By Victoria Nagy

Records from the Central Register of Female Prisoners permit a longitudinal analysis of ninety-five women convicted of murder and manslaughter in Victoria between 1860 and 1920. The data show the similarities and differences between the women convicted of these homicide offenses. An examination of the women’s socioeconomic profiles, occupations, ages, migrations, and victims reveals the links between their crimes and their punishment.

By Terra Wiens  

  KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS KEY FINDINGS ■ In 2023, more than 5,700 Hispanics were killed by guns. That year, 3,284 Hispanics died in gun homicides, 2,198 died in gun suicides, 63 died in unintentional shootings, and 202 died in other circumstances (including legal interventiona and undetermined intent). ■ More than 83,000 Hispanics were killed by guns between 2002 and 2023. During this period, 51,780 Hispanics died in gun homicides, 27,160 died in gun suicides, and 1,220 died in unintentional shootings. ■ Most Hispanic murder victims are killed with guns. In 2023, guns were used in more than three-quarters of the homicides where the victims were Hispanic. The latest data show that for homicides where the victim was Hispanic and a gun was used, 53.0 percent of these shootings involved a handgun. ■ The homicide victimization rate for Hispanics in the United States is higher than the homicide victimization rate for whites. The Hispanic homicide victimization rate in 2023 was 6.3 per 100,000. In comparison, the homicide victimization rate for whites was 2.9 per 100,000. ■ As a result of the limitations in current data collection, the total number of Hispanic victims is almost certainly higher than the reported numbers suggest. Government agencies often report data on race but not on ethnic origin. Recognizing the changing demographic landscape in the United States, it is clear that fully documenting such victimization is a crucial step in preventing it. RECOMMENDATIONS Governmental agencies that collect data on death and injury should obtain complete information on the ethnic origin of individuals in addition to their race. This will ensure complete and accurate data collection on Hispanic victims of lethal violence. ■ Individual-level ethnic origin information should be captured by all governmental agencies, regardless of department, and at all levels — local, state, and national — for all pertinent users and subjects of agency services. ■ Individual-level ethnic origin information should be self-reported and not based solely on a person’s surname or other measure. ■ All public access data and published reports issued by governmental agencies should include information on ethnic origin in addition to race. ■ The U.S. Department of Justice should issue periodic or special reports on Hispanic victimization. ■ States with a substantial proportion of Hispanic residents should issue periodic or special reports on Hispanic victimization and deaths due to all causes, including violence. Improved data collection is essential to fully understanding the scope of lethal firearms violence against Hispanics and helping develop effective measures to reduce such violence. At the same time additional efforts, both supporting current programs and activities as well as identifying new violence-reduction opportunities and approaches, should include the following: ■ Support for community-based violence intervention programs that are holistic and encourage participation by all stakeholders. ■ Educational efforts to better inform Hispanics of the risks associated with bringing a firearm into the home as measured by increased risk for homicide, suicide, and unintentional firearm deaths compared to how rarely guns are used in justifiable homicides. This is especially important in the face of current coordinated efforts by the gun industry targeting Hispanics as potential first-time gun buyers.b ■ Improved access to resources for victims and survivors of domestic violence. ■ Identification of anti-trafficking measures that could help interrupt the flow of illegal firearms into impacted communities   

By Juan Albarracín, Juan Corredor-Garcia, Juan Pablo Milanese, Inge H. Valencia & Jonas Wolff

Violence in post-conflict settings is often attributed to a post-war boom in organized crime, facilitated by the demobilization of armed groups and the persisting weakness of the state. The article argues that this is only one pathway of post-conflict violence. A second causal pathway emerges from the challenges that peace processes can constitute for entrenched local political orders. By fostering political inclusion, the implementation of peace agreements may threaten subnational political elites that have used the context of armed conflict to ally with armed non-state actors. Violence is then used as a means to preserve such de facto authoritarian local orders. We start from the assumption that these two explanations are not exclusive or competing, but grasp different causal processes that may well both be at work behind the assassination of social leaders (líderes sociales) in Colombia since the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla. We argue that this specific type of targeted violence can, in fact, be attributed to different, locally specific configurations that resemble the two pathways. The article combines fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis with the case studies of the municipalities

By David C. Pyrooz,  James A. Densley, Jillian K. Peterson

INTRODUCTION Mass shootings, defined as incidents where 4 or more people are shot with a firearm, have become a significant public health concern in the US.

