By The International Crisis Group

Launched soon after they retook power in 2021, the Taliban’s campaign against narcotics has drastically reduced opium poppy cultivation and upended Afghanistan’s drug economy. Driven by ideology, the Taliban’s anti-drug efforts include rounding up drug users, eradicating crops, and shuttering drug bazaars. The Taliban’s enforcement impacts the livelihoods of millions of people, particularly poor labourers and rural women. Wealthy traders, meanwhile, are profiting from high prices by selling existing stocks. Many farmers have switched to crops such as wheat, but struggle with the reduced income. The ban’s future is uncertain; although the Taliban are adamant about implementing it, it could collapse under the weight of economic hardship. Foreign donors, who have much to gain from reduced drug production in Afghanistan, should harness the Taliban’s zeal for counter-narcotics and encourage licit economic growth. In the meantime, the Taliban should consider the welfare of the poorest farmers and implement a phased approach to the ban. Implemented with growing seriousness, the Taliban’s anti-narcotics campaign has profoundly affected a country that ranks among the world’s largest suppliers of illegal drugs. The main focus has been opium, a central part of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Enforcement began slowly, but has grown stricter. Taliban forces started with easy targets, herding drug users into jails and rehabilitation centres. They then warned farmers not to cultivate the opium poppies whose resin they have harvested for centuries. When that failed, the Taliban deployed fighters to face down villagers and destroy their crops. As a result, the UN estimates, cultivation declined by 95 per cent – more than any other counter-narcotics campaign in recent history. The Taliban also started to apply pressure on traffickers, despite the fact that some of them backed their movement for decades. More recently the de facto authorities shut down drug bazaars and arrested hundreds of dealers. While underworld kingpins and big landowners have thrived under the ban, reaping the benefits of skyrocketing prices by selling stockpiles, many farmers have suffered. By UN estimates, the halt to opium farming has affected the livelihoods of almost seven million people. These individuals are unlikely to find other work in a stagnant economy burdened with sanctions. Farmers have lost an estimated $1.3 billion annually, or 8 percent of GDP in 2023. Farm work remains the biggest source of employment for Afghan women. The ban has hit them especially hard, given their lack of opportunities under a Taliban regime that severely limits their ability to work. The economic shock has been compounded by the Taliban’s limited capacity to offer farmers and rural workers alternatives. Many switched to cultivating wheat or cotton, but struggle to make ends meet. Development of licit agriculture would require more irrigation, cold storage facilities and better roads. The Taliban does not have the budget to develop such infrastructure. Meanwhile, the opium price has soared, tempting farmers to flout the ban. So far, few dare to defy the Taliban. Farmers respect the ban most faithfully in the south, where the Taliban have many supporters, and where bigger farms produced stocks of opium that could be sold after the ban. Still, pockets of disobedience remain, even in the Taliban’s home province of Kandahar. In the smaller fields of the mountainous north and east, resistance is more widespread. While the Taliban’s measures have shaken the drug sector to its very foundations, the future of the ban remains in doubt. Some experts predict that its economic impact will force the Taliban to back track on a signature policy. Of course, it is also possible that the Taliban leadership will remain stubborn and steadfast. Foreign governments have a lot to gain from Afghanistan no longer flooding global markets with drugs. After the Taliban’s severe restrictions on women’s rights made the regime odious to much of the outside world, the narcotics ban offers a rare opportunity to work with the new authorities on a pressing issue to the benefit of all sides. The Taliban’s strategy of banning drugs without providing alternative jobs risks large-scale displacement of rural Afghans and rising emigration, along with growing desperation among the poor. Donors should support a transition toward licit and equitable growth in the economy, easing the acute poverty crisis the country currently faces. Some already give aid for food security and rehabilitation of drug users, but the assistance falls far short. Effective support at a national scale would require working with the Taliban regime, which is politically difficult and, for many Western policymakers, unpalatable. It would, however, aid Afghan civilians, especially rural women. In the first instance, support could focus on rural development, agricultural support, water conservation and investments in agro-processing. But the reality is that a drug-free agricultural sector will not provide enough jobs, so the country needs a development plan focusing more broadly on non-farm employment, including for women. Regional countries should support Afghanistan’s integration into transport networks and trade arrangements, for their own interests and to stabilise their neighbourhood. All of this will require time. Until the country makes the painful transition away from dependence on narcotics as a cash crop, the Taliban should show a bit of leni ency. Although it is unlikely it will backtrack on the ban, at a minimum the regime should halt more intrusive eradication practices such as house-to-house searches. Adopting more lenient practices such as turning a blind eye to small garden plots of poppy and cannabis would give the poorest farmers a better chance of survival in the coming years. Farmers selling tiny amounts of opium for prices hundreds of times higher than what is paid for other crops would give them a lifeline without jeopardising the ban’s overall objectives. 

