By Lily Robin, Josh Fording, Travis Reginal, Paige Thompson, Andreea Matei, Jerome Louison, Ramik Jamar Williams

Since the peak of violent crime in the early 1990s, New York City has experienced a sustained decline in violence but, like many cities across the country, has seen an increase in violent crime since 2019. In the 67th Precinct in particular, where the East Flatbush neighborhood is located, there were 34.5 shootings per 100,000 people in 2022. There are several community-led, government-led, and law enforcement–led initiatives in East Flatbush and surrounding areas to address violent crime and gun violence. This report examines gun violence and gun violence prevention and intervention initiatives in the 67th Precinct and surrounding neighborhoods.

WHAT WE FOUND

• Community organizations employ a holistic approach to violence prevention that addresses root causes of violence using a multifaceted approach to mitigate and address violence and diffuse tension between communities and law enforcement.

• Community members had negative views of criminal legal system actors and generally lacked awareness of community-based organizations involved in violence prevention work.

• Several barriers exist to community-led anti–gun violence, including limited funding, a lack of supports for staff, a lack of visibility in the community, and a lack of housing for people in crisis.

We make the following five recommendations:

• Rely on evidence to target research, funding, and initiatives to the areas most in need.

• Leverage and grow the existing strengths of communities.

• Identify and address drivers of gun violence.

• Develop funding opportunities for gun violence prevention and intervention programs that encourage collaboration and visibility in the community.

• Invest in community engagement and cultural competency for law enforcement and other criminal legal system actors.

HOW WE DID IT

With funding from the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ), Urban, in partnership with the Kings Against Violence Initiative (KAVI), investigated gun violence and gun violence prevention and intervention initiatives in the 67th Precinct and surrounding neighborhoods through a review of existing literature, analysis of crime and shooting data, and interviews and focus groups with gun violence prevention and intervention initiative staff and community members.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2025. 44p.

By Mohamed Bin Ali and Rafillah Rapit

The increasing involvement of women in terrorism challenges traditional perceptions and necessitates a shift in counterterrorism strategies. Recent cases in Singapore illustrate how women are radicalised through online propaganda, familial influence, and ideological indoctrination, leading to their participation in extremist activities. Addressing this evolving threat demands gender-sensitive prevention and rehabilitation efforts, community engagement, digital counterterrorism, and tailored intervention programmes to counter radicalisation at its roots. COMMENTARY The recent detention of a 15-year-old self-radicalised female student in Singapore highlights the growing vulnerability of young individuals, especially women, to extremist influences online. Her case, the first involving a female minor under the Internal Security Act (ISA), signals an alarming shift in radicalisation trends, where even adolescents are being drawn to violent ideologies. This underscores the urgency of addressing radicalisation at its early stages, particularly in digital spaces where extremist propaganda thrives. Just months earlier, the case of a 56-year-old radicalised housewife demonstrated that women are no longer confined to passive roles in extremist networks. These developments challenge traditional assumptions about gender and radicalisation, reinforcing the need for targeted intervention efforts across different demographic groups.

In many cases, women were often involved as facilitators of terrorism, providing logistical support, acting as recruiters, or serving as symbols of ideological purity. However, recent trends show a growing number of women assuming leadership roles, engaging in combat, and even carrying out suicide attacks. Several factors drive this shift, including ideological indoctrination, social and economic disenfranchisement, and extremist organisations' strategic exploitation of gender norms. Terrorist groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda have actively sought to recruit women, recognising their potential to evade security measures and access targets that male operatives might struggle to reach. Extremist groups have used women as suicide bombers, assassins, and enforcers of their doctrine. In some instances, they have also taken on prominent roles in radicalisation efforts, using online platforms to spread extremist propaganda and recruit new members.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore 2025. 4p,

By Oluwole Ojewale and Raoul Sumo Tayo

This study presents evidence on the dynamics of cattle rustling in border regions of Cameroon and Chad. It identifies the drivers and enablers of the phenomenon and the networks of actors engaged in the criminal economy. The ungoverned spaces of border regions pose security challenges and accentuate the illicit economy of cattle rustling. Addressing cattle rustling in southern Chad and northern Cameroon requires a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach due to the complex interplay of economic, social and security dynamics in the regions. Key findings • The primary enablers of cattle rustling include transhumance and child labour, multiple conflicts, failure of governance, environmental factors, porous borders, cultural perception and social acceptance, corruption and ineffective justice system. • The link between cattle rustling and other forms of organised crime manifests through terrorism financing, cross-border smuggling, arms trafficking, abduction and money laundering. • In addition to the traditional cattle rustlers, the dominant actors perpetrating cattle rusting are ISWAP (71.4%), Boko Haram (9.5%), separatist groups (8.1%) and unidentified armed groups (5.4%).

