By Mercedes De Freitas , et al.

Organised crime and corruption in Venezuela have become a state problem that not only keeps Venezuelans in constant danger, but their effects are already impacting a number of Latin American countries, while the United States and several European nations have witnessed how illegal operations of power groups have infiltrated their financial and real estate systems with dirty money stolen from Venezuela’s coffers. A simple explanation for the complex humanitarian emergency facing Venezuela is that the country was subjected for several years to misguided public policies and decisions by authorities, which in most cases right out aimed to steal large amounts of money from the nation’s Treasury. It was a Grand Corruption scheme,1 with systematic measures that impinged on the entire population. This context was a breeding ground for organised crime, which became stronger with substantial firepower and economic resources, to the point of collaborating—in many cases—with agencies at all levels of authority, including senior officials in the administration. In view of this situation, at the end of this investigation we propose a set of initiatives to combat this evil, which will require forceful and unprecedented actions in Venezuela, such as resorting to the support of international organisations in the search for solutions that have been effective in other countries of the hemisphere, to punish the culprits. This work encompassed a nationwide vision—as opposed to the 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption study2 focused on border issues—which shows the map of criminal organisations, the types of crimes, the regional situation in various states, the role of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), as well as an analysis of the situation of women regarding organised crime and corruption. The most important findings of this new study can be summarised as follows: 1. The existence of at least 9 major organised crime rings in Venezuela, involving more than 13,000 criminal organisations, some of which have ties to policy makers and public officials. 2. Crimes and acts of corruption boast total impunity. 3. The lack of robust public institutions, the dismantling of some of them, as well as the existence of incentives derived from some public policies such as price controls and fuel subsidies, are a breeding ground for misdeeds, crimes, human rights violations and the theft of public funds. 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women In this investigation, the effort was focused on determining the institutional, social and economic aspects of criminal activity in Venezuela and is developed in 6 chapters: 1. Anatomy of crime: the 9 major crime rings controlling Venezuela 2. Corruption and crime in the regions: lawless states. 3. Military power, crime and corruption. 4. Differential impact of corruption and organised crime on women in Venezuela. 5. Crime, security agencies and human rights. 6. A proposal to desmantled organized crime in Venezuela. The general objective has been to gather and organize relevant information, with the purpose of providing sufficient data and empirical analysis for political leadership, with power to lead the country, can design the strategies and public policies that will defeat and overcome corrupt practices, incentives to corruption and the action of organized crime that, to the detriment of governance and institutional integrity, have had devastating consequences for the lives of Venezuelans with violations to the human rights, destruction of the productive apparatus, of the public services, opportunities to overcome poverty, and that have generated a process of unprecedented degradation that led to the complex humanitarian emergency that they are suffering and still waiting for solutions. The statements, opinions, and ratings present in all chapters correspond experts, witnesses, victims and affected persons, some of whom have chosen not to disclose their identity

Caracas: Transparency Venezuela, 2020.....135p.

By Christopher Blattman

International drug trafficking dominates the conversation on organized crime, but equally common and serious are urban systems of organized crime—criminal groups focused not on exports or transshipment, but on dominating local markets, neighborhoods, and politics. When policymakers do pay attention to this problem, they consistently make the same mistake—believing there are best practices. But systems of organized crime are not all alike. There is no one blueprint or general solution, and so following the latest fad is unlikely to deliver the desired result. Instead of trying to copy the quasi-mythological success of a Giuliani or Bukele, policymakers need to understand what kind of organized crime problem they have, what capabilities their city possesses, and what tools are appropriate to the circumstances. This paper looks in-depth at how organized crime is organized in three cities: Chicago, Medellín, and San Salvador. It also considers New York, Bogotá, and Port-au-Prince. I argue that the primary driver of their organization and incentives is their source of criminal revenues. A second major driver of behavior is the degree of criminal political organization, which broadly-speaking takes three forms: atomized individuals, fragmented groups, and competing confederations. These forms are not just the product of their revenues, but are also the result of decades of competition with the state and one another. What policy tools will work hinges on this diagnosis. I look at the evidence for a range of standard policies—from crackdowns to street outreach—and explain why we can expect them to have wildly different impacts depending on the context

Prepared for 2024 IMF & IDB Conference Crime in Latin America , 2024. 48p.

