By Halle Marchetta

In the United States of America, the federal government and many state governments have statutes that have banned all convicted felons from “ship[ping], transfer[ing], possess[ing], or receiv[ing]” firearms or ammunition.1 The statute applies equally to felons convicted of low-level, non-violent offenses like forgery or tax fraud as it does to highlevel, violent offenses like aggravated murder or rape. Treating every felon the same, without any consideration of their underlying charge, unconstitutionally infringes on their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms without significant justification. Convicted felons do not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech or freedom of religion, so why do they lose their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms? They retain their Fourth Amendment right to be secure from warrantless search and seizure in their own homes, so why do they lose their Second Amendment right to self-defense of their home? Felons still retain their Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when faced with criminal charges, so why should they lose their Second Amendment rights when convicted of those criminal charges? The blanket ban on all felons possessing and using firearms is a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

By David C. Pyrooz,  James A. Densley, Jillian K. Peterson

INTRODUCTION Mass shootings, defined as incidents where 4 or more people are shot with a firearm, have become a significant public health concern in the US.

OBJECTIVE To estimate the prevalence of direct exposure to mass shootings among US adults and identify the sociodemographic groups most affected.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS A survey was administered in January 2024 to a sample of 10 000 respondents (18 years or older) designed to be representative of US adults using a multistage matched sampling design. In addition to exposure to mass shootings, the survey also collected sociodemographic information, including age, gender, self-reported race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

EXPOSURE Survey respondents were asked about their lifetime presence at the scene of a mass shooting, any physical injuries sustained (including being shot or trampled or experiencing a related physical injury), and the features of such incidents.

MAIN OUTCOME AND MEASURES Multivariable logistic regression was used to generate adjusted odds ratios (AORs) of the associations between sociodemographic measures and being present on the scene of and injured in a mass shooting. All analyses undertaken to generate population and relational inferences were weighted to achieve representativeness of US adults.

RESULTS Of the 10 000 respondents included in the analysis, 51.34% (95% CI, 50.27%-52.40%) were female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 3.04% (95% CI, 2.71%-3.38%) were Asian, 12.46% (95% CI, 11.81%-13.12%) were Black, 16.04% (95% CI, 15.10%-16.98%) were Hispanic, 62.78% (95% CI, 61.73%-63.84%) were White, and 5.67% (95% CI, 5.23%-6.11%) were other race or ethnicity. The findings indicated that 6.95% (95% CI, 6.39%-7.50%) of respondents were present at the scene of a mass shooting, and 2.18% (95% CI, 1.85%-2.50%) sustained physical injuries, such as being shot or trampled, during such incidents. A total of 54.89% of mass shootings to which respondents were exposed occurred in 2015 or more recently, and 76.15% took place in respondents’ local communities. Mass shootings were most likely to occur in neighborhoods. Younger individuals (eg, AOR for Baby Boomer and Silent generations vs Generation Z, 0.12; 95% CI, 0.09-0.18) and males (AOR, 1.55; 95% CI, 1.29-1.85) were more likely to report exposure compared with those from older generations or female individuals, respectively. Black respondents reported higher rates of being present at mass shootings (AOR, 1.87; 95% CI, 1.49-2.34), while Asian respondents reported lower rates (AOR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.19-0.66), compared with White respondents, but there were no racial and ethnic differences in injuries sustained. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings from this survey study of US adults underscore the extensive and often overlooked regular exposure to mass shootings in this country. The demographic disparities in exposure highlight the need for targeted interventions and support for the most affected groups, particularly younger generations and males. Understanding these patterns is essential for addressing the broader impacts of gun violence on public health and community well-being. 

