By Jenna Harewell, Elizabeth Dunk Shivi Bains, Emma Howarth, Claire Powell, Lazaros Gonidis

  Background - The domestic abuse core outcome set (DVA-COS) is an agreed set of five outcomes intended for use in evaluations of interventions or services for children and families with experience of domestic violence and abuse (DVA, hereafter referred to as domestic abuse). A COS is a minimum standard for measurement in intervention studies, the purpose of which is to overcome heterogeneity in outcome selection and measurement. The aim of a COS is to maximise the value of a body of evidence by facilitating comparison between and synthesis across studies, thus reducing research wastage. Since the development of the DVA-COS, work has been undertaken to identify, select, and validate outcome measurement instruments (OMIs) to measure the core outcomes. The Warwick– Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (WEMWBS) was previously identified as acceptable by stakeholders to capture two outcomes: child and caregiver emotional health and wellbeing. This work seeks to extend those findings by validating the measure for use with domestic abuse experienced populations. Aims Foundations, the national What Works Centre for Children & Families, commissioned two work packages to develop and integrate previous work to outline and validate OMIs for use to assess outcomes comprising the DVA-COS. Work package 1 seeks to identify three OMIs, and this report focuses on work package 2, which aimed to validate the Short WEMWBS (SWEMWBS) for use with children and young people (aged 11 to 18) who have experienced domestic abuse. The studies that make up this work package used mixed methods to examine the acceptability, content validity, structural validity, internal consistency, and measurement invariance for the scale in children and young people experiencing domestic abuse. We also report a validation study of the WEMWBS for adults with experience of domestic abuse. Methods The above aims were addressed across four individual studies: two planned and two supplementary. First, a qualitative ‘think aloud’ study assessed the acceptability of the SWEMWBS with children and young people who had experienced domestic abuse. The remaining three studies were quantitative analyses of secondary data on using the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS with children and young people and adult samples. • Study A: a qualitative think aloud study that involved interviews and a focus group to gather feedback from children and young people with domestic abuse experience on use of the SWEMWBS. • Study B: examined cross-sectional data collected by the OxWell Student Survey to validate the SWEMWBS with children and young people affected by domestic abuse. • Study C: examined anonymised longitudinal service data to validate the SWEMWBS with children and young people affected by domestic abuse. • Study D: validated the WEMWBS with adults who have experienced domestic abuse using cross-sectional data from the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS). Key findings Our findings demonstrate the validity and acceptability of the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS in domestic abuse-experienced child and adult populations respectively. Study A indicated that the SWEMWBS is broadly acceptable for use with children and young people, while raising important considerations regarding respondents’ interpretation of the measure’s items as well as the emotional impact of the measure on this population. Studies B and C demonstrated robust psychometric validity2 of the SWEMWBS with children and young people affected by domestic abuse, and Study D showed robust psychometric validity of the WEMWBS with adult victims of domestic abuse. These are significant findings given the limited number of measures that have been evaluated for use with this population across practice and research contexts. Moreover, this represents an important step forward in the implementation of the DVA-COS, which we hope will help to unify outcome measurement in domestic abuse research and evaluation, as well as service monitoring. Recommendations We recommend that the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS be used to measure wellbeing in the context of evaluation studies (of any quantitative design) seeking to assess the impact of child-focused domestic abuse interventions. To enhance the acceptability of the measure to children and adults we suggest minor adaptations for use in the domestic abuse context. Finally, we recommend the development of guidelines for practitioners and researchers about how to use the tools in a ‘carefirst’ way and how to guard against the tools being used for screening or triaging, or rationing care, as well as guidance for commissioners on how to interpret and use evidence, generated by the completion of the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS, for the basis of decision making. This guidance needs to reflect the balance between the benefits of data-driven decision making and the risk of unduly narrowing the breadth of services or thwarting innovation in the sector. The OMI’s implementation (including the use of guidance) should be closely monitored and evaluated, to inform any associated refinements and to develop an in-depth understanding of the process and outcomes associated with embedding routine measurement in practice. Further work is also required to identify an alternative OMI or adapt the SWEMWBS for appropriate use with children under the age of.   11.

Foundations UK: 2025. 106p.

By Shivi Bains, Elizabeth Dunk, Lazaros Gonidis,  Jenna Harewell,Emma Howarth, Claire Powell