By Louisa Waugh and Zahbia Yousuf

While there are known threads between criminality and conflict, most interventions to tackle either are rarely based on this knowledge. Therefore, integrating approaches to address both criminality and conflict at once continue to be a struggle.

Focusing on cases in Colombia, Kosovo and Mali, this report aims to move away from the blunt tools of law and order (aimed at rupturing organised crime networks) and counter-terrorism (aimed at degrading armed groups). It recognises the potential of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts as important vehicles for laying the foundations for sustainable peace.

London: Saferworld, 2022. 40p.

By Transparency Venezuela

  Organised crime and corruption in Venezuela have become a state problem that not only keeps Venezuelans in constant danger, but their effects are already impacting a number of Latin American countries, while the United States and several European nations have witnessed how illegal operations of power groups have infiltrated their financial and real estate systems with dirty money stolen from Venezuela’s coffers. A simple explanation for the complex humanitarian emergency facing Venezuela is that the country was subjected for several years to misguided public policies and decisions by authorities, which in most cases right out aimed to steal large amounts of money from the nation’s Treasury. It was a Grand Corruption scheme,1 with systematic measures that impinged on the entire population. This context was a breeding ground for organised crime, which became stronger with substantial firepower and economic resources, to the point of collaborating—in many cases—with agencies at all levels of authority, including senior officials in the administration. In view of this situation, at the end of this investigation we propose a set of initiatives to combat this evil, which will require forceful and unprecedented actions in Venezuela, such as resorting to the support of international organisations in the search for solutions that have been effective in other countries of the hemisphere, to punish the culprits. This work encompassed a nationwide vision—as opposed to the 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption study2 focused on border issues—which shows the map of criminal organisations, the types of crimes, the regional situation in various states, the role of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), as well as an analysis of the situation of women regarding organised crime and corruption. The most important findings of this new study can be summarised as follows: 1. The existence of at least 9 major organised crime rings in Venezuela, involving more than 13,000 criminal organisations, some of which have ties to policy makers and public officials. 2. Crimes and acts of corruption boast total impunity. 3. The lack of robust public institutions, the dismantling of some of them, as well as the existence of incentives derived from some public policies such as price controls and fuel subsidies, are a breeding ground for misdeeds, crimes, human rights violations and the theft of public funds. 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women   

Transparency Venezuela, 2020. 135p.  

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non- state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 61(4), 2024, 673­ –693 pages

By Johanna Skinnari, Karolina Hurve and Andrea Monti

In this report, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) presents a government assignment regarding facilitators in the legal sector who provide assistance to criminal networks. For the purposes of this report, a facilitator is defined as someone misusing his or her position or mandate in local government or the public or private sectors in order to benefit criminal networks. Our research is based on analyses of interviews, cases and encrypted chat messages from members of criminal networks. Our study broadly confirms previous findings from Swedish and international research, particularly with regard to the tasks performed by facilitators. This report also presents a broader and more comprehensive picture of the conditions in Sweden. Unique data also provides us insight into areas not previously described.

