed by all jurisdictions in 2017, however some of its resolutions remain unimplemented including the creation of the National Firearm Registry. Others have been implemented inconsistently across Australia’s states and territories, such as under 18 firearm use, hampering their effectiveness.

The paper concludes that Australians needs gun laws that live up to the Howard Government’s bravery, and right now Australia does not have them

Canberra: The Australia Institute, 2025. 9p.

By Sydney Litterer, Ryan Scrivens,Thomas W. Wojciechowski &Richard Frank

Researchers, practitioners, and policymakers are increasingly interested in examining online posting behaviors in virtual communities known to facilitate violent racially and ethnically motivated extremism. However, little is empirically known about how such behaviors develop over time, and even less is known about how the content of posts is related to other posting behaviors. This study used group-based multi-trajectory modeling to explore how users’ online posting behaviors (i.e., posting frequency and use of offensive language) evolved as they engaged with other users on Stormfront, the largest and most well-known white supremacist forum, relative to typical user behaviors. Overall, several noteworthy posting behaviors were identified in the data. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis, its limitations, and avenues for future research.

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2025, 21p.

By Arthur Bradley and Galuzzi, O.

The abuse of digital technologies by violent extremists is keeping pace with the exponential growth of new technologies, and poses multifaceted challenges to national and global security. Cyber-enabled threats manifest for example in terrorist-operated websites, the shift to alternative or fringe social media platforms, the use of the decentralised web, the exploitation of gaming and adjacent platforms, and the abuse of live-streaming technologies to amplify terrorist and violent extremist attacks. In addition to these online activities, there are concerns also around more disruptive or destructive cyber operations, such as Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks and the hacking of critical infrastructure to cause civilian casualties. In all the research on the diverse range of malicious actors behind these threats, there is comparatively little on the online activity of violent extremist movements, whether right-wing or left-wing, in the Global South. This report forms part of UNICRI’s effort to investigate the threats stemming from the complex interplay between terrorism, violent extremism and cybercriminality – threats that are often overlooked, owing to the difficulty of gathering evidence and attributing offensive cyber operations, and to the prioritisation of more pressing security threats in diverse geographic locations. UNICRI strives to shed light on the online presence, activities and trends of right- and left-wing violent extremist movements and the cyber-enabled threats they may consequently pose to global security. The report was compiled following a three-part research methodology consisting of a literature review, expert interviews and open-source investigations conducted in order to analyse the online activities of right- and left-wing violent extremist movements in South America, Africa and Asia, and examining both their intent and ability to mount offensive cyber-attacks. The report includes particular case studies within these regions, including in Brazil, South Africa, India and Maritime South-East Asia. The case studies were selected because of the availability of public information online, the known presence of active non-state violent extremist actors with right- and left-wing ideologies, the similarities and differences these actors present, and their geographic diversity. These factors, and consequently the choice of case studies, demonstrate the global nature of the phenomenon which still requires contextually relevant solutions. The selection of these case studies does not imply that similar threats in other geographies are not considered relevant to international peace or development, and conversely, the omission of any movements is merely the result of restricted resources and time. The groups and movements presented within this report are not necessarily referenced as violent extremists either by the United Nations or by the Member States mentioned, however, their alignment, proximity, and connection with right- and left-wing violent extremist ideologies, as well as their use of violent extremist tactics, justify mention in this report to ultimately