By Angélica Durán-Martínez

Objective/context: After the paramilitary demobilization in Colombia, Cali and Medellín—major cities with a long history of political and criminal violence—saw a decline in violence despite the continuing operation of criminal groups. Yet, while Cali remained more violent than the national average, with criminal groups displaying less ability to regulate local affairs and security, Medellín became less violent than the national average and criminal groups engaged in more intensive governance. Methodology: I compare these cities using case studies constructed through fieldwork and interviews with security officials, NGO and social leaders, and former members of groups, drawing on my long-term, ongoing research engagement in both locations. Conclusions: The contrast between these cities exemplifies varied manifestations of post-conflict criminality. I argue that this variation in criminal governance is connected to the wartime balance of power, specifically, the level of territorial control and political connections armed groups had before the demobilization. Where control and political connections of paramilitary before demobilization were high, post-conflict crime groups were more likely to engage in governance behaviors. By contrast, disputed territories during wartime were likely to experience less criminal governance. Drawing on path dependence ideas, I introduce an overlooked mechanism through which wartime orders affect criminal behavior: learning processes inside and outside criminal groups. Originality: I show that to fully understand post-conflict criminality, it is crucial to consider armed actors peripherally involved in the war but essential for territorial control, whereas to understand criminal governance, the mid-ranks of armed groups and learning processes are crucial.

Revista Colombia Internacional ,2024. 35p.

By Pamela B. Teaster; Erica Wood; Sally B. Hurme; E. Carlisle Shealy

This is the full report resulting from a four-part environmental scan of the issues of abuse by guardians and systemic guardianship abuse, requested in 2021 by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), showing that more work and reform related to abuse and fraud by individual guardians and the guardianship system are required. The scan consisted of a literature review of research; a scan of the data landscape; a scan of legal, policy, and practice context; and considerations for data collection. This paper is the full report of the scan and its findings. On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services received a request for information from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Robert Casey about the roles of the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services concerning the collection of data on adult guardianship — particularly data on abuse and fraud by guardians. Part 1 was an extensive literature review. Part 2 examined how states collect data on adult guardianship. Part 3 highlighted the difficulties in determining the number of adults with guardians as well as the prevalence of abuse by guardians. Building on this research, the authors recommended federal actions to help states detect and address abuse.

Unpublished report, 2022. 146p.

By John K. Roman, Anthony Washburn; Sofia Rodriguez; Caterina G. Roman; Elena I. Navarro; Jesse T. Brey; Benjamin M. Reist

This final report of the HAVEN Project (Harms After Victimization: Experience and Needs), which was launched in 2020 as an update to the 1996 National Institute of Justice study, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look. This document reports on the HAVEN Project’s use of data, measurement, and analytic tools that were not originally available in 1996; it also examines the HAVEN Project’s expansion of the taxonomy of harms from victimization and development of a survey instrument and methodology to facilitate the collection of self-reported data on the harms from violent victimization across multiple dimensions that are typically excluded from violent crime harms measurement. The HAVEN Project also introduced a regression-based cost-benefit model that may be integrated into causal models. The key research questions discussed in this final report are: if regression models of victimization harms, including estimates of the variance in harms experienced by victims, are feasible; how integrated data systems (IDS) can be employed to estimate trajectories of harms using the harm taxonomy developed, and what the strengths and limitations of those data systems; if those new definitions of direct and indirect harms to victims change estimated costs of victimizations, and if those new definitions are applicable to all crimes; if household survey data can generate estimates of the incidence of each victimization trajectory, and what can be learned from the analyses about those harms that may not require hospitalization; if new cost benefit analysis (CBA) methodologies can improve the quality of program evaluations that include harms to victims; and which types of victimization are most harmful.

Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago, 2023. 37p.

By Benjamin Artz and  David M. Welsch:

We employ a unique 10-year panel dataset from California to examine both the effect crime has on homelessness as well as the effect homelessness has on crime. Our main estimator accounts for endogeneity by incorporating dynamics, controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and relaxing the strict homogeneity assumption for our key variables of interest. We find strong evidence that regions experiencing increases in property crime, but not violent crime, should expect a practically significant, 2024. 69p..in homelessness, whereas increases in homelessness increase the number of violent crimes, but not property crimes. Robustness and falsification checks confirm the results.

Bonn:  Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024. 49p.

By NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team

This report is the most comprehensive data analyses the Domestic Violence Death Review Team has undertaken to date, presenting detailed findings from over two decades of domestic violence homicides in NSW. It provides crucial insights to guide policymakers, service providers and advocates in preventing, responding to, and aiding recovery from domestic violence.