ENACT, 2025. 36p.

   By John Lindsay-Poland. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton and Giffords  

  The iron river of weapons transiting from the United States to Mexico and Central America that empowers criminal organizations and accelerates forced migration originates from hundreds of gun manufacturers and passes through thousands of local U.S. gun dealers, every year. In reaction to the flow of illicit weapons, a firearms race has developed, in which gun companies export more and increasingly militarized weapons to Mexican police and military forces. But the number of lives lost or disappeared through violence in Mexico continues to increase, while migrants fleeing through Mexico have become understandably more desperate to get to safety. Political discourse focuses on the U.S.-Mexico border. But the unregulated, massive and militarized U.S. gun market that feeds the violence, drug trafficking, and displacement is growing – and often ignored. The Stop US Arms to Mexico project obtained finely grained data, never before disclosed, on the origins of guns trafficked and exported to Mexico and Central America from the United States since 2015. We are publishing this data, in conjunction with this report, at stopusarmstomexico.org/iron-river  Gun violence in Mexico has spiraled in the last two decades since the expiration of the U.S. federal assault weapons ban in 2004 and the 2007 declaration of the drug war in Mexico with U.S. support. A modest decline in gun homicides since 2019 has not reduced violence even to the elevated levels of 2010-2011. Moreover, the growing number of forced disappearances, primarily carried out by criminal organizations armed with U.S. weapons and sometimes with collusion of Mexican security forces, has nullified the modest decline in gun homicides

San Francisco, CA:  Stop US Arms to Mexico, 2024. 12p.

By John Lindsay-Poland

The U.S. firearms market is generating growing storms of violence in neighboring countries. From Mexico – where traffickers in fentanyl and other criminal businesses are armed with thousands of U.S.- sourced assault weapons and .50 caliber rifles – to Haiti, where gangs armed with rifles easily purchased and smuggled from Florida and Georgia dominate and terrorize broad swaths of territory – the permissive, militarized and enormous gun trade in the United States is driving thousands of families to flee their homelands, arming the men who disappear people and commit femicide, empowering traders in narcotics that take thousands more lives, and looting economies. The damage is not limited to Mexico and Haiti. Firearms homicides – just one indicator of gun harms – have grown in Jamaica, Barbados, Central America and other nations, in tandem with the retail proliferation of U.S. weapons. In Guatemala, the exponential growth of exports of U.S. pistols has fed weapons trafficking and homicide rates. The United States is not exempt, of course: there were more shootings in U.S. schools in the last three years than any prior year.1 The concept frequently used for this violence is that of a pandemic: the health consequences of gun violence are severe and growing, with firearms and bullets as vectors and agents, respectively.2 But gun violence also behaves like a storm system in its violence and shattering effects. And the islands in which people may imagine that they are safe from these storms of gun violence are shrinking.

San Francisco, CA Stop US Arms to Mexico, 2025. 9p

By William R. Slomanson

An estimated quarter- to half-million guns are smuggled from the U.S. into Mexico each year. Seventy percent of guns recovered at Mexican crime scenes are traced back to the U.S. Many of these weapons are military-styled assault rifles, shipped into Mexico by U.S. drug gangs. This pipeline endangers citizens of the four U.S. border states, many of the nation’s counties, and the police who are outgunned by cartels. According to the complaint, 'tens of thousands of Mexico’s citizens have been wounded and killed.'

The typical precursor is sloppy or illegal practices in the manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer-buyer distribution chain. Data available to the gun industry could be used by its members to substantially reduce sales of guns to 'bad apple' retailers.

Mexico’s unique law suit  is the first whereby a foreign government has sued American gun makers. If ultimately successful, the trial judge has hinted that this novel filing would encourage similar litigation−in the U.S. and other nations.

Estados Unidos Mexicanos is not a lawsuit against the Second Amendment. Mexico instead hopes to trigger an exception to the federal statute that generally bars such suits against the U.S. gun industry. The plaintiff relies on lower U.S. court cases that have either interpreted that immunity from suit−in a way that allows such suits to proceed−or have considered this federal statute unconstitutional.

