By Stephen Koppel, Min Xie, Michael Rempel, Olive Lu, Jeremy Travis, & Preeti Chauhan

New York City’s response to crime and violence stands at a pivotal moment. After decades of declining crime and a shrinking criminal legal system, recent years have brought major criminal legal reforms, a global pandemic, and renewed debate about safety, fairness, and enforcement.

To help move the conversation forward, the goal of the Crossroads Project was to ground essential policy discussions in objective data concerning the pendulum swings that describe New York City’s trajectory from the 1990s to the present.

Introduction to the Crossroads Project The premise of this project is simple: In determining its response to crime and violence, New York City stands at a crossroads. After years of declining rates of crime, enforcement activities, and incarceration, New York City has experienced volatility in many of these same criminal justice measures. New realities have prompted calls for a more punitive response to crime which, in turn, are countered by advocates urging continued support for a reform agenda. Today’s choices on the path forward will have long-term consequences for the well-being of the City’s residents and communities, and for New Yorkers’ aspirations for safety, justice, and equity. To inform current policies, this report, along with another focusing on victimization, seeks to widen our perspective by drawing attention to the pendulum swings that describe the City’s longer history. These swings feature a multi-decade pattern of declining crime, enforcement activities, and incarceration from the 1990s until 2020, followed by upticks and reversals in the vacillating 2020s. The juxtaposition of this more extended view of history against present-day debates about the best path forward underscores the power of the metaphor: We are at a crossroads. The driving premise of the Crossroads project is that we have an opportunity to learn from past responses to crime—including disproportionate harm experienced by communities of color—to craft more effective policies in the future. To help move the conversation forward, our immediate purpose is to ground discussions in objective data concerning New York City’s history up to the present. We expand on two earlier analyses, 1 adding more metrics and extending the tracking period through at least 2023. In addition, an accompanying report draws on the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to document victimization trends in the City, the proportion of victimization reported to the police, and changes in victims’ confidence in police and use of services.2 Notably, that report finds that during the study period (1996 to 2022), more than half of all crimes were never reported to the police, with reporting rates declining over time—particularly for household property crime— and finds an increasing perception that police would not help if called. By contrast, the present report focuses solely on criminal complaints that are reported to the police and processed by the criminal legal system and thus may offer a more limited view of overall victimization. An executive summary available at the project landing page integrates key findings from both reports. The full report on crime victimization trends is available at this same landing page. Tied to this research, the Crossroads Convening, a two-day public event held at John Jay College in May of 2025, provides New Yorkers with an opportunity to look both backward and forward, reflecting on past trends and advancing a much-needed dialogue about the future steps New York City’s criminal legal system might take We seek to answer seven questions about the changing criminal legal landscape since 1990. 1. Crime: How have crime rates changed, encompassing the most serious violent crimes and shooting incidents, and misdemeanor crime complaints (Chapter 2)? 2. Law Enforcement: How have police enforcement activities changed, encompassing pedestrian street stops, minor summonses, felony and misdemeanor arrests, and drug arrests (Chapter 3)? 3. Decision-Making in the Courts: How have key decisions and case outcomes changed, encompassing prosecutors’ decision of whether to file arrests with the court in the first place, judges’ bail decisions, case dispositions (e.g., conviction rates), and the use of alternatives to incarceration (Chapter 4)? 4. Incarceration and Community Corrections: How have local jail, state prison, probation, and parole admissions and daily population numbers changed (Chapter 5)? 5. Recidivism After Disposition: How have recidivism rates changed for people immediately released into the community following a non-carceral case disposition (Chapter 6)? 6. Racial Disparities: Amid the overall trends, to what extent (if at all) have racial and ethnic disparities in people’s criminal legal system involvement declined (Chapter 7)? 7. The Early 2020s: Zooming in from this report’s longer-term analysis, what trends or fluctuations have taken place specifically in the early 2020s (covered in all chapters)? Answers to this last question will set the stage for a discussion of the criminal legal system we want, moving forward. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes major themes and takeaways

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice, at John Jay College, 2025. 40p.

By Emily Grant, Lena Dechert

Wyoming is home to a little over 16,000 Indigenous residents, who make up nearly 3% of the state's population. However, Indigenous people in Wyoming continue to experience disproportionately high rates of homicide and disappearances compared to White residents. This means they go missing and are killed more often than their population size alone would predict. The Wyoming Missing and Murdered Indigenous Persons (MMIP) Task Force is dedicated to tracking and sharing data on these cases. This fifth-annual publication includes the latest available information on Indigenous homicide victims and missing persons in Wyoming, along with updates on efforts to improve law enforcement protocols for missing person cases.

Laramie: Wyoming Survey & Analysis Center, University of Wyomingm 2025. 7p.

