By Diorella Islas

This thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of the transnational behaviour of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) by documenting the role that Mexican DTOs had in the cocaine trafficking to Europe after 2008. This was the year when the Italian authorities announced their discoveries that there were business interaction between the Mexican DTOs and the Italian mafia groups. At the same time the Italian authorities were announcing their findings, my literature review showed a lack of analysis and documentation regarding the transnationalization of Mexican DTOs to Europe. While most of the literature focuses on the explanation of the cartels inside Mexico, my research question focused on clarifying whether or not the Mexican DTOs are expanding their cocaine trafficking activities to Europe. At this point I considered the reports of the Italian authorities that affirm that the Mexican DTOs are relevant drug trafficking intermediaries in the cocaine trafficking routes to Europe. To answer my research question, and to systematically describe the evolution of DTOs, a qualitative methods approach was deployed (Mohajan, 2018) with a case study design adapted from Yin (2003). My analysis was carried out through the use of multiple triangulation techniques that helped me to collect and study different types of data to understand the subject. I collected empirical information through 28 interviews with security personnel with experience in countering Mexican DTOs or in the cocaine routes to Europe. The information gathered from the security personnel, complemented by official reports and open source information, was useful to answer my research question and test my hypothesis. The analysis showed that despite Italian authorities’ claims and perceptions, the power of the Mexican cartels is very limited when talking about their presence and links in Europe, and resulted in four key findings. Firstly, that the perception of the Mexican DTOs as having trans-Atlantic powers is erroneous, because the evidence showed that there is no transatlantic expansion. Secondly, the analysis uncovered the internal, national and international variables that were observed to alter the evolution and behaviour of the Mexican DTOs. At the internal level, the variables included the loss of leadership and the grievances between groups. At the national level the identified variables were the democratic transitions, corruption and impunity networks. And at the international level the variables were the international drug demand, the changes in the international illicit world, the situation of governance and corruption in foreign countries and the geography of theregion where the illicit business are taking place. The third finding was that the transatlantic cocaine trafficking routes are not controlled by an specific actor, but they are horizontal structures that are highly adaptative. The final key finding refers to a methodological observation which I describe as the “paradox of referencing”; when many sources reference something that was true in the past –like the links between Mexican DTOs and Italian mafia discovered in 2008– they help to perpetuate the present perception of a past phenomenon.

By James Lewis, Sarah Marsden, James Hewitt, Chloe Squires, Anna Stefaniak

Reliability and Validity of Risk Assessment Tools for Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review

By Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Ghayda Hassan, Wynnpaul Varela, Emmanuel Danis, Sarah Ousman, Pablo Madriaza, Inga Lisa Pauls, Deniz Kilinc, David Pickup, Robert Pelzer, Eugene Borokhovski, the CPN-PREV team