OBJECTIVE To estimate the prevalence of direct exposure to mass shootings among US adults and identify the sociodemographic groups most affected.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS A survey was administered in January 2024 to a sample of 10 000 respondents (18 years or older) designed to be representative of US adults using a multistage matched sampling design. In addition to exposure to mass shootings, the survey also collected sociodemographic information, including age, gender, self-reported race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

EXPOSURE Survey respondents were asked about their lifetime presence at the scene of a mass shooting, any physical injuries sustained (including being shot or trampled or experiencing a related physical injury), and the features of such incidents.

MAIN OUTCOME AND MEASURES Multivariable logistic regression was used to generate adjusted odds ratios (AORs) of the associations between sociodemographic measures and being present on the scene of and injured in a mass shooting. All analyses undertaken to generate population and relational inferences were weighted to achieve representativeness of US adults.

RESULTS Of the 10 000 respondents included in the analysis, 51.34% (95% CI, 50.27%-52.40%) were female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 3.04% (95% CI, 2.71%-3.38%) were Asian, 12.46% (95% CI, 11.81%-13.12%) were Black, 16.04% (95% CI, 15.10%-16.98%) were Hispanic, 62.78% (95% CI, 61.73%-63.84%) were White, and 5.67% (95% CI, 5.23%-6.11%) were other race or ethnicity. The findings indicated that 6.95% (95% CI, 6.39%-7.50%) of respondents were present at the scene of a mass shooting, and 2.18% (95% CI, 1.85%-2.50%) sustained physical injuries, such as being shot or trampled, during such incidents. A total of 54.89% of mass shootings to which respondents were exposed occurred in 2015 or more recently, and 76.15% took place in respondents’ local communities. Mass shootings were most likely to occur in neighborhoods. Younger individuals (eg, AOR for Baby Boomer and Silent generations vs Generation Z, 0.12; 95% CI, 0.09-0.18) and males (AOR, 1.55; 95% CI, 1.29-1.85) were more likely to report exposure compared with those from older generations or female individuals, respectively. Black respondents reported higher rates of being present at mass shootings (AOR, 1.87; 95% CI, 1.49-2.34), while Asian respondents reported lower rates (AOR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.19-0.66), compared with White respondents, but there were no racial and ethnic differences in injuries sustained. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings from this survey study of US adults underscore the extensive and often overlooked regular exposure to mass shootings in this country. The demographic disparities in exposure highlight the need for targeted interventions and support for the most affected groups, particularly younger generations and males. Understanding these patterns is essential for addressing the broader impacts of gun violence on public health and community well-being. 

By Kaitlin Forsberg, Kameron J Sheats, Janet M Blair, Brenda L Nguyen, Esther Amoakohene, Carter J Betz, Bridget H Lyons

Problem/Condition: In 2022, approximately 24,000 persons died of homicide and approximately 49,000 persons died of suicide in the United States, according to the National Vital Statistics System. This report summarizes data from CDC’s National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) on suicides, homicides, legal intervention deaths, unintentional firearm injury deaths, and deaths of undetermined intent that occurred in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico in 2022. Results are reported by sex, age group, race and ethnicity, method of injury, type of location where the injury occurred, circumstances of injury, and other selected characteristics. In contrast to the 2021 NVDRS report, which collected data from a subset of states and included suicide data for persons aged ≥10 years, this report includes data from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and includes suicide data for all ages.

Period Covered: 2022.

Description of System: NVDRS collects data from death certificates, coroner and medical examiner reports, and law enforcement reports. This report includes data collected for violent deaths and suicides that occurred in 2022. Data were collected from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. A total of 47 states had statewide data, three states had data from counties representing a subset of their population (32 California counties, representing 68% of its population; 32 Florida counties, representing 70% of its population; and 13 Texas counties, representing 63% of its population), and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had jurisdiction-wide data. NVDRS collates information for each death and links deaths that are related (e.g., multiple homicides, homicide followed by suicide, or multiple suicides) into a single incident.