Report No. 340 Kabul/Brussels,  International Crisis Group, 2024. 35p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Marina Gonzalez and Reygan Cunningham

Community violence prevention is an emerging field of public safety work focused on reducing and preventing lethal and sublethal violence.1 Yet, despite growing awareness of evidence-informed approaches, historic levels of investment and political support from the federal government, few cities have been able to sustainably reduce community violence at the city level through purposeful strategies. With support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) worked with a diverse range of field experts to identify key capacities that may play essential roles in reducing community violence at the city level and over time. The project team began by combining findings from research across a range of disciplines and interviews with leading subject matter experts to identify key capacities that were likely to play important roles in the ability of cities to sustainably reduce community violence. The six identified capacities were: 1. Political governance and public sector leadership, 2. Data-informed problem analysis, 3. Cross-sector collaboration on a shared strategy, 4. Effective operational management, 5. Robust violence reduction infrastructure, and 6. Sustainability planning and institutionalization. To test and refine these capacities, CPSC project leads explored the role of each capacity in seven cities with long-term violence challenges as well as significant experience with violence prevention efforts: Baltimore; Boston; Cincinnati; Los Angeles; New Orleans; Oakland; and Philadelphia. This second stage of the study surfaced the following city findings: Cities with more key capacities present appeared to be more successful. These cities were able to assemble violence reduction strategies that formal evaluations found to be effective in reducing violence over multi-year time horizons.2 Higher levels of effective political governance corresponded with more robust operational management, which appeared to play a crucial role in cities' ability to reduce violence; Sustained funding, a clear theory of change, a strategic focus on a highest-risk of violence population and organizational support were associated with effective CVI ecosystems. These ecosystems appeared to help cities sustain longer-term reductions. Problem-oriented, data-driven, collaborative policing appears to play an important role, operationally and politically; The challenge of scaling programs and strategies in larger cities is significant, but can drive creative adaptation when supported by robust management structures; and Sustainability and institutionalization of violence reduction strategies appear to depend heavily on stable political governance and effective management 

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities. 18p.

By Elizabeth Hacker, Kriti Bhattarai, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked, Bhujel, S. , Danny Burns, Mariah Cannon, Deshar, L. , Anita K.C., Pragya Lamsal, Barsha Luitel, Sudhir Malla, Mishra, N. , Rayamajhi, D. , Shakya, A. , Sherpa, P. , Kapil Shrestha & Amit Timilsina

Spanning five years, the focus of the CLARISSA programme in Nepal was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, with particular attention given to the informal economy where the worst forms of child labour are prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, in Nepal, 12 Participatory Action Research Groups of children and business owners spent between 12 and 18 months learning from action to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour, their lived experience of it, and the businesses in which they work. With a focus on both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour, this paper aims to further understanding of the reasons why children have to work and why businesses employ children. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in and the neighbourhoods where they live. This paper synthesises the detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why worst forms of child labour occur in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, and what can be done about it.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 18,  Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2024. 74p.

By Jody Aked, Danny Burns and A.K.M. Maksud  

CLARISSA (Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South‑Eastern Asia), a research programme on worst forms of child labour (WFCL), aims to identify, evidence, and promote effective multi-stakeholder action to tackle the drivers of WFCL in selected supply chains in Bangladesh and Nepal. Spanning five years, the programme’s focus in Bangladesh was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Dhaka’s leather industry, and particularly the informal economy, where WFCL is prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, 13 participatory action research groups of children and business owners spent 12–18 months learning about actions to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports, and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper synthesises this detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens in Dhaka’s leather industry and what can be done about it. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about child labour in the leather industry in and around Dhaka, Bangladesh. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour and their lived experience of it, alongside the small leather businesses they work in. The aim was to understand why children have to work and why the businesses employ children, looking at both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website,2 which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper looks across this rich and detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens and what can be done about it.   

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 11, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 70p.  

By Patricia C. Lewis , Nadine J. Kaslow, Yuk Fai Cheong, Dabney P. Evans and Kathryn M. Yount

Femicide Refers to the intentional gender-related killing of women and girls (1). Despite the high prevalence of female murder victimization in the United States (U.S.) (2, 3), the U.S. lags behind other nations in defining and documenting gender-related female homicides (4). While efforts are underway within the criminal justice and public health sectors to better track violent deaths, deficient surveillance systems limit efforts to estimate the annual incidence of femicide in the U.S. Here, we position femicide as a preventable death that should be treated as a social and public health problem and a distinct form of homicide in the legal code. This approach is especially salient, given the documented increase of non-lethal intimate partner violence (IPV) in major cities (5) and nationally (6) during the COVID-19pandemic, demonstrating the collateral impacts of public-health crises on violence against women (VAW). 

Front. Public Health, 27 February 2024 Sec. Injury Prevention and Control Volume 12 - 2024 |