Assessment of the risk of engaging in a violent radicalization/extremism trajectory has evolved quickly in the last 10 years. Guided by what has been achieved in psychology and criminology, scholars from the field of preventing violent extremism (PVE) have tried to import key lessons from violence risk assessment and management, while bearing in mind the idiosyncrasies of their particular field. However, risk tools that have been developed in the PVE space are relatively recent, and questions remain as to their level of psychometric validation. Namely, do these tools consistently and accurately assess risk of violent extremist acting out? To answer this question, we systematically reviewed evidence on the reliability and validity of violent extremism risk tools. The main objective of this review was to gather, critically appraise, and synthesize evidence regarding the appropriateness and utility of such tools, as validated with specific populations and contexts. Searches covered studies published up to December 31, 2021. They were performed in English and German across 17 databases, 45 repositories, Google, other literature reviews on violent extremism risk assessment, and references of included studies. Studies in all languages were eligible for inclusion in the review. We included studies with primary data resulting from the quantitative examination of the reliability and validity of tools used to assess the risk of violent extremism. Only tools usable by practitioners and intended to assess an individual's risk were eligible. We did not impose any restrictions on study design, type, method, or population. We followed standard methodological procedures outlined by the Campbell Collaboration for data extraction and analysis. Risk of bias was assessed using a modified version of the COSMIN checklist, and data were synthesized through meta-analysis when possible. Otherwise, narrative synthesis was used to aggregate the results. Among the 10,859 records found, 19 manuscripts comprising 20 eligible studies were included in the review. These studies focused on the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), the Extremism Risk Guidance Factors (ERG22+), the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG-V2), the Identifying Vulnerable People guidance (IVP guidance), and the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)—all structured professional judgment tools—as well as Der Screener—Islamismus, an actuarial scale. Studies mostly involved adult male participants susceptible to violent extremism (N = 1106; M = 58.21; SD = 55.14). The types of extremist ideologies endorsed by participants varied, and the same was true for ethnicity and country/continent of provenance. Encouraging results were found concerning the inter-rater agreement of scales in research contexts (kappas between 0.76 and 0.93), but one of the two studies that examined it in a field setting obtained disappointing results (kappas ranging between of 0.47 and 0.80). Content validity studies indicated that PVE risk tools adequately cover the risk factors and offending processes of individuals who go on to commit extremist violence. Construct validity analyses were few and far between, with results indicating that empirical divisions of scales did not match their conceptual divisions. The internal consistency of subscales was lackluster (Cronbach's alphas between 0.19 and 0.85), whereas full scales demonstrated acceptable internal consistency when assessed (0.80 for the ERG22+ and 0.64 for the IVP guidance). Only one study examined convergent validity, and it revealed a lack of convergence, primarily due to particularities of the scale under study (the MLG-V2). Discriminant validity analyses were exploratory in nature, but suggested that PVE risk tools might not be ideology-specific and may apply to both group and lone actors. Finally, although the TRAP-18 showed a relatively strong postdictive effect size (pooled r = 0.62 [0.35–0.77], p = 0.000), the results were highly heterogeneous (I2 = 86%), and all studies used retrospective designs, meaning the outcome was already known at the time of assessment. As such, no included study evaluated true predictive validity (i.e., the ability to forecast future violent extremist outcomes based on prospective risk assessment). This represents a significant evidence gap. Threats to validity were substantial: (a) Many studies were case studies or had very small samples, (b) nearly all samples were constituted through the triangulation of publicly available data, and (c) convenience outcome measures were often used. Although having imperfect data is better than having no data, the current state of empirical validation precludes the recommendation of one tool over another for specific populations and contexts, and calls for higher-quality validation studies for PVE risk assessment tools. Nevertheless, these tools constitute useful checklists of relevant risk and protective factors that could be taken into account by evaluators who wish to assess the risk of violent extremism and identify intervention targets.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume21, Issue4

December 2025, 2025.

By : Lienke Hutten, Lars Merkus, Joeri Vig

To effectively counter organised crime and high-risk criminal networks, criminal law alone often
falls short. Across the European Union, the administrative approach is increasingly recognised as
a crucial strategy to disrupt the infiltration of criminal networks in the legal economy. This study
maps both the legislative framework and practical initiatives that support the administrative approach
on organised crime drawing on contributions from six member states: Sweden, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Spain, Bulgaria, and Italy. This study maps both the legislative framework and
practical initiatives that support administrative interventions. A structured template was used to
collect country-specific information on relevant laws, the policy framework, and national and local
initiatives. In addition, EU-level strategies and directives were reviewed to assess the broader
policy context and identify shared priorities.

Findings reveal considerable diversity in the design of the legislative frameworks and initiatives.
Countries such as Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands have developed robust and proactive
frameworks, blending preventive and repressive instruments with administrative possibilities
on the local level. Others, like Sweden, demonstrate how general administrative laws can be
creatively adapted to serve crime prevention goals. Spain and Bulgaria show more centrally arranged
administrative bodies and sector-driven efforts. These differences make it apparent that
there is no one-size-fits-all model for the administrative approach. Gaining insight into the diverse
legal and institutional frameworks across countries enables mutual learning and the identification
of promising initiatives for all member states.