Mexico filed in the U.S. for several presumptive reasons. It seeks stratospheric damages of 'billions of dollars each year'. A large recovery is more likely in an American court than in Mexico. Securing the appearance of these U.S. corporations in a Mexican venue would be beyond wishful thinking. Mexico’s other major hurdle is whether a U.S. court can exercise personal jurisdiction, when all of the alleged harm has occurred in Mexico.

The case is now in the trial court. After that result is appealed, and case-split certiorari is sought, the reviewing courts may dismiss this case because: (1) it does not trigger the key exception to federal immunity from suit; and/or (2) the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants.

56 Suffolk University Law Review (forthcoming 2022), 35p.

By Eugenio Weigend Vargas , Jason Goldstick, Laura Vargas

Background - Every year, thousands of people from Latin America and the Caribbean are migrating to the USA. Policy-makers have argued that US firearms are fuelling violence in these countries and are contributing to migration. The objective of this article is to examine the proportion of immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean arriving at the US border who have previously been threatened with a firearm. This article further explores sociodemographic factors associated with the likelihood of previous firearm-related threats, whether those threats are associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as the reasons behind those threats. Methods Data were obtained from a survey of migrants recruited at the southern US border from March 2022 to August 2023. To be selected, respondents had to be 18 years of age or older, had to speak English or Spanish and come from a Latin American or Caribbean country. We used descriptive statistics and a logistic regression. Results We analysed 321 cases. Roughly, 48% of respondents reported previous firearm-related threats. Males and respondents coming from Honduras, Venezuela and El Salvador were more likely to report previous firearm-related threats. There was a strong association between previous firearm-related threats and signs of post-traumatic stress disorder. Most threats occurred during robberies or extortions, but other threats were perpetrated by authorities, to prevent crime reporting, or by intimate partners. Conclusion Understanding the violence, particularly firearm-related violence, experienced by those migrating to the USA from Latin America and the Caribbean could help guide policy discussion and actions.

Injury Prevention, Epub ahead of print: . doi:10.1136/ip-2024-045369

By Kristen Rand. Additional research was provided by Kaya van der Horst

Fifty caliber sniper rifles are used by militaries around the world and can penetrate armor plating and shoot down aircraft on take-off and landing, but can be purchased under federal law in the U.S. as easily as a single-shot hunting rifle. The study’s release comes the day before the U.S Supreme Court will hear oral arguments by the government of Mexico in its lawsuit against gunmaker Smith & Wesson, another manufacturer of military bred weaponry utilized by the cartels.

VPC Government Affairs Director Kristen Rand states, “Fifty caliber sniper rifles are the guns most coveted by the cartels and most feared by Mexican law enforcement. The VPC has warned for years about the unique threat these anti-materiel guns present. Now they are being used to inflict maximum harm in Mexico. The U.S.-based manufacturers of these weapons must be held accountable.”

The VPC joined other gun violence prevention organizations in an amicus brief in support of the government of Mexico. The VPC has issued a wide range of studies on the threat posed by 50 caliber sniper rifles, including the risk they pose in the U.S. to infrastructure, civil aviation, and national security.

The study details the history of the Barrett, manufactured in Murfreesboro, Tennessee and the original 50 caliber sniper rifle, the gun’s unmatched combination of firepower and range, and the use of it and other 50 caliber rifles in numerous attacks and assassinations by Mexican cartels. Data contained in the study reveal that from 2010 to February 2023, the majority of 50 caliber sniper rifles (519 of 831) recovered by Mexican authorities were Barretts. Barrett and other 50 caliber sniper rifles have also been obtained by terrorists around the world, including Al Qaeda. In addition, the study:

• Cites numerous reports and research warning of the terror threat posed by the easy accessibility of 50 caliber sniper rifles, including: compromising command and control via assassination; the threat to aircraft (including civilian airliners); and, infrastructure.

• Offers numerous examples of terrorist and other criminal acts, including assassination, involving 50 caliber sniper rifles in Mexico, the U.S., and around the world.

• Details how the use of armor-piercing rifle rounds can further magnify the power – and the threat – of these deadly weapons.

• Includes profiles of companies manufacturing 50 caliber sniper rifles.