What tasks do facilitators perform? Our study suggests that many members of criminal networks appear to have a substantial interest in using facilitators. Access to such facilitators is limited, but they can be found in all studied sectors. These mainly include the criminal justice system, numerous local government administrations, banking and finance, real estate, incorporation, bookkeeping and accounting services, legal services, security and surveillance, and transport. Overall, the identified cases occur in most regions of Sweden. This is therefore not solely a metropolitan phenomenon. The degree of activity among the identified facilitators ranges from sporadic, brief assistance to long-term and frequent assistance provided to numerous members of different criminal networks. The material as a whole shows that, in some areas, facilitators are more likely to assist criminal networks. Such professionals have frequent contacts with criminal actors, are exposed to threats or other pressure to a significant degree or receive remuneration that is tied to their number of clients. Facilitators mainly provide information to members of criminal networks, which is in line with previous studies. This information can be of very different kinds, including sensitive personal data, information about what public authorities or municipalities know about a criminal network, or more strategic information regarding potential criminal activity. Such information may also consist of warnings or instructions relayed to the criminal network from detained or imprisoned members. Such information allows them to coordinate their testimony and complicate investigations. One important observation is that information sought from facilitators need not be secret to be valuable. Rather, accumulated information and insider knowledge makes such information sensitive and useful to members of criminal networks. Professionals also facilitate logistics by smuggling, transporting or storing illegal goods. Facilitators may also create legitimate covers by generating credible documentation or certificates, or by providing companies which are used to commit crimes, as well as by identifying criminal schemes which appear as legitimate business activity. In some cases, facilitators are also needed to handle criminal proceeds, which public anti-money laundering measures have made more difficult for criminal networks. Finally, some facilitators even issue favourable decisions - they deviate from procurement procedures or other important decisions, fail to report crimes, or facilitate improper payments from welfare systems or the private sector. Our survey shows the facilitators are asked to perform a broad array of tasks of varying complexity. These range from logistical tasks, which the criminal network might have performed on its own or learned, to complex assignments which only a facilitator could perform, especially influencing the outcome of certain decisions and accessing sensitive information. Report 2024:2

Stockholm: Swedish Council on Crime Prevention 2025. 12p.

By Lina Fjelkegård and Emma Patel

The number of residential burglaries has decreased sharply in recent years – between 2017 and 2023, they were basically halved. However, many people still become victims of burglary. In 2023, 10,000 residential burglaries were reported to the police, and only 4 per cent were solved. Those affected may experience the burglary as a violation of privacy, and feel unsafe at home. For these reasons, Brå initiated this study on residential burglaries. The purpose is to provide an overall picture of the nature of residential burglaries, but also to examine the development of this crime over time, and how the police handle residential burglaries. Different methods and materials were used for this. We start from a number of preliminary investigations into residential burglaries, which Brå has coded and analysed. We have also used reporting statistics, data from police records, and interviews with police employees. International networks have probably had an impact Between 2007 and 2017, the number of reported residential burglaries in Sweden increased significantly. Brå has investigated possible explanations, and one piece of the puzzle seems to be increased activity from international crime networks from Eastern Europe. This may, in turn, be due to more open borders to the East and increased unemployment after the financial crisis in 2008. After 2017, the number of reported residential burglaries decreased – and around that time, border protection in Sweden was also enhanced. Meanwhile, the number of suitable objects for theft in dwellings seems to have decreased. The pandemic, which meant that people worked from home more, may also have contributed to a decrease in residential burglaries. However, Brå's review is only cursory, and several factors may have influenced the development of residential burglaries. Differences between single-family houses and flats Metropolitan municipalities generally have the highest number of reported burglaries per dwelling. Sparsely populated municipalities have the lowest number. The differences between the metropolitan municipalities and others mainly concern burglaries of single-family homes – flat burglaries are more evenly distributed across the country. There are also differences between single-family homes and flats in how the burglaries are committed. Single-family home burglaries are most often done by someone breaking open a window or a back door, while flats are more often breached through the entrance door. Flat burglaries are also more often committed with a low degree of finesse than single-family home burglaries. Most residential burglaries are committed during the day and the victim is rarely at home. The things stolen are often small and valuable. Two-thirds acted professionally To describe suspects of residential burglaries, Brå made a distinction between amateur and professional perpetrators. In one-third of the preliminary investigations, the perpetrators were classified as clear amateurs. They more frequently burglarised flats, and they relatively often had an addiction or mental illness. The female suspects most often fell into this group. The more professional perpetrators are more difficult to identify – they are less often caught and there is therefore less information about them in Brå's material. However, there is one group that can be described as clearly professional, and this is probably where you’ll find the international crime networks. According to the police, they often use false identities, change registration plates, and clean up traces at the crime scene. There is probably also an intermediate category of perpetrators who are neither amateurs nor among the most expert. The boundaries are also fluid for what is organised crime and what is not. People can, for example, be recruited temporarily by the criminal networks. The police could take more investigative measures According to the police's internal recommendations, the authority should always send out a police patrol in the event of a residential burglary, and then use specially trained staff for the technical investigation. Both of these things are also often done – a patrol was sent out in 73 per cent of burglaries of single-family houses. On average, the police carry out four investigative measures per residential burglary. However, Brå estimates that more measures probably could have been taken in almost half of the preliminary investigations. Often, there is no interrogation of an injured party or a witness. Police Region Stockholm carries out fewer investigative measures than the other police regions. Consistently, the police take more measures in cases of burglaries of single-family houses than in cases of flat burglaries. Today, the police immediately dismiss one-third of reports of residential burglaries, and the proportion has increased over time. It is also reasonable to immediately dismiss crimes that have little chance of being solved. Not everything that is reported is a crime – Brå sees that one-third of the preliminary investigations probably do not include residential burglaries. At the same time, the proportion of solved cases is only four per cent, and Brå estimates that the police can quite often do more. In particular, interrogations of injured parties and witnesses can be carried out more often. The police can improve coordination of investigations and work more on finding stolen goods There are four main ways to catch a perpetrator; in the act, trace evidence, witness identification, and stolen goods. This is according to the reported preliminary investigations. Police catch a suspect in the act in one third of the cases. In 29 per cent of cases, trace evidence is used to catch the suspect, usually DNA. Often, special local crime scene investigators (LCSI) collect traces. They conduct thorough examinations, which can be used to detect serial crime, but which rarely lead to a match in the police database. Therefore, Brå considers it could sometimes be more efficient to let the first police patrol do the crime scene investigation. This is especially true if there is no functioning crime linkage that can make use of traces collected by LCSI. Such coordination is lacking in several police regions – and it benefits organised crime when each case is handled locally. In one in five cases, witness identification is used to catch the perpetrator. More identifications could probably be made if the police interviewed more witnesses than today. There is also potential for improvement in terms of stolen goods. Today, a fifth of the cases are solved by the police identifying stolen goods. However, the goods are often discovered in connection with other matters – there is not much independent monitoring of stolen goods within the police. Brå assesses that there is a need for better IT tools and more active work in finding stolen goods. Report 2024:12 Stockholm: Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention, 2024. 7p.