Legislation and initiatives at the European level such as AML directives, procurement rules and
asset recovery reforms can serve as important enablers, though their impact heavily depends
on coordinated implementation. Overall, the administrative approach is gaining attention as an
essential component of internal security, offering flexible and preventive tools with local possibilities
to reduce the infiltration and influence of high-risk criminal networks.

By Lisa N. Sacco, Joanna R. Lampe, Hassan Z. Sheikh

Marijuana is a psychoactive drug that generally consists of leaves and flowers of the cannabis sativa plant. It is a Schedule I controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA; 21 U.S.C. §§801 et seq.), and thus is strictly regulated by federal authorities. In contrast, over the last several decades, most states and territories have deviated from a comprehensive prohibition of marijuana and have laws and policies allowing for some cultivation, sale, distribution, and possession of marijuana.

Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. According to data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), in 2024 an estimated 64.2 million individuals aged 12 or older used marijuana in the past year, and 44.3 million reported using it in the past month. The percentage of individuals 12 or older who reported past-month marijuana use gradually increased from 6.1% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024—a time frame during which a majority of states repealed state criminal prohibitions on marijuana and allowed for its recreational and/or medical use. The rate of past-month marijuana use among youth (ages 12-17) was 6.0% in 2024 and since 2008 has fluctuated from a low of 6.0% (in 2023 and 2024) to a high of 7.9% (in 2011), while adult (ages 18+) use steadily increased—from 6.3% in 2008 to 16.3% in 2024.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service; March 10, 2026.

By Valerie Wirtschafter

Over the past three decades, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has transformed from a prison gang founded in São Paulo into a transnational criminal “leviathan,” with a presence throughout South America, Africa, and Europe. In response to this growing threat, in 2021 the U.S. government cited the PCC as “the most powerful organized crime group in Brazil and among the most powerful in the world.” What can we expect from the PCC moving forward? And how might policymakers stall this international expansion?In the coming year, the PCC will likely continue to vie for dominance in strategic areas of contested control throughout Brazil and look for opportunities to consolidate gains abroad. Confrontation with rival groups, including the Comando Vermelho (CV), born in the Rio de Janeiro prisons, and its allies in areas such as the Amazon, is also likely to continue. This is particularly the case due to the region’s importance for drug smuggling

By David Spencer

A new report from Policy Exchange demonstrates how London is in the grip of a street crime epidemic and makes seventeen recommendations to show how the Metropolitan Police, City Hall and the Government can turn the tide.  

The report shows that:

• Knife crime in London increased by 58.5% in only three years between 2021 and 2024;

• Only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 “theft person” crimes in the capital were solved last year.

• 60% of the knife crimes committed in the capital were robberies – with over 81,000 mobile phones stolen in robberies and thefts last year.

• In 2024 one small geographic area of around 20 streets in London’s West End near Oxford Circus and Regent Street had more knife crime than nearly 15% of the rest capital combined; in 2023 these streets had more knife crime than 23% of the capital combined.

 The report identifies the top 20 neighbourhoods (technically known as Lower Layer Super Output Areas or LSOAs of about 15-20 streets each) in London which had the highest levels of knife crime in 2024. One in 15 of every knife crime offence in the capital in 2024 occurred in one of these 20 neighbourhoods (908 knife crimes). In 2024 only 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of all knife crime offences in the capital (3,615 knife crimes) and 15% of neighbourhoods accounted for half of all knife crime offences (7055 knife crimes).

The report identifies that within the Metropolitan Police there are least 850 police officers currently in non-frontline posts which could be redeployed to the policing frontline to tackle knife crime, robbery and theft in the areas where criminals are most prolific. This includes police officers currently posted to the following departments: Transformation (142 officers), Human Resources (24 officers), Culture, Diversity and Inclusion (20 officers) and Digital, Data & Technology (34 officers).  