The study also puts forth policy recommendations including a federal ban in the United States of these uniquely destructive firearms.

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2025. 34p.

By The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS) at Northwestern University

Gun violence reduction initiatives that seek to engage individuals involved in violence must effectively identify and manage risk. Risk assessment informs participant recruitment, service provision, and program evaluation. Discussions around risk assessment often center quantitative metrics and researcher-designed assessment tools, deemphasizing the lived and professional experience of frontline professionals who work and often live in the communities they serve. The study outlined here analyzes the perspectives of frontline street outreach and victim services workers in Chicago on how they define, assess, and respond to gun violence risk on the job. The findings are based on a series of semi-structured focus group discussions and a participatory analysis session conducted in early 2021 by researchers at the Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS). These discussions sought to answer the following 1. How do frontline violence prevention workers define risk for gun violence? 2. How do violence prevention workers assess and respond to risk? 3. What role do/should formal assessment tools play in violence prevention? Seasoned staff from both street outreach and victim services programs shared their experience identifying when, where, and who is at risk of shooting or being shot. It also gathers perspectives on strategies to mitigate this risk.

Evanston, IL: The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS) at Northwestern University, 2022. 28p.

By The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS) at Northwestern University

The Peacekeepers Program originally launched in Chicago in the summer of 2018 as the Flatlining Violence Inspires Peace (FLIP) Strategy. FLIP began as a summer-based community violence intervention program and grew to provide services in 16 Chicago community areas (CCAs) that held the lion’s share of violence in the city of Chicago. FLIP combined group violence intervention, violence prevention, and workforce development strategies designed as a street outreach apprenticeship program. Its immediate goal was to reduce gun violence in hotspots—areas with disproportionately high levels of shootings and victimizations. FLIP theorized that if gun violence could be reduced in these spatial pockets within a program community, it would create extended periods of peace across the broader community, ultimately contributing to a citywide decline in gun violence victimizations over time. In January 2023, the Illinois Office of Firearm Violence Prevention (OFVP), housed within the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS), supported FLIP’s transition into a year-round initiative, piloting their involvement and investment in the re-branded Peacekeepers Program (the Program). At the conclusion of the pilot period, two critical milestones occurred: the Program was integrated into the Reimagine Public Safety Act (RPSA) portfolio and, for the first time, received public funding to operate year-round. Moreover, with this funding, the Program was required to expand into RPSA priority communities, allowing the intervention to extend beyond Chicago and into surrounding Suburban Cook County  

  The report begins by providing an analysis of the 14 communities that implemented the Program for two consecutive calendar years. This exploration seeks to understand violence trends during the 2023-2024 year-round implementation of the Program compared to 2021-2022 calendar years, when the Program was only implemented during the summer months. Additional analyses will examine violence trends at both the community area and city-wide levels to assess the Program model’s claim that a reduction in hotspots might contribute to broader reductions across Program communities and the City of Chicago. The report also provides a brief overview of the year-over-year violence trends in the 13 Chicago-based Program expansion communities and their respective hotspots, during their launch year, to better understand violence trends following their start dates. This focus on both established and expansion communities highlights the progress made across all program community areas and offers insights into how implementation over consecutive 24-month periods aligns with observed violence trends. This report does not seek to establish causation or correlation between violence trends in program community areas and the implementation of the Program. Instead, it provides an exploratory analysis of gun violence trends in these areas, with a particular focus on program hotspots. Finally, the report concludes with early findings and recommendations on the implementation of the Program.  

Evanston, IL: Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS) at Northwestern University 2025. 34p.

By Naomi Johnson, Austin Segal, Maya Simkin, Stephanie Agnew, Kareem Butler, and Briana Payton

Over the last two decades, the policing, prosecution, incarceration, and surveillance of people who carry guns has increased tremendously. This criminalization has majorly impacted Black communities in the state – especially in Chicago and Cook County – without improving safety. In fact, the criminalization of gun possession and the conflation of gun possession and gun use have made communities less safe by entangling more people in the criminal legal system. Time and time again, Black men, teenagers, and children are targeted, arrested, and criminalized for carrying guns that they feel are necessary for their own protection in areas with high rates of gun violence and low clearance rates by police. The purpose of this report is to analyze the policies, processes, and sociocultural realities that have led to the “War on Guns,” which parallels the historic War on Drugs1 and has similarly devastated Black and Brown communities for decades. In this brief report, we use public information to provide a set of facts that explain how the mounting public pressure to stop gun violence has regressively and ineffectively targeted the victims of violence and their neighbors who carry guns for protection. We detail how this approach has contributed to discriminatory policing, confusing laws, harsh sentencing, over-incarceration, and other unnecessary and long-term entanglements with the criminal legal system.   

