By Kristin M. Tennyson, Lindsey Jeralds, Julie Zibulsky

Congress requires courts to consider several factors when determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed in federal cases, among them the “history and characteristics of the defendant.” The sentencing guidelines also specifically authorize judges to consider an offender’s age when determining whether to depart from the federal sentencing guidelines. In this report, the Commission presents information on a relatively small number of offenders who were aged 50 or older at the time they were sentenced in the federal system. In particular, the report examines older federal offenders who were sentenced in fiscal year 2021 and the crimes they committed, then assesses whether age was given a special consideration at sentencing. This report specifically focuses on three issues that could impact the sentencing of older offenders: age and infirmity, life expectancy, and the risk of recidivism.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2022. 68p.

By Courtney Semisch

This publication provides data on the broad variety of economic crime sentenced under §2B1.1.  The Commission undertook a project to systematically identify and classify the myriad of economic crimes sentenced under §2B1.1 using offenders' statutes of conviction and offense conduct. The Commission used this two-step methodology to assign the 6,068 offenders sentenced under §2B1.1 in fiscal year 2017 to one of 29 specific types of economic crime. This publication provides, for the first time, data from this new project as well as a brief description of the study's methodology.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2019. 87p.

By Tracey Kyckelhahn, Tiffany Choi

This study expands on prior Commission research by examining the geographic mobility of federal offenders. For this report, mobility is defined as having convictions in multiple states, including the location of the conviction for the instant offense. This report adds to the existing literature on offender criminal history in two important ways. First, the report provides information on how mobile federal offenders are, as measured by the number of offenders with convictions in multiple states. Second, the report provides information on the proportion of offenders with convictions in states other than the state in which the offender was convicted for the instant offense. The report also examines the degree to which out-of-state convictions in offenders’ criminal histories contributed to their criminal history score and their Criminal History Category.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2020.  24p.

By Kristin M. Tennyson, Charles S. Ray,  Kevin T. Maass  

This report examines the relatively new and emerging problem of fentanyl and fentanyl analogue trafficking. It summarizes the Commission’s related policy work and discusses the continuing policy-making efforts of Congress and the Department of Justice in this area. Finally, the publication presents data about fentanyl and fentanyl analogue offenses since 2005 and provides an in-depth analysis of fiscal year 2019 fentanyl and fentanyl analogue offenses and offenders.

Washington, DC; United States Sentencing Commission, 2021. 60p.

By Harjeev Kour Sudan, Andy Man Yeung Tai, Jane Kim, and Reinhard Michael Krausz

Introduction: The Dark Web is a subsection of the Internet only accessible through specific search engines, making it impossible to trace users. Due to extensive anonymity, the drug trade on the Dark Web makes regulation complicated. We sought to uncover the scope of the online drug trade on the Dark Web and the impact it may have on the dynamics of global drug trafficking.

Methods: We conducted a literature review to elucidate the availability and distribution of drugs on the Dark Web based on data reported in existing literature (n = 14) between September 2012 and June 2019. We simultaneously collected data about substances and listings from Dark Web cryptomarkets (n = 13) active between August 2022 and January 2023. Data from the literature review and the Dark Web scrape were combined to draw trends in the chronological availability and distribution of drugs between 2012 and 2023.

Results: The data collected from 13 cryptomarkets between late 2022 and early 2023 showed a relative change in substance distribution compared to 2012–2019, with a decrease in prescription drugs (from >20% to <5%) and a doubling of opioid listings (from 5.5% to 9.25%), while no major changes were observed on average during 2012–2019 according to literature.

Conclusions: The Dark Web warrants more attention in the analysis of the global drug trade. Understanding Dark Web drug markets can inform targeted interventions and strategies to reduce drug-related harms, while ongoing research is necessary to anticipate and respond to future changes in the landscape of the illicit drug trade.

Drug Science, Policy and Law Volume 9 January-December 2023

By Scott W. Duxbury and Dana L. Haynie

Although economic sociology emphasizes the role of social networks for shaping economic action, little research has examined how network governance structures affect prices in the unregulated and high-risk social context of online criminal trade. We consider how over-embeddedness—a state of excessive interconnectedness among market actors—arises from endogenous trade relations to shape prices in illegal online markets with aggregate consequences for short-term gross illegal revenue. Drawing on transaction-level data on 16 847 illegal drug transactions over 14months of trade in a ‘darknet’ drug market, we assess how repeated exchanges and closure in buyer– vendor trade networks nonlinearly influence prices and short-term gross revenue from illegal drug trade. Using a series of panel models, we find that increases in closure and repeated exchange raise prices until a threshold is reached upon which prices and gross monthly revenue begin to decline as networks become over-embedded. Findings provide insight into the network determinants of prices and gross monthly revenue in illegal online drug trade and illustrate how network structure shapes prices in criminal markets, even in anonymous trade environments.