By Pamela B. Teaster, Erica Wood,  Sally B. Hurme,  Carlisle Shealy

In the United States, 10.6% of adults ages 18-64 and 35.2% of people age 65 and older live with a disability (Kraus et al., 2018). Four and a half percent of adults ages 18-64 and 8.9% of people age 65 and older have a cognitive disability (Kraus et al., 2018). Certain cognitive disabilities make adults vulnerable to abuse and require the help of a surrogate decision-maker, such as a guardian or an agent under a power of attorney (Gunther, 2011). A wide spectrum of adults may need the assistance of a guardian, including individuals with serious mental illness, intellectual disability, and traumatic brain injury. The number of adults with serious mental illness increased from 8.3 million in 2008 to 13.1 million in 2019; the greatest increase occurred in young adults ages 18-25 (Lipari, 2020). More than 7 million people in the United States have an intellectual disability, with many requiring assistance (Population Specific Fact Sheet–Intellectual Disability | National Disability Navigator Resource Collaborative, n.d.). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that each year there are more than 2.87 million visits to emergency departments, hospitalizations, and deaths due to traumatic brain injury; some of these result in long-term disability (TBI Data | Concussion | Traumatic Brain Injury | CDC Injury Center, 2021). The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs reports that more than 400,000 U.S. service members experienced a traumatic brain injury between 2000 and 2019 (VA Research on Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), n.d.). Individuals with serious mental illness, intellectual disability, and traumatic brain injury may require short- or long-term guardianship depending on the progression and treatment of their disability. Advancements in medical care not only expand the lifespan of older individuals but also enhance the life expectancies of younger individuals with brain injuries, serious mental illness, or intellectual disabilities, who may outlive their family caregivers (Patja et al., 2000). Terminology for guardianship differs by state. In many but not all states, court-appointed surrogates who make decisions concerning an individual’s finances are referred to as “conservators,” and those who make decisions concerning an individual’s health or personal matters are called “guardians.” For this report, we use the term guardian to refer to both, unless specifically indicated. Guardians are bound by statutory requirements and case law — as well as ethical principles — to act in the best interests of a vulnerable adult. Guardians are fiduciaries, which means that they must act according to the highest standards of care, accountability, trust, honesty, confidentiality, and avoidance of conflict of interest (Managing Someone Else’s Money: Help for Court Appointed Guardian of Property and Conservators, 2019). Powers given to guardians are often immense — for example, the authority to sell a person’s home and personal property, make contracts on their behalf, and consent to all medical treatments. In addition, guardians may be authorized to charge fees for their services that are payable from an adult’s estate — a situation that, left unmonitored, opens the potential for abuse. Moreover, adults with cognitive impairments may be unable to recognize when guardians are not serving as they should. Although guardians should provide protection, there is also the risk that a guardian may take advantage of an adult whom they were named to protect. Despite this situation, we currently lack reliable data both on how many guardianships or guardians exist and on the outcomes of these  arrangements. A number of high-profile media exposés (e.g., Aviv, 2017; Day, Stark, & Coscarelli, 2021; Garland, 2017) have highlighted how, in some egregious cases, guardian actions have harmed adults who are at risk. 

Washington DC: National Institute of Justice , 2022. 64p.

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace ResearchVolume 61, Issue 4, July 2024, Pages 673-693

By Sherry, Suzanna

Last October, progressive Jews were shocked by the raw antisemitism displayed by their erstwhile allies on the political left. After Hamas terrorists tortured, raped, or murdered more than 1200 Israeli civilians and took some 200 civilians hostage, some progressives – especially on college campuses – celebrated. They chanted the Palestinian mantra “from the river to the sea,” seeking to erase Israel (and Jews) from the face of the earth. The number of antisemitic incidents on campus soared, coming from both students and faculty. A Stanford lecturer forced Jewish students to the back of the classroom and labeled them “colonizers.” Jewish students had to barricade themselves inside a library at Cooper Union, and Jewish students at MIT were told by faculty to avoid the university’s main lobby for their own safety. Many university presidents who had previously sent out campus-wide emails condemning the murder of George Floyd, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, and countless other world events suddenly discovered the Kalven Principles and claimed it would be inappropriate for them to take sides, or issued weak statements about how the situation in the Middle East was complicated. This double standard continued as some universities responded to student calls for genocide of Jews by invoking principles of free speech, principles that had been notably ignored when the speech in question was directed at other groups. Most campus DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) offices, especially at the most elite universities, had nothing to say about the surging antisemitism. This essay explains why no one should have been shocked, or even mildly surprised, by the progressive response to the massacre. Progressive or “woke” culture –as exemplified by critical race theory, anti-racism of the Ibram X. Kendi variety, and, especially on college campuses, the DEI juggernaut – is necessarily and inevitably antisemitic at its core. That these related movements have now exposed their antisemitism publicly is no surprise: antisemitism is bred in their bones.

FIU Law Review from Vol. 25 to Vol. 19, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 24-4, 2024. 

By Rupert Horsley

This report details the key trends and developments in human smuggling in Libya in 2023. In large degree, the year was one of continuity with the patterns seen in 2022. Over the course of the year, for example, 77 470 migrants departed the Libyan coast, only marginally higher than 2022’s figure of 75 500.1 Furthermore, hybrid migration, in which migrants travel to Libya regularly or semi-regularly before attempting the sea crossing to Europe, accounted for an estimated 75% of these departures, also roughly similar to the proportion recorded in 2022. Many of the migrants involved in hybrid journeys first arrived in Libya at Benina airport in the east of the country. This indicates the increasing importance of eastern Libya to human smuggling writ large. In addition to the migrant arrivals at Benina airport, eastern Libya also saw a dramatic rise in departures from the coastal areas in and around Tobruk in 2023, with some 40% of sea crossings in the first half of the year taking place from there. Some, though not all, of the migrants leaving from the east coast had arrived in Benina. While heightened enforcement by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) suppressed departures from the Tobruk hub in the second half of 2023, the body reportedly continued to allow Benina to be used as the main air travel arrival point for hybrid migration for the rest of the year. Thus, the LAAF clearly emerged as one of the main actors influencing hybrid migration in Libya in 2023. Following the shutdown of the Tobruk system, hybrid migration sea crossings were displaced to the west coast. By August, departures from this area had increased significantly and there were reports of migrants accumulating in warehouses in several hubs. In October, a notably large series of departures from Zuwara occurred at a remarkable rate. Increased departures from the west coast indicate that entrenched smuggling networks remain ready to seize opportunities. Given the political and security fragmentation of the region, these networks are likely to underpin the resilience of human smuggling in Libya for the foreseeable future. A notable element that remained marginal in 2023 was trans-Saharan smuggling through Libya. This was once a major route for migrants departing from Libya, but has declined significantly since 2017/18 due to insecurity and migrant abuse in Libya and law enforcement action in downstream countries. One of the few significant developments was the relatively moderate but growing number of Sudanese refugees fleeing the civil war in that country. However, this was not substantial enough to drive systematic changes in the dynamics of overland human smuggling. Similarly, Sudanese nationals did not leave the Libyan coast in large numbers. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Libya. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2017, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Libya, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.2   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 36p.