Chicago: Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts, 2024. 44p.

By Anne K. Mwobobia

This study sought to examine print media framing of gun violence in Kenya with reference to the Nation and Standard newspapers. The objectives of the study are to establish dominant frames in reporting gun violence by the Nation and the Standard newspapers; analyze the diction in framing gun violence by the Nation and the Standard Newspapers; to examine the figures of speech in framing gun violence by the Nation and the Standard Newspapers and; to assess the portrayal of gun violence as a serious societal problem by the Nation and the Standard Newspapers. The study was based on the Framing Theory and Goffman’s Frame Analysis. The study employed the descriptive research design and the mixed methods research approach. Purposive sampling technique was used to select suitable newspaper articles for the study. The study involved the collection of data on gun violence from Nation and Standard Newspapers for the period 1st September 2019 –30th August 2020. Data was collected using a code sheet and interview guide. The target population of the study consisted of 730 articles published by Nation and Standard Newspapers articles on gun violence. Two editors and three reporters experienced in reporting gun violence were also interviewed. Data was collected and analyzed using content analysis. Regarding the dominant frames in reporting gun violence by the Nation and the Standard newspapers, it is evident that most of dominant frame used to portray gun violence in both Nation and the Standard newspapers were fatality, terrorism, crime, citizen participation, cattle rustling, tactical response and accomplice. Cartoons and photos were also used as visual persuasion frames. Diction was also extensively used in the reporting of gun violence stories. In this regard, various catchwords and catchphrases were used in depicting gun violence. These included: silencing the guns, impunity, and proliferation of guns, dead, robbery, shootout and coup attempt. It was also made manifest that various figures of speech were used. These include idioms, similes, metaphors and idiomatic expressions. Lastly, the findings show that some of the major issues of societal concern focused by both newspapers included armed robbery, police brutality, cattle rustling and terrorism. It can thus be concluded that the print media plays a pivotal role in checking gun violence since it is widely viewed as the mirror of society and protective shield against violent gun crimes. The study recommends that the print media should expand the dominant frames used in reporting gun violence so as maximally show the various angles to the deep issue of gun violence. This could be through enhanced research on gun violence in Kenya. The use of diction and figures of speech could also be exploited within the process of enriching the presentation of gun violence stories. The print media should also increase the level to which they offer balanced coverage of gun violence stories in the whole country.

Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2021. 92p.

Edited by Gary LaFree and Joshua D. Freilich

Much has changed in the relationship between terrorism research and the field of criminology in recent years. Law and justice scholars such as Kittrie (1978) and Turk (1982) made significant contributions to the research literature on terrorism and responses to terrorism in the past half-century, but much of this early work was isolated, piecemeal, and done without federal research funding. It took the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995 and, more importantly, the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania before major funding to support social science research on terrorism in the United States became available. After these events, funding through the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism; terrorism research solicitations by the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Justice, and the Bureau of Justice Administration; and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security’s academic Centers of Excellence program all strengthened support for social scientific studies of terrorism and responses to terrorism (for a review, see LaFree & Dugan, 2016). More recently, the Minerva program, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD, 2015), and the Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism research program, funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ, 2014), have further increased levels of support.

Wiley Blackwell, 2017, 620p.

By Wesam Charkawi , Kevin Dunn ,  Ana-Maria Bliuc

Since the September 11 attacks, prevention and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs have rapidly increased worldwide, garnering significant interest among researchers. This paper is a systematic review focusing on the evaluations of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention programs from 2001 until 2020. The review identified 74 program evaluations that included satisfactory measures and metrics. Only 32% of the studies deemed the intervention successful, 55% described limited success, and 8% deemed the program had failed. Many of the programs evaluated failed to reach their objectives; some generated negative outcomes such as community disdain and an increase in the likelihood of alienation and stigma. Success was largely a self-assessed measure by the facilitators or stakeholders of the programs or the evaluators of the study. Success indicators can be operationalized as the degree of enhanced sense of belonging (connectedness to the community, social connection), trust and willingness to engage in programs, development of critical thinking skills (integrative complexity theory), and a strong sense of worth (quest for significance). Without a generally accepted set of metrics and no cohesive framework for conducting evaluations, this review offers an important addition to the field on the evidence suitable for program evaluations. An important aim of this systematic review was to identify what makes an effective and successful countering violent extremism program. The key findings indicate that enhancing belonging, identity, trust and community engagement, acknowledging perceptions of injustice, religious mentoring, and the promotion of critical thinking/self-reflection are associated with successful programs. The findings press upon policymakers, funders, and researchers the need to consider and support high-quality evaluations of programs.