The dataset has continued to grow year-on-year, not only in the number of cases— now over 1,800— but also in relation to the breadth and complexity of the data captured. The analysis in this report identifies a range of key findings and themes to direct the Team’s work as it recommences its in-depth case review analyses over the next reporting period.

Key findings

• Almost one-third of all homicides in NSW occurred in a context of domestic violence.

• While most homicides overall involved the deaths of males, females were far more likely to be killed in a domestic violence-context homicide.

• Approximately 80% of intimate partner violence homicides involved men killing women.

• Men who killed their female intimate partner were almost always the domestic violence abuser in the relationship, while women who killed men were almost always the victim of their partner’s violence.

• Over 25% of people killed in a context of domestic violence were born outside of Australia.

• Almost 19% of people killed in the context of domestic violence identified as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander.

• For 90% of children killed there was a history of intimate partner violence between their parents.

• Over 80% of relative/kin domestic violence-context homicide offenders had a history of experiencing mental health issues.

Sydney: Government of New South Wales, 2024.

By Iffat Idris GSDRC, University of Birmingham 28 February 2019

This review presents findings on the prevalence and nature of serious and organized crime1: in Jordan, and efforts to combat this. The extremely limited literature on the topic indicates that Jordan has low levels of serious and organized crime: the main forms are smuggling of goods and drugs, and human trafficking. The influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees has promoted crime within refugee camps, but the impact on crime in Jordan overall appears limited.

The review drew on academic and grey literature, as well as media reports. It found very little literature on the topics covered in the query, and nothing on the links between tribal groups and organized crime or on specific drivers of crime. The dearth in literature is perhaps a reflection of low levels of organized and serious crime in Jordan – though, without data on this, it is impossible to assert this definitively. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016: 13) highlights the problem of lack of data on serious and organized crime across the Middle East:

• In general, data on drugs, drug use, HIV, people living in closed settings, crime, corruption and terrorism in the region are scarce. Analytical studies on the profile of organized criminal groups involved in illicit trafficking, their modus operandi and the routes used are very limited, as is information on the relationship between organized crime and terrorism. This can be the result of a lack of capacity and/or infrastructure to generate, manage, analyse and report data, or the lack of or poor coordination amongst the relevant institutions.

Key findings of the review are as follows:

• Crime statistics – There is a dearth of crime statistics for Jordan, but available figures point to a rise in crime in recent years, notably murder, aggravated assault and kidnapping. A total of 24,000 crimes were recorded in 2016 (OASC, 2018). 

• Smuggling – Jordan’s long and remote desert borders with neighbouring countries make it susceptible to smuggling of cash, gold, fuel, narcotics, cigarettes and other contraband. Smuggling into Jordan tends to be small-scale, largely fuel and cigarettes. With regard to drugs, Jordan is more a corridor country than a destination point: the main drugs being captagon, heroin, hashish and marijuana. Large quantities of narcotics were seized by the authorities in 2017: increased seizures point to a rise in narcotics smuggling. 

• Money laundering and corruption – Jordan is not considered a hub for money laundering. Corruption is a bigger problem: Jordan ranked 52nd (out of 140 countries) for incidence of corruption (WEF, 2018: 313). Government efforts to contain and prosecute corruption have not been effective. 

• Trafficking – Jordan is a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to forced labour, domestic servitude, and sex trafficking. Trafficking victims in Jordan are primarily from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria; refugees from Syria, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq are especially vulnerable to trafficking. Forced labour victims in Jordan experience withheld or non-payment of wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, isolation, and verbal and physical abuse. Diverse migrant women can be forced into prostitution: those who migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and nightclubs; Egyptian women married to Jordanian husbands; out-of status domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka who have fled their employers; Iraqi refugee women who have to provide for their families. 

• Crime in Syrian refugee camps – the literature indicates that, while crime is prevalent in Syrian refugee camps, it is not serious in nature: largely smuggling of camp vouchers and goods, though one report notes that the camps’ proximity to border areas of conflict makes them susceptible to smuggling and drug trafficking. While there are reports of a rise in crime in Jordan overall, this is attributed to economic pressures rather than the influx of Syrian refugees into the country. 

• Regional findings – A brief examination of serious and organized crime in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region points to a post-Arab Spring rise in transnational organized crime – facilitated by public disorder, deterioration in capacity of state law enforcement agencies, and economic hardship. Jordan is not explicitly mentioned, but given its geographic location, would likely be a target for such transnational crime networks.

