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Posts in Public Safety
Rapid review of Victoria’s firearms laws: final report

Ken Lay

This rapid review of Victoria’s Firearms Laws was conducted in accordance with its Terms of Reference that required reforms that protect all Victorians, while recognising the legitimate need for some sectors of the community to possess, carry and use firearms. The review proceeds from a consistent starting point: no recreational pursuit, however valued, can take precedence over the safety of the whole community.

This report presents the findings and recommendations of this review across the matters specified in the Terms of Reference. It addresses nine key areas including: limits on the number of firearms an individual may hold the classification of firearms the licensing scheme, including citizenship requirements licence duration and monitoring Illicit firearms and emerging risks imitation firearms and accessories the use of criminal intelligence in licensing decisions information-sharing arrangements between agencies other considerations for the promotion of public safety. The review made 16 recommendations to the Victorian Government. The government has accepted 15 of those recommendations, and did not accept the recommendation related to capping firearms ownership.

The review was conducted in the context of significant national firearms reform activity being undertaken through National Cabinet, including the renegotiation of the National Firearms Agreement. Alignment with national settings has informed a number of the recommendations.

Key findings

Reducing firearm numbers reduces harm. A cap of up to four reflects current ownership patterns. Hunting drives higher firearm numbers in the state. Genuine need is not always assessed for each firearm acquired. Precedents already exist for limiting higher-risk firearms. Some licence holders present low public safety risk.
Firearm caps are an emerging policy tool.

Key recommendations

Introducing a cap of up to four firearms per individual category A & B licence holder. Limiting eligibility of firearm licences to Australian citizens, or New Zealand citizens with permanent residency in Australia who can
demonstrate a genuine reason for holding a licence. Legislative change to the Firearms Act 1996 (Vic) to update existing firearm categories so that higher-risk firearms are appropriately classified. Strengthening oversight across the full licence lifecycle – including renewal requirements, fit and proper person assessments, genuine reason assessments, and training and ongoing monitoring. Strengthening laws relating to the management of illicit firearms to address unlawful use, trafficking and transport risks. Strengthening the regulation of imitation firearms, firearm accessories and firearms-related items.

American gun ownership and the ingroup/outgroup divide

By Ocka Jeong , Nicholas Buttrick

American protective gun ownership privatizes collective behavior, transmuting the role of the state to keep citizens safe into individual actions to protect one's family and one's immediate community. In doing so, owners may sharpen the ingroup/outgroup divide into those who need protection and those who need to be protected against. Using nationally representative individual-level data from the General Social Survey, we find that American gun owners have friendship structures that are more ingroup-focused than nonowners: more cohesive (more of owners’ friends are friends with each other) and less diverse (fewer of owners’ friends are of different races or religions). Using county-aggregated data from over 70 million Facebook users (over 21 billion friendship ties), we similarly find that US counties with higher rates of gun ownership have friendship structures that are more cohesive and less diverse. This is mirrored in our findings that states and counties with higher rates of firearm ownership have lower rates of social infrastructural sites that bring communities together and lower rates of civic trust. Finally, we show evidence that the presence of guns is a quasi-causal factor in declining social capital—using modern time-series analyses, we show that a state-level increase in gun sales predicts a significant decrease in the next year's rates of social capital.

Beyond Intent: How Firearm Power Shapes School Shootings

By Brent R. Klein

Protecting children from gun violence in K-12 schools means facing two realities: the roots of violent intent and the destructive capacity of firearms. In a recent study published in Criminology, my colleagues (Cory Schnell, Steve Chermak, and Josh Freilich) and I revisited a decades-old question: do firearms or motivations to kill drive mortality during school shooting assaults? The answer was striking. Lethal intent mattered—but so did the weapon. Of the incidents we studied, when a shooter used a higher-caliber gun, such as a .45 caliber versus a .22 caliber handgun, the chances of someone dying in the event increased even after controlling for the shooter’s background and, importantly, why they acted. In short, caliber counts. Encouragingly, there are concrete policy steps that can be considered and implemented to make it count less.

Militarized Policing—Whether Cooperative or Coercive—Still Misses the Point

By Sarah Anderson

When it comes to public safety, the need to emphasize collaboration over coercion cannot be overstated. This goes for relationships between law enforcement and communities as well as between law enforcement entities themselves. New Mexico’s recent deployment of the National Guard to Albuquerque illustrates a cooperative effort between state leadership, local police, and community stakeholders to fill administrative and support roles amidst law enforcement staffing shortages.