Socio-Economic Review, 2023, Vol. 21, No. 1, 25–50

By Andrew Scourfield, Catherine Flick, Jack Ross, David M. Wood, Natalie Thurtle, Darryl Stellmach & Paul I. Dargan

Changes in legislation have affected supply routes of new psychoactive substances such as synthetic cannabinoids with evidence of supply over the darknet. We identified darknet drug markets using an index database and Tor Browser to access markets. We identified SC in product listings using a custom-programmed script. We collected data at bimonthly intervals (August 2016–April 2017). Eleven darknet markets listed SC for sale, the largest number from China, UK, US, Netherlands, and Germany. Formulations available were high purity powder/crystal, smoking preparations and vape preparations. The top five listed compounds from China across the time points were FUB-AMB, ABD-FUBINACA, 5F-NPB-22, MAB-CHMINACA, and NM-2201. 5F-CUMYL4CN-PINACA was unavailable at early time points but emerged during the study. Cost of high purity formulations from China ranged from 1.3 to 3.1 Euro per gram for quantities 1000 g. Europe and North America accounted for 99% smoking preparations predominantly in small packages (<50 g). SC are widely available on the darknet with availability changing over time. High purity formulations are predominantly available from China in quantities up to kilograms with price per gram reducing with increased quantity. Small packages of ready-made smoking mixtures are available from Europe and North America.

Toxicology Communications, 3:1, 7-15, DOI: 10.1080/24734306.2018.1563739 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.10 , 2019.

By Alexandra Karden; Julian Strizek

Over the last decade, drug sales through cryptomarkets located on the so-called darknet have received increasing attention. This paper considers how web surveys might be used to provide insights concerning those people who purchase drugs on cryptomarkets. First, it analyses data from the European Web Survey on Drugs (EWSD), with a view to identifying differences between respondents who buy drugs on cryptomarkets and those who acquire drugs from other sources. The study shows that people using cryptomarkets as a usual source of supply were a small group of users in most participating countries, but that proportions differ significantly, and that buyers were more likely to be male and consume more substances on average. Second, the sampling of web survey respondents on the darknet is discussed based on a sampling strategy tested in Austria, highlighting the challenges and opportunities involved in undertaking survey recruitment on the darknet. The paper highlights the importance of building trust, establishing credibility and guaranteeing anonymity, since awareness of privacy issues is seemingly higher among darknet users than surface web users. By doing so, the authors show how people who buy drugs on cryptomarkets might be reached to improve their representation in future web surveys for drug data collection.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 2022. 9p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Flore Berger, Kingsley Madueke, Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo and Lyes Tagziria

Self-defence groups have proliferated across West Africa. While these groups are often considered key sources of resilience for local communities, they often pose major political and security concerns. Given their entrenchment in many contexts in the region, this report outlines what lessons can be learned from cross-continental experiences towards building a more effective framework to mitigate the risks and harness the benefits of self-defence groups.

Recommendations l ECOWAS should leverage its role as a regional normsetter by adopting and promoting a regional charter of principles for the regulation of armed self-defence groups. l States should prioritise diagnoses and dialogues to rebuild trust between state, communities and self-defence groups. l There are several key considerations that must be taken into account when states adopt a strategy of absorbing or legalising self-defence groups. l Impunity of self-defence group members must be effectively and publicly challenged, emphasising narratives around accountability, with clear mandates established. l Community and civil society oversight mechanisms for self-defence groups must be strengthened and engaged with by national policymakers. l Clearly defined demobilisation programmes and ‘exit strategies’ must be crafted to ensure long-term sustainable peace.

OCWAR-T::Organised Crime: West African Response to Trafficking. 2024. 28p.

