By Rupert Horsley

This report details the key trends and developments in human smuggling in Libya in 2023. In large degree, the year was one of continuity with the patterns seen in 2022. Over the course of the year, for example, 77 470 migrants departed the Libyan coast, only marginally higher than 2022’s figure of 75 500.1 Furthermore, hybrid migration, in which migrants travel to Libya regularly or semi-regularly before attempting the sea crossing to Europe, accounted for an estimated 75% of these departures, also roughly similar to the proportion recorded in 2022. Many of the migrants involved in hybrid journeys first arrived in Libya at Benina airport in the east of the country. This indicates the increasing importance of eastern Libya to human smuggling writ large. In addition to the migrant arrivals at Benina airport, eastern Libya also saw a dramatic rise in departures from the coastal areas in and around Tobruk in 2023, with some 40% of sea crossings in the first half of the year taking place from there. Some, though not all, of the migrants leaving from the east coast had arrived in Benina. While heightened enforcement by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) suppressed departures from the Tobruk hub in the second half of 2023, the body reportedly continued to allow Benina to be used as the main air travel arrival point for hybrid migration for the rest of the year. Thus, the LAAF clearly emerged as one of the main actors influencing hybrid migration in Libya in 2023. Following the shutdown of the Tobruk system, hybrid migration sea crossings were displaced to the west coast. By August, departures from this area had increased significantly and there were reports of migrants accumulating in warehouses in several hubs. In October, a notably large series of departures from Zuwara occurred at a remarkable rate. Increased departures from the west coast indicate that entrenched smuggling networks remain ready to seize opportunities. Given the political and security fragmentation of the region, these networks are likely to underpin the resilience of human smuggling in Libya for the foreseeable future. A notable element that remained marginal in 2023 was trans-Saharan smuggling through Libya. This was once a major route for migrants departing from Libya, but has declined significantly since 2017/18 due to insecurity and migrant abuse in Libya and law enforcement action in downstream countries. One of the few significant developments was the relatively moderate but growing number of Sudanese refugees fleeing the civil war in that country. However, this was not substantial enough to drive systematic changes in the dynamics of overland human smuggling. Similarly, Sudanese nationals did not leave the Libyan coast in large numbers. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Libya. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2017, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Libya, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.2   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 36p.

By Megan Lowry

Today, communities across Louisiana and Southeastern coasts are emerging from the shadow of Hurricane Ida. The storm has left New Orleans without power, surrounding areas flooded, and thousands evacuated from their homes.

Since Hurricane Katrina swept through Louisiana almost exactly 16 years ago, the National Academies have helped produce scientific insights and recommendations through initiatives such as the Resilient America Program to help policymakers avoid the worst impacts of future disasters — addressing questions like: How can we improve hurricane prediction? How can cities and states better manage evacuations? How can we make sure the electrical grid is ready for increasingly intense storms?

August 31, 2021; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

By: Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience

This handbook companion document supports Public Information and Warnings (AIDR 2021) and provides guidance on the elements of the Australian Warning System.

The role of warnings in a public information and warning context is to provide point-in-time information about a hazard that is impacting or is expected to impact communities. It describes the impact and expected consequences for communities and includes advice on what people should do.

Previously, there have been different warning systems for different hazard types across Australia. The Australian Warning System was adopted by ANZEMC in March 2021 and aims to provide a consistent warnings approach to Australian communities.

The system is a three-level scaled warning system and includes a nationally consistent set of hazard icons for each warning level to show warnings on various publishing platforms (e.g. websites and apps) and provides calls to action. There are icons for cyclone, bushfire, flood, extreme heat, storm, and other. There is a consistent shape and colour scheme, with icons increasing in size as the warning level increases.

Each warning level is to be combined with an action statement to give the community clearer advice about what to do. Calls to action can be used flexibly across all three warning levels and contextualised for each hazard within each state or territory.

The system builds on existing warning frameworks and applies to bushfire, flood, severe storm, cyclone and extreme heat – but is designed to be adaptable and scalable to other hazards.

(AIDR 2021)

By: W. C. Arthur

The 2018 Tropical Cyclone Hazard Assessment (TCHA18) provides an evaluation of the likelihood and intensity (“how big and how often”) of the occurrence of tropical cyclone winds across the Australian region, covering mainland Australia, islands and adjacent waters. It is a probabilistic evaluation of the expected maximum gust wind speeds with a range of annual exceedance probabilities (or conversely, average recurrence intervals). The assessment is derived using a statistical-parametric model developed by Geoscience Australia called the Tropical Cyclone Risk Model (TCRM). Maximum 0.2-second duration, 10-metre above ground wind speeds are calculated for Standard Australia's AS/NZS 1170.2 (2011) terrain category 2 (0.02 m roughness length) surface conditions, over a 0.02 degree grid across Australia. Maps of average recurrence interval (ARI) wind speeds of 100- and 500-year ARI are provided in a separate product suite.