  Background - The domestic violence and abuse core outcome set (DVA-COS) is an agreed set of five outcomes intended for use in evaluating interventions for children and their families with experience of domestic abuse. The purpose of a core outcome set is to harmonise outcome measurement, helping to reduce variation in outcome selection and measurement across studies, with the aim of preventing research waste. This minimum, but not exclusive, set of outcomes also aims to ensure interventions capture impact meaningful to all stakeholders, whether through routine data collection within domestic abuse services or as outcomes in trials and research evaluations. Since the development of the DVA-COS, work has been undertaken to consolidate and validate outcome measurement instruments (OMIs) to use within the core outcome set. The work reported here builds on and extends these efforts (Powell, Clark, et al., 2022; Powell, Feder, et al., 2022). Aims Foundations, the national What Works Centre for Children & Families, commissioned a programme of work, comprised of two work packages, to develop and validate OMIs for use in the DVA-COS. This report focuses on work package 1, which sought to identify and appraise measurement tools, using the COnsensus-based Standards for the selection of health Measurement INstruments (COSMIN) Process, to assess three of the five core outcomes of the DVA-COS: family relationships, feelings of safety, and freedom to go about daily life. Work package 2 sought to validate the Short Warwick–Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (SWEMWBS) for use with child and young people populations with experience of domestic abuse and is reported separately. Methods To meet the aim of work package 1, this project adopted a four-stage process. Within stage A, OMIs were identified through rapid reviews of the domestic abuse literature (peer-reviewed and grey) and through targeted searches of the non-domestic abuse literature; these searches were informed by concept workshops with 15 key stakeholders to highlight priority concepts within the outcomes. In stage B, candidate OMIs and their associated studies were quality appraised, using the COSMIN protocol, and the highest-scoring tools were shortlisted for assessment of their acceptability and feasibility. Feedback workshops and stakeholder votes, held within stage C, determined which tools should proceed to the consensus workshop. Concluding this process (stage D), a consensus workshop was held with 29 domestic abuse practitioners, commissioners, researchers, and survivors to allow stakeholders to discuss and reach agreement on recommending OMIs for the three outcomes. Key findings In total 144 OMIs were identified across all evidence sources and from previous work. A systematic process of conceptual mapping, quality appraisal, and examination of acceptability and feasibility issues resulted in a shortlist of 18 OMIs (seven OMIs mapping to family relationships, six mapping to feelings of safety, and five capturing freedom to go about daily life) for discussion by three stakeholder groups. Of these, eight OMIs (three OMIs for family relationships, three for feelings of safety, and two for freedom to go about daily life) progressed to the final consensus workshop. Votes held during the consensus workshop identified the Children and Families Against Domestic Abuse (CAFADA) Wellbeing and Safety as the preferred OMI to assess two outcomes: family relationships (81.5%) and feelings of safety (74.1%). A provisional recommendation for use of this tool was agreed, given that it was recently developed and so it lacks psychometric validation. Therefore it is recommended that before widespread use, this OMI is subject to further adaptation and evaluation in cooperation with the tool developers. In particular, thought is needed about the tool’s suitability for a wider range of interventions, including those supporting perinatal families or services including the person that harms. No agreement, and therefore no recommendation, was reached for an OMI capturing freedom to go about daily life. Feedback from the consensus workshop highlighted a range of positive attributes that explained the CAFADA Wellbeing and Safety’s high acceptability for use within domestic abuse contexts, such as visually appealing design, trauma-informed and strengths-based language, and the complementary adult and child versions. The consensus workshop also highlighted key areas of development such as removing gendered language, being inclusive of non-traditional family structures, and being accessible to children of different ages or cognitive maturity. Conclusion This work makes important strides towards the realisation of a DVA-COS. It establishes a consensus with respect to the provisional recommendation for use of the CAFADA Wellbeing and Safety scale, in research and practice contexts, to assess feelings of safety and family relationships. This provisional recommendation is dependent on further work being carried out to refine the tool and to evaluate its implementation in real-world contexts and in relation to different types of childand family-focused interventions. The not insignificant challenges of implementing a core outcome set are discussed, including the importance of creating trauma-informed guidance to ensure the DVA-COS adopts a care-first approach and to mitigate any unintended consequences. Key findings In total 144 OMIs were identified across all evidence sources and from previous work. A systematic process of conceptual mapping, quality appraisal, and examination of acceptability and feasibility issues resulted in a shortlist of 18 OMIs (seven OMIs mapping to family relationships, six mapping to feelings of safety, and five capturing freedom to go about daily life) for discussion by three stakeholder groups. Of these, eight OMIs (three OMIs for family relationships, three for feelings of safety, and two for freedom to go about daily life) progressed to the final consensus workshop. Votes held during the consensus workshop identified the Children and Families Against Domestic Abuse (CAFADA) Wellbeing and Safety as the preferred OMI to assess two outcomes: family relationships (81.5%) and feelings of safety (74.1%). A provisional recommendation for use of this tool was agreed, given that it was recently developed and so it lacks psychometric validation. Therefore it is recommended that before widespread use, this OMI is subject to further adaptation and evaluation in cooperation with the tool developers. In particular, thought is needed about the tool’s suitability for a wider range of interventions, including those supporting perinatal families or services including the person that harms. No agreement, and therefore no recommendation, was reached for an OMI capturing freedom to go about daily life. Feedback from the consensus workshop highlighted a range of positive attributes that explained the CAFADA Wellbeing and Safety’s high acceptability for use within domestic abuse contexts, such as visually appealing design, trauma-informed and strengths-based language, and the complementary adult and child versions. The consensus workshop also highlighted key areas of development such as removing gendered language, being inclusive of non-traditional family structures, and being accessible to children of different ages or cognitive maturity. Conclusion This work makes important strides towards the realisation of a DVA-COS. It establishes a consensus with respect to the provisional recommendation for use of the CAFADA Wellbeing and Safety scale, in research and practice contexts, to assess feelings of safety and family relationships. This provisional recommendation is dependent on further work being carried out to refine the tool and to evaluate its implementation in real-world contexts and in relation to different types of childand family-focused interventions. The not insignificant challenges of implementing a core outcome set are discussed, including the importance of creating trauma-informed guidance to ensure the DVA-COS adopts a care-first approach and to mitigate any unintended consequences

Work Package 1.   