This stands in stark contrast to President Donald J. Trump’s pronouncement that he would send the “Full Force” of the military into “War ravaged Portland [Oregon].” This top-down, heavy-handed occupation risks undermining norms of the Constitution and public trust in policing. Although the lesser of two evils compared to forcible federal intervention, New Mexico’s model for using the National Guard as law enforcement is still not the right way to promote long-term public safety in our cities.

However, it is still worth discussing the differences and highlighting the extreme challenges that Trump’s proposed actions in Portland pose for law enforcement and public safety. The contrast between New Mexico’s approach and the rhetoric around Portland could not be starker. In Albuquerque, Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham authorized 60 to 70 New Mexico National Guard personnel to work behind the scenes beginning in mid-May. All underwent training to assist the Albuquerque Police Department in collaboration with New Mexico’s departments of Homeland Security and Public Safety and the State Police.

They do not patrol in military uniforms or ride in Humvees. They do not carry rifles or even make arrests. Instead, they help secure crime scenes, process case files, transport detainees, and monitor security cameras. In short, they free up sworn officers to focus on actual policing. The arrangement is carefully limited, publicly explained, and shaped by local input. It reflects the sober recognition that Albuquerque faces serious violent crime challenges while its police department struggles to recruit and retain enough officers to meet
demand.

By comparison, the declaration to use force in Portland is filled with inflammatory rhetoric, implying that the city needs a military occupation to restore order. This framing of an American city as if it were a foreign battlefield is deeply inappropriate. Portland is not a war zone, nor is it unique. This is just the latest in a string of cities threatened with forced deployments, often over the clear objections of governors, mayors, and local law enforcement. Not only do such threats disregard federalism and constitutional guardrails, they also risk turning tense local situations into crises of legitimacy and normalizing military overreach.

Civil liberties advocates have rightly warned that even cooperative and carefully outlined National Guard missions still risk normalizing military involvement in civilian life. Others argue that resources spent on deployments or other means of “cleaning up” homelessness and crime would be better invested in community services, from mental health intervention to addiction treatment. Those critiques underscore an essential truth: Even the most collaborative use of the National Guard is not a long-term solution and can even harm overall public safety.

Preventing the revolving door. Data and voices for change

By Revolving Doors and Newton

The hidden cost of England’s so-called “prolific offenders” the people repeatedly in the headlines for shoplifting and low-level crime – is laid bare in groundbreaking new research by Revolving Doors and
Newton.

The report is the first of its kind, bringing together the insights of people with lived experience of the ‘revolving door’ of reoffending with innovative analysis of real public sector data, including case notes. It reveals new findings about the toll that punishment without rehabilitation and key missed opportunities has on people, public finances and public services.

Revolving Doors is now calling for a joint-departmental Government response across health, justice and housing. They are also requesting a focus on interventions that are known to work to address the root
causes of offending and a joined-up approach that combines shared data, thinking and lived experience.

The joint analysis finds:

●      Between 30,000 and 50,000 individuals make up this group, trapped in cycles of repeat offending.

●      They are responsible for at least 130,000 crimes a year, from shoplifting and assault to drug offences and criminal damage.

●       True costs find that individuals cost more than £100,000 each year, with lifetime costs of over £1.4m.

●      They cost the criminal justice system at least £242m annually, with a total socio-economic bill of up to £5.2bn. This figure represents almost a quarter of all reoffending costs and is the first ever measurement of this group’s impact on public services including the NHS, councils and social services.

Those in this group are often referred to as “prolific offenders”. This report identifies them more clearly to show they are in fact the ‘revolving door cohort’: people in crisis who cycle in and out of the justice system because of unmet health and social needs – including mental ill health, addiction, homelessness and histories of trauma.

Crucially, this group is not captured by existing systems like Integrated Offender Management, which was set up to specifically target those identified as most persistently offending.

Testing the Long-Term Impact of Bail Reform Across New York State: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation

By René Ropac

New York’s bail reform, put into effect in January 2020 and amended in July 2020, eliminated money bail for most misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies. The law also reduced the use of bail even in cases remaining
legally eligible for it through such measures as providing judges with a universal option to order supervised release and an option to order electronic monitoring for certain charges. The mid-2020 amendments
reinstated bail eligibility for certain cases. Later amendments implemented in 2022 and 2023 were modest. As a result, the July 2020 framework essentially remains the basis of New York’s bail reform today. This study is the first to evaluate the recidivism impacts of the bail law as it currently operates. Using statewide court data and quasi-experimental methods, we tracked people for more than four years (50 months) after arraignment—far longer than prior evaluations—to test the impact of reform following the July 2020 amendments. Data Source, Key Measures, and Methods Drawing on non-public court data, we compared people who had bail set or were remanded at arraignment from July 2 to October 31, 2019 (pre-reform), with similar people released during the same dates in 2020 (post-reform). Each person was tracked for 50 months, encompassing both pretrial and post-disposition periods. This design allowed us to examine the long-term public safety consequences of pretrial release in lieu of bail or remand. To test the effects of bail reform on recidivism, we applied a quasi-experimental approach using propensity score weighting. Specifically, we first used logistic regression models to estimate propensity scores and applied inverse probability of treatment
weighting (IPTW) to create an analytic sample in which the distribution of observed baseline characteristics is comparable between treatment and comparison groups. The models included a large number of covariates, such as demographic factors, county and month of arraignment, charge variables, and criminal history measures. For the main analyses, we then employed a doubly robust approach that combined IPTW with covariate adjustment, reducing potential bias in our results. Analyses were conducted separately for: (1) cases seeing the elimination of bail under reform; and (2) cases remaining legally eligible for bail but seeing reduced use of it due to provisions such as the expansion of pretrial supervision. Overall results are reported separately for New York City and the rest of the State. We also examined whether impacts varied for people with or without recent criminal histories (within the past two and a half years) across all counties combined. Impact of Eliminating Bail and Pretrial Detention for Select Cases Effects in New York City: Bail reform's provisions eliminating the option to set bail or remand led to substantial recidivism reductions in New York City. Over the 50-month follow-up period, people released under reform had significantly lower rates of
overall re-arrest (57% vs. 66%), felony re-arrest (33% vs. 40%), and violent felony (VFO) re-arrest (20% vs. 25%), as well as averaged fewer numbers of overall, felony, and VFO re-arrests, compared to people who had bail set or were remanded pre-reform.

Effects in the Rest of the State: The prohibition of bail and detention had no effect in any direction on any of six recidivism outcomes in the suburban and upstate regions (encompassing rates and prevalence of overall, felony, and VFO re-arrest). Effects Among Different Subgroups: Among two "low-risk" subgroups—those with no recent criminal history and no recent prior violent felony arrests—bail elimination yielded statewide reductions in both re-arrest rates and average numbers of re-arrests. The largest benefits appeared among those with no recent criminal history at all. In other words, for those with no recent criminal history, prohibiting the use of bail substantially reduced re-arrest. Yet even people who may have had a prior record, so long as it did not involve a recent violent felony arrest, experienced meaningful recidivism reductions. In contrast, findings for "high-risk" subgroups were more mixed but generally indicated increases in recidivism. Among
those with any recent criminal history, re-arrest rates were unaffected, though the frequency of overall and felony re-arrests increased. For the smaller fraction of people (under 15% in all regions) with recent prior violent felony arrests, release without bail was consistently associated with elevated rearrest rates and more
re-arrest incidents across all six outcomes. Impact of Reducing the Use of Bail in Legally Eligible Cases Effects in New York City: The reduced use of money bail in eligible cases led to modest reductions in rates of overall re-arrest (53% vs. 56%) and felony re-arrest (30% vs. 33%), while violent felony re-arrest rates and the frequency of re-arrest incidents were unaffected. This suggests that reform reduced the likelihood of being re-arrested at least once without altering the overall frequency of re-arrests. Effects in the Rest of the State:
Results were essentially neutral in the suburban and upstate regions. Re-arrest rates and average numbers of re-arrests were nearly all the same for people released without bail and those in the comparison group.

Effects Among Different Subgroups: "Low-risk" individuals with no recent criminal history experienced notable statewide recidivism reductions, while those with no recent prior violent felony arrests showed no significant changes. For "high-risk" individuals with recent criminal history, on the other hand, the reduced use of bail was consistently associated with worse outcomes. Those with recent criminal histories or prior violent felony arrests had higher re-arrest rates and more rearrest incidents across all outcome measures. These increases were larger among people with recent prior violent felony arrests. Study Results in Context Bail reform aimed to reduce reliance on money bail and pretrial detention while maintaining public safety. By these measures, the current law can be considered a success. However, the recidivism increases among a relatively small subgroup of people with recent criminal histories should not be overlooked. The amendments to “initial” bail reform put into effect in July 2020 sought to allay public safety concerns primarily by reinstating bail for a range of cases. Yet, the present study shows that the detrimental impacts among subgroups of “high-risk” individuals defined by serious recent criminal history—previously observed in DCJ’s studies of initial bail reform—remain evident under the current law as well. Another key finding is the contrast between
New York City and the State’s suburban and upstate regions; in New York City, the prohibition of money bail (or "mandatory release") was associated with declines in both the likelihood and frequency of re-arrest, while rearrest outcomes in the rest of the State remained unchanged. Several factors may explain this divergence: possible baseline differences in pre-reform release rates (courts released fewer people prior to reform outside New York City); differences in the populations processed in each region; or potential gaps in the implementation and effectiveness of pretrial supervision and other support programs outside New York City

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 6—Drug Enforcement Administration

By Jillian Snider

This is the sixth and final installment in a six-part series examining major federal law enforcement agencies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each agency across the same core categories.