By Mark Galeotti

In May 2022, Lithuanian police raided two underground factories where counterfeit cigarettes worth some €73 million were being produced.2 This happens all the time, and even the involvement of a Russian-linked organized crime group was hardly unusual. However, as the investigation extended to Belgium (where the goods would be transhipped to Britain), it became clear that behind the gangsters lay Russian intelligence officers, who were using the business – or at least part of its profits – to raise operational funds for their activities in Europe. With Putin regarding himself as ‘at war’ with the West, at a time when Europol chief Catherine de Bolle is warning that organized crime is on the rise across Europe,3 and Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s counter-intelligence agency, is assessing ‘the risk of [Russian] state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased’,4 it is perhaps unsurprising that gangsters and spies would find themselves brought together in his campaign. It has, after all, become commonplace since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to characterize the relationship between Russia and the West as some shade of war: economic, political, but typically more than just cold. Indeed, even as he insists that his invasion is not a war, just a ‘special military operation’ (SVO) – actually calling it a ‘war’ can conceivably get Russians a 15-year prison sentence5 – Putin freely uses the term when describing his country’s engagement with the West. However, it is less clearly understood just how significant and long held this view of his may be. In this context, it does seem in hindsight that Putin has considered himself as de facto at war with the West – or, more precisely, that the West has been warring against him – since at least around 2012. After stepping back from the presidency to the position of prime minister in order to observe the letter, if not the spirit, of term limits, all the while clearly still running the country, when Putin announced he would be returning to the Kremlin, this was for many the last straw. Demonstrations that became known as the Bolotnaya Protests were mastered and dispersed, but Putin seems to have been unable or unwilling to accept that they were a genuine, organic expression of dismay. Instead, he chose to see them as spurred by the US Department of State, after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘gave the signal’ to opposition leaders.6 There had been a growing school of thought within Russian security circles that the West was using ‘political technologies’ to topple hostile governments, and support for civil society, democratization and the rule of law were seen as part of this campaign. As a former Kremlin insider put it, Putin was scared, then angry. As far as he was concerned, this was it, this was a sign that the West – the Americans – were coming for him. So he was determined to fight back, and that didn’t just mean defending himself, the repressions and arrests, it meant going on the attack. He was clear, he made it clear to us all: if the West was coming to mess with him, we would mess them up worse, by whatever means necessary.