reflect on the global dimension of the abuse of digital technologies by violent extremists . This report finds widespread exploitation of digital platforms by right- and left-wing violent extremists based in South America, Africa and Asia. Groups and their affiliated networks use a wide variety of platforms and services for a range of different purposes, and they often seem to face fewer restrictions in terms of content moderation by technology companies, many of which are based in the United States or European countries. In particular, it found: As in Europe, North America, and Australasia, the online activities of right- and leftwing violent extremist groups in South America, Africa and Asia are increasingly superseded by more disparate, horizontal online networks. In many of the case studies, for example in Brazil and India, physical attacks have increasingly been carried out by lone actors or small cells, some of which may have had previous engagement with organised groups. This dynamic has implications for the ability of technology companies and law enforcement agencies to counter the threat, as planned attacks and their perpetrators may be more difficult to prevent or identify. * Violent extremist networks and individuals are increasingly using a more diverse range of online platforms and services to further their goals. This is in line with the increase in the number of online platforms and services used by broader populations generally, but it may also be part of a concerted effort by these networks to reach a broad audience and mitigate the impact of the potential removal of their accounts or groups by technology companies. Violent extremist networks continue to exploit multiple platforms simultaneously, using outlinking between platforms to evade detection or enforcement by specific companies. Violent extremists comprise the minority of the perpetrators delivering cyber-attacks globally, most of which are believed to be carried out by state-backed actors, hacktivist collectives, or financially motivated criminals. Interviews with a group of 31 experts consulted as part of this research, however, indicate that the threat from cyber-attacks motivated by a belief system and delivered by individuals or groups affiliated with violent extremist movements is likely to increase in the coming years, and is likely to be particularly high in countries believed to have less developed cybersecurity defences. This report suggests that international technology companies are not adequately fulfilling their content moderation policies as consistently in South America, Africa and Asia as in other countries in Europe, North America, and Australasia. Also, they do not appear to be allocating sufficient resources to ensuring platform safety in these regions, where they face significant challenges in effectively countering the exploitation of their services by violent extremist movements. Practical challenges are compounded by definitional challenges regarding contentious terms such as “violent extremism” and “terrorism”, neither of which has an internationally agreed definition. Also, technology companies, it seems, still struggle to detect and understand violent extremist content or communications effectively in languages other than English. This task is made more difficult by the challenge of interpreting and understanding local dynamics and the community-specific slang found in content, and by the efforts of malevolent networks to evade detection or enforcement by moderation teams. Evidence suggests that, to date, this – together with an imbalance in resource allocation – means that the capability of many technology companies to moderate content in languages other than English is comparatively ineffective. Often, a splintered regulatory landscape also makes it difficult for technology companies to apply their policies consistently across multiple jurisdictions around the world. Technology companies operating globally are subject to a variety of differing and often contradictory regulatory requirements, including those relating to designations, hate speech legislation and Internet-related laws, and companies can be under pressure from the political or cultural contexts in particular countries. This can make it difficult for these companies consistently and effectively to maintain a balance between removing violative content and upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms. The report focuses on a set of case studies diving into the online activities of right- and left-wing violent extremist groups in South America, Africa and Asia, and the ways in which they abuse digital technologies