Policy Exchange rejects the suggestion that stop and search is being deployed in a “racist” way. While only 39.5% of those stopped and searched by the police are black, 43.6% of those charged with murder are black, 45.6% of non-domestic knife-crime murder victims are black and 48.6% of robbery suspects are black. 13.5% of London’s population are black. Policy Exchange asserts that it is not “racist” when the police are merely responding to the demographic breakdown of serious and violent offending in the capital.  

Policy Exchange analysis shows that the courts are taking a dangerously lax approach to the most prolific criminals. Despite already having 46 or more previous convictions, “Hyper-Prolific Offenders” are sent to prison on less than half of all occasions (44.5%) on conviction for a further indictable or either-way offence – 4,555 such criminals walked free from court in 2024. For “Super-Prolific Offenders” (those with 26 to 45 previous offences) this falls to 42.1% with 9,483 such criminals walking free from court in 2024. Despite there being mandatory sentencing provisions for repeat knife-carriers to be sent to prison over a third are not sentenced to a term of immediate custody

By D.J. Summers

in the past five years, Colorado’s largest cities have had very different experiences of crime.

Colorado’s violent and property crime rates rose sharply in the early 2020s, prompting varying responses from leaders at state and local levels. Some have been more successful than others, according to the most recently available Colorado Bureau of Investigation data.

CSI analyzed the violent and property crime trends of Colorado’s ten largest cities: Denver, Colorado Springs, Aurora, Fort Collins, Lakewood, Thornton, Arvada, Westminster, Pueblo, and Centennial. These ten cities represent just under half the state’s total population, with a combined population of roughly 2.3 million residents. CSI analyzed the average violent and property crime rates per 100,000 people through the first two quarters of each year between 2016 and 2025. Pueblo’s police data is not current and could not be included in the analysis.

Property and violent crime cost the state $27 billion in economic losses in 2022 between the tangible and intangible effects of reported and unreported crime. It is imperative that public leaders continually examine and understand which policies best address crime rates.

Key Findings

Denver’s violent crime rate is the highest among Colorado’s largest cities, with 235 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

 Aurora’s is second highest, with 203 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

Aurora’s violent crime has remained beneath Denver’s for three years, breaking the trend of the late 2010s and early 2020s in which Aurora’s rates were higher.

Only Colorado Springs saw an increase in the violent crime rate between 2022 and 2025.

Among the largest cities, Aurora saw the sharpest decrease in violent crime rate.

Aurora saw the second highest decrease in violent crime rate, with a 36% decrease.

Denver has the highest property crime rate of Colorado’s largest cities, with 1,122 property crimes per 100,000 people.

Lakewood has the second highest rate, with 1,099 per 100,000 people.

Aurora and Centennial had the sharpest decreases in property crime rate since 2021, at 56%, 49%, and 44%, respectively. 

By Hsiang-Chin Hsu & Tzu-Ching Sung 

This study investigates the impact of a service-learning activity on the personal and professional development of 28 international medical students at I-Shou University, focusing on their participation in a service-learning project at a juvenile correctional school in Taiwan. Through the collection and thematic analysis of written reflections, four key themes were identified: cultural competence, empathy development, medical professionalism, and personal and professional growth. The service-learning experience significantly enhanced students’ cultural competence by exposing them to cross-cultural challenges, deepening their understanding of the social determinants of health, and reinforcing the importance of communication skills in overcoming language and cultural barriers. This is particularly relevant in diverse healthcare settings where effective communication is essential for patient-centered care. A notable outcome of the activity was the development of empathy, as students reflected on the emotional needs of the juveniles they encountered, highlighting the critical role of non-judgmental, compassionate care in healthcare practice. Furthermore, the experience fostered medical professionalism by confronting students with ethical dilemmas, such as equitable access to healthcare for marginalized populations, thus emphasizing the responsibility of future physicians to advocate for social justice and address healthcare disparities. Personal and professional growth emerged as another significant outcome, with students reporting increased self-awareness and emotional intelligence. The service-learning activity challenged their preconceived notions about marginalized populations, enabling them to recognize and mitigate personal biases, ultimately contributing to more compassionate and ethical patient care. Overall, the study underscores the transformative role of service-learning in medical education, fostering cultural competence, empathy, ethical awareness, and social responsibility—qualities essential for preparing socially responsible physicians to navigate healthcare. These findings collectively bridge theory and practice, illustrating how transformative learning and professional identity formation manifest through experiential service-learning. Accordingly, this study emphasizes integrating service-learning into medical education curricula to bridge theory and practice and equip students for ethical, cultural, and professional challenges. Future research should explore its long-term impact on professional development and broader curricular integration.