By Emily Grant, Lena Dechert, Laurel Wimbish, Andria Blackwood

HOMICIDE 105 Indigenous people (34 females, 71 males) were victims of homicide between 2000 and 2020. Indigenous homicide victims were 21% of the total homicide victims in Wyoming between 2000 and 2020. Between 2010 and 2019, the homicide rate per 100,000 for Indigenous people was 26.8, eight times higher than the homicide rate for White people. The homicide rate for Indigenous females was 15.3 per 100,000, 6.4 times higher than the homicide rate for White females. MISSING Between 2011 and September 2020, 710 Indigenous persons were reported missing. Some Indigenous people were reported missing more than once during the time period, resulting in a total of 1,254 missing person records for Indigenous people. Eighty-five percent were juvenile, and 57% were female. They were reported missing from 22 counties in Wyoming. Ten percent of missing Indigenous people are found within the same day they are reported missing, 50% are found within one week. One-fifth of the Indigenous people reported missing were missing for 30 or more days, which is a higher percentage than White people missing for 30 or more days (11%). Currently, 10 Indigenous people are listed as missing (3 females and 7 males). MEDIA COVERAGE Only 30% of Indigenous homicide victims had newspaper media coverage, as compared to 51% of White homicide victims. Indigenous female homicide victims had the least amount of newspaper media coverage (18%). MEDIA PORTRAYAL The newspaper articles for Indigenous homicide victims were more likely to contain violent language, portray the victim in a negative light, a nd provide less information as compared to articles about White homicide victim COMMUNITY BARRIERS Lack of trust in law enforcement and the judicial system, no single point of contact during an investigation, and lack of information during the investigation and after the final outcome were seen as barriers in the community related to the reporting and response to MMIP. RECOMMENDATIONS Develop consistent protocols and data systems for MMIPs to inform both law enforcement and families. Pay particular attention to documenting tribal affiliation in official records, coroner reports, and vital records. Create an Indigenous advocacy position/response team to help families navigate the reporting and investigation process. The advocate can serve as a communication point person, helping to reduce the emotional burden for families of repeating incident details to multiple agencies. Raise community awareness about the prevalence of MMIP, contributing risk and protective factors, and available resources. Distribute a list of community resources and efforts

Laramie: Wyoming Survey & Analysis Center University of Wyoming , 2021. 51p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is proud to release a practical resource designed to empower law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and stakeholders in tackling cryptocurrency-related crimes. The guide "Decoding Crypto Crime: A Guide for Law Enforcement" simplifies complex concepts like blockchain technology and virtual assets, offering best practices for investigating common crypto crimes such as investment scams, extortion, and phishing.

It provides actionable steps for collecting critical evidence, interacting with Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), and utilizing blockchain analytics tools. Recognizing the challenges victims face, the guide also offers support strategies and emphasizes the importance of cross-jurisdictional collaboration. While not exhaustive, this guide serves as a foundational tool to bridge the knowledge gap and enhance law enforcement’s ability to navigate the rapidly evolving world of crypto crime. Download the guide today to strengthen your capacity to combat digital financial crime and ensure a safer digital landscape.

Prague: OSCE, 2025. 64p.

By Hannah Miles Samantha Bricknell

The National Homicide Monitoring Program is Australia’s only national data collection on homicide incidents, victims and offenders. This report describes 262 homicide incidents recorded by Australian state and territory police between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024. During this 12-month period there were 277 victims of homicide and 278 identified offenders

Statistical Report no. 52.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 77p.

By Paul Pazen, Thomas Young, DJ Summers and Cooper Pollard

Colorado’s crime rate is not back to its pre-pandemic level. Both local and state authorities are currently attempting to find policy solutions.

Some localities have created policies and procedures that go beyond state guidelines in an effort to control crime. The City of Aurora implemented mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for auto theft in 2022, for example, the year that Colorado’s and Aurora’s auto theft rates were highest. This policy led to a decrease in the auto theft rate in the city beyond what was seen statewide. In 2023, state lawmakers tried to address auto theft with passage of SB23-097. This bill did not implement mandatory minimum sentences, but instead made it a felony to commit auto theft regardless of the value of the vehicle. The law went into effect on July 1, 2023.

Using Aurora’s experience as a guide, CSI attempted to assess what the economic savings would be if the state were to experience the same decrease in auto theft, shoplifting, and overall crime that Aurora did after implementing its ordinance.

Key Findings

The share of auto theft in Aurora was 19% in July 2022. Since the passage of Aurora’s ordinance, known as “Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Motor Vehicle Theft,” the share averaged 16% from August 2022 through December 2024, representing a three percentage point decrease from the pre-August 2022 period.

A market model predicting auto theft in Aurora suggests there were 723 fewer auto thefts in Aurora from August 2022 to December 2024, a 6% decline relative to other large cities in the state.

For automobile crime, a 6% decline equates to $16.3 million in economic savings for Aurora from August 2022 through December 2024. For the largest city in the state, Denver, the economic savings would be $37.3 million over the same 29 months.

In contrast to Aurora’s experience, initial model results on the state impact from its 2023 effort was less pronounced at a 3% reduction in auto theft.

If Aurora’s experience is indicative of the potential savings of a similar statewide approach to crime, a 6% decline in crime statewide for all reported criminal offenses would have equated to $1.8 billion in economic savings in 2024, or roughly $774 per Colorado household.

Changes in local crime are not uniform across the state, however. The change in crime over the past five years varies widely by city and county.

Greenwood Village, CO : Common Sense Institute, 2025, 18p

By Jennifer McDonald

Across the country, law enforcement agencies routinely seize currency from individuals using civil forfeiture—a legal process that allows agencies to take and keep property without ever charging owners with a crime, let alone securing a conviction. Studies examining civil forfeiture have found it to be a multibillion-dollar industry that punishes people without proving they have done anything wrong. This study is the first to examine how U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard—use civil forfeiture to take and keep currency from often unsuspecting travelers at airports across the country. DHS agencies are just a few of the many government agencies that conduct airport seizures, but newly available data give fresh insight into their activity. This study, covering 2000 through 2016, quantifies just how often DHS agencies have seized currency at airports—and just how much currency has flowed into the federal government’s coffers as a result.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2020. 32p.

By Natascha Eichinger, Ekaterina Spassova, Murat Yildiz, et al.