Turin, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the VOX-Pol Institute. 2025. 88p.

By Nicole J. Johnson ,Caterina G. Roman

This study examines changes in gun violence at the census tract level in Philadelphia, PA before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Piecewise generalized linear mixed effects models are used to test the relative impacts of social-structural and demographic factors, police activity, the presence of and proximity to drug markets, and physical incivilities on shooting changes between 2017 and June, 2021. Model results revealed that neighborhood structural characteristics like concentrated disadvantage and racial makeup, as well as proximity to drug markets and police activity were associated with higher shooting rates. Neighborhood drug market activity and police activity significantly predicted changes in shooting rates over time after the onset of COVID-19. This work demonstrates the importance of understanding whether there are unique factors that impact the susceptibility to exogenous shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic. The increasing risk of being in a neighborhood with an active drug market during the pandemic suggests efforts related to disrupting drug organizations, or otherwise curbing violence stemming from drug markets, may go a long way towards quelling citywide increases in gun violence.

. PLoS ONE 17(2):, 2022. e0263777

By John R. Lott and Carlisle E. Moody

The FBI tracks active shooting cases—where individuals attempt to kill people in public places, excluding those tied to robberies or gang violence. This study is the first to systematically compare how uniformed police and civilians with concealed handgun permits perform in stopping these attacks. Civilians with permits stopped the attacks more frequently and faced a lower risk of being killed or injured than police. Officers who intervened during the attacks were far more likely to be killed or injured than those who apprehended the attackers later. We also provide evidence that these numbers significantly underestimate the advantages of civilians over officers in stopping these attacks. We explore the implications of two possible identification problems. Lott, John R. and Moody, Carlisle E., Do Armed Civilians Stop Active Shooters More Effectively Than Uniformed Police?

Salt Lake City, UT: Crime Prevention Research Center, 2025. 36p.

By John J. Donohu, Samuel V. Cai, Matthew V. Bondy, Philip J. Cook

While the recent state panel data literature has broadly concluded that “right-to-carry” (RTC) concealed handgun regimes increase violent crime, there is little empirical evidence on the precise mechanisms that drive this increase. Using data from 217 US cities, we find that the effect of RTC on violent crime is concentrated to large urban centers. In cities with an average population of over 250,000 between 1979 and 2019, we find that the introduction of RTC increases violent crime by 20 percent. We then present novel estimates that RTC increases gun theft by 50 percent and lowers violent crime clearance rates by 9 percent in these large cities. Leveraging city-level heterogeneity in RTC-induced violent crime effects, we demonstrate that these two mechanisms explain a substantial portion of the RTC-induced increase in violent crime.

Working Paper 30190, 2023, 21p.

By John R. Lott, and John E Whitley

It is frequently assumed that safe storage gun laws reduce accidental gun deaths and total suicides, while the possible impact on crime rates are ignored. However, given existing work on the adverse impact of other safety laws, such as safety caps for storing medicine, even the very plausible assumption of reduced accidental gun deaths cannot be taken for granted. Our paper analyzes both state and county data spanning nearly twenty years, and we find no support that safe storage laws reduce either juvenile accidental gun deaths or suicides. Instead, these storage requirements appear to impair people?s ability to use guns defensively. Because accidental shooters also tend to be the ones most likely to violate the new law, safe storage laws increase violent and property crimes against low risk citizens with no observable offsetting benefit in terms of reduced accidents or suicides. During the first five full years after the passage of the safe storage laws, the group of fifteen states that adopted these laws faced an annual average increase of over 300 more murders, 3,860 more rapes, 24,650 more robberies, and over 25,000 more aggravated assaults. On average, the annual costs borne by victims averaged over $2.6 billion as a result of lost productivity, out-of-pocket expenses, medical bills, and property losses.

Yale Law School, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 237, 72p.

By Carlisle E. Moody, John R. Lott

A review of the literature studying the effect of right-to-carry laws shows that the weight of evidence indicates that such laws reduced violent crime. However, more recent studies, using more recent data, tend to find that these laws cause increases in various kinds of violent crime, raising the possibility that circumstances have changed since 2000, causing these laws to become detrimental. We suggest that these recent studies, which do not use all the available data, are seriously compromised because they compare states that only recently have adopted right-to-carry laws with states that have had these laws for many years, instead of comparing against states with more restrictive laws. Early adopting states experienced relatively large reductions in crime corresponding to large increases in the number of right-to-carry permits. Late adopting states passed rules making it difficult to obtain permits and exercise the right to carry concealed weapons. Ignoring the fact that these late adopting states with stricter rules on obtaining permits issue relatively few permits can produce perverse results where coefficients imply an increase in crime even though the opposite is true. We demonstrate this effect with a simple statistical test.

Academia Letters, February 2022, 6p.

By David C. Pyrooz, James A. Densley, Jillian K. Peterson

Mass shootings, defined as incidents where 4 or more people are shot with a firearm, have become a significant public health concern in the US.