By The Alliance for Youth Justice

The briefing, funded by the Barrow Cadbury Trust, examines what happens as exploited children turn 18, exploring how responses across safeguarding and criminal justice fail to keep pace with ongoing risk and harm. It sets out principles and practical steps to ensure protection continues into young adulthood and to prevent the unjust criminalisation of victims.

While awareness of CCE has grown, responses for children remain inconsistent and are too often led by punishment. At 18, those weaknesses are magnified. Support frequently falls away, thresholds for help rise, and young adults are more likely to be treated as perpetrators than recognised as victims. As parliament considers the Crime and Policing Bill’s new offence of child criminal exploitation (CCE), there is a critical opportunity to improve the response for victims – but a growing risk that exploited young adults will be prosecuted as perpetrators.

The briefing is informed by an evidence review and consultation with professionals, legal practitioners, academics, civil servants, and sector experts and identifies several urgent issues:

By Joshua Rovner

Youth arrests and incarceration increased dramatically in the closing decades of the 20th century but have fallen sharply since. Public opinion often wrongly assumes that crime (and incarceration) is perpetually increasing. In fact, the 21st century has seen significant declines in both youth arrests and incarceration. Despite positive movement on important indicators, far too many youth—disproportionately youth of color—are incarcerated. Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2023, the number of youth held in juvenile justice facilities, adult prisons, and adult jails fell from 120,200 to 31,800—a 74% decline.

By Tobias Auer and Tom Kirchmaier

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.

By Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Marilyn Ibarra-Caton

Background

Mexico rolled out state-led criminal justice reforms between 2000 and 2017 to modernize procedures and improve rule of law. Whether these changes reduced violent crime—especially in cartel-affected areas—remains uncertain.

Aims

Estimate the impact of reform implementation on homicides and arrests, and assess mechanisms related to enforcement capacity and public cooperation with law enforcement.

Materials & Methods

We build a municipality–year panel (2000–2017) from death certificates (homicides) and administrative records (arrests). Because states adopted reforms at different times, we use difference-in-differences estimators designed for staggered adoption and heterogeneous treatment effects, with rich fixed effects and controls. To probe mechanisms, we analyze nationally representative survey measures of crime reporting, institutional trust, and perceived police/prosecutorial integrity.

Results

Reform implementation is associated with a ~25% increase in homicide rates. Over the same horizon, arrest rates fall by >50%. As homicides are less prone to underreporting than other crimes, the homicide increase is unlikely to be a reporting artifact. Survey evidence shows reduced crime reporting, declining trust in institutions, and more negative views of police and prosecutors; effects are strongest in cartel-affected regions.

Discussion

The pattern is consistent with an erosion of effective enforcement capacity at rollout: fewer arrests and lower public cooperation raise expected returns to violent crime. In high-violence settings, reforms that change procedures without parallel boosts to investigative and prosecutorial capacity—and without safeguards for witnesses—can weaken deterrence.

Conclusion

Mexico’s staggered judicial reforms coincided with higher homicides and sharply lower arrests. Successful reform in violent contexts likely requires coordinated institutional strengthening (policing, prosecution, witness protection), phased implementation with measurable benchmarks, and strategies to sustain public trust and reporting.