Results: For 2022, NVDRS collected information on 72,127 fatal incidents involving 74,148 deaths that occurred in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. In addition, data were collected for 727 fatal incidents involving 809 deaths in Puerto Rico, which were analyzed separately. Of the 74,148 deaths that occurred in 50 states and the District of Columbia, the majority (60.6%) were suicides, followed by homicides (30.2%), deaths of undetermined intent (7.1%), legal intervention deaths (1.4%) (i.e., deaths caused by law enforcement and other persons with legal authority to use deadly force acting in the line of duty, excluding legal executions, without denoting the lawfulness or legality of the circumstances surrounding the death), and unintentional firearm injury deaths (<1.0%). Of the 809 deaths that occurred in Puerto Rico, 73.9% were homicides and 23.5% were suicides.

By: Naoka Carey, Rebekah Levine Coley

Objectives: This study explores the changing prevalence of adolescent handgun carriage, with attention to differences across sociodemographic groups.Methods: Data were drawn from repeated cross-sectional, nationally representative surveys conducted annually from 2002 to 2019, the National Survey on Drug Use & Health. The study sample included adolescents aged 12 to 17 (N = 297 055). Logistic regression models estimated the prevalence of past year handgun carriage across cohort and sociodemographic subgroups. Interactions between 4-time cohorts and other variables explored sociodemographic variability in prevalence rates over time.

Results: Handgun carriage increased significantly, particularly among rural, White, and higher-income adolescents. Carriage increased by 41% over cohorts, with predicted prevalence rates increasing from 3.3% in 2002-2006 to 4.6% in 2015-2019. Across cohorts, rural (5.1%), American Indian/Alaskan Native (5.2%), lower-income (<$20 000; 3.9%), male (5.9%), and older (16-17 years old; 4.5%) adolescents were the most likely to report carriage. However, these patterns changed significantly over time, with White and higher-income adolescents (>$75 000) most likely to carry in the most recent cohorts. Predicted carriage rates increased from 3.1% to 5.3% among White adolescents, from 2.6% to 5.1% among higher-income adolescents, and from 4.3% to 6.9% among rural adolescents between the 2002-2006 and 2015-2019 cohorts. Carriage among Black, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and lower-income adolescents decreased.Conclusions: Adolescent handgun carriage is increasing, concentrated among particular subgroups of youth, and carriage patterns across sociodemographic groups have changed over time. Programs to address the risk of adolescent gun carriage should be tailored to the specific sociocultural and place-based concerns of diverse adolescents.

By John J. Donohue

Substantial evidence has documented a powerful “instrumentality†effect: the more lethal the weaponry employed, the greater the likelihood that death will result from any given assault. This finding provides the foundation for the subsequent findings that a variety of measures that restrict the prevalence or limit the permissible types of lethal weaponry can lower the costs of gun violence. The literature has advanced to the point that there is a sufficient empirical basis to call for the elimination of right-to-carry laws, to reestablish bans on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, to maintain restrictions on youthful access to guns, and to repeal stand-your-ground laws. The Supreme Court’s recent decision expanding the scope of the Second Amendment in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen shows a concerning disinterest in the importance of these empirical findings.

By University of Chicago, Crime Lab

New insights from the field of behavioral science open new doors for addressing a seemingly intractable, and uniquely American, public health crisis: gun violence. This brief presents results from a study of the Chicago-based Choose to Change® (C2C®) program, a partnership between non-profits Brightpoint and Youth Advocate Programs, Inc. (YAP)™. The data show that it is possible to create large and lasting reductions in violent-crime arrests among a program population that has historically been hard to reach: youth who are increasingly disconnected from school. If gun violence = guns + violence, then anything that reduces the prevalence of violence overall can be an important part of the solution to solving gun violence.  