Russia’s transition from a “conscription state” to a full “mobilization state”, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations.

The report also highlights Russia’s weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally.

“Gangsters at War” reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia’s geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 62p.

By Phil Williams

By 2040, organized crime may thrive like never before, exploiting climate crises, geopolitical conflicts, and technological advancements. Our latest report reveals a chilling forecast where criminal networks operate as shadow governments, shielded by authoritarian regimes and empowered by rapid technological evolution.

This “fifth wave” of organized crime, as coined by author Phil Williams, will capitalize on scarcity markets, leveraging disruptions in essential resources like water, minerals, and energy caused by climate change. Criminal networks are expected to infiltrate legitimate markets, blurring lines between lawful and illicit activities and using scarcity as a driving force for growth.

The report suggests that by leveraging emerging tools such as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and 5G technology, criminal organizations will achieve new levels of sophistication, making it difficult for law enforcement to counter their reach and resilience. Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions are likely to exacerbate the situation, as some authoritarian regimes utilize criminal networks as extensions of state power, offering them safe havens and strategic support in exchange for destabilizing activities abroad.

The findings raise urgent questions about global readiness to combat organized crime’s possible evolution. “The Fifth Wave” challenges policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and international organizations to rethink their approach to organized crime in a rapidly shifting world. It underscores the importance of proactive strategies that go beyond traditional crime-fighting tactics, advocating for comprehensive international collaboration, adaptive policy-making, and innovative technology to address this deeply entrenched threat.

As crime increasingly infiltrates legal economies, emerging as a powerful economic and social force, international collaboration and innovative strategies will be vital to mitigate this emerging threat. This threat requires an unprecedented global response.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 30p.

By Insight Crime

This present study on Bolivia was led by InSight Crime. The findings and analysis are based on one year of open-source and fieldwork investigation in the cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz, and desk research, phone, and face-to-face interviews with environmental experts, government and security officials, members of local communities, academics, and others.1 The report provides a snapshot of the complex web of actors (state and non-state) and relationships fueling environmental crime in the Bolivian Amazon. Rather than just diagnosing the issue, the study aims to raise new dialogue and intervention opportunities regarding environmental crime in the region. This study addresses long-standing issues of securing land rights to traditional communities in the Amazon, many of which currently face new forms of land grabbing and land trafficking, notably by export companies extracting natural resources. It also includes ideas for reforming and strengthening structurally weak and corruption prone public institutions in the Bolivian Amazon, notably those related to land, environmental, and security issues. Finally, the report also sheds light on the transnational and cross-border dynamics of environmental crime in Bolivia in activities such as wildlife trafficking and illegal mercury trafficking for river-gold mining and illegal logging exports. The complexity of increasingly globalized supply chains initiating in or cutting through the Bolivian Amazon call for more and stronger regional and international cooperation to dismantle environmental crime and protect the forest and its people

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 73p.