OBJECTIVE - To estimate the prevalence of direct exposure to mass shootings among US adults and identify the socio-demographic groups most affected.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - A survey was administered in January 2024 to a sample of 10 000 respondents (18 years or older) designed to be representative of US adults using a multistage matched sampling design. In addition to exposure to mass shootings, the survey also collected sociodemographic information, including age, gender, self-reported race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

EXPOSURE - Survey respondents were asked about their lifetime presence at the scene of a mass shooting, any physical injuries sustained (including being shot or trampled or experiencing a related physical injury), and the features of such incidents.

MAIN OUTCOME AND MEASURES - Multivariable logistic regression was used to generate adjusted odds ratios (AORs) of the associations between sociodemographic measures and being present on the scene of and injured in a mass shooting. All analyses undertaken to generate population and relational inferences were weighted to achieve representativeness of US adults.

RESULTS - Of the 10 000 respondents included in the analysis, 51.34% (95% CI, 50.27%-52.40%) were female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 3.04% (95% CI, 2.71%-3.38%) were Asian, 12.46% (95% CI, 11.81%-13.12%) were Black, 16.04% (95% CI, 15.10%-16.98%) were Hispanic, 62.78% (95% CI, 61.73%-63.84%) were White, and 5.67% (95% CI, 5.23%-6.11%) were other race or ethnicity. The findings indicated that 6.95% (95% CI, 6.39%-7.50%) of respondents were present at the scene of a mass shooting, and 2.18% (95% CI, 1.85%-2.50%) sustained physical injuries, such as being shot or trampled, during such incidents. A total of 54.89% of mass shootings to which respondents were exposed occurred in 2015 or more recently, and 76.15% took place in respondents’ local communities. Mass shootings were most likely to occur in neighborhoods. Younger individuals (eg, AOR for Baby Boomer and Silent generations vs Generation Z, 0.12; 95% CI, 0.09-0.18) and males (AOR, 1.55; 95% CI, 1.29-1.85) were more likely to report exposure compared with those from older generations or female individuals, respectively. Black respondents reported higher rates of being present at mass shootings (AOR, 1.87; 95% CI, 1.49-2.34), while Asian respondents reported lower rates (AOR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.19-0.66), compared with White respondents, but there were no racial and ethnic differences in injuries sustained. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings from this survey study of US adults underscore the extensive and often overlooked regular exposure to mass shootings in this country. The demographic disparities in exposure highlight the need for targeted interventions and support for the most affected groups, particularly younger generations and males. Understanding these patterns is essential for addressing the broader impacts of gun violence on public health and community well-being.

JAMA Network Open. 2025;8(3):e250283. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025, 9p.

By Andrew Willinger

On October 4, 2024, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos. The case involves claims brought by the government of Mexico against a group of U.S. gun manufacturers seeking to recover for the costs of gun violence in Mexico that the Mexican government alleges are caused by the gunmakers’ sales and distribution practices that facilitate cross-border gun trafficking.

If the Supreme Court holds that Mexico failed to allege the type of violation contemplated in the predicate exception, that could narrow the scope of predicate-exception litigation substantially to instances where the gun manufacturer itself engages in illegal conduct (rather than aiding and abetting downstream illegal conduct). And such a decision would have major consequences for domestic PLCAA litigation because the new wave of state public nuisance statutes often specifically contemplate that a gunmaker’s distribution practices can give rise to liability even after the point of sale. Another avenue by which the Court could reverse is to focus on the unique causal chain in the case that includes cross-border gun trafficking and harm caused by foreign cartels with American-manufactured firearms. This route seems less likely to broadly unsettle things at the state level, as it is at least possible for the Court to write an opinion that emphasizes how unique the facts of this case are. In most domestic litigation, there simply will not be the same number of intervening actions because the harm caused will be closer to home. That said, it will be important to watch whether the Court seems receptive to the gunmakers’ argument that Mexico’s damages are merely derivative of the harm suffered by individual people harmed by gun violence in the country. That line of argument would presumably hamstring efforts by state attorneys general to pursue predicate-exception litigation against gunmakers based on harm to the public.

64 South Texas Law Review 97 (2025), 5p.