The continued global demand for opiates, and the conditions that sustain opiate production in Afghanistan, pose a threat to public health, governance, and security at regional and global

level. This is likely to continue following the change of regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. Afghan opiates are trafficked to almost every continent worldwide. In 2021, the income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some USD 1.8–2.7 billion: however, much larger sums are accrued by international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) along illicit drug supply chains outside Afghanistan. While most opiates trafficked from Afghanistan are trafficked by land methods, a proportion of the opiates produced in South-West Asia are also trafficked by maritime methods to global destinations.

� Some of the opiates produced in Afghanistan and South-West Asia are trafficked via the southern route by maritime means. Seizures of opiates – and methamphetamine – have been increasing in the Indian Ocean, the result of sustained interdictions by national authorities and international maritime coalitions including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the EU Naval Force – Somalia (EUNAVFOR). � Drug packages seized in the Indian Ocean are marked with a wide range of stamps including hand pressed and hand-written markings. These stamps are made up of several elements consisting of sequential and non-sequential numbers, names, locations, and different objects. The stamps can provide some detail on the manufacturers and traffickers involved in the production and transport of drugs to international markets. � Stamps can often be used for branding purposes in a similar way to brand logos used with legitimate goods or can be used to identify or alternatively conceal the producers of a batch of heroin. The number of different stamps marked on a package of heroin can be an indicator of how many producers or traffickers were involved with that package. � Stamps are chosen by individual Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). They appear to be well known amongst DTOs and usually can not be copied by other traffickers. However, in some cases a “franchising” process is possible, with smaller traffickers purchasing the right to use stamps associated with larger DTOs. � Dates printed on heroin packages generally indicate the production year. However, there is less clarity when two dates are stamped on a package. In some cases, the second year may indicate when heroin manufacture continued by the same lab, or alternatively can be the expiry date of the heroin or the date when the package was distributed to international markets. Printed dates can also be updated by hand-written markings. � Sequential and non-sequential numbers stamped on heroin packages are generally seen as being coded communications between heroin manufacturers and traffickers, although the specific messages are not known. Sequential numbers (for example 555 or 777) have been found in both the Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2021, and in Central Asia and the Russian Federation in 2012. By comparison, nonsequential numbers (for example 355 or 787) seized in the Indian Ocean are not seen in Central Asia and are only infrequently seized in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that sequential numbers may be associated with relative purity of the heroin contained in the packages stamped with these numbers. � Words stamped on heroin packages appear to be an indicator of where the heroin was produced. Heroin produced in southern Afghanistan is reportedly stamped with Pashto words, while heroin produced in northern Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more likely to be stamped with Farsi words. Heroin produced in eastern and western Afghanistan often has words in English, Farsi and Pashto, while heroin produced in Pakistan is labelled with words in English and Urdu. � Heroin and methamphetamine manufactured and trafficked by the same DTO may be stamped with the same or very similar stamps. In some cases, heroin packages are stamped with images of

animals which may be an indicator of relative purity of the heroin or an indicator of the location of the manufacturer. � Although some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of heroin stamps seized in the Indian Ocean, there is still a lack of clarity on the meaning and purpose of some stamps – even among the drug traffickers interviewed in Afghanistan. Further analysis is required, including the analysis of drug stamps seized in locations outside of the Indian Ocean. It would be advantageous to develop a database of the different markings of heroin stamps to aid such analysis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 36p.

By Kristin Franke Björkman and Lina Fjelkegård

Since 2021, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) has been commissioned by the Government with evaluating the initiative for 10,000 more police employees. The initiative aims to increase the number of police employees by 10,000 over the period 2016-2024 (Ju2021/02238). This is the third interim report under the assignment and focuses specifically on the investigative activities. The overarching purpose of the report is to analyse staff development and investigative results in the police's work with serious crime, especially serious crimes related to organised crime, and crime against particularly vulnerable victims during the period 2018-2023. In the study, Brå uses the Police Authority's personnel statistics and case data, interviews with heads of units and investigators, as well as a survey on the current staffing situation in the police districts’ investigative sections. In the analyses of case data, we also use the Police Authority's complexity measure, which was developed with the purpose of weighting cases according to how resource-intensive (complex) they are. The higher the value of the complexity measure (Kvalue) a case has, the more resources it requires. Delimitations In terms of staff development, the study is limited to focus specifically on Serious Crimes Investigative Units (SCUs), which are on the police district and regional organisational level, and on Domestic Violence Investigative Units (DVIUs), which are on the police district level. Investigative activities at local police district level are covered to a limited extent, and activities at national level are not included in the study at all. Trends in the inflow of cases and investigation outcomes focus on three overarching categories of offences. The first two categories, serious crimes and serious crimes related to organised crime (a subset of serious crimes), were identified empirically based on the types of crime that, according to the list of offences, shall be investigated at the police district level and are usually investigated by the SCUs. These categories include for example homicide (with or without the use of firearms), extortion, violence against a public official (police officer), arson, destruction causing public endangerment by explosion (hereafter referred to as explosions) and serious weapons offence. The fact that we selected the types of crime that the SCUs normally investigate is a delimitation that Brå has had to make in order for the study to be manageable in its scope. By including explosions and homicides with firearms, which are two of the most resource-intensive types of crime in terms of investigation, we believe that the study captures a key part of the police's investigative activities in relation to serious crime and serious organised crime. The third category, crimes against particularly vulnerable victims (SUB crimes), is the collective name for the offence code groups crimes against children, crimes in close relationships and rape against adults. This study includes those SUB crimes that, according to the list of offences, shall be investigated at police district level and are usually investigated by