By Alagie Jinkang

Italy’s illegal commercialised sex industry is estimated to be worth 90 million Euro and involves up to 9 million clients annually. The industry depends on migrants from Nigeria, Romania and Albania, many of whom are victims of human trafficking, abuse, exploitation, oppression, extreme educational and economic poverty, and non-integration in Italy. But despite legal and policy interventions, sexual exploitation of migrants is highly tolerated, goes largely unpunished and is increasingly threatening to migrant women's wellbeing throughout the peninsula, as in the case of migrant women from Nigeria. This brief focuses on the NigerianItalian HTSE for two main reasons: (a) Italy’s proximity to the central Mediterranean route serving as key irregular route for migrant smugglers and human traffickers; (b) Italy’s dysfunctional and emergencial asylum systems coupled with its insufficient, untimely and inefficient policy intervention on migrants' sexual exploitation, and; (c) perceptions and misinformation about Europe as source of economic and social opportunities and prestige, which all provide a fertile ground for mafia activities and organised crime to flourish. Therefore, coupled with PERCEPTIONS findings, this brief draws political attention to the intersections between irregular migration and asylum, mafia activities and organised crime, targeted deception and misinformation, abject poverty and traditional practices within the discourse of NigerianItalian HTSE.

By The International Organization for Migration

This report, Climate Chains: Mapping the Relationship between Climate, Trafficking in Persons and Building Resilience in the Philippines, explores the complex links between climate change, livelihood, vulnerability, migration and human trafficking in the Philippines. Commissioned by IOM under the Climate Resilience Against Trafficking and Exploitation (CREATE) project, this study forms part of a broader research focusing on Ethiopia and the Philippines – two countries facing distinct climate challenges: slow-onset droughts and sudden-onset typhoons, respectively.  

The research used a mixed-methods approach including household surveys, interviews and focus group discussions. The report puts forward a conceptual model that links climate events and trafficking through a series of intertwined steps. It identifies a causal chain where climate events disrupt livelihood, increase vulnerability and heighten migration intentions, which can lead to exploitation and trafficking. The research explores how factors linking climate and trafficking operate in the Philippines. 

This study provides critical insights and recommendations for policymakers, donors and organizations in the Philippines and internationally that are working to combat human trafficking and exploitation, while strengthening resilience to climate change

By Crest Advisory with RSM UK Consulting

Economic growth is the number one mission of the Government in the UK, seeking to restore stability, increase investment and reform the economy to improve productivity, prosperity, and living standards. This commitment has been made in the context of a sustained period of economic stagnation, throughout which there has been an ongoing conversation as to whether the right levers are being pulled to achieve economic growth. The Office of the Chief Scientific Adviser for the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) commissioned us to understand the role of policing as a lever - our research seeks to collate existing evidence as well as identify where there are opportunities to develop this evidence in the future. This research also falls within the wider discussion on police funding, police productivity and police reform which is particularly relevant given that the Home Office will be looking to find savings ahead of this year’s spending review as an unprotected government department, ongoing debate about the police funding formula and growing financial pressures on police forces. Science and technology has a significant role to play in police efficiency and effectiveness, but also growth. The NPCC’s Science and Technology Strategy sets a clear ambition for policing “to deliver the most science and technology led police service in the world”. Often, our understanding of policing impact is focused on implementation and public safety outcomes, but economic outcomes have the potential to shift the narrative in terms of how we define an effective and efficient police response. Our work, in partnership with RSM UK Consulting, has sought to understand the evidence between policing and economic outcomes, from which we have produced a logic model to understand these relationships (a logic model conceptualises the links between activities and key outcomes). While we have not been able to estimate the scale of impact of UK policing on economic growth, we hope this logic model can act as a framework for partners to use to further develop the evidence base around the impact of policing on economic outcomes, specifically designing evaluations with these outcomes in mind. In time, this evidence may begin to change how we understand the positive impact of policing on individuals, businesses and communities in England and Wales - with the potential for positive economic outcomes influencing future decisions on funding allocations and commitments to specific policing initiatives and operational interventions. Furthermore, growth could sit alongside efficiency and effectiveness as key metrics for success in policing.

London: Crest Advisory, 2025. 69p.