Key findings of the review with regard to efforts to combat serious and organized crime in Jordan are as follows: 

• Agencies - A number of government agencies are involved in combating serious and organized crime, including trafficking. Key among these is the Public Security Directorate (PSD), which includes the Anti-Narcotics Department. The PSD and Ministry of Labour have a joint Anti-Trafficking Unit. 

• Legislation – The Anti-Human Trafficking Law was passed in 2009 but there are shortcomings with regard to meeting international standards in both the legal provisions and, even more, in enforcement. Challenges with the latter include victims being too afraid to file complaints, repatriation of victims, non-availability of evidence, and perpetrators being located out of the jurisdiction/reach of the country or hidden from the police. Jordan's Penal Code criminalizes corruption, including abuse of office, bribery, money laundering and extortion, but again the law is not implemented effectively. 

• Support from international partners – The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main international development organization supporting the Govt. of Jordan to combat serious and organized crime. Its interventions are often part of wider regional programmes, notably the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) which strengthening the capacities of international airports to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers (including foreign terrorist fighters), and the Container Control Programme (CCP) which helps member states strengthen their border control capacity and detect illicit goods in cargo containers. Interventions by other development partners include an EU project to combat human trafficking (JEMPAS) and the UK Jordan Security Sector Programme, aimed at reducing internal security threats in Jordan. etc.

K4D Helpdesk Report 537. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2019. 13p.

By Andrés Cajiao | Paula Tobo | Mariana Botero Restrepo

Just how organized is organized crime? This report on the relationship between migration and organized crime along the Colombia–Panama border explores this recurring question in research on organized crime with the aim of demystifying two underexplored phenomena in Colombia. The first is the Gulf Clan (Spanish: Clan del Golfo), which calls itself the Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, a group that continues to control the region despite being the object of one of the most intensive intelligence and judicial operations in the country’s recent history. While the specifics of how the Clan operates are unknown, this report demonstrates that criminal governance always depends on a complex set of relationships between organized crime, local communities and the state. Violence and the threat of violence are not enough to govern. In fact, one of the main findings of this study is that the influence of organized crime means that irregular migration and the economy that arises around it do not operate through violence. The second phenomenon explored here is migrant smuggling, which is widespread in border areas. The actions taken by states and international organizations have not curbed this highly complex illicit economy. Although irregular migration is stigmatized and presents a serious humanitarian problem in the region, it has been key in reviving the economies of Urabá and the Darién Gap, along the Colombian border, which should play a central role in public policy discussions. Without a better understanding of migratory phenomena and the key players involved, there is little the state can do to guarantee people’s safety or recover territorial control where it has lost it.

Geneva: Global Initiative AGainst Transnational Organized Crime, 2022.

By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

By Elena Campbell, Todd Fernando, Leigh Gassner, Jess Hill, Zac Seidler, Anne Summers

The purpose of this review was to draw together advice and identify opportunities to strengthen prevention efforts and approaches across all forms of violence against women and children, including a particular focus on homicides. The report provides specific and practical advice to strengthen prevention approaches, and builds on work currently underway in the National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022-2032.

The Rapid Review highlighted a number of areas of priority including:

• responding to children and young people’s experiences of domestic, family and sexual violence

• engaging with men and boys in violence prevention, including meeting them where they are at

• better understanding pathways into perpetration to improve targeting of early intervention initiatives, with the aim of preventing violence from occurring.

The report makes 21 recommendations across 6 key areas of:

• A national emergency – and an ongoing national priority

• The prevention potential

• Prevention through people

• Prevention through responses

• Prevention through systems and industries

• Prevention through learning and data.

Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia), 2024. 97p.

By The Young Women’s Alliance

This report examines young people’s relationships, sex lives and experiences of disrespect and violence. The evidence reveals:

• Statistically significant disparities between young women and men. For women, heightened vulnerability snowballs into disadvantage in other life areas; for men, early sexist views compound in educational and workplace settings, and can manifest in violent behaviour.

• YWA's original psychological risk profile of young men is more highly correlated with GBV perpetration than the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), a validated indicator of likelihood to engage in violent behaviour.1

• A stark reality exists where 90% of interviewed women see sexual violence and/or assault as inevitable in their lifetime (if it had not already occurred); a matter of ‘when’ not ‘if,’ expressing that violence is synonymous with womanhood.

• Significant gender disparities in perceptions of sexuality-related education, with men rating the education they received on sex and consent as significantly better than women, a concerning gap in preparedness prior to formative sexual experiences.