the DVIUs. In addition, the study covers, to a limited extent, the investigative activities at the level of local police districts and their investigation of volume crimes, which are less complex and common types of crime such as theft, assault, and minor drug offences. The main outcome used to measure investigative performance is the proportion of cases reported to prosecutors out of all closed cases involving a preliminary investigation, which we refer to as clearance rate. Some analyses also present the number of cases reported to prosecutors. More employees in the investigative activities Within the investigative activities as a whole, the number of employees has increased by 2,900 (36%) over the period 2018-2023. However, staff growth is not evenly distributed across organisational levels, but is significantly higher at police district and regional level than at local police district level. Increased inflow of cases and high number of staff on temporary loan in Serious Crimes Over the period 2018-2023, the total inflow of serious crimes has increased by almost 30 per cent, both in terms of the number of cases and their complexity (K-value). However, the number of serious crime cases handled by the specialised Serious Crimes Investigative Units (SCUs) has remained relatively unchanged over time, while the K-value has increased. This development indicates that less complex cases have been removed from the SCUs, while a larger part of their inflow consists of the most complex serious crimes. The clear discrepancy between the increase in total inflow of cases (30%) and the unchanged inflow to the SCUs also suggests that a large and increasing number of serious crimes are handled in other parts of the organisation. This is also reflected in the increasing number of serious crime cases handled by local police districts. The number of serious crimes investigated by local police districts has increased by more than 80 per cent since 2018. Police Region Stockholm is the main driver of this development. There, the number of serious crimes investigated by local police districts has increased by almost 300 per cent. The number of employees in the SCUs has increased by 250 people, just over 30 per cent, between 2018 and 2023. The increase in staff took place mainly at the beginning and end of the period studied. Police Region Stockholm stands out with a significantly lower staff growth than the other regions (7%). Police Region Mitt has also experienced relatively low growth (17%). Growth is highest in Police Region Bergslagen (75%). Despite large regional variations, the overall picture is that despite the increase in staff, the specialised SCUs have not been able to cope with the increased influx of serious crimes. The staffing survey of the investigative sections also shows that the teams have difficulty managing the influx of cases themselves. According to the survey, almost a quarter of the SCU's staffing consists of temporarily borrowed staff.

English summary of Brå report 2024:9

Stockholm: Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention, 2024. 14p.

By Johanna Skinnari, Karolina Hurve and Andrea Monti

In this report, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) presents a government assignment regarding facilitators in the legal sector who provide assistance to criminal networks. For the purposes of this report, a facilitator is defined as someone misusing his or her position or mandate in local government or the public or private sectors in order to benefit criminal networks. Our research is based on analyses of interviews, cases and encrypted chat messages from members of criminal networks. Our study broadly confirms previous findings from Swedish and international research, particularly with regard to the tasks performed by facilitators. This report also presents a broader and more comprehensive picture of the conditions in Sweden. Unique data also provides us insight into areas not previously described.

What tasks do facilitators perform? Our study suggests that many members of criminal networks appear to have a substantial interest in using facilitators. Access to such facilitators is limited, but they can be found in all studied sectors. These mainly include the criminal justice system, numerous local government administrations, banking and finance, real estate, incorporation, bookkeeping and accounting services, legal services, security and surveillance, and transport. Overall, the identified cases occur in most regions of Sweden. This is therefore not solely a metropolitan phenomenon. The degree of activity among the identified facilitators ranges from sporadic, brief assistance to long-term and frequent assistance provided to numerous members of different criminal networks. The material as a whole shows that, in some areas, facilitators are more likely to assist criminal networks. Such professionals have frequent contacts with criminal actors, are exposed to threats or other pressure to a significant degree or receive remuneration that is tied to their number of clients. Facilitators mainly provide information to members of criminal networks, which is in line with previous studies. This information can be of very different kinds, including sensitive personal data, information about what public authorities or municipalities know about a criminal network, or more strategic information regarding potential criminal activity. Such information may also consist of warnings or instructions relayed to the criminal network from detained or imprisoned members. Such information allows them to coordinate their testimony and complicate investigations. One important observation is that information sought from facilitators need not be secret to be valuable. Rather, accumulated information and insider knowledge makes such information sensitive and useful to members of criminal networks. Professionals also facilitate logistics by smuggling, transporting or storing illegal goods. Facilitators may also create legitimate covers by generating credible documentation or certificates, or by providing companies which are used to commit crimes, as well as by identifying criminal schemes which appear as legitimate business activity. In some cases, facilitators are also needed to handle criminal proceeds, which public anti-money laundering measures have made more difficult for criminal networks. Finally, some facilitators even issue favourable decisions - they deviate from procurement procedures or other important decisions, fail to report crimes, or facilitate improper payments from welfare systems or the private sector. Our survey shows the facilitators are asked to perform a broad array of tasks of varying complexity. These range from logistical tasks, which the criminal network might have performed on its own or learned, to complex assignments which only a facilitator could perform, especially influencing the outcome of certain decisions and accessing sensitive information. Report 2024:2

Stockholm: Swedish Council on Crime Prevention 2025. 12p.