By Alistair Fraser, Keir Irwin-Rogers, Fern Gillon, Susan McVie, Tilman Schwarze

Violence is a critical issue around the world. In addition to the high financial costs, it takes a heavy toll on community wellbeing. Young people are most commonly affected by violence, with the World Health Organisation estimating that 43% of global homicides involve people aged 10-29 (WHO 2016). Over the last two decades, Scotland has witnessed a remarkable reduction in serious violence, including homicide, and has managed to sustain this while rates of violence in other parts of the UK have increased. This has led to an increasing consensus around Scotland’s ‘public health approach’ to violence reduction and heavy investment in specialist violence reduction units across England and Wales. Despite the perceived success of the Scottish approach, however, there has to date been a lack of evidence on the causes of violence reduction in Scotland. While it is clear that lessons can be learned, there is confusion over what public health approaches are, how they work, and the conditions under which such ideas can travel. This briefing paper aims to summarise the evidence-base on violence reduction in Scotland and highlight key lessons for other jurisdictions. It is based on a three-year research project, funded by the ESRC, involving detailed analysis of statistical data on violence, 190 interviews with senior stakeholders and community participants across the UK, reviews of Scottish Government policy, and case-studies with communities affected by violence. The briefing focuses on lessons that can be drawn from Scotland’s violence reduction journey, answering four basic questions: (1) What has changed? (2) Why did it change? (3) Where are we now and (4) Where do we go from here?

Glasgow: Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, 2024. 32p.

By Amer Smailbegovic , Nedzad Korajlic, Marija Lucic-Catic, Muamer Kavazovic

ABSTRACT: The Penal-Correctional Institution of the Enclosed Type in Zenica (Kazneno-popravni zavod zatvorenog tipa Zenica), Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been in continuous operation for over 130 years and is currently the largest and most-diverse penal institution in the country. With 714 inmates serving lengthy sentences (up to 40 years) for the variety of serious offenses (including terrorism), the issue of narcotics use, traffic and trade has been encountered and countered, particularly in the last decade. The types of drugs encountered in the institution range from prescription drugs (i.e. buprenorphine, methadone), to “heavy” narcotics (i.e. heroin, morphine, speed. The type, quantity and frequency of drug use and seizure shows certain seasonal and temporal effects and is associated with the inmate-furlough periods, awarded for good behavior. Many inmates use this privilege to bring narcotics into the facility. Some of the encountered substances have been seized from the facility visitors and even from the prison staff, in the past five years, but the charges have been generally dismissed by the prosecutors for the lack of evidence. An average seizure is about ten grams per incident, and the number of seizures has been continuous, suggesting considerable financial interest and gain for the drugs to enter the institution. There are various measures proposed to counter the traffic and limit the purchases, however the inmate population is very apt in using the current legal regulations and EU-mandates to circumvent the proposed countermeasures. This study is presenting some of the findings, directions and recommendations for combating the drug-traffic within the correctional institution.

American Journal of Qualitative Research August 2020, Vol.4 No. 2, pp. 20-26

By Spencer Chainey and Robert Muggah

Despite numerous attempts to decrease homicides in the Latin American region, high homicide levels have persisted. Examining four cities in Rio de Janeiro, the research reveals the intense geographic concentration of homicides in each city, but illustrates differences in the extent of homicide concentration when using a variety of crime concentration measures. Single events involving multiple homicides and a homicide near repeat pattern are observed, with almost all these incidents taking place in areas of homicide concentration. The findings suggest that programmes targeted to areas of homicide concentration, including interventions that suppress the likelihood of future incidents, could decrease homicides.

The Police Journal, 95(2), 255-275. 2022.

 By Khachik Harutyunyan and Caitlin Maslen   

After a protracted conflict and a period of self-rule from 2005, South Sudan is now the world’s most recent sovereign country. The young state faces considerable governance challenges; it regularly ranks at or near the bottom of international corruption indices. Corruption is systemic across all levels of government and pervades nearly every economic sector, and perpetrators enjoy widespread impunity. As such, it takes a heavy toll on the populace by diverting the wealth from the country’s extensive oil reserves into private pockets instead of public service provision or gross fixed capital formation. This kleptocratic dynamic is embodied in scandals such as the Cash Grab and Dura Saga scandals. The international community has called on the South Sudanese government to take stronger action to tackle corruption. However, progress has been slow, and corruption remains a major challenge for South Sudan's future development  

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

 By David Olusegun Sotola and Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka  

Corruption in Sierra Leone remains a pervasive challenge. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, successive governments have made efforts to tackle corruption and hold perpetrators, especially those from the previous government, accountable, but challenges remain. Anti-corruption efforts have focused on amending laws, institutional frameworks and the establishment of a special anti-corruption judicial division but concerns about the backsliding of democracy in the country, weak checks on the power of the executive and the politicisation of the anti-corruption cause make it difficult to counter corruption effectively.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.