• YWA’s original Gender and Relationship Distress Score, a 12-item measure, indicates that more than 1 in 5 young women (21.8%) experience significant gendered distress in their intimate relationships.

Australia: Young Women's Alliance, 2024. 96p.

By Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Jasmine McGowan, Rebecca Stewart

This study privileges the voices of children and young people with lived experience of family violence. It seeks to extend current understandings of how child-specific risk identification, assessment and management practices can best be developed, implemented and embedded across Victoria.

Melbourne, VIC: Monash University, 2023. 52p.

By Laura Hidderley, Marni Manning, Elena Marchetti, Anne Edwards

Public opinion about sentencing is notoriously difficult to assess. In 2017, the Queensland Sentencing Advisory Council was asked to do just that in relation to sentencing for child homicide offences. Building on the existing literature on public attitudes to the criminal justice system, this study aimed to explore community views on this issue using a focus group methodology. A group of 103 participants was recruited by a market research company from a mix of urban and rural locations in Queensland. After completing a series of questionnaires, participants were assigned a ‘punitiveness score’ and assessed the seriousness of three separate child homicide vignettes. The study found that participants viewed the sentences as inadequate and not sufficiently reflective of the vulnerability and defencelessness of the child. These findings contributed to the Council’s recommendations to the Attorney-General and have since led to legislative change.

Research Report no. 21.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2021. 58p.

By Annette Idler | Frederik Florenz | Ajmal Burhanzoi John Collins | Marcena Hunter | Antônio Sampai

This paper contributes to research on the relationship between conflict and organized crime (the crime–conflict nexus), using Afghanistan as a case study. For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been plagued by internal armed conflict, influenced by local, national, regional, and international external actors, and the intricate relationships among them. To varying degrees, power, politics, and criminality informed these relationships. Organized crime provides actors in Afghanistan with significant political power, while powerful political actors are uniquely positioned to reap the profits of the country’s criminal markets. This paper gives an account of the existing literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, identifying some of the key insights that this literature has revealed. To do so, it uses a four-pronged framework, exploring how conflict has fuelled organized crime in Afghanistan; how organized crime has fuelled conflict; how conflict over the control of illicit markets has resulted; and how organized crime has contributed to the erosion of the state. By assessing the literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, the paper identifies knowledge gaps and suggests areas for future research.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 36p.

By Luke Kelly

This annotated bibliography includes research and evidence on militarized approaches to combating serious and organized crime (SOC) in various contexts. Militarised approaches involve using military forces or methods to deter and disrupt SOC groups. These approaches have been employed in states facing high levels of violence, fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings, and against threats like piracy and wildlife crime. The research finds that the evidence on the effectiveness of militarised approaches is largely negative. While there are a range of militarised approaches, applied in a variety of contexts, most papers nevertheless agree that military force, or military techniques, can only address one facet of SOC at best, and need to be linked with a range of other measures such as policing, rule of law interventions and economic interventions, to effectively combat SOC. As well as drawing resources away from these other measures, militarised approaches have also been found to have a number of direct and indirect negative effects, such as human rights abuses, increases in violence, and undermining the rule of law.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper 4.   

By Eunsik Chang, Sandra Orozco-Aleman, María Padilla-Romo:

This paper studies the effects of mothers' long-term pre-conception exposure to local violence on birth outcomes. Using administrative data from Mexico and two different empirical strategies, our results indicate that mothers' long-term exposure to local violence prior to conception has detrimental effects on infant health at birth. The results suggest that loss of women's human capital and deterioration of mental health are potential underlying mechanisms behind the adverse effects, highlighting intergenerational consequences of exposure to local violence. Our findings shed light on the welfare implications of local violence that are not captured in in-utero exposure to violence.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 