By Lina Fjelkegård and Emma Patel

The number of residential burglaries has decreased sharply in recent years – between 2017 and 2023, they were basically halved. However, many people still become victims of burglary. In 2023, 10,000 residential burglaries were reported to the police, and only 4 per cent were solved. Those affected may experience the burglary as a violation of privacy, and feel unsafe at home. For these reasons, Brå initiated this study on residential burglaries. The purpose is to provide an overall picture of the nature of residential burglaries, but also to examine the development of this crime over time, and how the police handle residential burglaries. Different methods and materials were used for this. We start from a number of preliminary investigations into residential burglaries, which Brå has coded and analysed. We have also used reporting statistics, data from police records, and interviews with police employees. International networks have probably had an impact Between 2007 and 2017, the number of reported residential burglaries in Sweden increased significantly. Brå has investigated possible explanations, and one piece of the puzzle seems to be increased activity from international crime networks from Eastern Europe. This may, in turn, be due to more open borders to the East and increased unemployment after the financial crisis in 2008. After 2017, the number of reported residential burglaries decreased – and around that time, border protection in Sweden was also enhanced. Meanwhile, the number of suitable objects for theft in dwellings seems to have decreased. The pandemic, which meant that people worked from home more, may also have contributed to a decrease in residential burglaries. However, Brå's review is only cursory, and several factors may have influenced the development of residential burglaries. Differences between single-family houses and flats Metropolitan municipalities generally have the highest number of reported burglaries per dwelling. Sparsely populated municipalities have the lowest number. The differences between the metropolitan municipalities and others mainly concern burglaries of single-family homes – flat burglaries are more evenly distributed across the country. There are also differences between single-family homes and flats in how the burglaries are committed. Single-family home burglaries are most often done by someone breaking open a window or a back door, while flats are more often breached through the entrance door. Flat burglaries are also more often committed with a low degree of finesse than single-family home burglaries. Most residential burglaries are committed during the day and the victim is rarely at home. The things stolen are often small and valuable. Two-thirds acted professionally To describe suspects of residential burglaries, Brå made a distinction between amateur and professional perpetrators. In one-third of the preliminary investigations, the perpetrators were classified as clear amateurs. They more frequently burglarised flats, and they relatively often had an addiction or mental illness. The female suspects most often fell into this group. The more professional perpetrators are more difficult to identify – they are less often caught and there is therefore less information about them in Brå's material. However, there is one group that can be described as clearly professional, and this is probably where you’ll find the international crime networks. According to the police, they often use false identities, change registration plates, and clean up traces at the crime scene. There is probably also an intermediate category of perpetrators who are neither amateurs nor among the most expert. The boundaries are also fluid for what is organised crime and what is not. People can, for example, be recruited temporarily by the criminal networks. The police could take more investigative measures According to the police's internal recommendations, the authority should always send out a police patrol in the event of a residential burglary, and then use specially trained staff for the technical investigation. Both of these things are also often done – a patrol was sent out in 73 per cent of burglaries of single-family houses. On average, the police carry out four investigative measures per residential burglary. However, Brå estimates that more measures probably could have been taken in almost half of the preliminary investigations. Often, there is no interrogation of an injured party or a witness. Police Region Stockholm carries out fewer investigative measures than the other police regions. Consistently, the police take more measures in cases of burglaries of single-family houses than in cases of flat burglaries. Today, the police immediately dismiss one-third of reports of residential burglaries, and the proportion has increased over time. It is also reasonable to immediately dismiss crimes that have little chance of being solved. Not everything that is reported is a crime – Brå sees that one-third of the preliminary investigations probably do not include residential burglaries. At the same time, the proportion of solved cases is only four per cent, and Brå estimates that the police can quite often do more. In particular, interrogations of injured parties and witnesses can be carried out more often. The police can improve coordination of investigations and work more on finding stolen goods There are four main ways to catch a perpetrator; in the act, trace evidence, witness identification, and stolen goods. This is according to the reported preliminary investigations. Police catch a suspect in the act in one third of the cases. In 29 per cent of cases, trace evidence is used to catch the suspect, usually DNA. Often, special local crime scene investigators (LCSI) collect traces. They conduct thorough examinations, which can be used to detect serial crime, but which rarely lead to a match in the police database. Therefore, Brå considers it could sometimes be more efficient to let the first police patrol do the crime scene investigation. This is especially true if there is no functioning crime linkage that can make use of traces collected by LCSI. Such coordination is lacking in several police regions – and it benefits organised crime when each case is handled locally. In one in five cases, witness identification is used to catch the perpetrator. More identifications could probably be made if the police interviewed more witnesses than today. There is also potential for improvement in terms of stolen goods. Today, a fifth of the cases are solved by the police identifying stolen goods. However, the goods are often discovered in connection with other matters – there is not much independent monitoring of stolen goods within the police. Brå assesses that there is a need for better IT tools and more active work in finding stolen goods. Report 2024:12 Stockholm: Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention, 2024. 7p.

By Roselle P. Jansen , Stijn Ruiter and Ronald van Steden

Objectives There is a rich body of research on how and why victims report crime to police, but little is known about the crime reporting process itself. This paper explores the relationship between victim satisfaction with the police after reporting crime and the various reporting channels victims used, as well as the subsequent police response. Methods We capitalize on a large-scale nationwide survey among victims in the Netherlands (N=25,760). Using linear regression, we test how victim satisfaction with the police relates to the reporting channel used, follow-up contact by the police, and action taken by the police while controlling for type of crime, its impact on victims, their needs and their sociodemographic characteristics. Results The model explains 38% of the variance in victim satisfaction. The crime reporting channel and subsequent police response to crime reports show largest effects. When victims had in-person conversations with the police, the police reported back to them, and took further action, victims were most satisfied. Conclusions This study shows the importance of how police operate during and after victims report a crime for their satisfaction with police. The results suggest that police may be able to positively affect victim satisfaction by taking relatively simple measures. More research is needed to test this hypothesis using (quasi)experimental designs

Crime Science (2024) 13:30

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager., et al.

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this report, we look at teenage children’s views and experiences of the police. Here’s what we found. Opinions of the police differ according to children’s experiences. Teenagers’ views of the police shift as they get older and gain more exposure to policing. Over half (54%) of 13-17-year-olds believe the police do a good job in their local areas. Similar proportions feel the police use force appropriately (50%) and are available when needed (47%). Only 45% think the police treat everyone fairly, regardless of race or religion.