Foundations UK: 2025. 126p.

Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 65653 Fordham Urb. L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2026)44 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2025 Last revised: 9 Sep 2025

By Mary Holper

The United States once authorized only border-based mandatory detention. However, immigration detention is now like an enormous fortress that has grown two mandatory detention turrets: status-based mandatory detention and crime-based mandatory detention. Status-based mandatory detention sees its only doctrinal foundations in the detention of those physically standing at the border. Yet, it has grown to reach both physically and temporally beyond those stopped at the border. Status-based mandatory detention first grew to include those stopped within 100 miles of a land border and under fourteen days in the U.S., whom immigration enforcement agents placed in expedited removal. Then, status-based mandatory detention grew further to include those stopped anywhere in the U.S. and under two years in the U.S., whom immigration enforcement agents placed in expedited removal. Most recently, status-based mandatory detention has grown to include persons who entered the U.S. at any time and whom immigration enforcement agents never placed in expedited removal. 
This article documents each of the blocks that have been placed in the massively-growing turret of status-based mandatory detention, and analyzes the strength of each block to hold up the turret. The article argues that broad status-based detention is inconsistent with the intent of Congress in passing what traditionally has been border-based mandatory detention. Under principles of statutory interpretation, this excessively large status-based mandatory detention turret cannot hold up.

Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 656, 53, 2025 Fordham Urb. L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2026)

By Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya

We synthesize research on conflict as a fundamental economic phenomenon, arguing that the implications of the ”dark side of self-interest” have received insufficient attention in economics. We define conflict as interactions where parties choose costly inputs that are adversarially combined against one another — distinct from the collaborative input combinations typical in economic models. We make four key contributions: First, we demonstrate that conflict induces economically significant costs comparable to or exceeding traditional deadweight losses. Second, we explain how these costs vary across contexts based on property rights protection, state capacity, and cultural norms. Third, we show how incorporating conflict into economic models leads to substantially different predictions than traditional models — including inverse relationships between compensation and productivity; distortions in comparative advantage; prices determined by power rather than solely by preferences endowments, and technology. Fourth, attributes of modern states such as centralization in the presence of law, checks and balances, other forms of distributed power, and the bureaucratic form of organization can partly be thought of as restraining conflict and appropriation, with implications for governance and economic development. Overall, in the presence of conflict and appropriation, power considerations cannot be separated from economics and first-best models are not empirically plausible.

 CESifo Working Paper No. 12135, 2025

By Jennifer Franks

The Department of Homeland Security's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program gives agencies cybersecurity tools to strengthen the networks and systems they use to meet their missions.While the program has met two of its goals, it lacks sufficient guidance for managing network security and data protection. The program generally supports government-wide cybersecurity initiatives, but DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency hasn't finalized all plans for how CDM can provide support. For example, the agency hasn't fully updated the program's cloud asset management guidance.

We recommended DHS address these issues

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025. 46p.

By Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke

In Superhighway Robbery, Graeme Newman and Ronald Clarke provide a grounded, pragmatic analysis of how the digital revolution didn't necessarily create new types of criminals, but rather provided them with a much more efficient set of tools. They move away from the sensationalized "hacker" myths of the early 2000s to focus on the cold reality of Situational Crime Prevention. The book's central thesis is that the internet acts as a vast infrastructure—a superhighway—that significantly reduces the effort required to commit traditional crimes like theft, fraud, and piracy while increasing the potential rewards and lowering the risk of being caught.

By applying their famous CRAVED model to the digital world, the authors explain that data and software are the ultimate targets because they are easily concealable, removable, and available. They argue that the most effective way to stop cybercrime is not to wait for a change in human nature, but to change the digital environment itself. This involves "designing out" crime by making digital targets harder to reach and less profitable to exploit. Ultimately, Newman and Clarke strip away the mystery of the "Information Age" to reveal that cybercrime is essentially a matter of opportunity, and by closing those digital windows of opportunity, we can make the superhighway a significantly safer place.

In the digital realm, the CRAVED model explains why certain data or media becomes a prime target for "superhighway robbery." Concealability is at an all-time high because digital files take up no physical space and can be hidden in encrypted folders or behind innocuous filenames, making them easy to possess without detection. These files are incredibly Removable because they can be copied or moved across the globe in milliseconds, allowing a thief to "steal" an item while the original remains in place. The Availability of these targets is virtually limitless; once a movie or piece of software is uploaded to a server, it is accessible to anyone with a connection, twenty-four hours a day.