When federal agents dismantle a covert fentanyl lab, when pharmaceutical personnel are charged with unlawful distribution, when investigators trace a methamphetamine pipeline from a Mexican cartel into networks across the U.S., or when the federal government loosens restrictions on the most widely used illegal drug in the country, one agency is at the center of each: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Yet of the agencies in this series, the DEA is among the least understood as it is often conflated with the broader “war on drugs” rather than recognized for the specific statutory machinery it
operates.

The DEA is the federal government’s lead agency for enforcing the nation’s drug laws, and the youngest of the three Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies examined in this series. But its defining feature is that it does not merely enforce the drug laws, it also helps determine which substances are controlled, and how tightly,
through its authority over the federal drug-scheduling system. Those scheduling decisions, in turn, help define what counts as a federal drug crime in the first place. It is that combination of powers, enforcing the drug laws while also helping to write them, that has drawn the DEA into one of the most consequential drug-policy debates in a generation: the rescheduling of marijuana, an issue that has reached a turning point in 2026.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 5—Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

By Jillian Snider

This is the fifth in a six-part series examining major federal law enforcement agencies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each against a consistent set of criteria.

In Kansas City, federal agents traced handguns recovered from the mass shooting at the 2024 Super Bowl victory rally back through unlawful transfers to straw purchasers. In College Station, Texas, federal agents and fire investigators examined a burned-out Krispy Kreme for accelerant traces and graffiti, analyzing evidence of arson. And of the 9,696 federal firearms licensees inspected in 2024, industry operations investigators combed through acquisition and disposition records line by line. All three encounters involve the same federal agency; one many Americans associate with controversies decades old rather than the day-to-day work that defines its current mission.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the smallest of the three Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies in this series. ATF employs roughly 5,300 personnel, including approximately 2,373 special agents as of 2025, and operates on a budget of roughly $1.6 billion. ATF’s dual role as both criminal enforcer and industry regulator has placed it at the center of repeated political fights over its very existence.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 4—Federal Bureau of Investigation

By Jillian Snider

This is the fourth in a six-part series examining major federal law enforcement agencies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each agency across the same core categories.

When a cyberattack cripples a hospital’s computer network, when a public corruption investigation topples a sitting mayor, when a terrorist plot is disrupted before it reaches execution, or when a fugitive on the Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list is tracked across international borders, the same three letters appear in the headlines:
FBI. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) occupies a unique position in American law enforcement—it is simultaneously the country’s principal federal criminal investigative agency, a domestic intelligence service, and an international law enforcement partner. With its jurisdiction spanning more than 200 categories of federal crime, no other agency in the federal system operates as broadly.

Yet the FBI’s breadth of authority has always made it a lightning rod. The same agency that disrupted the MS-13 gang network and dismantled ransomware operations also carries the historical weight of COINTELPRO—the counterintelligence program that surveilled civil rights leaders—and the more recent controversies surrounding the Bureau’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Since early 2025, the FBI has undergone significant organizational restructuring under Director Kash Patel, including the removal of senior career officials; large-scale personnel transfers out of the Washington, D.C. region; and the redeployment of agents toward immigration enforcement and violent crime. These changes have placed the Bureau at the center of debate over whether its mission is sharpening or being redirected.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 3—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

By Jillian Snider

This is the third in a six-part series examining major policing strategies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each strategy against multiple criteria.

When federal agents in plain clothes and tactical gear appeared at car washes, worksites, and bus stops across American cities in recent months, many residents had the same question: Who are these people, and what authority do they have to be here? In most cases, the answer was U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—an agency that most Americans have heard of but few could describe with precision.