By Lasha Gogidze

The election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr, nicknamed “Bongbong”, as the President of the Philippines in May 2022 has sustained fears of state capture by oligarchic family clans, widespread grand corruption and human rights abuses, all of which marred the rule of his father, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the country’s former dictator who ruled from 1965 until 1986. Those fears appear to have been substantiated by continued extrajudicial killings, arrests of communist-linked leaders and activists, as well as the Marcos families’ unpaid taxes and damages to U.S. courts from human rights cases, leading to fears that this means further entrenchment of impunity.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

By Jackson Oldfield   

Corruption is widespread in Nigeria, where patronage networks and foreign actors play a significant role. Drivers of corruption include neo-patrimonialism and the “resource curse” – referring to the country’s abundance of natural resources. Bribery and other forms of corruption occur in many sectors, including public administration, the judiciary, the electricity sector, and extractive industries. Although several new anti-corruption laws have recently been introduced, weaknesses in relevant institutions have undermined their effectiveness. Despite these challenges, anti-corruption actors, such as civil society organisations, continue addressing corruption as a priority and have had notable achievements, particularly in the area of asset recovery.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023). 25p.

By Mathias Bak

Yemen's ongoing conflict has transformed into an economic battle, with various factions fighting over crucial resources, such as aid flows and control over state resources. The war economy has intensified existing corruption challenges and created avenues for illicit wealth accumulation for new power brokers and previously less powerful networks. However, this takeover of the state has not fundamentally changed the nature of the systematic corruption that has plagued Yemen long before 2014.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2024:1)

By Vaclav Prusa   

In 2023, President Mnangagwa secured a second term amid allegations of election irregularities and corruption in Zimbabwe. Despite anti-corruption efforts, challenges include political interference and resource constraints, hindering transparency. Though there have been efforts to address corruption in the natural resources sector, progress in prosecuting politically exposed persons and recovering stolen assets has been uneven. Likewise, hopes for reform since Mnangagwa's 2017 presidency have been tempered by enduring corruption, economic challenges, and human rights abuses. And illicit financial flows, notably linked to corruption in mining, timber, and wildlife, pose a significant international threat as they have drained billions of dollars from the country. Though civil society and independent media play crucial roles in exposing corruption, initiatives such as The Patriot Act, introduced in 2023, raises concerns about suppressing dissent and investigative journalism.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway ; Berlin: Transparency international, 2023. 26p.

By Chad Whelan, David Bright, and James Martin

The concept of organised cybercrime has been the subject of much debate over the last decade. Many researchers who have applied scholarly definitions of organised crime to cyber-criminal groups have concluded that such groups are not “organised criminal groups” and do not engage in “organised crime”. This paper adopts a different perspective to argue that certain cyber-criminal groups involved in ransomware can and should be considered organised crime if a more contemporary and flexible framework for conceptualising organised crime is adopted. We make this argument using three primary domains of organised crime first described by von Lampe: criminal activities, offender social structures, and extra-legal governance. We narrow in on the concepts of violence and extra-legal governance in particular as they have been interpreted to hold significant differences for criminal groups operating in physical and digital domains. The paper argues that it is time to move on from criminological debates regarding whether organised cybercrime can exist to focus on the many rich questions that researchers can take from organised crime scholarship and apply to cyber-criminal groups. We put forward a reconceptualisation of organised cybercrime towards this end.

Journal of Criminology, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/26338076231199793, Preprint 2023.

Sergi, Anna

Attention to the Calabrian mafia, the ‘ndrangheta, has been increasing across law enforcement authorities around the world. This paper aims at bringing forward a theoretical and operational conversation on how to best approach, from a policing perspective, what is a complex clan-based criminality able to operate simultaneously in different states. The paper will therefore formulate a preliminary framework for strategies focusing on the policing of mafia dynasties. It will do so by identifying how ‘ndrangheta clans can be studied as family dynasties, including in their assessment also the factors of family life (familiness) that can facilitate or obstruct the dynasty’s success. By looking at ‘ndrangheta clans as family dynasties, we can inform a framework that cuts through the most common policing aims and strategies against organised crime, as shared by states involved in current anti-mafia efforts.

‘Ndrangheta Dynasties: A Conceptual and Operational Framework for the Cross-Border Policing of the Calabrian Mafia. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15 (2). (2021) pp. 1522-1536.