By Nathan P. Jones and John P. Sullivan

Criminal cartels and gangs dominate the illicit economy in Mexico. These organized crime groups challenge the solvency (specifically capacity and legitimacy) of the state in Mexico. Organized crime in Mexico is involved in a range of activities including extortion, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and petroleum theft. Criminal cartels, often called drug trafficking organizations, have diversified into other illicit activities specifically petroleum theft. This paper provides an overview of the rise of a specialized organized criminal entity: huachicoleros. Huachicoleros specialize in fuel theft and like their narco counterparts use corruption and violence to protect their illicit market. The rise of Cártel de Santa Rosa Lima (CSRL) is discussed as a salient case study. The volatile mix of corruption, violence, and economic instability will be assessed, and government and national oil company (PEMEX) response is discussed

By Omar García-Ponce 

Organized criminal groups (OCGs), ranging from local gangs to powerful drug cartels that operate across national boundaries, represent the single most important security threat in Mexico and Central America. A growing body of research in political science and other disciplines has examined the political and socioeconomic roots of these organizations, as well as the mechanisms underlying the production of organized criminal violence. The unprecedented wave of organized criminal violence that has been affecting the region in recent years can be traced back to political transformations and policy changes that disrupted the social and political order at the local level, redefining the organization of illicit markets, and undermining the rule of law. On these issues there is a particularly rich literature that focuses on understanding the outbreak of violence and criminal rivalry in Mexico. Several studies have emphasized the role of state-criminal group relationships as a key factor to understand the challenges that organized crime poses in terms of peacebuilding and democratic rule. Within this framework, the existing literature has identified various forms of criminal governance prevalent in Mexico and Central America, and shed light on how communities respond to crime and violence in contexts of low state capacity. Some of these responses include social mobilization, vigilantism, and support for extralegal violence. The use of violence by OCGs in electoral contexts has also received particular attention in the literature, since they often target candidates or intimidate voters, affecting political preferences and patterns of political participation. Finally, a series of studies has rigorously investigated the impact of organized criminal violence on a number of outcomes, including political attitudes and behavior, trust in institutions, and health and education, among others.

By Omar García-Ponce

The study of criminal violence has received increasing attention in political science over the past 15 years, as organized criminal groups have grown and diversified worldwide, unleashing unprecedented waves of violence. This article presents a critical assessment of the current state of political science scholarship on criminal violence. It discusses the sources and dynamics of organized criminal violence, emphasizing the reconceptualization of state–criminal group relationships in the literature, shifts in illegal markets, and the political incentives fueling criminal wars. It also examines how states and societies respond to criminal violence. State responses include punitive approaches, institutional reform, and community-based interventions, while societal responses can be examined through the lenses of exit (e.g., migration, disengagement), voice (e.g., political participation, collective resistance), and loyalty (i.e., compliance with state authorities or criminal groups). The article also addresses conceptual and methodological challenges, policy implications, and ethical considerations inherent in this field of study and identifies promising pathways for future research.