Geoscience Australia, Canberra. http://dx.doi.org/10.11636/Record.2018.040

By: Jane Sexton, Michael Tait, Heidi Turner, Craig Arthur, David Henderson, Mark Edwards

Ask a Queenslander where tropical cyclones occur and the inevitable response will be, North Queensland. While most of the tropical cyclones have made landfall north of Bundaberg, the cascading and concurrent effects are felt much further afield. The major flooding following Tropical Cyclone Yasi in 2011 and Tropical Cyclone Debbie in 2017 are 2 examples where impacts were felt across the state, and the damage to the banana plantation following Tropical Cyclone Larry (2006) was felt nationally. Acknowledging that climate is influencing the intensity and frequency of intense severe weather hazards, understanding how tropical cyclone hazard varies under future climate conditions is critical to risk-based planning in Queensland. With this climate influence, along with increasing population and more vulnerable building design in South East Queensland (relative to northern Queensland), there is an urgent need to assess the wind risk and set in place plans to reduce the effects of a potential tropical cyclone in South East Queensland.

AJEM 38:4, October 2023, pages 33-39.

By: The National Association of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Following a series of natural disasters, including Hurricane Katrina, that revealed shortcomings in the nation's ability to effectively alert populations at risk, Congress passed the Warning, Alert, and Response Network (WARN) Act in 2006. Today, new technologies such as smart phones and social media platforms offer new ways to communicate with the public, and the information ecosystem is much broader, including additional official channels, such as government social media accounts, opt-in short message service (SMS)-based alerting systems, and reverse 911 systems; less official channels, such as main stream media outlets and weather applications on connected devices; and unofficial channels, such as first person reports via social media. Traditional media have also taken advantage of these new tools, including their own mobile applications to extend their reach of beyond broadcast radio, television, and cable. Furthermore, private companies have begun to take advantage of the large amounts of data about users they possess to detect events and provide alerts and warnings and other hazard-related information to their users.

More than 60 years of research on the public response to alerts and warnings has yielded many insights about how people respond to information that they are at risk and the circumstances under which they are most likely to take appropriate protective action. Some, but not all, of these results have been used to inform the design and operation of alert and warning systems, and new insights continue to emerge. Emergency Alert and Warning Systems reviews the results of past research, considers new possibilities for realizing more effective alert and warning systems, explores how a more effective national alert and warning system might be created and some of the gaps in our present knowledge, and sets forth a research agenda to advance the nation's alert and warning capabilities.

ISBN 978-0-309-46737-7 | DOI 10.17226/24935

By: Ronald W. Perry, Marjorie R. Greene, and Michael K. Lindell

As a strategy for manipulating the consequences of disasters, evacuation - that is, the relocation of people from a place of high threat to a relatively safer place - has a particularly long history and constitutes a common societal adjustment to environmental hazards. The Greek historian Herodotus described the Egyptians systematic evacuations to escape the seasonal flooding of the Nile River as early as the fourth century B.C. During the Middle Ages in Europe, significant movements of populations occurred as a function of people’s attempts to escape various epidemics. The history of warfare, from the Dorian invasion of central Greece in 1130 B.C., through the Vietnam conflict of the 1970s and the recent invasion of Afghanistan, is also a history of population movements, many of which began as evacuations. Thus, evacuation has been used by many societies for centuries as an adjustment to cope with disasters.

Particularly with regard to riverine flooding, pre-impact evacuation of the threatened population is an important management strategy which may be used by authorities. Of course, evacuation is not the only, or even the “best”, means of coping with flood hazards. Other options include controlled building in flood plains and enhanced building design and construction techniques. Such measures, however, are easily incorporated into new construction and communities, but not so easy to institute in established comnites where such protections tend to be developed slowly in connection with continuous building and renovation. Thus, many communities must depend, in part or completely, upon measures other than elaborate land use planning or restrictive construction codes in their plans to adjust to floods.