By David Spencer

London is in the grip of a crime wave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusLondon is in the grip of a crimewave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusLondon is in the grip of a crimewave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusfalling – dropping from 66.1% in 2014 to 55.4% in 2024. For violencerelated offences, imprisonment rates have also decreased, with just 36.5% of offenders sentenced to custody in 2024. Despite laws mandating prison for repeat knife offenders, around a third evade immediate incarceration. It appears likely that these rates of incarceration will fall even further in the coming years given the Government’s apparent intention to send fewer offenders to prison following the Independent Sentencing Review led by Rt Hon David Gauke1 and the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts led by Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson.2 The failure to adequately deal with the most prolific offenders presented before the courts is perhaps the gravest sign of the permissiveness with which the criminal justice system treats those most dedicated to committing crime. In the year to December 2024, of the 8,207 “hyperprolific” offenders who already had 46 or more previous criminal convictions or cautions, only 44.5% were sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment on conviction for a further indictable or “eitherway” criminal offence – 4,555 hyper-prolific offenders were released on conviction without receiving an immediate term of imprisonment. Of the 16,386 “super-prolific” offenders with between 26 and 45 previous convictions or cautions, only 42.1% were sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment on conviction for a further indictable or “eitherway” criminal offence – 9,483 super-prolific offenders were released on conviction without receiving an immediate term of imprisonment. It is difficult to conceive of a collection of statistics which better demonstrates the contempt with which the criminal justice system is treating the lawabiding majority. Chapter 3 examines the effectiveness of high-visibility policing in crime “hotspots” – citing evidence which demonstrates that the tactic is highly effectively at reduces crime. However, the use of a key element of proactive police patrolling – stop and search – has fallen significantly over the last decade, partly because of the policies of the Conservative-led coalition government (supported by the now Home Secretary Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP). The reduction in stop and search coincided with substantial increases knife crime, suggesting the reforms introduced in all likelihood significantly undermined the fight against crime. We cite research by the criminologists Piquero and Sherman (2025) which demonstrates that increased stop and search correlates with reduced knife crime. Stop and search in London has been widely criticised for racial disproportionality, often framed as evidence of “racist” policing. Critics argue that black Londoners are unfairly targeted – claims we robustly challenge. Data shows that black people are “over-represented” among victims of the most serious knife crime – within London black people are 3.38 times more likely to be killed in a knife-enabled non-domestic homicide than white people. Similarly black people are 5.0 times more likely than white people in London to be charged with murder. While only 13.5% of London’s population are black, 48.6% of robbery suspects are described as black by victims when reporting the crime to the police. Incontrast to allegations of police “racism”, outcomes of stop and search in London reveal that black suspects are 64% more likely than white suspects to receive ‘community resolutions’ when a prohibited item is found when searching for a weapon (rather than be charged or summonsed and sent to court). This suggests there may well be a leniency being shown towards black suspects compared to white suspects. It is not the role of policing to correct for all of society’s ills – to quote the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police Sir Stephen Watson QPM: “It’s really important in policing that you play the ball that is bowled – you describe the problem, you faithfully attack the various ingredients of the problem and you do so without fear or favour in the public interest”.3 We agree and strongly reject the political ideology and timidity of police leaders which has led to the precipitous reductions in stop and search. As part of better serving the law-abiding majority there should be a surge in stop and search within those parts of London where knife crime, robbery and theft is most prevalent. Chapter 4 examines how offenders can be targeted – specifically through innovative Live Facial Recognition technology and innovations in court orders which limit the activities of known offenders. The Metropolitan Police’s deployment of Live Facial Recognition as a tool to identify wanted individuals, particularly within crime hotspots, has been remarkably successful. In 2023 the force undertook 24 deployments in the capital – in 2024 there were 179 deployments and by mid-June 2025 there had been 94 deployments. An Independent evaluation by the National Physical Laboratory confirmed that the technology can be deployed with a high degree of accuracy and – notably, an absence of significant demographic bias when properly configured. Despite demonstrable results – including 1,045 arrests since 2023 – several London councils have passed motions opposing its use. This includes Islington Council which at the time was led by Kaya Comer-Schwartz – who was subsequently appointed by the Mayor of London Sir Sadiq Khan as the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime. The chapter also reviews a series of legal tools, including Knife Crime Prevention Orders and Serious Violence Reduction Orders, which can be utilised to restrict repeat offenders’ behaviours but have seen limited or inconsistent application. We recommend that their application is made mandatory for certain violent and knife-carrying offenders. Londoners and visitors to the capital face a street crime epidemic – one which includes a very real risk of becoming a victim of seriousviolence, robbery or theft. The steps taken by the Metropolitan Police, Mayor of London and Government have so far been unequal to the task. The Metropolitan Police must take an unequivocal “Crime Fighting First” approach – in those locations where rates of knife crime, robbery and theft are highest that should mean a “Zero Tolerance” approach to crime and criminals. The Government and Mayor of London must demonstrate the necessary political leadership to explicitly reject the policies and ideologies which have led us to this point.The law-abiding majority of people do not accept the status quo, and neither do we at Policy Exchange – this report should act as a call to action for political leaders and police chiefs alike.