Sergi, Anna

This research is linked to studies on the criminal mobility of the 'ndrangheta in Australia. Starting from extensive research in the field, and from a critique of the concept of ethnicity and its links with organised crime in Australia, this work reflects on the political interests of the Calabrian clans in Australia. Some clans can maintain ties with powers and professional elites also by exploiting "ethnic solidarity” within the migrant community

‘ndrangheta e “ricerca del potere”: riflessioni su mafia e potere politico in Australia. Rivista di studi e ricerche sulla criminalità organizzata, 6 (4). (2021) pp. 110-136

Sergi, Anna

Attention to the Calabrian mafia, the ‘ndrangheta, has been increasing across law enforcement authorities around the world. This paper aims at bringing forward a theoretical and operational conversation on how to best approach, from a policing perspective, what is a complex clan-based criminality able to operate simultaneously in different states. The paper will therefore formulate a preliminary framework for strategies focusing on the policing of mafia dynasties. It will do so by identifying how ‘ndrangheta clans can be studied as family dynasties, including in their assessment also the factors of family life (familiness) that can facilitate or obstruct the dynasty’s success. By looking at ‘ndrangheta clans as family dynasties, we can inform a framework that cuts through the most common policing aims and strategies against organised crime, as shared by states involved in current anti-mafia efforts.

‘Ndrangheta Dynasties: A Conceptual and Operational Framework for the Cross-Border Policing of the Calabrian Mafia. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15 (2). (2021) pp. 1522-1536.

Sergi, Anna and Storti, Luca

This paper, which is the introduction to this special issue on ‘Spaces of Organised Crime’, aims to analyse the nexus between organised crime groups and territories. Such groups are able to exploit resources that circulate within territorial contexts in which they are embedded. They also operate concretely as entities that can take part to the transformation of spaces into places. Accordingly, we will lay out an analytical model about the processes through which organised crime groups contribute to create and shape territories. We show how these processes link with the main types of organised crime groups on a diferentiated basis. In the last section of this introduction, we present the papers included in the special issue and the logic connecting them to one another.

Shaping space. A conceptual framework on the connections between organised crime groups and territories. Trends in Organized Crime, 24 (2). (2021) pp. 137-151

Sergi, Anna

This article will present the results of a qualitative research into organised crime in the port of Genoa, Italy’s largest port, by looking at the challenges of policing the port space. Through the case of Genoa, the paper reflects on how organised crime manifests across three trajectories in seaports: trafficking through the port, infiltration in the port economy and governance of the port management. This paper argues that the space and geography of the port-city relationship are key to understand how and to what extent different organised criminal groups act in and around the port and within global drives. An integrated approach between urban criminology and organised crime studies is needed to better map the very complex picture of organised criminality in the port within the city.

Policing the port, watching the city. Manifestations of organised crime in the port of Genoa. Policing and Society, 31 (6). (2021) pp. 639-655.

Sergi, Anna and Vannucci, Alberto

This paper wishes to explore some characteristics of the relevant interconnections between mafias/ mafiosi and masonic lodges/masons in the Italian context. The paper sets out to study these interconnections from a social science perspective rooted in sociological and neo-institutional studies of organised crime and mafias, but also in criminological approaches to social constructionism, in the form of symbols and narratives. We will present a case study to reflect on the roles that (deviant) masons can assume in contexts where both mafias’ and personal, political, or economic interests are at play. The case study shows how masonic alliances can augment networking and enforcing capabilities: we call this process masonic deviance amplification. Additionally, the case study confirms the constitutive power that narratives around the masonic world hold today in the Italian context.

The Secret Nexus. A case study of deviant masons, mafia, and corruption in Italy. The British Journal of Criminology, 63 (5). (2022) pp. 1165-1183.

By Clio Andris, Daniel Della Posta, Brittany N. Freelin, Xi Zhu, Bradley Hinger, Hanzhou Chen

The American Mafia is a network of criminals engaged in drug trafficking, violence and other illegal activities. Here, we analyze a historical spatial social network (SSN) of 680 Mafia members found in a 1960 investigatory dossier compiled by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The dossier includes connections between members who were ‘known criminal associates’ and members are geolocated to a known home address across 15 major U.S. cities.

Under an overarching narrative of identifying the network’s proclivities toward security (dispersion) or efficiency (ease of coordination), we pose four research questions related to criminal organizations, power and coordination strategies. We find that the Mafia network is distributed as a portfolio of nearby and distant ties with significant spatial clustering among the Mafia family units.