The Value of digital goods remains high because they often represent thousands of hours of professional labor or sensitive personal information that can be sold on the dark web. These items are also highly Enjoyable, as they often consist of popular entertainment, games, or high-end tools that people naturally want to use. Finally, they are perfectly Disposablebecause there is a massive, ready-made market of willing buyers or downloaders, ensuring that a criminal can quickly offload their "loot" for profit or social capital without the logistical headaches of physical fencing.

Cullompton, Devon. UK. Willan. 2003.

BY Richard Grelling.. Translated By Alexander Gray. Introduction by Colin Heston.

Richard Grelling’s The Crime (Das Verbrechen), translated into English by Alexander Gray and published in London and New York between 1917 and 1919, is conceived as both a moral successor and completion to his earlier pacifist landmark, J’Accuse!, written between August 1915 and November 1916. In creating this extended work, Grelling sought to underscore the causes of World War I and dissect the self-justifying rhetoric that sustained the conflict long after its outbreak. Volumes I and II lay foundational groundwork, tracing the immediate antecedents of the war: imperialist tendencies within Germany and, on the part of the opposing Entente powers, ostensibly defensive motives followed by trait protectionism.

Never before in the annals of humankind has a crime of such sweeping magnitude been committed—and seldom has its perpetration been met with denial so unashamed. Within the very citadels of reason and culture, a proud civilization unleashed catastrophe under the guise of necessity—only to scramble afterward in self-exculpation. It is in this spirit of moral defiance—standing firm against voices of dissent, even from one’s own kin—that The Crime is offered to you. In the trilogy’s third volume, Grelling moves beyond the origins of war into the heart of wartime rationalization, exposing the “war-aims” that enabled aggression to persist under the cloak of purpose. May this work cast a clear light upon the structures of self-deception that allowed the world’s descent, and may it stir an unyielding clarity in us to recognize—and reject—such patterns again.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 261p.

By Ian Mynot and Oksana Ihnatenko

This report summarises the main findings of the first meeting of the Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine

Overview

On 15 November 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security and the Center for Financial Integrity (CFI)1 launched a Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine. An in-person meeting in Warsaw, held on a non-attributable basis, convened 40 representatives, including those from the public and private sectors in Ukraine, and international experts.

The discussion included two sessions focused on the current state of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine and on international experience and recommendations. This report summarises the main findings of each of these sessions.

London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. (RUSI) 2025. 15p.

By Human Rights Watch

Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are inherently discriminatory, denying equality before the law to non-Muslims and facilitating violence against anyone accused of the crime. Blasphemy is an offense officially punishable by death in Pakistan, and while no one has been executed for blasphemy, the laws have long been used to carry out personal vendettas and prosecute members of minority religious communities with grave consequences. A mere accusation of blasphemy can be a death sentence: in the past decade, vigilantes have killed dozens of people in mob violence following blasphemy accusations.

This report focuses on an additional widespread abuse: people making blasphemy accusations often do so for economic motivations, including forced evictions to acquire land that belongs to another. While the targets of blasphemy accusations and the violence fostered by the law belong to all socio-economic and religious groups in Pakistan, most of the victims have been from marginalized groups.

Blasphemy accusations against Christians and Ahmadis in particular have often forced entire communities to flee their homes and neighborhoods. Because many minority communities in Pakistan live in informal, low-income settlements without titles to the land, their forced exodus leaves their property up for easy seizure. Those alleging blasphemy have also benefitted financially by targeting business rivals and businesses owned and run by religious minorities. This exploitation of the blasphemy law, in particular the ease with which anyone can make an accusation as part of a personal dispute or for economic gain, has instilled fear among those at risk.

An entrenched bias in the criminal justice system results in miscarriages of justice against people accused of blasphemy. The authorities almost never hold those who commit violence in the name of blasphemy to account, while those accused under discriminatory and vague laws—generally without evidence—suffer long pretrial detention, lack of due process, and unfair trials that may result in years of imprisonment. In cases of vigilante attacks, police seldom take action to protect those targeted, and those who do may themselves face threats of violence. As a result, perpetrators of mob violence who enjoy the patronage and protection of politicians or religious leaders avoid arrest or are acquitted.

Human Rights Watch calls on the government of Pakistan to repeal the blasphemy law and safely release all those held or imprisoned on blasphemy charges. The authorities should investigate all attacks and threats based on blasphemy accusations, with particular concern for those targeting religious minorities and other marginalized groups and those that result in forced evictions and large-scale forced displacement. The authorities should also institute safeguards to prevent the coerced transfer and sale of properties of those accused following such incidents.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2025. 34p.

By Jeselyn and Danielle Lynn Goh

Transnational crime networks in Cambodia and Indonesia have been responsible for heinous cybercrime, including illegal online gambling and scams. These networks target vulnerable populations and undermine human security. Addressing these challenges requires stronger law enforcement cooperation, regulatory reforms, and coordinated regional and national strategies to dismantle the criminal networks. COMMENTARY In Southeast Asia, transnational crime has long posed a significant challenge. These include illicit drugs, human trafficking, cyber scams, and illegal gambling. Cybercrime has surged in recent decades with technological advancements and increasing global connectivity. In particular, operators of illicit gambling networks have expanded their operations into countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, and the border regions of Myanmar. Many of these centres are not limited to illegal gambling alone – they also function as cyber scam hubs. These scam centres engage in a wide range of online fraudulent activities, including investment scams, romance scams, and phishing operations. The current landscape of organised crime in Southeast Asia thus reflects a convergence of illicit gambling and sophisticated cyber scamming operations, often managed by the same transnational criminal networks. 