ICE is the federal agency responsible for immigration enforcement in the interior of the United States and for criminal investigations involving cross-border violations. With more than 20,000 law enforcement and support personnel—a figure that grew significantly following a 2025 hiring surge—operating out of more than 400 offices domestically and in approximately 50 countries, ICE enforces more than 400 federal statutes. It shares a parent department and legislative origin with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); however, where CBP’s jurisdiction is anchored at and near the border, ICE’s operational footprint is centered in the nation’s interior.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 2—U.S. Customs and Border Protection

By Jillian Snider

This is the second in a six-part series examining major policing strategies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each strategy against multiple criteria.

A traveler arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) hands over their passport. A rancher in southern Arizona sees agents patrolling the mesquite beyond his fence line. A shipping container at
the Port of Los Angeles undergoes imaging scans before its contents reach American consumers. All three encounters involve the same federal agency, but most Americans would be hard-pressed to explain how or why.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the largest federal law enforcement agency in the United States, with more than 60,000 employees and a budget exceeding $19 billion. It is simultaneously a law enforcement agency, a trade facilitation body, and the federal government’s primary screening operation for people and goods entering the country. Understanding how one agency came to hold all of these responsibilities—and what authorities it exercises in each role—is essential context for the policy debates that surround it.

Understanding Federal Law Enforcement in the United States Part 1—Introduction

By Jillian Snider

This is the first in a six-part series examining major policing strategies through a research-grounded lens, assessing each strategy against multiple criteria.

When most Americans think of law enforcement, they picture the local police officer on patrol, the county sheriff, or perhaps a state trooper on the highway—and with good reason. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the 17,500-plus state and local law enforcement agencies operating across the country employ over 1.2 million full-time sworn and civilian personnel who represent about 90 percent of U.S. law enforcement. Most citizens encounter these officers in their daily lives; however, operating alongside them is a vast network of federal law enforcement that many Americans know primarily from television or news headlines.

The scale of this federal apparatus is significant: The most recent BJS Census of Federal Law Enforcement Officers found that 90 agencies employed 136,815 full-time federal law enforcement officers authorized to make arrests, carry firearms, or both. As the largest of these agencies, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs approximately 80,000 officers across nine agencies and offices. But despite this substantial presence, public understanding of jurisdictional boundaries, statutory authorities, and the distinctions between agencies remains limited.

This need for clarity has never been more pressing. In recent years—particularly since early 2025—federal law enforcement agencies have moved to the center of national debate. Expanded enforcement operations by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in American cities have raised questions about use-of-force standards, the relationship between federal and local agencies, and public trust. Fatal shootings involving federal agents during enforcement operations have prompted scrutiny of whether agents receive adequate training for volatile urban environments. The unprecedented assertion of federal control over some major U.S. cities has sparked questions about the boundaries of federal authority over local policing.

Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have conducted large-scale violent crime and drug enforcement operations in cities across the country, often alongside local police departments. This surge of federal agents has left residents struggling to distinguish between the agencies operating in their neighborhoods and questioning each agency’s authority and limitations.

Understanding Trends in Law Enforcement Staffing

By Brandon Martin, Deepak Premkumar, and Mandi Acevedo

Law enforcement agencies have experienced hiring and retention challenges amid the pandemic, economic uncertainty, and changing views of the police. This report provides key trends and context for understanding officer staffing in California and highlights several obstacles for agencies moving forward.

Key Takeaways
Law enforcement agencies at the state, county, and local levels employ more than 77,000 individuals with arrest powers across California spending about $28 billion on policing. Research shows that hiring additional law enforcement officers reduces crime, especially violent crime. Yet agencies have experienced several challenges around officer recruitment and retention in recent years amid the COVID-19 pandemic, economic uncertainty, and societal changes.

In this report, we bring together several new and underused data sources to provide key trends and context for understanding officer staffing in California, highlighting several possible challenges for agencies moving forward

The number of officers has decreased since the pandemic. Despite small growth over the last two years, the statewide officer count (77,200) in 2024 is 3 percent less than it was in 2019 (79,600). California has 196 officers per 100,000 residents, down from a peak of 221 in 2008. → Officer demographics have shifted. Although officers are predominantly male, the share of female officers has risen over time, from 12.8 percent in 2005 to 15.3 percent in 2024. Looking at race/ethnicity, representation of white and Black officers has declined over the last two decades, while representation of Latino officers has increased significantly and representation of Asian officers has remained largely unchanged. Average officer age and tenure have stayed relatively stable. Recent research shows benefits to having more female, Latino, Black, older, and experienced officers. → Staffing trends differ based on agency size and type. While agencies of all sizes saw declines in staffing after the Great Recession, the post-pandemic drop was concentrated in large agencies with over 100 officers. In recent years, rural agencies have experienced more volatile changes in staffing than non-rural agencies. And over the last two decades, staffing levels have risen at sheriff’s departments while decreasing slightly at police departments. → Officer retention has declined. From 2016 to 2020, total separations—including resignations, retirements, and terminations—rose steadily at California law enforcement agencies, by about 11 percent.