International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 2024., 19p.

By By Stephane J. Baele,* Lewys Brace, and Elahe Naserian 

Scholars and practitioners investigating extremist and violent political actors’ online communications face increasingly large information environments containing ever-growing amounts of data to find, collect, organise, and analyse. In this context, this article encourages terrorism and extremism analysts to use computational visual methods, mirroring for images what is now routinely done for text. Specifically, we chart how computer vision methods can be successfully applied to strengthen the study of extremist and violent political actors’ online ecosystems. Deploying two such methods – unsupervised deep clustering and supervised object identification – on an illustrative case (an original corpus containing thousands of images collected from incel platforms) allows us to explain the logic of these tools, to identify their specific advantages (and limitations), and to subsequently propose a research workflow associating computational methods with the other visual analysis approaches traditionally leveraged  

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XIX, Issue 1 March 2025  

By Stephane J. Baele and & Lewys Brace

How to best chart and analyse extremist digital ecosystems? This paper proposes to complement standard mapping methods based on URL outlinks, which are typically deployed but present several critical flaws, with socio-semantic network analysis. Adapting bi-nodal socio-semantic network principles to the specificities of extremist and terrorist digital communications, we put forward a simple yet efficient method for generating informative networks based on ideological or thematic proximity rather than URL connections. We use three datasets of various sizes and nature (French far-right websites, British far-right websites, US far-right Telegram channels) to compare traditional URL-based vs. socio-semantic networks, demonstrating how the latter bypasses the flaws of the former and offers significant advantages in multi-methods research designs. This empirical validation of our methodological proposition unfolds several new observations concerning the contemporary Western far-right digital ecosystem, highlighting specificities and commonalities of its French, British, and American variants.

By Luke Baumgartner

On July 22, 2011, 32-year-old Anders Behring Breivik embarked on a threehour murder spree across Norway, killing seventy-seven in what would become the single largest loss of life in the country since the Second World War. Beginning that morning in central Oslo, Breivik’s terrorist attack claimed its first victims after detonating a van filled with nearly one ton of explosives outside of the Regjeringskvartalet complex, which housed the prime minister’s administrative offices. Disguised as a police officer, Breivik then boarded a ferry for the island of Utøya, where he proceeded to kill sixty-nine students attending a youth worker’s party summer camp in a mass shooting that lasted nearly ninety minutes. An hour before the bombing, Breivik emailed his manifesto, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, to more than 1,000 contacts, asking for their assistance in disseminating his magnum opus, which, according to him, took more than three years to complete. The 1,500-page compendium contained a litany of grievances and rails against political correctness, feminists, and “multiculturalist/cultural Marxists,” ultimately accusing them of complicity in a grand conspiracy orchestrated by political elites of the European Union and Arab states to destroy Western civilization through the gradual replacement of white Christian Europeans by way of increased Muslim immigration—in other words, a Great Replacement. Breivik’s actions that day would inspire a cascade of copycat attacks in the United States, New Zealand, and Germany. As part of their attacks, each perpetrator wrote a manifesto to explain the rationale for their actions. In doing so, the manifestos can–and often do–serve multiple purposes: air the personal and societal grievances that led them to kill, provide a blueprint for future attackers, and perhaps, most importantly, gain the public notoriety and infamy they so desperately crave. At its core, terrorism is an act of violence that seeks validation through its very nature as a public spectacle, and thus, manifestos can provide answers to the ever-present question of why an event of this magnitude occurs. While these attacks are separated from one another in both time and space, the ideological glue binding them together is the belief in a racially and culturally homogenous dystopian future, one in which white people gradually cease to comprise demographic majorities in traditionally white dominions such as the United States and Europe. Or, in the most dire circumstances, cease to exist at all. These manifestos contain several common themes central to replacement theory–the conspiracy that motivated their attacks. This paper attempts to build on the current body of academic literature that focuses on the thematic elements of the manifestos and the historical and theoretical foundations upon which the attackers’ justifications for their actions lie. Beginning with a detailed history of replacement sentiment in the United States and Europe, this section seeks to provide the necessary background and context for where replacement theory comes from and how it has motivated actors across time and space. Within the context of the United States, replacement theory finds its ideological roots in late-19th and early-20th century race science, or eugenics, beginning with the works of sociologist Edward A. Ross and anthropologist Madison Grant, both of whom popularized the notion of “race suicide.” Subsequent generations of post-war white supremacists, such as David Duke and David Lane, transformed race suicide into the explicitly anti-semitic conspiracy theory of “white genocide,” laying the groundwork for contemporary militant far-right extremists to coalesce around the idea of replacement theory. Meanwhile, European manifestations of parallel racist conspiracies emerged during an intellectual movement of the 1960s in France known as the Nouvelle Droite, championed by the likes of Jean Raspail. Raspail’s work would influence leading public figures such as Italian author Oriana Fallaci and British Historian Bat Ye’or, who were instrumental in sparking Renaud Camus’ coining of the “Great Replacement.”