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore , 2025. 6p.

By Kelly M. McMann

Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? In Corruption as a Last Resort, Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Edited by France Desmarais

Every day, cultural objects disappear. Stolen from their place of conservation – whether pilfered from a museum or, as is most often the case, ripped out of an archeological site – they embark on the road often travelled by illicit antiquities. A road we are still trying to map with more precision. The desire to better understand that journey, to figure out what the routes are, to know who the culprits could be, and of course to discover where these coveted objects end up, spurred the creation of the first – and only – International Observatory on Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) in December 2012, thanks to a grant from the European Commission. ICOM has, for long, been at the forefront of the fight against illegal trade. The protection of the world’s cultural heritage has featured in the organization’s mission statement since 1947, a year into its creation 70 years ago. Ever since, as the voice of the world museum community, ICOM has played a foremost part in advocating advancement in the protection of cultural heritage practice in general, and in countering illegal trade in particular (UNESCO 1972). From the Code of Ethics for Museums, now referred to as the international deontological standard for museum professionals, to the well-known Red Lists of Cultural Objects at Risk, directly associated with helping law enforcement recognize and seize important quantities of antiquities, the aim has always been to develop innovative practical tools designed to help protect cultural property. In need of figures In 2011, the idea of creating an observatory stemmed from the dire need to obtain more information on the whereabouts of stolen objects and more reliable facts and figures on illicit traffic in art and heritage. It is surprising, to say the least, that illicit traffic in cultural objects should have been officially recognized for decades – if not a century – but that no organization gathered official global statistics to illustrate the extent of the problem. Many numbers are brought forward by different expert organizations to quantify the trade, in mass or in financial value. Some of those numbers are astronomical. Yet, none can be confirmed by official empirical data. While the INTERPOL Expert Group on Stolen Cultural Property concluded, in June 2015, that data gathering and systematic research are of high relevance for combatting the illicit traffic in cultural items, it remains impossible, to this day, to precisely rank illicit traffic in cultural objects so as to measure it to other types of transnational crimes. Although some improvement has been observed in the collection and analysis of the numbers related to theft and seizures, it is unfortunately still impossible to answer questions regarding the number of objects that disappear or are sold illegally each year. In the big data era, and in a moment in time when massive looting has spread to large parts of the world, even as political leaders and the general public seem more than ever concerned about the fate of cultural heritage in danger, this impossibility to quantify seems paradoxical. The reality is that, despite the palpable increase in global awareness concerning the importance of protecting cultural objects, the actual means to support their protection are somewhat lagging behind. If, as a long-standing actor in he global fight against illicit traffic, ICOM wants to keep developing useful tools and proposing appropriate response mechanisms to effectively counter the illegal trade, it needs to know and understand the phenomenon as yet. Identifying the trade routes, the agents involved and the types of objects targeted is the only way to comprehend the significance of the illegal art and antiquities market. This can only be tackled through transdisciplinary research initiatives, such as that initiated with the Observatory project, as relevant organizations are encouraged to do under the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Indeed, Article 17 of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property mentions the possibility for relevant organizations to conduct studies on matters related to the illicit movement of cultural property. Looting and illicit traffic represent one of the global challenges yet to be faced, for which a research and data gathering body such as the International Observatory in Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods is needed. What we do know for a fact is that museums are particularly concerned by theft in art and heritage, as primary places of conservation from which objects can be stolen, but also as collecting institutions that could, unwillingly, end up buying looted cultural property. Indeed, objects are not only stolen from museums, but they can also land, with the help of sometimes ill-informed accomplices, in the hands of private collectors. Later, through a donation for example, they might find themselves in museums. It is specifically because stolen art and antiquities risk falling into museum collections that it is the duty of the world museum community to come together and counter illicit traffic in art and heritage. The inaugural gesture is to apply strict ethical practice concerning provenance of acquisitions. But it does not suffice. It must be supported by strong national programmes

Paris: ICOM International Observatory on Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods , 2015. 215p.

By Cruz, J. M., Coombes, A., Mizrahi, Y., Vorobyeva, Y., Tanyu, M., Campie, P., Sánchez, J., & Hill, C