By Ingri Bøe Buer

This article reconsiders peace and security from the perspectives of community leaders, educators and activists in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2019–2020. Through a critical lens, it argues that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro resembles a form of new wars where the state is a major producer of insecurity. It questions the meaning of peace and top-down pacification processes in a city where the favelas, since their origin, have been considered dangerous areas needing to be pacified and controlled. The article introduces favela peace formation as a concept to describe alternative processes working to reduce the inter-sectional forms of violence in these communities: non-violent, locally legitimate peace processes working to slowly construct a positive, sustainable peace. To conclude, it discusses how favela peace formation presents a way of imagining peace as ‘care’ instead of ‘order’ in response to the state’s violent peace as ‘control’

Peacebuilding, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2024.2354083

By Sarah Projansky

Looking at popular culture from 1980 to the present, feminism appears to be "over": that is, according to popular critics we are in an era of "postfeminism" in which feminism has supposedly already achieved equality for women. Not so, says Sarah Projansky. In Watching Rape, Projansky undermines this complacent view in her fascinating and thorough analysis of depictions of rape in U.S. film, television, and independent video. Through a cultural studies analysis of such films as Thelma and Louise, Daughters of the Dust, and She's Gotta Have It, and television shows like ER, Ally McBeal, Beverly Hills 90210, and various made-for-tv movies, Projansky challenges us to see popular culture as a part of our everyday lives and practices, and to view that culture critically. How have media defined rape and feminism differently over time? How do popular narratives about rape also communicate ideas about gender, race, class, nationality, and sexuality? And, what is the future of feminist politics, theory, and criticism with regard to issues of sexual violence, postfeminism, and popular media? The first study to address the relationship between rape and postfeminism, and one of the most detailed and thorough analyses of rape in 25 years, Watching Rape is a crucial contribution to contemporary feminism.

New York: NYU Press, 2001.