By Natasha P. Sobers, Joeleita Agard, Katrina Norville, Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, Callixtus Joseph, Madeleine Joseph, Maria Garcia-Joseph, Reginald King, Patrick Jason Toppin, Hugh Wong, Simon G. Anderson

In the Caribbean, gun violence has reached crisis levels and regional heads of government have called for a public health approach to inform prevention and control. Feedback loops resulting from work carried out under the ‘Pathway to Policy’ project showed that firearm-related crimes increased the chances of household poverty, national economic costs, deaths and disability and promoted a culture of violence, all of which reinforced gun violence. Interventions to reduce illicit access and use of firearms, social development programs, and investment in educational systems may balance rates of gun violence.

Firearm-related violence in the Caribbean is a complex systemic issue: how do we move towards a solution?—an article co-written with our project partners from the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, the Caribbean Public Health Agency, and the George Alleyne Chronic Disease Center at the University of the West Indies—discusses the work carried out by the Advisory Committee of Regional Experts, a multisectoral group convened to develop a ‘pathway to policy’ that informs a regional approach to tackling firearm violence. Using a systems mapping technique to inform our understanding of firearm-related crimes and injuries based on the expertise of stakeholders and based on analysis of publicly available data from thirteen countries within the Caribbean Community, this article calls for greater attention to the equilibrium between crime response strategies and prevention approaches.

By Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya

We synthesize research on conflict as a fundamental economic phenomenon, arguing that the implications of the ”dark side of self-interest” have received insufficient attention in economics. We define conflict as interactions where parties choose costly inputs that are adversarially combined against one another — distinct from the collaborative input combinations typical in economic models. We make four key contributions: First, we demonstrate that conflict induces economically significant costs comparable to or exceeding traditional deadweight losses. Second, we explain how these costs vary across contexts based on property rights protection, state capacity, and cultural norms. Third, we show how incorporating conflict into economic models leads to substantially different predictions than traditional models — including inverse relationships between compensation and productivity; distortions in comparative advantage; prices determined by power rather than solely by preferences endowments, and technology. Fourth, attributes of modern states such as centralization in the presence of law, checks and balances, other forms of distributed power, and the bureaucratic form of organization can partly be thought of as restraining conflict and appropriation, with implications for governance and economic development. Overall, in the presence of conflict and appropriation, power considerations cannot be separated from economics and first-best models are not empirically plausible.

 CESifo Working Paper No. 12135, 2025

By Robert Leiter

  In debates over the Second Amendment, the conventional view is that the government ought to possess a monopoly of legitimate force, subject to the right of individuals to act in emergency self-defense. Many treat the non-defensive circumstances in which our system decentralizes force as holdovers from the days of nonprofessional police and soldiers. When it comes to the Second Amendment, many believe that the only legitimate reason individuals may bear arms today is for individual self-defense against isolated criminal violence (e.g., to resist a home invasion). This Symposium Essay attacks the monopoly-of-force account, justifying the continued relevance of American law’s decentralization of legitimate force. This Essay argues that decentralization of force remains important for three reasons. First, despite the rise of professional police, American law enforcement still enforces core crimes below desirable levels, particularly in disadvantaged and rural communities and during times of civil unrest. Decentralization of force mitigates this underenforcement problem. And decentralization may be a better solution than providing more police because many areas where law is under-enforced also (paradoxically) suffer from the effects of overcriminalization. Second, American law has a mismatch between public duties and private rights. Providing effective law enforcement is only a public duty. Individuals have no private claim that the government adequately enforce the law or protect them against unlawful violence. Self-help and private law enforcement are the best remedies when governments undersupply needed levels of police protection. Third, even if the government has a monopoly of force, it does not follow that government officers are the only ones in whom the government’s monopoly may be vested. The “government” is an incorporeal entity whose power must be exercised by human agents. Agents do not perfectly carry out the tasks of their principals; some government officers commit malfeasance and nonfeasance. The decentralization of force provides a remedy for such abuses of office. Ultimately, this Essay concludes that the individual right to bear arms still has relevance for public defense and security. This fact should warrant consideration when determining the scope of the right, including that the  arms protected by the Second Amendment should continue to include those arms that are primarily useful for public security.   

 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 35 (2021), 46p.

By David Blake Johnson and Jason Szkola

Existing research examining gun violence often faces criticism because of complications related to gun laws and gun culture. In this manuscript, we argue that these elements change the overall quality of gun owners and this quality has a significant effect on homicide. To demonstrate this, we introduce a measure of gun owner quality independent of local law enforcement and possibly indicative of illegal or dubious transfer of firearms: the time to crime of "exported" crime guns. We find that decreases in the time to crime of exported crime guns increase homicides and gun homicides while also having no effect on non-gun homicides and only a small effect on suicide. We then show how the time to crime of exported crime gun changes as a function of gun culture and gun laws.

Unpublished paper, 2024, 25p.