Disasters, Vol.4, No.4.pp.433449

By Kimberly Starr Nagulpelli and Steven E. Butt

“Operations research” and “sociology” are infrequently discussed together. Though an analytic approach is positioned to benefit society through quantitative measurement and evaluation. This research reviews literature surrounding the sex trafficking victimization experience during a lifetime: namely sex trafficking, lifetime experiences, and Markov modelling. With the results of the literature review, a framework is defined to evaluate and assess the experience of sex trafficking victimization during a lifetime for individuals and/or populations. Particularly valuable outcomes of this research are the extensive review of related literature and the definition of a fully interconnected framework of the experiences individuals face within sex trafficking victimization. The defined framework is presented to support current analytic interests of anti-trafficking and policy-maker groups, as well as provide the foundation for further developments to better support impacted communities and society.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By Mark McMullen

Although it is particularly pronounced in Oregon, there is no question that the fentanyl epidemic is imposing severe economic costs across the nation. The current report quantifies some of these costs and describes the state policy environment. Public policy regarding drug use is evolving rapidly in Oregon as we speak. As with all CSI does, the primary goal of this report is to educate and inform Oregonians on policy issues such as this that impact their lives. Key Findings • The economic cost of Oregon’s fentanyl crisis is more than $31 billion annually, up from $5.88 billion in 2017. • Enough fentanyl was seized last year to kill every Oregonian more than 20 times over. • Most western states have seen above-average growth in fentanyl use during recent years. Even so, Oregon’s experience stands out relative to its neighbors. Since the pandemic began, fentanyl-related overdose deaths in Oregon have increased by over 1,000%, more than in any other state. Alaska’s experience is the only one that even comes close. • Although Oregon’s decriminalization experiment cannot be blamed for all the disproportionate local impact of the fentanyl epidemic, it is clearly playing a role. When decriminalization went into effect in February 2021, Oregon ranked 38th out of 48 states with available data in the rate of fentanyl related overdose deaths. By January 2024, Oregon’s rank rose to 13th. • Many voters and policymakers quickly experienced regrets associated with the decriminalization effort and are making some efforts to improve the law. During the 2023 legislative session, legislators enacted House Bill 4002, which created a new misdemeanor for simple drug possession. The new law gives leeway to counties on how to implement it locally, and we are likely to learn much as the different programs evolve.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common  Sense Institute 2024. 

By Goodman-Williams, Rachael; Volz, Jessica; Smith, Samantha

Introduction: Forensic nurses routinely provide services to sexual assault victims who are uncertain about reporting their assault to police. The purpose of this study was to determine whether assault characteristics are related to the concerns about police reporting expressed by sexual assault victims who have forensic evidence collected but do not report their assault to police at that time. Methods:We Analyzed Medical records of patients who received services at a hospital-based forensic nursing program between 2010 and 2021. Records were included if a sexual assault evidence kit was collected, the patient declined to report the assault to police, and the patient completed a nonreport sexual assault evidence kit supple ment form that included a question asking why they chose not to report the assault (N = 296). We qualitatively analyzed patients' reasons for not reporting the assault and then used two-variable case-ordered matrices and chi-square analyses to explore relationships between reasons for not reporting and assault characteristics. Results: Identified reasons for not reporting included lacking information about the assault, fear of harm/retaliation, andself-blame/minimization. Physicalforce,drug/alcohol consumption,andvictim–offender relationships were related to patients referencing lacking information and fearing harm/retaliation as reasons for not reporting, but not related to the frequency of patients referencing self-blame/minimization. Implications: Results indicate that assault characteristics are related to reasons for not reporting at the time of the medical forensic examination. Being aware of these

  Journal of Forensic Nursing 20(3):p 151-159, 7/9 2024. 

By Shiying Zhang, Ao Huang

There have been numerous debates regarding the educational practice of grade retention and social promotion. This study analyzes the effect of an exogenous policy reform in China that abolishes grade retention during the compulsory education period. We exploit the staggered introduction of the reform across provinces and estimate a flexible difference-in-differences model that can capture the effect of exposure to the reform in different grades. The results indicate that abolishing grade retention significantly decreases the probability of junior high school completion, and most of these negative impacts are concentrated among students exposed to the reform in early grades. Moreover, rural children and boys are more likely to be negatively affected by the reform. Finally, we find that the reform increases the likelihood of later criminal behavior in early adulthood.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By George Brauchler, Mitch Morrissey, Chris Brown, & Alexa Eastburg