Separations then went up more than 30 percent between 2020 and 2022, potentially influenced by factors like the pandemic and protests following the murder of George Floyd. → Average salaries have decreased slightly; agencies are increasing overtime pay. After adjusting for inflation, the average base salary for officers declined between 2011 and 2023, from $116,000 to $110,000, possibly due to more experienced officers leaving. Over this time, average overtime pay grew from $10,000 to over $25,000. Though rural and non-rural agencies had similar overtime pay in 2011, there was a large difference by 2023 ($16,000 rural, $28,000 non-rural). → Agency competition and pay are key challenges to recruitment and retention. Respondents in our survey say that location issues, like remoteness of agency as well as housing costs and availability, also play a role. When it comes to hiring, agencies report that unqualified applicants are an issue. About 30 percent of respondents indicate that limited staff capacity has led to shifts in services or response priorities, such as deprioritizing non-criminal medical calls.

Keeping Us Safe: Rethinking policing, harm and justice,

By Runnymede Trust

Keeping Us Safe: Rethinking policing, harm and justice, is a major new report calling for a fundamental shift in how the UK approaches safety, harm prevention and justice.

Drawing on nationally representative polling of 5,405 people in England and Wales, alongside in-depth community-based qualitative research, the report finds strong public support for social investment over punitive enforcement when given nuanced choices.

Key findings from the national polling include:

More than half (52%) think investing in public and social services would do more to prevent crime than increasing police powers (18% disagree, the rest are unsure). Half (50%) of the public believe investing in public and social services would do more to prevent crime than increasing the number of police officers (22% disagree, the rest are unsure). Keeping Us Safe critiques the dominant political and media framing that more police and more policing powers are common-sense solutions to social issues. It argues that binary polling questions obscure these nuances and reinforce a narrow public narrative that equates safety with police presence.

In the report, we trace modern British policing to its colonial origins, finding that contemporary policing continues to reproduce racial injustices through stop and search, punitive practices in educational settings, policing the border, mental health detentions and the overrepresentation of Black and racialised communities in the criminal legal system.

We argue that despite decades of inquiries and reform efforts, including high-profile reviews into institutional racism - from the 1999 Macpherson Report which found ‘institutional racism’ in the Metropolitan Police, to the 2023 Casey Review which identified a culture of racism, misogyny, and homophobia - attempts to reform policing have failed to address systemic issues. Instead, it argues, reform has often individualised racism as a matter of ‘bad apples’, leaving structures which produce inequality intact.

Police spending reached £19.9 billion last year, while youth services, mental health provision, housing support and community infrastructure face chronic underfunding.

Across six key areas (‘serious youth violence’, education, housing and homelessness, border enforcement, gender-based violence and mental health), the research finds that policing often deepens harm and fails to address root causes such as poverty, social exclusion, trauma and racism. It highlights community-led models already in practice, including: transformative justice practices that address harm without reproducing
violence, grounded in care, consent and collective accountability; reparative justice approaches that acknowledge and seek redress for historic and ongoing harms caused by racism, colonialism and slavery
and the inequalities they produced; restorative justice initiatives that empower survivors and create genuine opportunities for people who’ve caused harm to take responsibility and repair relationships; healing justice models that recognise harm as both systemic and interpersonal and treat healing as part of a collective political project.

The report sets out a series of ‘non-reformist reforms’ designed to build safer, more resilient communities. These include investing in teachers and pastoral support; ending school exclusions and the Prevent Duty; overhauling the Mental Health Act to end the use of police in responding to people in crisis; and an end to the No Recourse to Public Funds policy.

Keeping Us Safe concludes that safety does not begin with enforcement but with meeting people’s basic needs. It calls for a redistribution of public resources away from punitive systems and towards harm prevention, collective care and accountability.

BART Fare Enforcement: Balancing Goals, Community Concerns, and Human Costs, in partnership with Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART).

By Price Nyland

This month, the Center for Policing Equity (CPE) published a ne report, BART Fare Enforcement: Balancing Goals, Community Concerns, and Human Costs, in partnership with Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART). The team received additional support from Stout, a global advisory firm specializing in corporate finance, accounting and transaction advisory, valuation, financial disputes, claims, and investigations. The report is a comprehensive assessment of BART’s approach to enforcing its fares, and CPE hopes to see the recommendations contained in this report adopted for implementation.