By Gisli Vogler

How should those profiting from injustice and violence respond to their complicity? And how can they remain responsive when faced with the many ways in which they are entangled in an unjust world? We are at a deciding moment in affluent (Western) societies when it comes to addressing these kinds of questions. On the one hand, there is cause for optimism: the last decade has seen a significant shift towards open discussion of patriarchal society, institutional racism, capitalist exploitation, and the destruction of the environment, amongst many other contemporary political problems. Social movements such as #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, Fridays for Future, and Occupy Wall Street have helped turn assuming responsibility for violence and injustice into a dominant political issue. As a consequence, unjust practices, as diverse as Amazon’s working conditions and the Oxfam sexual exploitation scandal, are met with global condemnation. Debates about how those benefiting from exploitation and expropriation can act more responsibly now pervade many aspects of everyday life, from what to eat and wear, to who has what kind of opportunities. On the other hand, societies continue to be characterized by a failure to act upon the omnipresent demands for facing up to one’s involvement in injustice. Racism, sexism and ableism, and the exploitation of minorities, poorer countries and people, and nature all remain integral parts of human existence. The re-emergence of reactionary populist forces and parties in the US and large parts of Europe, together with the consolidation of power by authoritarian leaders across the world, has exacerbated the problem. The enduring failures by complicit actors to address injustice are cause for much despair and frustration. However, they have also served as catalysts for a sustained scholarly reflection on the complexities of complicity and how to address them (Beausoleil, 2019;  Hayward, 2017; Mihai, 2022; Schaap, 2020). It is my intention in this book to contribute to this interrogation and to think further how people can appropriately respond to their complicity in injustice and violence. To this end, I begin with a constructive evaluation of recent scholarship on complicity.  

Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2024. 194p.

Edited by Tony Roberts and Karekwaivanane, George Hamandishe

In an era when hashtag campaigns like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter capture global attention for victims of injustice, politicians and corporations are now spending billions employing Cambridge Analytica-type consultancies to manufacture disinformation - employing trolls, cyborgs and bots to disrupt dialogue and drown-out dissent. In the first study of its kind, this open-access book presents a range of case studies of these emerging dynamics across Africa, mapping and analyzing disinformation operations in ten different countries, and using innovative techniques to determine who is producing and coordinating these increasingly sophisticated disinformation machines. Drawing on scholars from across the continent, case studies document the actors and mechanisms used to profile citizens, manipulate beliefs and behaviour, and close the political space for democratic dialogue and policy debate. Chapters include examinations of how the Nigerian government deployed disinformation when the #EndSARS campaign focused attention on police brutality and corruption; insights into how pro-government actors responded to the viral #ZimbabweanLivesMatter campaign; and how misogynists mobilized against the #AmINext campaign against gender-based violence in South Africa. Through the documentation of episodes of unruly politics in digital spaces, these studies provide a valuable assessment of the implications of these dynamics for digital rights, moving beyond a focus on elaborations of the idea of ‘fake news’, and providing actionable recommendations in the areas of policy, legislation and practice. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

London: Zed Books, 2024. 256p.

By The New South Wales Crime Commission

Tracking devices are a growing enabler of serious and organized crime in NSW. Accessible, inexpensive, and easily concealed – they are used by organized crime networks to monitor, locate, and ultimately attack their rivals. An initial review of joint operations between the Commission and partner agencies identified frequent and increasing use of tracking devices to facilitate murders, public place shootings, kidnappings, violent drug thefts, and drug trafficking, and tracking devices are extensively being used by high-risk domestic and family violence offenders. 

By matching sales data against criminal histories and intelligence records, Project Hakea identified that:

• 37% of customers who had purchased tracking devices were adversely known to police

• 25% of customers had a history of domestic and family violence

• 15% had a history of serious and organized crime

•  9% of customers had a history of both domestic and family violence and serious and organized crime.

In addition to the extensive use of tracking devices by organized criminals, their widespread use by domestic and family violence offenders creates an urgent need to address the issue. 

By Katherine Verdery

Surveillance and Identity: The author, Katherine Verdery, explores how being under surveillance by Romania's secret police during the Cold War affected her sense of identity and her work as an anthropologist.

Ethnography and Spying: The book delves into the similarities and differences between ethnographic research and spying, questioning the ethical implications of both practices.

Impact of Surveillance: Verdery reflects on the emotional and psychological impact of discovering her secret police file, which contained extensive surveillance records and accusations of espionage.

Historical Context: The narrative provides a detailed account of life în Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu's regime, highlighting the pervasive nature of state surveillance and its effects on individuals and society.

Duke University Press, 2018, 323 pages

By David M. Hart

Hobsbawm Thesis: Eric Hobsbawm's analysis of banditry as a form of political protest is applied to the Islamic world by David Hart, examining cases from Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan.

Case Studies: The document includes detailed case studies of banditry in North Western Morocco, the Moroccan Central High Atlas, Colonial Algeria, and the North West Frontier of Pakistan.

Bandit Behavior: The analysis reveals that while elements of political protest were present, bandit behavior was influenced by various other factors, making the Hobsbawm thesis not always applicable.

Historical Context: The document provides historical context and examples of banditry, highlighting the complex interplay between bandits and political power in different regions.

Middle East & North African Studies Press, 1987, 86 pages