Crime has undeniably and dramatically increased over the last decade in Colorado. The pandemic-related policy restrictions and resulting economic disruptions brought further stress to society, which exacerbated problems related to crime. The result has been billions of dollars in additional costs borne by Coloradans. These costs are felt in many ways, both directly by the victims, and indirectly by the community. It is important to distill the jaw-dropping impact of crime down to numbers that everyone can grasp. The numbers show trends and enable conclusions, which in turn can be tested. Numbers remove the emotional impact and personal tragedy of crime and lead to dispassionate, practical solutions to what is, in part, an economic issue. All victims know that crime is intensely personal. Most people never fully recover from the impact of being victimized. Behind every statistic of violent crime, theft of valued possessions or any violation of one’s right to live a safe and secure life, is a person and that person’s family and friends – are each damaged by a criminal act. The primary and consistent policy trend in Colorado has been to discourage the jailing of those arrested for committing crimes and to reduce the severity of punishment for those convicted. However well intended, these recent policies must be monitored to ensure the costs from the unintended – albeit predictable consequences do not outweigh the anticipated benefits. Given the concerning trends and high costs, it is imperative that policy makers implement timely, transparent, and actionable accountability metrics, that allow them to diagnose specific system level problems and individual policy decisions across the multiple dimensions of criminal justice in Colorado. Let us move forward with the important work of understanding the impact of public policy on the lives of our community. While we’re interpreting data and delving deeper into cause-and-effect, we must also remember the thousands and thousands of victims who have suffered and deserve justice. Colorado’s crime surge increased over the last two years but started long before the pandemic - - - From 2010 through 2019, Colorado’s population-adjusted annual murder rate increased by an annual average of 8%, motor vehicle theft by 6%, and assault by 3%. Average monthly crime in 2021 per 100,000 Coloradans is 28% higher than in 2011, and 11% higher than in 2020 The monthly murder rate increased 20% in both 2019 and 2020. The 2021 total rate of crime is 14% higher than it was in 2019. This trend exceeds the 12% increase Colorado experienced between 2009 and 2012. etc........

Greenwood Village, CO, Common Sense Institute, 2021. 27p.  

By Fredrik Kärrholm, Peter Neyroud & John Smaaland

Research Question -  Which method for deriving a Crime Harm Index (Policing 10:171 183, 2016) for Sweden from criminal justice sources offers the best evidence for providing a sensitive indicator of differences in harm levels across offence categories? Data The number of days of imprisonment for each offence category associated with five different kinds of scales were extracted and compared: consensus by an expert panel of judges, the statutory maximum penalties, statutory minimum penalties, the average of maximum and minimum penalties and the average of actual sentences imposed in a recent time period for each crime type. Unlike the UK, for which the Cambridge Crime Harm Index draws on sentencing guidelines, Sweden has no such guidelines to offer. Methods - The data were compared for sensitivity defined as the difference in length of imprisonment days between high and low severity crimes, as well as other characteristics of the data sources. Findings - Given the available alternatives, the sentencing data average of actual sentences handed down by crime type provided the greatest reliability and sensitivity across the penalties for offences of high and low severity. Applying that method to both crime trends and crime mapping produces substantially different results from counting all crimes with equal weight and can be used by police and others to allocate resources with greater precision in relation to harm prevention. Conclusions - On both empirical and normative grounds, the average sentences in a recent time period for each crime category provides the most sensitive and democratic method for establishing an officially recognized Swedish Crime Harm Index.  

Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing 4(1): 15–33. 2021.  

By Jo‑Anne Kramer,  Arjan A. J. Blokland, ·Edward R. Kleemans, Melvin R. J. Soudijn

In order to launder large amounts of money, (drug) criminals can seek help from financial facilitators. According to the FATF, these facilitators are operating increasingly business like and even participate in professional money laundering networks. This study examines the extent to which financial facilitators in the Netherlands exhibit business-like charac teristics and the extent to which they organize themselves in money laundering networks. We further examine the relationship between business-like behavior and individual money launderers’ position in the social network. Using police intelligence data, we were able to analyze the contacts of 198 financial facilitators who were active in the Netherlands in the period 2016–2020, all having worked for drug criminals. Based on social network analysis, this research shows that financial facilitators in the Netherlands can be linked in extensive money laundering networks. Based on the facilitators’ area of expertise, roughly two main types of professional money laundering networks can be discerned. Some subnetworks operate in the real estate sector, while others primarily engage in underground banking. Furthermore, the application of regression models to predict business-like behavior using individual network measures shows that facilitators with more central positions in the net work and those who collaborate with financial facilitators from varying expertise groups tend to behave more business-like than other financial facilitators

Kramer JA, Blokland AAJ, Kleemans ER & Soudijn MRJ 2023. Money laundering as a service: Investigating business-like behavior in money laundering networks in the Netherlands. Trends in Organized Crime.