By Tara Wheeler, Julia Bergeron-Smith, George Shaler, Lisa Sampson

Sex offender recidivism data can be difficult to comprehend, especially when conducting research across states. For example, sex offenders can be categorized in numerous ways: by the type of crime committed (e.g., rape, assault, exhibitionism), by offense severity, by victim age (adult or child). Likewise, recidivism definitions (e.g., rearrest, reconviction, or reincarceration) and timeframes (e.g., one-year, two-year, or three-years following release) can vary across local, state, and federal agencies. Thus, there is no single measure systemically used across jurisdictions. Recognizing the public’s concerns about sex offender recidivism, the Maine and Massachusetts Statistical Analysis Centers (SACs), proposed and received funding for a retrospective sex offender recidivism study through the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice. This collaboration marks the first time either state has undertaken this type of study. This project studied the recidivism rates of Maine sex offenders who were released from prison between 2005 and 2019 and Massachusetts sex offenders released between 2009 and 2018. In total, the Massachusetts cohort was composed of 1,210 offenders and the Maine study of 905 offenders. Criminal history records were obtained for each offender from their respective states to determine whether the offender recidivated (i.e., committed post-release offenses that resulted in a conviction). To be included in the recidivism portion of this study, there must have been at least a five-year window between the time of release and the time the criminal history data was pulled. Overall, 880 offenders were included in the Massachusetts recidivism analysis and 661 in the Maine recidivism analysis. A primary interest area was to determine whether recidivism rates differed by offense severity (i.e., rape or non-rape) and victim age (i.e., child or adult), however, these two groupings are not entirely separate from one another— while rape is considered more severe than other types of sex offenses, crimes against children are also deemed to be more egregious than crimes against adults. Therefore, an offender typology—based on the original sex offenses associated with the commitment and subsequent release—was created that incorporates both victim type and offense severity. The first, and most severe, category is child rapist, which includes all offenders who committed a child rape offense, followed by the rapist category, which includes all other offenders who committed a rape offense. Next is child predator and is used for those who committed a sex offense against a child but did not commit a rape offense. Last, is the other category and captures those who did not fall within one of the prior three categories. To gain a better understanding of recidivism among the sex offender population, survival analysis (specifically, the Cox Proportional Hazards regression method) was conducted to determine which offender characteristics, if any, influenced recidivism rates. Using this approach, researchers were able to control for other known attributes. The attributes tested in this study were: • offender type • severity of sex offense(s) (Maine only) • number of sex offense(s) • commitment length (Maine only) • release type (supervision or discharge) • security level of facility offender was released from (Massachusetts only) • release age Key Findings • Age at earliest sex offense associated with commitment varied by offender type for both Maine and Massachusetts. Interestingly, child predators had a mean age that was statistically higher than that of rapists and child rapists. o In Massachusetts, the average offense age of child predators was 36.6 years old, which was significantly higher than the offense age of rapists (31.1 years old) and child rapists (33.9 years old). o For Maine, child predators were, on average, 35.0 years old at the time of their earliest sex offense associated with commitment, compared to 30.4 years old for child rapists and 31.1 years old for rapists. • Maine’s five-year recidivism rate (43%) was much higher than the Massachusetts five year recidivism rate (25%). While there are numerous potential scenarios that could explain the differences in recidivism rates, it is important to note that each state has its own criminal laws and procedures that, in turn, impacts the underlying study population and their recidivism rates. For instance, an offense that resulted in commitment to state prison in Maine might result in a county jail commitment for Massachusetts. Therefore, caution should be taken when making comparisons between the two states. • Offender type, severity of sex offense, and release age were found to be associated with Maine recidivism rates. When coupled with release age, release type was also found to have an influence on recidivism rates. Holding all other attributes constant: o Individuals whose most severe sex offense was a misdemeanor are expected to recidivate at a rate 45% higher than those with a felony level offense. o ‘Other’ type offenders (those whose offenses fell short of rape and did not target children) have an expected recidivism rate 45% higher than offenders who committed sex offenses against children (child predators and child rapists) o Age at release, both by itself and as an interaction with release type, is associated with recidivism rates. For every 10-year increase in age at release, the predicted recidivism rate decreased by 21%. However, for offenders who were released to supervision, the hazard rate decreases even further, with supervised offenders having a 38% decrease in risk for every 10-year increase of age at release. • Of the attributes tested, offender type, release type, release level, and release age were found to be associated with Massachusetts recidivism rates. Holding all other attributes constant: o Offenders released from a maximum-security level facility are predicted to recidivate at a rate 2.4 times higher than that of offenders released from a medium security level facility or lower. o ‘Other’ type sex offenders are predicted to recidivate at a rate 115% higher than those who committed child-based sex offenses (child predators and child rapists). Meanwhile, non-child rape offenders are expected to recidivate at a rate 58% higher than child offenders. o Discharged offenders released without supervision have an expected recidivism rate 61% higher than offenders who were supervised following release. o For every 10-year increase in age, the recidivism rate is expected to decrease by 37%.    

 Portland:  Maine Statistical Analysis Center;   Massachusetts Statistical Analysis Center, 2023. 50p.

By Kara Miller

The Oklahoma Statistical Analysis Center (SAC), a unit located within the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI), is tasked with analyzing and reporting crime data. In 2019, Oklahoma House Bill 2597 was passed by the legislature and signed by the Governor. Effective November 1, 2019, the bill modified Oklahoma law to permit anyone over 21 years or military services members and/or veterans over 18 to carry a firearm without first obtaining a self-defense act (SDA) license provided they are not disqualified based on their criminal history. In order to evaluate whether the change in law impacted crime in Oklahoma, the SAC chose to study violent, gun-related crimes in Oklahoma using State Incident-Based Reporting System (SIBRS) data for the offenses of “murder and non-negligent manslaughter” and aggravated assault. This initial report evaluates 2018 data to establish a baseline. Future reports will analyze data from 2019 and beyond comparing the results to this benchmark report. Key Findings:  For the 37 victims of murder where the sex was known: o Male victims (27) were killed by offenders whose sex was reported as male (17, 56.7%), female (8, 26.7%), or unknown (5, 16.7%). o Female victims (10) were killed by offenders whose sex was reported as male (9, 90.0%) or female (1, 10.0%).  The majority (540, 79.3%) of victims of aggravated assault with a gun were reported with no injury. Victim-to-offender relationship: o For 73.7% of victim-to-offender relationships for victims of murder/non-negligent manslaughter, the victim was within the family of the offender (42.1%), or the victim was outside of the family but known to the offender (31.6%). o For 64.8% of victim-to-offender relationships for victims of aggravated assault, the victim was within the family of the offender (17.8%), or the victim was outside of the family but known to the offender (47.0%).  Victims of Aggravated Assault and Injuries of Aggravated Assault is defined as the presence of a weapon that could cause serious injury or presence of severe injuries.  Nearly 80.0% of victims were reported with no injury. 

Oklahoma City: Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation. Office of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2020. 81p. 

May Contain Markup

By Eliza Earle Ferguson

Crimes of Passion: The book explores how crimes of passion,particularly those involving intimate violence, were understood and treated in fin-de-siècle Paris. These acts were often seen as love stories gone wrong and were frequently acquitted.

Gender Dynamics: It highlights the gendered nature of intimate violence, showing how men and women experienced and justified violence differently, often influenced by societal norms and economic conditions.

Community and Legal Interactions: The document discusses the role of community networks and the legal system in addressing intimate violence, revealing tensions between local knowledge and state power.