Age plays a significant role in shaping perceptions. Thirteen-year-olds consistently express the most positive views, while 16-17-year-olds are more critical of police conduct. Interestingly, Black teenagers (63%) are the most likely to agree that the police do a good job locally, compared to 54% of White children, 52% of Asian children and 50% of mixed ethnicity children. However, Black (39%) and mixed ethnicity (36%) children are far less likely to believe the police treat everyone fairly than White children (47%). When it comes to the use of force, Asian (47%), Black (42%) and mixed ethnicity (39%) children are also less likely to agree that police use force only when necessary when compared to White children (52%).

Children with direct experiences of violence tend to have more positive views of the police. For instance, 62% of children who’ve been victims of serious violence think their local police do a good job, compared to 54% of children who haven’t been a victim. Direct experiences with the police also affect perceptions, but the effect differs depending on racial background. White teenagers who’ve had contact with the police are more likely to say the police do a good job than those with no direct experience. But this is not the case for teenagers from Black, Asian and mixed ethnic backgrounds.

Children are mostly supportive of stop and search but don’t all agree it’s used fairly. Most teenagers are supportive of the police’s power to stop and search, though not all believe it’s applied fairly. Overall, 68% of 13-17-year-olds support stop and search, and 72% believe it helps prevent knife crime. However, only 56% think that stop and search is used fairly. Younger teenagers (aged 13-15) are generally more supportive of stop and search than older teenagers (aged 16-17). Racial differences also emerge, with White children more likely to view stop and search as both effective and fair than their Black, Asian and mixed ethnicity peers.

London: Youth Endowment Fund, Children, violence and vulnerability 2024 Report 4. 33p.

By Stephen Merchant, Greg Wilson

In 2023 the Government commissioned a ‘first principles’ independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements.

The review assessed the effectiveness of the ACIC’s legislative framework and found that comprehensive reform was needed to ensure ACIC could operate effectively as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency. The review recommended ACIC shift away from its existing law enforcement and investigative functions towards providing unique intelligence on serious and organised crime to Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies.

The independent review’s recommendations set out a blueprint to transform the ACIC in response to the significant and ongoing threat of serious and organised crime. The Government has agreed or agreed in-principle with 27 of the 29 recommendations - as set out in the government response.

Key recommendations

• Undertake robust legislative reforms to address significant deficiencies in the existing legislative frameworks and ensure the ACIC has appropriate powers for the collection of intelligence.

• Incorporate appropriate oversight and safeguards for the ACIC, including in relation to its use of coercive powers.

• Reinvigorate national governance and coordination arrangements for responding to serious and organised crime.

• Reinforce the independence of the Australian Institute of Criminology.

BARTON, ACT : Attorney-General's Department (Australia), 2024. 68p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences; etc

Facial recognition technology is increasingly used for identity verification and identification, from aiding law enforcement investigations to identifying potential security threats at large venues. However, advances in this technology have outpaced laws and regulations, raising significant concerns related to equity, privacy, and civil liberties.

This report explores the current capabilities, future possibilities, and necessary governance for facial recognition technology. Facial Recognition Technology discusses legal, societal, and ethical implications of the technology, and recommends ways that federal agencies and others developing and deploying the technology can mitigate potential harms and enact more comprehensive safeguards.

Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2024.

By Bakytbek Tokubek uulu, Sanjar Kurmanov, Louisa Musing

Law enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan can greatly benefit from systematically collecting, analysing, and sharing data with neighbouring countries on illegal wild species traders, networks, and trade routes. By doing so, these agencies can effectively bring these criminals to justice.

The report comprises four main parts: Guidance on Illegal Wild species Trade Data Collection, Guidance on Illegal Wild species Trade Data Analysis, Guidance on Illegal Wild species Trade Data Sharing, and Training and Capacity Building Resources to Support Law Enforcement Agencies Tackling the Illegal Wild species Trade.

The Guidance also includes examples of best practices from other countries, including European Union Member States. Additionally, the report references existing resources such as the ICCWC Wild species and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit and consolidates various tools and resources from initiatives like CITES, the World Customs Organisation (WCO), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) websites.

The report acts as a guidance tool, urging law enforcement agencies to adopt best practices in combating illegal wild species trade. By understanding the intricacies of this criminal activity and leveraging data-driven approaches, agencies can significantly enhance their effectiveness in tackling this global issue.

Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC, 2024. 36p.

By Sjoukje van Deuren, Robby Roks & Teun van Ruitenburg

Outlaw biker clubs have drawn considerable attention of law enforcement agencies across European countries. Despite law enforcement efforts, the popularity of the outlaw biker subculture has been on the rise recently. There is, however, still little understanding of how individuals become engaged in the outlaw biker subculture. Using unique data from interviews with current members of the Dutch Hells Angels (N = 24), this article addresses the entry mechanisms into the club and how individuals become full-patched members. The results show that active recruitment by the Hells Angels MC and gradually growing into the club’s membership are common entering mechanisms. Pre-existing social ties, both on the club and the individual level, play a significant role for involvement in Dutch Hells Angels membership. Moreover, the Dutch Hells Angels apply various mechanisms to establish the trustworthiness, loyalty, and suitability of a person before becoming a full-patched member of the club.

Trends in Organized Crime, 2024.