CPE’s Research Team Contextualized Community Harm During Analysis Phase

Aiming to uplift the voices of those most impacted by BART’s practices, CPE’s qualitative research team conducted 14 focus groups composed of 95 Bay Area residents living in the five counties BART serves. The focus groups explored BART riders’ perceptions of safety, fare affordability, contact with BART police and fare enforcement, and factors influencing their decisions to ride BART. Community participants also offered input on ways to improve BART’s public safety responses.

In addition to this qualitative effort, CPE conducted a quantitative analysis of fare enforcement practices and outcomes using financial, ridership, and BART Police Department (BPD) data, including information on arrests, calls for service, proof of payment, and citations. CPE also used publicly available data collected as part of California’s Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA)¹.

CPE Recommendations to Improve BART Operations

This project was a timely collaboration for both CPE and BART, as BART works to address revenue and public safety challenges while seeking a deeper understanding of community impacts and goals. CPE anticipates that the community input, financial, qualitative, and quantitative analyses and recommendations detailed in the report will improve outcomes for BART riders and the wider community BART serves, as well as the agency’s financial solvency.

CPE’s findings indicate that BART’s current fare enforcement strategy—which disproportionately affects marginalized groups, including Black and Brown riders, low-income individuals, people experiencing mental health crises, and individuals who are unhoused— has not resulted in significant revenue recovery or improved public safety. Instead, punitive measures have contributed to community mistrust. In addition to these human costs, CPE found that BART’s frequently cited $25 million annual revenue loss due to fare evasion is inflated and misrepresents the actual financial impact of fare evasion. Stout estimated that BART’s annual revenue loss as a result of fare evasion is $5.7 million – $9.5 million per year, far below the BART estimate.

Based on these analyses and findings, CPE developed recommendations for the BART Board of Directors to improve BART’s fare enforcement practices, policies, and impacts:

Expand BART’s Transit Ambassador and Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) personnel as non-police responses to public disorder and community concerns regarding unhoused individuals and people with mental health conditions. Clarify BPD’s warrant policy to eliminate discretion regarding arrests for misdemeanor warrants. The policy should mandate that officers arrest only for an outstanding misdemeanor warrant if required by California Penal Code § 827.1 or a specific BART policy and that officers must issue a citation in all other instances. Revise BPD policy to explicitly require warnings for individuals stopped for fare evasion for the first time. Additionally, update policies to mandate the use of civil proof-of-payment citations instead of criminal citations under California Penal Code § 640, except in specific circumstances. Improve access to discounted fares for low-income riders, youth, seniors, and people with disabilities by automating eligibility for and access to BART discounted cards for individuals with Medi-Cal Benefits Identification Card (BIC), Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards, Supplemental Security Income (SSI)/Social Security Disability (SSD) eligibility, and student or senior IDs. Discounted card availability should be expanded at BART stations, and more community partners should be formally engaged to assist with discounted card applications online. End the enforcement of fare evasion under California Penal Code § 640(c)(1) as a misdemeanor to reduce the human and fiscal harm incurred by BART riders, as well as the impact on social service and criminal legal systems.
As recommended in 2020, CPE also notes the need for improved data collection processes and implementation of data auditing measures to ensure all aspects of a BART Police Department interaction are
documented. All findings and recommendations can be found in the report and the executive summary.This project signals an opportunity for BART to dig deeper into its own practices and policies to ensure alignment, both within the agency and in partnership with the community it serves, on the quality of service being provided. CPE believes the voices of those most impacted by current fare enforcement practices must play a central role in shaping system reforms. The report offers BART a powerful opportunity to innovate and build on existing efforts to ensure the system is both safe and equitable.

This project signals an opportunity for BART to dig deeper into its own practices and policies to ensure alignment, both within the agency and in partnership with the community it serves, on the quality of service being provided. CPE believes the voices of those most impacted by current fare enforcement practices must play a central role in shaping system reforms. The report offers BART a powerful opportunity to innovate and build on existing efforts to ensure the system is both safe and equitable.