Historical Context: The book situates these issues within the broader social and cultural context of 19th-century Paris, providing a detailed analysis of how intimate violence intersected with gender, class, and urban life.

JHU Press, Mar 19, 2010, 268 pages

By Ghulam Hyder Sindhi

Historical Context: The document explores the historical and cultural roots of honour killings, highlighting how these practices have evolved over time and their deep-seated presence in various societies.

Status of Women: It discusses the status of women in Pakistan,emphasizing the social, economic, and political challenges they face,including limited access to education and economic opportunities.

Violence Against Women: The document provides an in-depth analysis of different forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, psychological violence, and honour killings.

Recommendations: It offers recommendations for improving the status of women, such as legal reforms, educational initiatives, and the need for a broader social movement to raise awareness and change societal attitudes.

National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2007, 212 pages

By Scottish Government. Safer Communities Directorate

This research reports on 22 victims' and witnesses' experiences of court since the introduction of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 (DASA) in April 2019. The Act aimed to expand understandings of domestic abuse, improve the criminal justice system's ability to tackle domestic abuse effectively and increase courts' capacity to protect victims, witnesses and associated children. This in-depth qualitative study contributes to a programme of work to meet the Ministerial 3-year reporting requirement of DASA (S14(2) (f)) to provide: 'information about the experience of witnesses (including witnesses who are children) at court'. Early implementation of the Act (2019-22) coincided with the advent of COVID-19, which had an unprecedented impact on those experiencing domestic abuse and the operation of the justice system; these findings should be considered in that context.

Key findings

According to the 22 adult and child victims/witnesses involved in the research:

The new law better reflects how adult victims experience domestic abuse: participants reported a range of psychological, physical and, for some, sexual harm over time. However, there was limited awareness of what constitutes criminal behaviour under DASA amongst the public (including victims/witnesses) and the professionals that participants encountered.

Many participants felt DASA and/or its provisions were under-utilised. Most reported a continued focus on single/severe incidents of physical violence rather than ongoing abuse. Many felt the justice system struggled with prosecution of psychological abuse, particularly regarding verbal, telephone and online abusive behaviour.

Most parents/child witnesses reported that harm to children was insufficiently recognised; they felt perpetrators were not held accountable for the impact that domestic abuse had on children and that children's safety and specific needs/vulnerabilities were inadequately addressed. Many victims felt that abuse of a third party – for example, family and friends – had not been taken account of adequately throughout the process.

Although there were some positive examples of reporting to the police, this was not the experience of the majority of participants. The immediate aftermath of reporting domestic abuse was a time of particular vulnerability for victims and witnesses. Most participants felt an onus was on them to keep themselves safe during this time.

Participants had inadequate knowledge of decision-making processes and the rationale for decisions made throughout the investigation and court proceedings. They cited a lack of communication, collaboration and involvement/transparency in decision-making. Far from being at the centre of the justice process, they felt on the periphery and marginalised by it.

Participants reported that going to court was difficult and, for many, frightening and traumatic. Feeling uninformed, giving evidence in an adversarial process, court adjournments and delays significantly impacted on their mental health.

Participants raised the potential for court to empower and provide a sense of closure to victims and witnesses, particularly when support and advocacy was provided.

Participants had significant concerns that the investigation, prosecution and sentencing for domestic abuse offences did not adequately reflect the sustained level, severity or impact of abuse experienced.

Safety was not consistently ensured for all participants before, during or post proceedings. This was contrary to their expectations that reporting would stop abuse and provide safety for themselves, family and friends. Non-harassment orders (NHOs) offered some protection and reassurance for victims.

Advocacy and support were reported as the most significant mechanisms for minimising trauma and enhancing feelings of safety; however, participants identified gaps in provision, particularly earlier in the process and post court.

94p.

By Susan A. Batchelor and Caitlin Gormley

Interpersonal repeat violent victimisation

The definition and conceptualisation of interpersonal repeat violent victimisation (RVV) is contested. Interpersonal violence refers to violence between individuals, often subdivided into community violence and violence against women and girls, including domestic abuse. These two forms of interpersonal violence are often studied separately, using divergent theoretical and methodological approaches (Batchelor et al. 2019). Mainstream research on RVV is largely quantitative in orientation, counting recurrent incidences of the same type of violent offence against the same target and identifying risk factors that make some people more prone to victimisation than others. Feminist research on men's violence against women and girls more often draws on qualitative methods to explore experiences of overlapping and intersecting forms of violence, conceptualising repeat physical violence as part of a process of coercive control located within a context of gendered inequality and norms.

Building on these insights, the current research adopts a qualitative approach to unpack patterns of RVV evident in official statistics on non-sexual violence in Scotland. Unlike survey research, which asks respondents to self-report the number of incidents they have experienced over a specified period, typically the previous 12 months, the present study acknowledges the impact of repeat violence and associated trauma on memory, imposing no time limit on participants' experiences. As a result, whilst we invited participants to reflect on recent experiences of physical violence, they also often related experiences of other forms of violence, experienced across the life course.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Safer Communities Directorate, 2023. 147p

By Scottish Government, Minister for Victims and Community Safety, Justice Directorate

The former Minister for Community Safety, Ash Regan MSP, asked the Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN) and the Scottish Government to undertake a review of antisocial behaviour (ASB). This report presents the findings from work undertaken to gather views on the current approach to antisocial behaviour in Scotland. It is based on discussions with key stakeholders across Scotland including those who have experienced antisocial behaviour, frontline staff seeking to prevent and tackle antisocial behaviour and community and equality groups including those representing minority communities in Scotland. The discussions included people from both urban and rural settings across different areas of Scotland.