By William Downs

Police disciplinary proceedings are brought in cases where it is agreed, following an investigation, that a police officer has a case to answer for: • misconduct (meaning a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that justifies disciplinary action of at least written), or • gross misconduct (meaning a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that is so serious to justify dismissal) A decision on whether there is a case to answer is based on whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a misconduct panel “could make a finding on the balance of probabilities” that an officer’s behaviour amounted to misconduct or gross misconduct. The Commons Library briefings Police standards: Complaints and Police Standards: Conduct explain in more detail how allegations of police wrongdoing are investigated.

London: UK Parliament. House of commons Library.. 2025. 19p.

By Camilla De Camargo, Fred Cram

The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic required police officers in England and Wales to enforce new public health restrictions (e.g., stay-at-home directives, social distancing requirements and mask mandates), as well as navigate the risk that COVID-19 posed to their own health and safety during interactions with the public. From a practical standpoint, these factors changed the nature of the policing task significantly, with previously routine police decision-making (e.g., whether or not to carry out stops, searches, arrests and/or detentions) necessarily responding not only to traditional concerns around suspicion and evidence but also directly to these novel legal and organisational challenges. Findings from interviews carried out in 2020 and 2022 with 18 police officers from 11 different forces in England and Wales suggest that well-established predictors of arrest decisions (e.g., offence severity, evidence and/or the pursuit of culturally orientated objectives) were disrupted due to broader considerations, uniquely related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This article uses Keith Hawkins’ (2002) conceptual framework of criminal justice decision-making—surround, field and frame—as an explanatory device to help us understand arrest and non-arrest decisions of street-level police officers during this period, despite the existence of sufficient evidence to support such action.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice Volume 64, Issue 3 Sep 2025 Pages 277-417

By Stephen Farrall, Jason Warr, Abigail Shaw, Kanupriya Sharma

This paper reviews what is known about ethnic identity and the processes by which people cease offending. Whilst the past 30 years have seen dramatic growth in what is known about desistance, in many jurisdictions, there is a paucity of research which examines this in terms of ethnicity or ethnic variations. We therefore review what is empirically known about ethnicity and desistance. Whilst this review draws from the global literature, our focus is on what this literature tells us about ethnicity and desistance from a British perspective. We find that the majority of these have been undertaken in the United States (although there are some European and Australasian studies). Few studies, however, have fully unpacked the role of racism (in terms of institutional processes or overt prejudice and hostility) and that there have been very few studies of the roles played by ethnicity in processes of desistance.

The Howard Journal of Crime and JusticeVolume 64, Issue 3Sep 2025

By Jenna Harewell, Elizabeth Dunk Shivi Bains, Emma Howarth, Claire Powell, Lazaros Gonidis