Policing Mass Demonstrations: Recommendations for Policy, Training, and Community Engagement

By Dustin Richardson, Jeremy Barnum, Meagan Cahill

The police have a complex role in managing mass demonstrations, requiring them to balance competing priorities and obligations. On the one hand, they must uphold the fundamental right to free assembly and
expression guaranteed by the United States Constitution, while on the other hand, they must maintain safety and order. Although most mass demonstrations are peaceful, some can escalate into widespread civil
disturbances. The primary challenge for agencies, then, is to implement training, policies, and crowd management approaches that prepare officers to safely and effectively facilitate the vast majority of peaceful protests while also having plans and contingencies in place should property destruction or violence occur.
Too much focus on either outcome leaves agencies unprepared and can result in inappropriate responses that have unintended consequences

Systems Thinking for Sustainable Crime Prevention: Planning for Risky Places

By Vania Ceccato, Andy Newton

This book offers a comprehensive overview of areas with elevated levels of crime, which we consider ‘risky places.’ These can be facilities, nodes, or paths and can be found everywhere, from small towns to megacities. Crime and fear are examined from the perspective of those who use these places, based on examples from the US, the UK, Sweden, Nigeria, Brazil, China, Australia, and more. Advocating for a systems thinking approach, the book shows what can be learned from risky places and identifies ways to address their inherent problems. The book also assesses current barriers to applying systems thinking and identifies ways to foster interconnected long-term crime prevention strategies that meet the diverse needs of multiple stakeholders. Aimed at academics, students, and professionals in urban planning, criminology, geography, and related fields, this book is a vital resource for those dedicated to creating safer, more inclusive, and sustainable environments.

Partnerships in Policing: How Third Parties Help Police to Reduce Crime and Disorder

By Lorraine Mazerolle,
Kevin Petersen,
Michelle Sydes and
Janet Ransley

Partnerships in policing are used worldwide to reduce crime and disorder problems. Police forge partnerships with businesses, government agencies, and communities to co-produce public safety. Third-party policing (TPP) is a particular type of partnership that involves the police addressing crime and disorder by working through (and with) third-party partners. This Element focuses on the nature and effectiveness of TPP partnerships. Using systematic review and meta-analytic techniques, it shows that TPP interventions are effective in efforts to reduce crime and disorder, without displacement of these problems. Cooperative partnerships are associated with considerably larger crime control effects than interventions relying on coercive engagement styles. Dyad partnerships – twosome partnerships between police and one third party – are likely to offer the “sweet spot” in TPP. The Element concludes that partnership policing using non criminal justice legal levers is a promising approach to crime control.

Mass Shooting in the United States: Large capacity ammunition magazines

By Violence Policy Center

Large capacity ammunition magazines are the common thread running through most mass shootings in the United States. Since 1980, there have been at least 110 mass shootings (three or more fatalities not including the shooter) where the shooter used large capacity ammunition magazines containing more than 10 rounds. A total of 981 people were killed in these shootings, and 1,328 were wounded. This number is likely a significant undercount of actual incidents as there is no consistent collection or reporting on thisdata. Even in many high-profile shootings, information on magazine capacity is neither released nor reported. The Violence Policy Center has compiled this list of incidents by analyzing news reports and follow-up investigative reports on mass shootings. Only shootings in which there is specific information that large capacity magazines were used are included. Columbine shooter armed with Intratec TEC-DC9 assault pistol equipped with high capacity ammunition magazine

Large capacity ammunition magazines are the common thread running through most mass shootings in the United States. Since 1980, there have been at least 110 mass shootings (three or more fatalities not including
the shooter) where the shooter used large capacity ammunition magazines containing more than 10 rounds.
A total of 981 people were killed in these shootings, and 1,328 were wounded. This number is likely a significant undercount of actual incidents as there is no consistent collection or reporting on this data. Even in many high-profile shootings, information on magazine capacity is neither released nor reported. The Violence Policy Center has compiled this list of incidents by analyzing news reports and follow-up investigative reports on mass shootings. Only shootings in which there is specific information that large capacity magazines were used are included.

The Impact of Training on Use of Force by Police in an English Police Force; Evidence from a Pragmatic Stepped Wedge Randomized Controlled Trial

By Michael Sanders, Kate Bancroftb, Susannah Humea, Oliver Chetwyndc and Paul Quintonca

We aim to test the impact of a new national curriculum for public and personal safety training (PPST) developed by the College ofPolicing, which aims to reduce the use of force by police. We con-duct a large-scale Stepped Wedge Pragmatic Controlled Trial with a single police force and 1843 participating police officers.Officers were assigned to be trained during a particular week of the year. We find statistically significant reductions in the use of force by police officers as a result of the training. These effects are a reduction of between 8.0% and 10.9% in the propensity to use force in a given week compared to the counterfactual. The Effect is accompanied by a significant reduction in the likelihood of injury to civilians, and no rise in the risk of harm to officers.We conclude that the PPST curriculum appears effective at reduc-ing use of force by police in a large scale, robust trial