The findings do not amount to a definitive statement on what people feel needs to be done to change the way we view, prevent and address antisocial behaviour. However, they do provide a qualitative evidence base given the size and breadth of engagement. It is clear from these sessions that there are no quick fixes or easy solutions here. Therefore, we need to look at how we set the path to begin the journey and identify future work activity and milestones.

Overall, 25 engagement discussions involving close to 250 people, representing a wide range of interests (Annex B - methodology summary) were held by the Scottish Community Safety Network and the Scottish Government. We are indebted to all who shared their time and their expertise. This report reflects the views, opinions and experiences from those discussions, and additional written feedback received.

The Scottish Government and its partners believe that everyone has the right to be, and feel, safe in their community and homes. Embedding change which will have a positive sustainable impact, requires a process of innovating, evaluating and building on success. We can also learn from challenging issues and sharing best practice.

What has come across very clearly during this engagement, is that prevention is better than cure and that working collaboratively in partnership is essential to finding long term solutions to address antisocial behaviour and make all of our communities safer and more welcoming places to live.

We all have a role to play in preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour and hope that this report will be used as the starting point of a much broader and deeper discussion of these issues, leading to a long-term road map of how we can work collectively to prevent and address antisocial behaviour in effective ways.

We can, and should, come together to address the mutual problems we face in our communities, but we will achieve little if we approach this in a way that is not properly considered, including the potential for unintended consequences, and therefore we need to develop structures which we can work within to achieve change and incrementally build on approaches which are proven to be successful.

As such, two recommendations arise from our assessment of the qualitative evidence:

Recommendation one

That Scottish Ministers, and statutory, non-statutory and voluntary sector service providers and communities themselves recognise that our approach to preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour needs to be a long-term approach (that recognises societal changes and evolves) and that we need to make a commitment to a programme of activity which will provide a framework that will guide us in taking forward this agenda in alignment with other linked national policies.

Recommendation two

An independently chaired group of experts, potentially including statutory, non-statutory and voluntary service providers, community representatives and other key interests should be brought together to develop a long-term framework for addressing antisocial behaviour.

This should have a strong focus on steps that can be taken to prevent antisocial behaviour from occurring as well as considering the effectiveness of current approaches to tackling the antisocial behaviour which occurs.

The findings in this and other relevant, existing reports should form the foundations of the group’s work and they should not be restricted in identifying what areas are most important to move this agenda forward, which could include considerations of the effectiveness of current legislation.

The group should be able to commission and gather evidence to support their work and have a free hand to engage with anyone who can support this agenda. Central to this work should be building broad support for any long-term work that the group proposes.

Edinburgh:

2023. 63p.

Download here: The former Minister for Community Safety, Ash Regan MSP, asked the Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN) and the Scottish Government to undertake a review of antisocial behaviour (ASB). This report presents the findings from work undertaken to gather views on the current approach to antisocial behaviour in Scotland. It is based on discussions with key stakeholders across Scotland including those who have experienced antisocial behaviour, frontline staff seeking to prevent and tackle antisocial behaviour and community and equality groups including those representing minority communities in Scotland. The discussions included people from both urban and rural settings across different areas of Scotland.

The findings do not amount to a definitive statement on what people feel needs to be done to change the way we view, prevent and address antisocial behaviour. However, they do provide a qualitative evidence base given the size and breadth of engagement. It is clear from these sessions that there are no quick fixes or easy solutions here. Therefore, we need to look at how we set the path to begin the journey and identify future work activity and milestones.

Overall, 25 engagement discussions involving close to 250 people, representing a wide range of interests (Annex B - methodology summary) were held by the Scottish Community Safety Network and the Scottish Government. We are indebted to all who shared their time and their expertise. This report reflects the views, opinions and experiences from those discussions, and additional written feedback received.

The Scottish Government and its partners believe that everyone has the right to be, and feel, safe in their community and homes. Embedding change which will have a positive sustainable impact, requires a process of innovating, evaluating and building on success. We can also learn from challenging issues and sharing best practice.

What has come across very clearly during this engagement, is that prevention is better than cure and that working collaboratively in partnership is essential to finding long term solutions to address antisocial behaviour and make all of our communities safer and more welcoming places to live.

We all have a role to play in preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour and hope that this report will be used as the starting point of a much broader and deeper discussion of these issues, leading to a long-term road map of how we can work collectively to prevent and address antisocial behaviour in effective ways.

We can, and should, come together to address the mutual problems we face in our communities, but we will achieve little if we approach this in a way that is not properly considered, including the potential for unintended consequences, and therefore we need to develop structures which we can work within to achieve change and incrementally build on approaches which are proven to be successful.