By David Spencer

London is in the grip of a crime wave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusLondon is in the grip of a crimewave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusLondon is in the grip of a crimewave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusfalling – dropping from 66.1% in 2014 to 55.4% in 2024. For violencerelated offences, imprisonment rates have also decreased, with just 36.5% of offenders sentenced to custody in 2024. Despite laws mandating prison for repeat knife offenders, around a third evade immediate incarceration. It appears likely that these rates of incarceration will fall even further in the coming years given the Government’s apparent intention to send fewer offenders to prison following the Independent Sentencing Review led by Rt Hon David Gauke1 and the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts led by Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson.2 The failure to adequately deal with the most prolific offenders presented before the courts is perhaps the gravest sign of the permissiveness with which the criminal justice system treats those most dedicated to committing crime. In the year to December 2024, of the 8,207 “hyperprolific” offenders who already had 46 or more previous criminal convictions or cautions, only 44.5% were sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment on conviction for a further indictable or “eitherway” criminal offence – 4,555 hyper-prolific offenders were released on conviction without receiving an immediate term of imprisonment. Of the 16,386 “super-prolific” offenders with between 26 and 45 previous convictions or cautions, only 42.1% were sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment on conviction for a further indictable or “eitherway” criminal offence – 9,483 super-prolific offenders were released on conviction without receiving an immediate term of imprisonment. It is difficult to conceive of a collection of statistics which better demonstrates the contempt with which the criminal justice system is treating the lawabiding majority. Chapter 3 examines the effectiveness of high-visibility policing in crime “hotspots” – citing evidence which demonstrates that the tactic is highly effectively at reduces crime. However, the use of a key element of proactive police patrolling – stop and search – has fallen significantly over the last decade, partly because of the policies of the Conservative-led coalition government (supported by the now Home Secretary Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP). The reduction in stop and search coincided with substantial increases knife crime, suggesting the reforms introduced in all likelihood significantly undermined the fight against crime. We cite research by the criminologists Piquero and Sherman (2025) which demonstrates that increased stop and search correlates with reduced knife crime. Stop and search in London has been widely criticised for racial disproportionality, often framed as evidence of “racist” policing. Critics argue that black Londoners are unfairly targeted – claims we robustly challenge. Data shows that black people are “over-represented” among victims of the most serious knife crime – within London black people are 3.38 times more likely to be killed in a knife-enabled non-domestic homicide than white people. Similarly black people are 5.0 times more likely than white people in London to be charged with murder. While only 13.5% of London’s population are black, 48.6% of robbery suspects are described as black by victims when reporting the crime to the police. Incontrast to allegations of police “racism”, outcomes of stop and search in London reveal that black suspects are 64% more likely than white suspects to receive ‘community resolutions’ when a prohibited item is found when searching for a weapon (rather than be charged or summonsed and sent to court). This suggests there may well be a leniency being shown towards black suspects compared to white suspects. It is not the role of policing to correct for all of society’s ills – to quote the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police Sir Stephen Watson QPM: “It’s really important in policing that you play the ball that is bowled – you describe the problem, you faithfully attack the various ingredients of the problem and you do so without fear or favour in the public interest”.3 We agree and strongly reject the political ideology and timidity of police leaders which has led to the precipitous reductions in stop and search. As part of better serving the law-abiding majority there should be a surge in stop and search within those parts of London where knife crime, robbery and theft is most prevalent. Chapter 4 examines how offenders can be targeted – specifically through innovative Live Facial Recognition technology and innovations in court orders which limit the activities of known offenders. The Metropolitan Police’s deployment of Live Facial Recognition as a tool to identify wanted individuals, particularly within crime hotspots, has been remarkably successful. In 2023 the force undertook 24 deployments in the capital – in 2024 there were 179 deployments and by mid-June 2025 there had been 94 deployments. An Independent evaluation by the National Physical Laboratory confirmed that the technology can be deployed with a high degree of accuracy and – notably, an absence of significant demographic bias when properly configured. Despite demonstrable results – including 1,045 arrests since 2023 – several London councils have passed motions opposing its use. This includes Islington Council which at the time was led by Kaya Comer-Schwartz – who was subsequently appointed by the Mayor of London Sir Sadiq Khan as the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime. The chapter also reviews a series of legal tools, including Knife Crime Prevention Orders and Serious Violence Reduction Orders, which can be utilised to restrict repeat offenders’ behaviours but have seen limited or inconsistent application. We recommend that their application is made mandatory for certain violent and knife-carrying offenders. Londoners and visitors to the capital face a street crime epidemic – one which includes a very real risk of becoming a victim of seriousviolence, robbery or theft. The steps taken by the Metropolitan Police, Mayor of London and Government have so far been unequal to the task. The Metropolitan Police must take an unequivocal “Crime Fighting First” approach – in those locations where rates of knife crime, robbery and theft are highest that should mean a “Zero Tolerance” approach to crime and criminals. The Government and Mayor of London must demonstrate the necessary political leadership to explicitly reject the policies and ideologies which have led us to this point.The law-abiding majority of people do not accept the status quo, and neither do we at Policy Exchange – this report should act as a call to action for political leaders and police chiefs alike.