Sergi, Anna

Attention to the Calabrian mafia, the ‘ndrangheta, has been increasing across law enforcement authorities around the world. This paper aims at bringing forward a theoretical and operational conversation on how to best approach, from a policing perspective, what is a complex clan-based criminality able to operate simultaneously in different states. The paper will therefore formulate a preliminary framework for strategies focusing on the policing of mafia dynasties. It will do so by identifying how ‘ndrangheta clans can be studied as family dynasties, including in their assessment also the factors of family life (familiness) that can facilitate or obstruct the dynasty’s success. By looking at ‘ndrangheta clans as family dynasties, we can inform a framework that cuts through the most common policing aims and strategies against organised crime, as shared by states involved in current anti-mafia efforts.

‘Ndrangheta Dynasties: A Conceptual and Operational Framework for the Cross-Border Policing of the Calabrian Mafia. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15 (2). (2021) pp. 1522-1536.

Edited by Nils Duquet  

This report contains the 7 country studies  – Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Spain and Sweden –  that were undertaken as part of the second phase of project TARGET. While the reader will be able to observe interesting similarities between the situations in these countries, it is clear that gun violence in Europe is not a homogenous phenomenon.

In the first phase of Project TARGET quantitative and qualitative data on gun violence and firearm trafficking was collected in 34 European countries (27 Member States of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and six countries in the Western Balkans). In a second phase, dedicated research teams analysed the situation in seven European countries in depth. The results of the comparative analysis of all the data collected during the different phases of Project TARGET were published in the report Targeting gun violence and trafficking in Europe that was published by the Flemish Peace Institute in December 2021.

This project was coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute and cofunded by the European Union. The research partners in this project were Leiden University, Arquebus Solutions, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, and the Victimology Society of Serbia. The project was supported by Europol, the Dutch National Police, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNDP’s SEESAC) and the European Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction (EMCDDA).