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University , 2025. 32p.

By Leland Lazarus and Alexander Gocso

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese individuals, gangs, and companies engaging in illicit activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Our methodology was to research academic literature, news articles, press releases, official statements, and podcasts in Spanish, Portuguese, Mandarin and English, as well as conduct off-the-record interviews with U.S. and LAC intelligence and law enforcement officials to ascertain growing trends in Chinese criminal behavior in the region.

Miami: Florida International University, 2023. 33p.

By Phil Williams and Sandra Quincoses

The economic and political environments in Latin America have been advantageous for local, regional, and transnational threat networks. Specifically, technology, increased international trade and economic interdependence, heightened interest in natural resources for profit, synthetic drug production, economic disparities, corruption, impunity, and unstable political conditions have led to a complex web of opportunities that requires new, progressive ways to address criminal activities. The creativity of threat networks along with their entrepreneurial strategies have resulted in increasing power and influence. Despite efforts by the United States and some governments in Latin America to combat these networks, the everchanging global environment has worked in their favor. Indeed, some countries in Central and South America are in danger of transforming into what Jorge Chabat described as “criminally possessed states.” Furthermore, gangs in Central America, especially in Honduras where MS-13 has become more closely linked to drug trafficking, have reduced local extortion, become more aware of their nascent political power and have even engaged in rudimentary social welfare provision. Another major trend identified in this report is the strategic diversification of trafficking routes, activities, and markets. For instance, licitly established transpacific trade between East Asia and Latin America has been exploited by criminal groups involved in wildlife and drug trafficking. This, along with other activities such as illegal logging and mining, have undermined licit trade. Moreover, criminal groups have also conducted cyber-attacks against government agencies to obtain false documentation to illegally conduct logging activities in protected areas of Brazil’s Amazon rainforest. Such activities illustrate the growing relationship between technology, illicit behavior, and criminal groups’ diverse capabilities. An emerging nexus between state and non-state threat networks is also identified as a key trend in the region. Notable links between criminal groups and malign state actors such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are publicly known with indigenous and under-resourced communities violently confronting illicit organizations that sometimes have the tacit support of government authorities and agencies. Moreover, external state actors’ investments and economic interests in highly corrupt and unstable political environments pave the way for impunity, which enables threat networks to operate without inhibition. The most explicit example pertains to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC)-linked mining operations in Venezuela. Undoubtedly, trends are becoming increasingly complex now that activities have reached a global scale. This is also evident in illicit financial flows into, through, and out of the region. In terms of money laundering, tried and tested methods still seem to be favored, although it is likely that new opportunities, such as those provided by digital currencies, will be increasingly exploited in the future. The paper concludes that, in spite of adverse trends, it is important to avoid worst-case analysis. It also suggests, however, that many of the problems in the region stem fundamentally from poor governance—and that taking steps to deal with this should be a priority.

Miami: Florida International University, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, 2019. 45p.