By Pamela Ruiz

Government officials in northern Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) claim the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 are primarily responsible for violence in their countries. These gangs have been identified to exert violence, extortion rackets, and confront security forces that enter gang-controlled communities (Seelke, 2014; Natarajan et al, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2017; Servicio Social Pasionista (SSPAS), 2017; Insight Crime and Asociación para una Sociedad mas Justa (ASJ) [Association for a more Just Society] 2016, Arce, 2015). But exactly how do gangs contribute to violence and extortion rackets in these countries? What are the differences, if any, on how the gangs commit these crimes in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador? This working paper discusses the complex violence dynamics in northern Central America and argues that a chronic deficiency in data, weak rule of law, and impunity exacerbate insecurity in these countries. The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 originated in Los Angeles, California and are now present throughout the United States, northern Central America, Spain, and Italy (Franco, 2008; Valdez, 2009; Seelke, 2016; Valencia, 2016; Finklea, 2018; Dudley & Avalos, 2018). Barrio 18 was formed in the 1960s by mixed-race Mexican, and MS-13 was formed in latter 1980s by Salvadorans who fled the civil war (Franco, 2008; Valdez, 2009; Seelke, 2016; Wolf, 2012). Some scholars argue gang culture was exported when individuals with criminal records were deported to their country of origin, while other scholars argue voluntary migration contributed to gangs’ presence in northern Central America (Arana, 2005; Franco, 2008; Seelke, 2016; Cruz, 2010). It is imperative to clarify that a criminal removal from the United States is not synonymous,nor does it imply a perfect correlation with a gang member being removed. Nonetheless, these gangs have become major security concerns in northern Central America. This study examined the concentration of crimes often attributed exclusively to gangs (homicides, extortion, and confrontations) using administrative data from the Salvadoran National Civilian Police, Honduran Prosecutor’s Office, and Guatemalan National Civilian Police. Interviews with subject matter experts supplemented the quantitative analysis to gain further understanding of violence dynamics per country. This paper follows with a literature review on homicides, extortion, and confrontations trends in northern Central America, a methodology section, results, and a discussion.  

Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center , Florida International University,  January 2022 31p.

By Megan Kang

This study draws on 95 interviews and observations with gang-affiliated individuals in Chicago to examine how gang structures shape disengagement and desistance from crime. During the last two decades, the city's gangs have experienced a decline in group closure, or their capacity to regulate membership and member behavior, and a blurring of boundaries between those active in a gang from all others. In the past, Chicago's gangs maintained closure and bright boundaries that made gang affiliations, norms, and territories clearly defined. Leaving these gangs required costly exit rituals that signaled an unambiguous departure while facilitating desistance. Today, with weaker gang structures and blurry boundaries, leaving a gang is no longer a distinct event. The ease of gang disengagement, however, makes desistance harder as inactive members struggle to knife off past ties and access turning points. In this uncertain landscape, desistance tactics can backfire, sending “blurred signals”—behaviors intended to create distance from former affiliates and rivals but appear as wavering commitment to supporters—that trap individuals in a liminal space between social worlds. Contrary to leading desistance theories that emphasize individual readiness, opportunity, and prosocial bonds, this study underscores how group structures critically shape pathways out of crime.

CriminologyVolume 63, Issue 4 Nov 2025 Pages687-883

By Natasha P. Sobers, Joeleita Agard, Katrina Norville, Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, Callixtus Joseph, Madeleine Joseph, Maria Garcia-Joseph, Reginald King, Patrick Jason Toppin, Hugh Wong, Simon G. Anderson

In the Caribbean, gun violence has reached crisis levels and regional heads of government have called for a public health approach to inform prevention and control. Feedback loops resulting from work carried out under the ‘Pathway to Policy’ project showed that firearm-related crimes increased the chances of household poverty, national economic costs, deaths and disability and promoted a culture of violence, all of which reinforced gun violence. Interventions to reduce illicit access and use of firearms, social development programs, and investment in educational systems may balance rates of gun violence.

Firearm-related violence in the Caribbean is a complex systemic issue: how do we move towards a solution?—an article co-written with our project partners from the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, the Caribbean Public Health Agency, and the George Alleyne Chronic Disease Center at the University of the West Indies—discusses the work carried out by the Advisory Committee of Regional Experts, a multisectoral group convened to develop a ‘pathway to policy’ that informs a regional approach to tackling firearm violence. Using a systems mapping technique to inform our understanding of firearm-related crimes and injuries based on the expertise of stakeholders and based on analysis of publicly available data from thirteen countries within the Caribbean Community, this article calls for greater attention to the equilibrium between crime response strategies and prevention approaches.