The methods used here differ from former methods that analyze the point pattern locations of individuals and the social network of individuals separately. The research techniques used here contribute to the body of non-planar network analysis methods in GIScience and can be generalized to other types of spatially-embedded social networks.

International Journal of Geographical Information Science Volume 35, 2021 - Issue 12: Spatial Social Networks in GIScience

By Anna Sergi

This paper will investigate narratives, traits, and expectations of Italian-American mafias in North America. The specific case study is the area of Niagara, at the border between New York State, USA and Ontario, Canada. In this context, the artricle will mainly explore narratives and traits of so-called “mafia” families in the city of Hamilton, and their apparent connections with other “mafia” groups on the other side of the borderland, in Buffalo and in Toronto. Through qualitative design adapted from grounded theory methodology with mixed data, including news stories, investigative files and interviews, this article shows how mafias in the borderland of Niagara are conceptualised as hybrid groups, employing different identity “flags”. Mafias appear isomorphic since they imitate each other's structures and (try to) obey traditional mafia rules, to adapt and survive. In line with GT methodology, this paper finally explores an emerging theoretical category, that of the mafia borderland. As a space and identity, mafia borderland helps to sketch traits and expectations of mafia groups in border areas.

Journal of Borderlands Studies, 1-23. 2022

By  Anna Sergi

This project involved qualitative primary research into criminality within seaports, by observing how ports, as microcosmic realities run through formal and informal relationships and have specific security vulnerabilities, which facilitate different types of illegal or deviant behaviours. Research has been carried out in two European ports (Liverpool and Genoa) and three non-European ones (Montreal, New York and Melbourne), which are either targets of, or transit zones for, criminal activities and criminal networks.  The main aim of this comparative research project was to improve policy understanding of how the complex relationships within ports act as conduits or facilitators in how criminal networks operate in the territory of and around the ports. With specific attention to the changing geopolitical conditions surrounding the port of Liverpool within the Brexit scenario, the study has looked at what could be learned in the British experience from international ones both in terms of security and in terms of transnational risk assessments. 

London: University of Essex, 2020.    230p.

By The Venezuela Investigative Unit

Ten years ago, Tren de Aragua was a little more than a prison gang, confined to the walls of the Tocorón penitentiary and largely unheard of outside its home state of Aragua in Venezuela. Today, it is one of the fastest-growing security threats in South America.

Tren de Aragua’s transnational network now stretches into Colombia, Peru, Chile, and beyond. It has established some of the most far-reaching and sophisticated migrant smuggling and sex trafficking networks seen in the region. And it has spread terror in host countries and among the Venezuelan migrant population, which it has ruthlessly exploited.

But the seizure of Tocorón by Venezuelan authorities in September 2023 directly attacked the nerve center of this network. Now, a new, more uncertain, era is beginning for Venezuela’s most notorious criminal export.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 28p.

By John Pitts

County Lines are criminal networks based mainly in cities that export illegal drugs to one or more out-of-town locations. The organisers use dedicated mobile phone lines to take orders from buyers, and children and vulnerable adults to transport, store and deliver the drugs. County Lines organisers may use coercion, intimidation and violence (including sexual violence) to control this workforce. Initially, the ‘Youngers’, the children involved, may be given money, phones or expensive trainers, but are then told they must repay this by working for the County Lines gang. Sometimes the ‘Elders’, the organisers, arrange for them to be robbed of the drugs they are carrying so that they become indebted. If they protest, they may be told to keep working to pay off the debt or they, and their families, will be subject to violent retribution. The ‘Youngers’, who deliver the drugs, risk being apprehended by the police, assaulted and robbed by their customers or by members of rival gangs (Andell and Pitts, 2018; Harding, 2020). This Academic Insights paper sets out how County Lines operations have developed and evolved over recent years. Focus is then given to multi-agency ways of tackling County Lines which involve probation and youth offending services.

Academic Insights, 2021.01. Manchester, UK: HM Inspectorate of Probation , 2021. 15p.