By Lea Gerster, Francesca Arcostanzo, Nestor Prieto-Chavana, Dominik Hammer and Christian Schwieter

As part of its project on “Combating Radicalisation in Right-Wing Extremist Online Subcultures”, ISD is investigating smaller platforms to which the German-speaking far-right online scene is retreating. Their aim is to circumvent regulation and moderation on large platforms, for example as required by the German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG, or 'Facebook Act'). Analyses contained in the report on “Telegram as a Buttress” have already made clear the importance of investigating PeerTube. While writing the previous report, the ISD research team came across multiple video platforms with almost identical layouts and functionalities. It was found that eight out of 19 video platforms identified were set up using the free software PeerTube. PeerTube is an example of a growing socio-technological movement that attempts to turn away from large, centralised platforms towards decentralised and mostly community-managed websites. Instead of a single platform with a monopoly on content, this movement is building a network based on servers that are maintained independently of one another. This is leading to a “hydra effect”: even if connected servers are cut off, the network itself survives, allowing for new servers to be added at will. While far-right extremists are not the ones driving this phenomenon, it does appear that they are exploiting these new-found possibilities. For example, various far-right figureheads have established platforms via PeerTube where users can in some cases create their own accounts. Some of these PeerTube platforms record millions of visits per month. But it is not just its reach but also its structure which makes PeerTube worth investigating. With PeerTube, individuals or organisations can create their own video platforms where they set the rules for content, moderation and user registration. This is essential for far-right and conspiracy groups and individuals who, according to previous ISD research, prefer audiovisual platforms to other types, such as micro-blogging services. PeerTube is a particularly valuable tool since it is more technologically demanding to host and access audiovisual materials than text files. In contrast to centralized platforms such as YouTube, PeerTube content is managed separately by so-called instances - this refers to the small-scale video platforms created with PeerTube software. Different instances can network with each other and form federations. This allows videos that have been uploaded on one instance to be played on another instance without having to change the website. PeerTube belongs to the so-called Fediverse, which will be discussed in more detail below. Another difference to centralized video platforms is that this software uses peer-to-peer technology (P2P), which presumably explains the name. The fact that instances are not managed by large companies, but by individuals or groups at their own expense and with the help of free software, also has implications for their regulation. Key Findings • There is no central moderating authority for managing content. PeerTube offers individuals or groups, whose content has been blocked on centrally managed video platforms for to violating the terms of service, an attractive way of continuing to share their content online. Where it is these groups or individuals who control moderation, content can only be removed from the network by switching off the server. • It is difficult to accurately map the size and connections of the Fediverse. The network is constantly in flux as the relationships between instances can change rapidly due to blocking and follow requests. Instances can also go offline from one day to the next. • The instances used by far-right and conspiracy actors make up only a small fraction of the Fediverse network. They primarily network among themselves. However, some of the instances that were investigated are connected to a wider Fediverse through their own highly networked servers. • The deletion of extremist YouTube channels is not necessarily reflected in the number of account registrations on the corresponding PeerTube instances. PeerTube is rather used as a back-up option for deplatforming. The frequently observed phenomenon that not all users migrate to the new platform can also be observed here. • Instances are often customised in different ways. For example, each instance varies in whether they permit third parties to register for accounts and upload videos. There is no clear correlation between the numbers of accounts, videos and views. However, the most watched videos on relevant instances were mostly created by prominent members of the milieu, which would appear to indicate that persons with a pre-established audience are particularly successful on PeerTube. • The instances selected for the five case studies hosted a lot of content that focused on the COVID-19 pandemic. Another frequent narrative was an alleged conspiracy perpetuated by elites who, according to conspiracy theorists, use events such as the pandemic or Putin's war against Ukraine to further their secret agenda. These findings suggest that PeerTube instances provide safe refuge for disinformation. • Because PeerTube is a piece of software that anyone can access and use in a variety of different ways, state regulation will do little to limit its use by farright extremists. While state agencies can enforce individual aspects of the NetzDG against PeerTube instances, many instances do not have the number of users required to impose reporting obligations or requirements to delete content. Moreover, most content is not hosted with the aim of generating profit, which limits the applicability of both the Facebook Act and the EU's Digital Services Act. • However, PeerTube's community moderation function does allow the community to moderate the use of PeerTube for promoting harmful content. One way of doing this is by isolating extremist instances. Efforts should be undertaken to work with the Fediverse community, i.e. with the server operators and their users, and to develop best practices for identifying and combating extremist activities. This could include further training on how to spot hate speech or setting up a body for reporting extremist instances.

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2023). 44p.