Can a gang member in Honduras leave the gang, abandon criminal activities, and rehabilitate? What factors facilitate the process of disengagement from gangs in Honduras? To answer these questions, the American Institutes for Research (AIR), the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University (LACC-FIU), and Democracy International (DI) conducted a study with Honduran gang members and former gang members across the country. The study is based on a survey with a sample of 1,021 respondents with a record of gang membership and 38 indepth interviews with former gang members and other community members. Active gang members do disengage from the gang and its activities, but this disengagement depends on a myriad of factors, including the types of social relationships which the individual establishes outside the gang, the type of gang organization, and the availability of faith-based programs willing to reach out to the individual. This study, funded through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Latin America and Caribbean Youth Violence Prevention project, builds on previous academic scholarship on gangs in Honduras and Central America. We conducted the survey interviews in three adult penitentiaries, three juvenile detention centers, two juvenile parole programs, and several faith-based centers which work with former gang members in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. We complemented the information with semistructured interviews with 14 former gang members in the metropolitan areas of San Pedro and La Ceiba. We also interviewed 24 subject-matter experts and community members in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and La Ceiba. We contracted a local firm, ANED, to conduct the survey interviews and trained a local team of interviewers, who collected the information under our direct supervision. For the in-depth interviews, we contracted and trained two local specialists. Data collection was conducted between October and December 2019. PRIMARY RESULTS The results indicate that gangs remain a predominantly male phenomenon, and the average age at which males join a gang is 15. Interviewed females joined the gang at an average age of 13.2. Nearly 46 percent of the subjects interviewed for this study are active members of a gang, while the rest are in different stages of gang membership. Approximately 54 percent of the subjects interviewed in the survey belong—or have belonged—to Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), while 35 percent expressed their loyalty to the 18th Street Gang, also known as Pandilla 18 (or 18th Street Gang). The rest of the interviewees indicated membership in smaller gang groups: Los Chirizos, El Combo que no se deja, Los Olanchanos, Los Vatos Locos, etc. Education The average number of years that individuals with a record of gang membership spent in school was 9.6 years, and 90 percent of our respondents never finished high school. Half of the respondents have a household income of less than 250 USD, and 84 percent did not have a regular job, either in the formal or informal sector, even before going to prison. One in every four gang members lived with their parents or step-parents, while 31 percent lived with other relatives or alone. Furthermore, 56 percent of gang members had children of their own, and 45 percent were married or in a stable relationship. Gang Activities Violence and criminal activities are essential components of gang life. Extortion, murder, and drug trafficking are the most common crimes of which gang members are accused. Nearly 69 percent of the respondents were accused of committing these types of crimes in addition to assaults, robberies, and illicit association. In Honduras, both gangs control territories through the use of extortion, drug trafficking, and violence. Such activities, in combination with seniority as an active gang member, are critical components for ascending the gang structure ranks. Contrary to the common assumption that gang members had to complete a “mission” to join the gang, evidence collected by the study suggests that most of them did not have to go through rites of initiation or perform a mission. Rather, “missions” become an important mechanism by which to ascend the gang ranks once the individual has joined the gang. Gang Structure Over the past two decades, the structures of MS-13 and Barrio 18 seem to have evolved and “mutated.” Gangs appear to be more structured and mandated by a system of unwritten norms and rules common to each organization and shared by the diverse subgroups who share the same gang affiliation. Gangs preserve a regionally fragmented structure (sectors and cliques) which enables them to operate with certain autonomy while adhering to the rules established by membership. The structure of both MS-13 and Barrio 18 include different levels of management, which typically start with the clique as its lowest operational level (i.e., at the neighborhood level). Cliques are the basic gang unit and are composed of several members. On average, cliques are composed of 36 male members, but they vary by size. However, cliques from other gangs (Los Chirizos, El Combo que no se deja, etc.) tend to be larger on average, with 45.8 male members per clique. Cliques are clustered in regional groups called sectores (sectors). Both cliques and sectores are run by a senior member of the gang. Senior members of the MS-13 gang are known as Compas and Palabreros, and Barrio 18 leaders are known as Toros and Homies. Half of the survey respondents (49 percent) held what can be considered a soldier position within the structure of the gang, 17 percent held some position of leadership, and 25 percent were aspiring members of the gang who served as collaborators or informants. Gang leaders do not consider collaborators or informants to be official members of the gang, yet they participate in core activities and play a significant role in the dynamics of gang survival and operation. Joining the Gang From the standpoint of former and active gang members, most (63 percent) joined the gang because of the “pull forces” which peers in the gang exert over them in their teenage years. Gang involvement revolves around the opportunity of disenfranchised teens to join a group which provides them with affection and care, which many do not find at home. Thus, gang members value the “solidarity,” “social respect,” and resources the gang provides, which otherwise would be absent if they were not part of the organization. Evidence suggests that several gang members grew up in environments in which problematic families, lack of opportunities, and lack of respect and affection from their communities were common. Gang recruiters appeal to youth by promising to supply such needs to grow and exert stronger control inside their territories. Thus, findings suggest that most people end up joining gangs in Honduras for “innocent” reasons rather than because of criminal intent. Gang Disengagement The findings of this study suggest that many members do in fact disengage from gangs, but they go through a process in which the interaction of several conditions determines how soon or how complicated the separation could be. More than half of active gang members want to leave the gang. There are four significant predictors of active gang members’ intentions to leave a gang: the type of organization to which the person belongs, the number of years that the person has been active in the gang, the individual’s religious affiliation, and the person’s immediate social circle. Members of the two major gangs expressed less intention of leaving the gang compared to members of the smaller gangs. Active members of MS-13 demonstrated fewer intentions of leaving the gang compared to their rivals in Barrio 18. Additionally, there is a U-shaped curve relationship between the number of years in the gang and intentions to leave. During the first years of gang membership, intentions to leave are stronger; then they subside for a while and start growing again after six years of being in the gang. This pattern suggests that the early months and years of gang life are probably full of doubts about membership. These doubts are later quenched by gratifying experiences as a gang member and then re-emerge as the individual matures. This finding is significantly different from that in Cruz and colleagues’ 2018 study in El Salvador, in which researchers found that intentions to leave the gang are low during the first years of gang membership and then grow as time passes. Religion plays an important role in the process of leaving the gang, although comparatively, this role seems less prevalent than in El Salvador. Belonging to an evangelical church not only contributes to one’s intention to disengage from the gang but also is approved by leaders of the gang (more specifically, MS-13). Further, evangelical churches seem to be more successful than other denominations in connecting with the spiritual needs of the gang population. In the in-depth interviews, half of the respondents referred to a connection to God as the most powerful change mechanism which enabled gang members to disengage from the gang. Survey data also reveal that one of the most important factors in an individual’s intention to leave a gang is social interaction. Gang members who spent the most time with non-gang individuals (their family, non-gang friends, or even alone) before they were detained in prison were more prone to thoughts about leaving the gang. Thus, one’s social circle has a significant influence on the intent to disengage. Gang members who are exposed to social groups different from the gang appear to be more willing to abandon gang life. Reintegration The process of leaving a gang doesn’t end there. Rather, being a defector is the beginning of a series of challenges and obstacles which a former gang member has to face. The most common reintegration challenges by a former gang member include lack of opportunities, insecurity, police abuse, social discrimination, poverty, and lack of family support. Most study participants (69.2 percent) said that church or faith-based organizations are the appropriate institutions to lead rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Otherwise, 14.6 percent of respondents said that nongovernmental organizations should lead rehabilitation programs. Few people interviewed saw government agencies leading rehabilitation efforts, and experts interviewed thought there was little to no political will to approach the gang phenomenon from a rehabilitation standpoint. RECOMMENDATIONS Our research indicates that violence prevention efforts should target the root causes of joining a gang, which are mostly related to absence of positive youth development opportunities in their communities, including lack of employment, insufficient access to education, weak family structures, and negative peer influences. We recommend that programming focus on providing relational, educational, community, and economic supports to young people from an early age to both prevent youth from joining gangs, as well as to support those who have disengaged. Prevention strategies should include efforts to support disengagement from the gangs during the first years of gang membership, when many youth are considering disengagement. Finally, once gang members disengage from gangs, we recommend supporting rehabilitation and reintegration of former gang members to help them become productive members of society and prevent their reinsertion into gang activity.

Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research & Florida International University. 2020. 91p.

By De Souza Oliveira, Elenice De Souza; Natarajan, Mangai; and da Silva, Bráulio

Abstract This study examines the spatial patterns and other situational determinants leading to the high number of bus robberies in Belo Horizonte. Main research questions include patterns of robberies, spatial concentration, locations prone to robberies, and environmental characteristics therein. This study also provides a variety of safety measures based on the Situational Crime Prevention approach. The Rapid Assessment Methodology (RAM) was employed using both quantitative and qualitative data. It involves spatial analysis, direct observation of hot spots using a safety audit protocol, and focus group discussions with key participants. Bus robberies involve minimum risk and low detection and arrest. The “hottest products” to be stolen include electronic devices and cash. The robberies occur at specific times and locations depending on opportunity. As many crimes go unreported, police data have inaccuracies. Therefore, it is impossible to verify the exact location of the robberies. This study concludes that for safe travel preventive measure should focus on reducing crime opportunities. A collaborative effort is needed from agencies and individuals alike. Further research should focus on examining why the majority of bus robberies are concentrated in only two main bus routes. Are these hot spots just recent spikes or are they chronic?

Crime & Delinquency 1–25 © The Author(s) 2019, 26p.

By Elenice De Souza Oliveira , Braulio Figueiredo Alves da Silva , Flavio Luiz Sapori & Gabriela Gomes Cardoso

Many studies demonstrate that homicides are heavily concentrated in impoverished neighborhoods, but not all socially disadvantaged neighborhoods are hotbeds of violence. Conducted in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, this study hypothesizes that the association between high rates of homicide and impoverished areas is influenced by the emergence of a specific type of street drug-dealing common to favelas (slums). The study applies econometric techniques to police data on homicides and drug arrests from 2008 to 2011, as well as 2010 Census data, to test its hypothesis. The findings provide insight into the development of crime prevention policies in areas of high social vulnerability.

International Journal of Law and Public Administration Vol. 3, No. 2; December 2020

By Gabriel Brollo Fortes, Patricia Faraldo Cabana

The collateral consequences of the non-payment of fines have merited much attention in jurisdictions such as the USA or Australia, yet they are relatively unexplored in countries of the Global South. In this article, we analyse Brazil as a case study. Although Brazil has the third largest prison population in the world, its criminal justice system has received little attention. We intend to fill this gap by addressing the legal framework and practices surrounding the non-payment of fines in a country whose draconian policies cause social exclusion and impede rehabilitation.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, 64, 129–144, 2025.