By Rachel Locke, Kelsey Paul Shantz, Andrei Serbin Pont, Jai-Ayla Sutherland
This open access book represents a multiyear exploration into identity-based mass violence (IBMV) within urban contexts. It explores the complexities of structural and acute violence in cities, drawing on local solutions rooted in the fields of urban violence prevention, atrocity prevention, and peacebuilding. The authors present a multidimensional approach that addresses sexual and gender-based violence, racial and ethnic violence, gang or group-based violence, state-perpetrated violence, political violence, violence against migrants, and others. The volume investigates the outsized influence of power in shaping how violence is understood and how prevention outcomes are evaluated. The chapters span scholarship, practical guidance, and lived experience of enduring and bearing witness to IBMV. This volume speaks directly to reform-minded partners and allies in policy and practice, as well as to funders and supporters. It provides a practical foundation for collaborative, prevention-focused action and policy opportunities.
Cham: Springer Nature, 2025. 

By Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya

We synthesize research on conflict as a fundamental economic phenomenon, arguing that the implications of the ”dark side of self-interest” have received insufficient attention in economics. We define conflict as interactions where parties choose costly inputs that are adversarially combined against one another — distinct from the collaborative input combinations typical in economic models. We make four key contributions: First, we demonstrate that conflict induces economically significant costs comparable to or exceeding traditional deadweight losses. Second, we explain how these costs vary across contexts based on property rights protection, state capacity, and cultural norms. Third, we show how incorporating conflict into economic models leads to substantially different predictions than traditional models — including inverse relationships between compensation and productivity; distortions in comparative advantage; prices determined by power rather than solely by preferences endowments, and technology. Fourth, attributes of modern states such as centralization in the presence of law, checks and balances, other forms of distributed power, and the bureaucratic form of organization can partly be thought of as restraining conflict and appropriation, with implications for governance and economic development. Overall, in the presence of conflict and appropriation, power considerations cannot be separated from economics and first-best models are not empirically plausible.

 CESifo Working Paper No. 12135, 2025

By Katalin Parti  · Faika Tahir  · Pamela B. Teaster 

Cyber victimization targeting vulnerable populations, particularly older adults, has become increasingly prevalent in the digital age. Grounded in the Bioecological Systems Framework (Bronfenbrenner in The ecology of human development: Experiments by nature and design, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1979), this research explores the factors contributing to victimization, including the ease of exploitation, the situational factors setting up victims for scams, their vulnerabilities, the dynamics within their environments, and the challenges victims face in recognizing scams. Using semi-structured interviews, we asked scam victims (n=19) aged 60 years and above about their personal and structural circumstances as well as their individual assessment of the impact of their being victimized. Despite high levels of education and computer literacy among our sample, their victimization occurred far too frequently, which prompts a call for the revision of existing approaches toward helping older adults overcome scam victimization.  

  Security Journal (2025) 38:49

By Yen Zhi Yi
SYNOPSIS
In recent months, heightened media scrutiny has drawn attention to the proliferation of scam centres along Myanmar’s border towns and the subsequent crackdowns on them. Concurrently, Singapore has also witnessed a significant increase in scam-related incidents, with the government urging vigilance and taking precautionary measures to safeguard its citizens. Against this backdrop, it is imperative for ASEAN countries to work collaboratively to tackle this growing cross-border scourge. Doing so calls for stepped-up action at home to enhance awareness and enforcement collaboration abroad among regional partners to check this transnational security challenge.
 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

Socio-economic status, demographic background and criminal history.

By Lisa Westfelt

This study focuses on aspects that have not yet been examined in Swedish research: the socio-economic status and demographic background of victims and perpetrators at the time homicides are committed, as well as the victims and perpetrators’ criminal histories.

English summary of Brå report 2025:5 Stockholm: The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), 2025. 14p.