Firearm trafficking and gun violence go hand in hand in Europe. An important reason for this is that criminals generally do not have access to legally-held firearms and thus need to resort to illicit gun markets – either locally or internationally - to acquire firearms. Yet, while all European countries are confronted with a certain degree of firearm trafficking, the levels of gun violence and the availability of firearms on criminal markets differ substantially across Europe. In recent years firearm trafficking has fuelled criminal gun violence and even terrorism in several European countries, but other countries seem to be much less affected. This book contains chapters on gun violence and firearm trafficking in seven different European countries: Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Spain and Sweden. While the reader will be able to observe interesting similarities between the situations in these countries, it is clear that gun violence in Europe is not a homogenous phenomenon. The country-specific analyses in this book were undertaken as part of Project TARGET, a large-scale research project on the linkages between gun violence and firearm trafficking in Europe. This project was coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, an independent research institute affiliated to the Flemish Parliament (Belgium), and cofunded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund. The research partners in this project were Leiden University, Arquebus Solutions, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, and the Victimology Society of Serbia. The project was supported by Europol, the Dutch National Police, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNDP’s SEESAC) and the European Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction (EMCDDA). In the first phase of Project TARGET quantitative and qualitative data on gun violence and firearm trafficking was collected in 34 European countries (27 Member States of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and six countries in the Western Balkans). In a second phase, dedicated research teams analysed the situation in seven European countries in depth. This is done in an attempt to describe the dynamics of gun violence, firearm trafficking and the possible linkages between both phenomena. In a third phase various interviews were undertaken to complement the collected data. The results of the comparative analysis of all the data collected during the different phases of Project TARGET were published in the report “Targeting gun violence and trafficking in Europe” that was published by the Flemish Peace Institute in December 2021. This book  contains the country studies that were undertaken as part of the second phase of the project. The first chapter of this book focuses on Belgium, a European country that is traditionally known for its history and passion for firearms. Although no reliable estimates of the illegal firearms possession rate in Belgium exist, law enforcement agencies in the country believe the availability of firearms on the criminal market has increased in recent years. Belgium has a reputation as a hotspot for illicit firearm trafficking in Europe, with criminal demand driven by drugs traffickers and armed robbers. Yet, different types of criminals tend to possess and use different types of firearms in Belgium. While armed robbers tend to use handguns, including blank firing weapons and modified firearms to threaten their victims, drugs criminals more often use their firearms in shootings. Military-grade firearms - very often smuggled conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans but also reactivated firearms - are more often used in the drugs context than in other criminal contexts. These types of weapons have also ended up in the hands of terrorists after being trafficked via Belgium. While clear linkages can be observed between firearm trafficking and criminal and terrorist violence, the impact of firearm trafficking on domestic violence is quite limited since this type of violence is generally carried out with firearms that are available to the perpetrator at that time, including legally-held firearms and ‘non-regularized’ firearms that are not trafficked. In Estonia, the focus of the second chapter of this book, firearm trafficking and gun violence are rather rare phenomena, and a clear-cut connection between them has not been observed in recent years. While both phenomena were significant security problems in Estonia in the decade after the country regained its independence from the Soviet regime, this is no longer the case. Firearm trafficking is quite limited and often involves the reactivation of firearms. Organised crime groups are not frequently involved in firearm trafficking; it is mainly carried out by opportunistic individuals on an ad hoc basis. Criminal gun violence is rather exceptional since the use of firearms by criminals is marginal. Incidents of gun violence largely occur in the family context and involve the consumption of alcohol. The perpetrators in such incidents are generally not criminals and lack access to trafficked firearms. Unsurprisingly, almost 40% of the firearms homicides are committed with a legally-held firearms. The other firearm homicides were committed with an illegally-held firearm, but these firearms are generally not trafficked weapons. Instead, often non-regularised firearms, which have been held illegally since the Second World War or since the proliferation of firearms after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s are being used. The third chapter of this book analyses gun violence and firearm trafficking in The Netherlands. Like in Belgium, a strong nexus between firearm trafficking and drugrelated criminal violence can be observed in The Netherlands. The very lucrative character of cocaine-trafficking, but also the presence of synthetic drug production and trafficking in the country, has increased criminal demand for firearms and boosted firearm trafficking, including in military-grade firearms. This has fuelled violent competition between organised crime groups, resulted in an arms race between criminals and boosted shootings in the criminal milieu. This criminal gun violence has also spilled over to other parts of society with recent high-profile shootings of a lawyer and a crime journalist. Over the years, The Netherlands has become an important destination and transit country for the various types of firearm trafficking in Europe, including the smuggling of conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans and reactivated firearms from Slovakia. The fourth chapter of this book focuses on Poland, which has one of the lowest firearms homicide rates in Europe. The low level of gun violence in the country is strongly connected to the low levels of firearm trafficking and the low criminal demand for firearms in the country. Yet, like in Estonia, this was not always the case: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, firearm trafficking increased substantially with emerging criminal groups fighting each other for control over lucrative criminal markets. Since the mid-1990s the number of firearms seizures increased and reached its peak around 2000, with a significant portion of the firearms being smuggled into the country from Czechia and Slovakia. Although firearms seizures have gradually decreased afterwards, these two countries can still be considered key source countries. Poland has also become more of a transit country than a destination country with regard to firearm trafficking. In recent years the number of firearm seizures at the border has increased strongly. Especially firearm trafficking at the border with Ukraine has become a key concern for Polish law enforcement agencies, who warn about the future risk for increased trafficking in conflict-legacy weapons from Ukraine. In the fifth chapter gun violence and firearm trafficking in Serbia are analysed. Serbia is characterised by a high rate of both legal as well as illegal firearms possession, resulting from a cultural and historical tradition of firearms possession and production, and from its recent history of armed conflict and political instability. Firearms possession is dominated by young and middle-aged men and largely motivated by tradition, hunting and self-defence. Although the scope of illicit firearm possession is difficult to estimate, this possession is widely believed to be significant. The armed conflicts in the region have fuelled gun violence within Serbia and in other European countries. During these armed conflicts large amounts of firearms have ended up in the hands of civilians, where many of them have stayed for numerous years. An unknown share of these conflict legacy weapons have in recent decades, however, also been smuggled to other parts of Europe, where they are being used in the criminal milieu. Illegally-held conflict legacy firearms are not only trafficked out of the country, but also used by criminals – especially armed robbers – within the country. Gun violence in Serbia is mainly a ‘male phenomenon’ with male perpetrators and victims, with the exception of gun violence in a family context in which most victims are women. Gun violence in this context also tends to be far more lethal than in the criminal context and, like in other countries, frequently involve legally-held firearms. The sixth chapter of this book focuses on Spain, where the scope of both lethal and non-lethal gun violence has strongly decreased over the years. Yet, in the southern part of Spain gun violence, strongly connected to drug trafficking, is a significant security issue. Criminal gun violence in Spain mainly consists of (often lethal) incidents related to score-settling between crime groups involved in drug trafficking and the (generally non-lethal) use of firearms in armed robberies. In the criminal milieu especially handguns are used. The criminal acquisition of these firearms is clearly linked to international firearm trafficking, and especially the trafficking in reactivated and converted firearms. While high-level criminal groups, especially those in the south of the country, tend to have access to wide range of firearms, including automatic rifles, lower-end criminals tend to rely on lesser quality firearms. Domestic gun violence on the other hand, is not clearly linked to firearm trafficking. In such incidents of gun violence especially long guns are used, which are believed to be mainly legally held. In the final chapter the situation in Sweden is analysed. Gun violence in Sweden has increased dramatically in the last decade and this evolution is strongly connected to firearm trafficking. Increased firearm trafficking into the country has led to a greater supply of firearms in general but also automatic firearms in particular. For a long time, most of the firearms trafficked into Sweden came from the Western Balkans. Yet, since the mid-2010s the supply of firearms diversified with, next to the steady supply of firearms from the Balkans, also the increased supply of reactivated firearms and (converted) blank firing weapons. This diversification has opened up new pathways for criminals to access firearms, which in turn lowered the threshold for gun violence especially by younger criminals. As a result, the profile of gun violence in the country in recent decades has shifted away from incidents in the family context, which tend to take place in private settings and often involve legally-held firearms, towards more incidents in the criminal context, which generally take place in public settings and involve illegally-held firearms. Resorting to gun violence has become an established norm in the criminal milieu in Sweden and has, in turn, boosted firearm trafficking since criminal groups are now often involved in a miniature arms race. Consequently, Sweden has become one of the most important hotspots for gun violence in Europe. In a global perspective, levels of gun violence and firearm trafficking in Europe can be considered relatively low. Yet, both phenomena continue to have serious security implications in Europe. Policy initiatives to prevent gun violence and combat firearm trafficking are hindered by the lack of a clear intelligence picture. With this book we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of both gun violence and firearms trafficking across Europe, and to a better understanding of the dynamics between these two phenomena. Even in a region with relatively low levels of gun violence and firearm trafficking, the lack of a sound understanding of these phenomena can have far-reaching consequences for peace and security in our societies

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2022. 444p

By Max Gallien

Researching illegal activities, while an object of increasing interest, generates a range of methodological challenges for political scientists. Rather than an exhaustive discussion, this article provides a simple framework that structures these challenges. It highlights that illegality itself is an insufficient guide to method development and needs to be supplemented by an analysis of three further dimensions: enforcement, normalisation and ethics. The article notes that beyond providing insights into the feasibility and challenges of different methodologies, examining these dimensions also directly point researchers to key political science questions about illegal activities themselves.

 Political Science & Politics, 1-5. doi:10.1017/S1049096521000317