By Ernesto Schargrodsky and Lucía Freira

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between inequality and crime, with a focus on the Latin America and Caribbean region. We find a significant, positive, and robust association between these variables.

The results persist if one instruments for inequality with historical variables in crime regressions, suggesting that a causal interpretation of the estimated effect is reasonable. Moreover, inequality is the only variable showing this robust regularity. Education levels, economic activity, income per capita, and poverty show weaker and unstable relationships with crime. The analysis of the distribution of crime victimization indicates that men and youth suffer more crime than women and the elderly. By socio-economic strata, high-income groups suffer more victimization relative to poorer groups in LAC countries, but the poor suffer more homicides.

UNDP LAC Working Paper 13.

Panama City, Panama: United Nations Development Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean , 2021. 48p.

Edited by Thiago Pierobom de Ávila, Aline Yamamoto, Cristina Elsner de Faria, Jude McCulloch, Kerry Carrington

This collection of articles is the fruit of a joint project implemented between Brazilian and Australian researchers and professionals committed to the work of gender and family violence prevention and response. With the support of the Australian Embassy in Brazil and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women Brazil Country Office, an innovative project was designed to support research exchange and strenghten academic collaboration, as well as foster a collaborative network of experts and professsionals, with the aim to enhance debate on gender and family violence prevention and extract lessons from both countries’ policy experiences. The Brazil-Australia Partnership on Preventing Domestic and Gender-based Violence project included several institutions. Amongst those institutions, it is important to highlight the role played by the Gender Equality Cabinet of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Federal District (MPDFT), along with the Monash Gender and Family Violence Prevention Centre and the School of Justice of Queensland University of Technology in Australia, in the organization of international conferences and the coordination of this collection. This initiative also had the active participation of the São Paulo Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPSP), the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), the Research Group on Criminal Policies of the Law Faculty at the University Center of Brasilia (UniCEUB), the Superior School of the Public Prosecutor of the Union (ESMPU), the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Center for Studies and Research on Women at the University of Brasilia (UnB) and the Gender Observatory of the Brazilian Senate. From the Australian side, the project was financially supported by the Council on Australia Latin America Relations (COALAR), and additionally to the institutions previously mentioned, it also had the participation of Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety (ANROWS) and RMIT University. In June 2019, as part of the Project’s planning, a delegation of Australian professionals from governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations, academic and justice sectors came to Brazil (Brasilia and São Paulo) to explore the Brazilian policy framework and analyse program cases. Following it, in December 2019, a delegation of Brazilian experts went to Australia (Brisbane and Melbourne) to participate in expert workshops and conferences, as well as visit Australian successful programs for violence prevention. As a result, the project allowed an in-depth policy dialogue and advanced debates related to measuring the costs of domestic violence, as well as its impact on the economic growth. It also created opportunties to share good practices in gender equality policies, particularly primary prevention approaches, and to promote an integrated approach across the justice, public security and public health systems. The aim is to establish collaborative arrangements between both countries, contributing to policy development on gender and family violence prevention in Brazil and Australia.

Brasilia 2021 Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios, Brazil. 2021. 203p.

By Lyla Latif

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) cost Africa around US$88.6 billion per year. They have hamstrung progress and created poverty, insecurity and financial challenges which today impede implementing the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development and the AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. IFFs have also driven the African continent towards indebtedness, in addition to eroding funds that could be used for services such as education, health care and infrastructure.

This study focuses on one form of IFF, namely corruption and the resultant money laundering. It describes and analyzes the symbiotic relationship between corruption and money laundering and how they mutually reinforce an IFF ecosystem inclined towards draining resources needed for development. It further proposes measures to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption and money laundering.

This study is produced by the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) within its mandate to support analytical work in improving coherence and coordination of the UN System support to Africa and to facilitate intergovernmental deliberations on Africa\

United Nations, 2022. 46p.

By Dan Ngabirano

illicit financial flows pose a critical challenge to African countries, as IFFs deny countries the opportunity to generate the revenues required for them to meet their expenditure needs and to fund long-term development plans. UNCTAD has put the magnitude of IFFs in Africa at an average of $88.6 billion per year, which represents about 3.7% of the continent’s total Gross Domestic Product. Curbing IFFs can reduce the region’s financing gap by 33%. IFFs drain foreign exchange reserves, affect asset prices, distort competition, and undermine the capacity of countries to maintain economic and financial stability. Consequently, African countries are constrained in meeting commitments made under various regional and international frameworks, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063.

This report is focused on IFFs linked to aggressive tax planning and other illegal commercial practices in the context of Africa. Commercial practices constitute the largest source of IFFs from Africa (65%), followed by crime (30%) and corruption (5%). The report provides a broad overview of the scale and distribution of IFFs in Africa; discusses different forms of IFFs that arise from tax and illegal commercial practices; and reviews current initiatives for combating tax and commercial-related IFFs in Africa. The report provides the conclusion and policy recommendations for combating tax and commercial IFFs in Africa.

United Nations, Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2022. 42p.