  Background - The domestic abuse core outcome set (DVA-COS) is an agreed set of five outcomes intended for use in evaluations of interventions or services for children and families with experience of domestic violence and abuse (DVA, hereafter referred to as domestic abuse). A COS is a minimum standard for measurement in intervention studies, the purpose of which is to overcome heterogeneity in outcome selection and measurement. The aim of a COS is to maximise the value of a body of evidence by facilitating comparison between and synthesis across studies, thus reducing research wastage. Since the development of the DVA-COS, work has been undertaken to identify, select, and validate outcome measurement instruments (OMIs) to measure the core outcomes. The Warwick– Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (WEMWBS) was previously identified as acceptable by stakeholders to capture two outcomes: child and caregiver emotional health and wellbeing. This work seeks to extend those findings by validating the measure for use with domestic abuse experienced populations. Aims Foundations, the national What Works Centre for Children & Families, commissioned two work packages to develop and integrate previous work to outline and validate OMIs for use to assess outcomes comprising the DVA-COS. Work package 1 seeks to identify three OMIs, and this report focuses on work package 2, which aimed to validate the Short WEMWBS (SWEMWBS) for use with children and young people (aged 11 to 18) who have experienced domestic abuse. The studies that make up this work package used mixed methods to examine the acceptability, content validity, structural validity, internal consistency, and measurement invariance for the scale in children and young people experiencing domestic abuse. We also report a validation study of the WEMWBS for adults with experience of domestic abuse. Methods The above aims were addressed across four individual studies: two planned and two supplementary. First, a qualitative ‘think aloud’ study assessed the acceptability of the SWEMWBS with children and young people who had experienced domestic abuse. The remaining three studies were quantitative analyses of secondary data on using the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS with children and young people and adult samples. • Study A: a qualitative think aloud study that involved interviews and a focus group to gather feedback from children and young people with domestic abuse experience on use of the SWEMWBS. • Study B: examined cross-sectional data collected by the OxWell Student Survey to validate the SWEMWBS with children and young people affected by domestic abuse. • Study C: examined anonymised longitudinal service data to validate the SWEMWBS with children and young people affected by domestic abuse. • Study D: validated the WEMWBS with adults who have experienced domestic abuse using cross-sectional data from the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS). Key findings Our findings demonstrate the validity and acceptability of the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS in domestic abuse-experienced child and adult populations respectively. Study A indicated that the SWEMWBS is broadly acceptable for use with children and young people, while raising important considerations regarding respondents’ interpretation of the measure’s items as well as the emotional impact of the measure on this population. Studies B and C demonstrated robust psychometric validity2 of the SWEMWBS with children and young people affected by domestic abuse, and Study D showed robust psychometric validity of the WEMWBS with adult victims of domestic abuse. These are significant findings given the limited number of measures that have been evaluated for use with this population across practice and research contexts. Moreover, this represents an important step forward in the implementation of the DVA-COS, which we hope will help to unify outcome measurement in domestic abuse research and evaluation, as well as service monitoring. Recommendations We recommend that the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS be used to measure wellbeing in the context of evaluation studies (of any quantitative design) seeking to assess the impact of child-focused domestic abuse interventions. To enhance the acceptability of the measure to children and adults we suggest minor adaptations for use in the domestic abuse context. Finally, we recommend the development of guidelines for practitioners and researchers about how to use the tools in a ‘carefirst’ way and how to guard against the tools being used for screening or triaging, or rationing care, as well as guidance for commissioners on how to interpret and use evidence, generated by the completion of the SWEMWBS and WEMWBS, for the basis of decision making. This guidance needs to reflect the balance between the benefits of data-driven decision making and the risk of unduly narrowing the breadth of services or thwarting innovation in the sector. The OMI’s implementation (including the use of guidance) should be closely monitored and evaluated, to inform any associated refinements and to develop an in-depth understanding of the process and outcomes associated with embedding routine measurement in practice. Further work is also required to identify an alternative OMI or adapt the SWEMWBS for appropriate use with children under the age of.   11.

Foundations UK: 2025. 106p.

By Mary Holper

The United States once authorized only border-based mandatory detention. However, immigration detention is now like an enormous fortress that has grown two mandatory detention turrets: status-based mandatory detention and crime-based mandatory detention. Status-based mandatory detention sees its only doctrinal foundations in the detention of those physically standing at the border. Yet, it has grown to reach both physically and temporally beyond those stopped at the border. Status-based mandatory detention first grew to include those stopped within 100 miles of a land border and under fourteen days in the U.S., whom immigration enforcement agents placed in expedited removal. Then, status-based mandatory detention grew further to include those stopped anywhere in the U.S. and under two years in the U.S., whom immigration enforcement agents placed in expedited removal. Most recently, status-based mandatory detention has grown to include persons who entered the U.S. at any time and whom immigration enforcement agents never placed in expedited removal. 
This article documents each of the blocks that have been placed in the massively-growing turret of status-based mandatory detention, and analyzes the strength of each block to hold up the turret. The article argues that broad status-based detention is inconsistent with the intent of Congress in passing what traditionally has been border-based mandatory detention. Under principles of statutory interpretation, this excessively large status-based mandatory detention turret cannot hold up.

Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 65653 Fordham Urb. L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2026)44 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2025 Last revised: 9 Sep 2025