As such, two recommendations arise from our assessment of the qualitative evidence:

Recommendation one

That Scottish Ministers, and statutory, non-statutory and voluntary sector service providers and communities themselves recognise that our approach to preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour needs to be a long-term approach (that recognises societal changes and evolves) and that we need to make a commitment to a programme of activity which will provide a framework that will guide us in taking forward this agenda in alignment with other linked national policies.

Recommendation two

An independently chaired group of experts, potentially including statutory, non-statutory and voluntary service providers, community representatives and other key interests should be brought together to develop a long-term framework for addressing antisocial behaviour.

This should have a strong focus on steps that can be taken to prevent antisocial behaviour from occurring as well as considering the effectiveness of current approaches to tackling the antisocial behaviour which occurs.

The findings in this and other relevant, existing reports should form the foundations of the group’s work and they should not be restricted in identifying what areas are most important to move this agenda forward, which could include considerations of the effectiveness of current legislation.

The group should be able to commission and gather evidence to support their work and have a free hand to engage with anyone who can support this agenda. Central to this work should be building broad support for any long-term work that the group proposes.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Justice Directorate, 2023. 63p.

By Safer Communities Directorate

Executive Summary

• There is an ongoing cost of living crisis in Scotland, and the rest of the United Kingdom, which is characterised by higher energy costs, higher food and other household costs and real term pay decreases. This paper focuses on the relationship between this cost crisis and crime in Scotland.

• The academic evidence is by no means conclusive in favour of a certain economic variable having a relationship with overall or total crime. This is an important finding as it dispels the idea that worsening economic conditions will inevitably result in a rise in crime.

• Unlike the recessions of the 1980s, the 1990s and 2008 which brought periods of higher unemployment and decreasing inflation, the current cost crisis is characterised by increasing levels of inflation, combined with low levels of unemployment. Therefore, whilst the existing literature helps us to understand how previous economic shifts have impacted upon crime in the past, any attempts to use this literature to predict the impact of the cost crisis on crime is methodologically unadvisable. We must rely on present day data to monitor crime trends during this current period of cost crisis in Scotland.

• Gross Domestic Product is too broad a measure when it comes to determining the impact of the economy on crime. Therefore, we must specify and explore how changes in specific economic variables impacts upon crime.

• For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians explored the relationship between levels of unemployment in Scotland, all recorded crime, and some specific crime types from 1971 until the present day. The analysis found a strong positive linear correlation between unemployment and overall recorded crime, housebreaking and, theft of a motor vehicle. Considering forecasted increases in unemployment, this relationship is noteworthy.

• We know from the academic evidence that relative falls in the wages of low wage workers increases rates of property and violent crime. This finding has present-day relevance given recent real-term falls in wages as a result of the cost crisis.

• The academic evidence also tells us that increases in inequality and poverty rates increase the rates of property crime and violent crime. However, it is not yet clear how these two economic variables are being affected by the cost crisis and therefore if, and how, they may impact upon crime.

• Non-economic factors play a significant role with regard to fluctuations in overall crime rates as well as rates of specific crime types and are impossible to precisely disentangle from the economic factors that impact upon crime. Such factors include the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of police officers, and population demographics.

• For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians found a strong, positive, linear correlation between the proportion of young men (16-24) in the population and overall recorded crimes of housebreaking and theft of a motor vehicle. Population forecasts tell us that over the next 10 years the size of this group is projected to steadily increase.

• This paper's case study on housebreaking further explores this phenomenon of economic and non-economic factors impacting upon the rates of specific crimes. The case study suggests that housebreaking, an acquisitive crime, may not be susceptible to the cost crisis. This contrasts with findings from the academic evidence review and suggests the presence of non-economic factors that are acting to limit any rise in housebreaking.

• That being said, analysis demonstrates a rise in overall recorded crime and Crimes of Dishonesty that may be the result of cost crisis pressures. It is unclear, however, whether crime is simply returning to pre-pandemic levels. Of particular note is the large uplift in shoplifting, which increased by 21% in the year ending June 2023, when compared to the previous year.

• With regard to next steps, a second occasional paper will be published in 2024 which will draw on the latest Police Recorded crime data and the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey data and will focus on the impact of the cost crisis on violent crime and domestic abuse in addition to revisiting the crime types identified in this paper.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Social Research, 2023. 28p.

By Sophia Ricono-Kaufhold, Marie Czarnietzki, Rajan Darjee, Nathan Brooks, Aleshia Nanev, Michael R. Davis

The present study examined distinctions between child (n = 30) and adult (n = 212) sexual homicide offenders (SHOs) in Australia and New Zealand, contributing to the limited international research on the subject. Data, primarily sourced from judges' sentencing comments on AustLII and New Zealand Legal Information Institute, revealed significant differences. Child SHOs displayed elevated rates of pedophilia, sexual deviance, and adverse childhood experiences, including sexual abuse. They were more likely to be married, cohabitate, and target familial victims. Their crimes were more often committed during daylight and outdoors, involving tactics such as victim conning, restraints, strangulation, and hiding victim's bodies. No significant group differences emerged regarding offenders' psychopathy or sexual sadism scores. Results were interpreted in line with child SHOs' deviant sexual preferences and the routine activity theory. The study, as the first investigating child sexual homicides in Australia and New Zealand, sets the foundation for an evidence-based approach to policy and practice.

Behavioral Sciences & the Law; 2024 Volume 42, Issue 4Jul 2024