By Peter Gerbrands, Brigitte Unger, Michael Getzner & Joras Ferwerda 

Aim

There is a growing literature analyzing money laundering and the policies to fight it, but the overall effectiveness of anti-money laundering policies is still unclear. This paper investigates whether anti-money laundering policies affect the behavior of money launderers and their networks.

Method

With an algorithm to match clusters over time, we build a unique dataset of multi-mode, undirected, binary, dynamic networks of natural and legal persons. The data includes ownership and employment relations and associated financial ties and is enriched with criminal records and police-related activities. The networks of money launderers, other criminals, and non-criminal individuals are analyzed and compared with temporal social network analysis techniques and panel data regressions on centrality measures, transitivity and assortativity indicators, and levels of constraint.

Findings

We find that after the announcement of the fourth EU anti-money laundering directive in 2015, money laundering networks show a significant increase in the use of foreigners and corporate structures. At the individual level, money launderers become more dominant in criminal clusters (increased closeness centrality). This paper shows that (the announcement of) anti-money laundering policies can affect criminal networks and how such effects can be tested.

EPJ Data Science, 11(1), [15]

By Joras Ferwerda, Alexander van Saase, Brigitte Unger & Michael Getzner

 It is important to understand the amounts and types of money laundering flows, since they have very different effects and, therefore, need different enforcement strategies. Countries that mainly deal with criminals laundering their proceeds locally, need other measures than countries that mainly deal with foreign illegal investments or dirty money just flowing through the country. This paper has two main contributions. First, we unveil the country preferences of money launderers empirically in a systematic way. Former money laundering estimates used assumptions on which country characteristics money launderers are looking for when deciding where to send their ill‑gotten gains. Thanks to a unique dataset of transactions suspicious of money laundering, provided by the Dutch Institute infobox Criminal and Unexplained Wealth (iCOV), we can empirically test these assumptions with an econometric gravity model estimation. We use this information for our second contribution: iteratively simulating all money laundering flows around the world. This allows us, for the first time, to provide estimates that distinguish between three different policy challenges: the laundering of domestic crime proceeds, international investment of dirty money and money just flowing through a country  

Ferwerda J, van Saase A, Unger B & Getzner M 2020. Estimating money laundering flows with a gravity model-based simulation. Scientific Reports 10(1).

By Ozkan Eren & Emily Owens

Objectives: This paper examines the impact of local economic activity on criminal behavior. We build on existing research by relaxing the identification assumptions required for causal inference, and estimate the impact of local economic activity on recidivism.

Methods: We use the fracking boom as a source of credibly exogenous variation in the economic conditions into which incarcerated people are released. We replicate and extend existing instrumental variables analyses of fracking on how many released offenders return to state prison seperately from aggregate crime and arrests.

Results: Our instrumental variables estimates imply that a ten thousand dollar increase in the value of per capita production is associated with a 2.8% reduction in the 1-year recidivism of ex-offenders at the county level. Improved labor market conditions, specifically an increase in wages for young adults, may explain a non-negligible fraction of the reduction in recidivism associated with economic booms. In contrast, we replicate existing work finding that fracking increased aggregate measures of crime and arrests.

Conclusion: Increased economic opportunity appears to have a different impact of overall crime than on recidivism. This suggests that the relationship between economic opportunity and offending may be conditioned by local social ties. Further research examining how social connections and labor markets affect individual criminal behavior is needed.

Economic booms and recidivism. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 40, 343-372. 

By Renato Molina, Juan Carlos Villaseñor-Derbez, Gavin McDonald, Grant McDermott

Maritime transport has been historically susceptible to piracy. While broad assessments suggest the impact of modern piracy causes large economic losses, the literature lacks quantification of the magnitude of the costs and the behavioral responses that underpin them. Here, we combine theory and a unique geospatial dataset combining more than 25 million shipping voyages and thousands of pirate encounters across the globe to find that pirate encounters lead to significant and costly avoidance measures. Shippers modify their path along a route to avoid locations with known pirate encounters. This increases voyage distance and duration, which lead to significant increases in fuel and labor costs estimated to be over US$1.5 billion/year. Additionally, emission of CO2, NOx, and SOx due to increased fuel consumption results in environmental damages valued at US$5.1 billion per year. Together, our results provide the first global estimates linking the presence of pirates to individual behaviour and aggregate transportation cost, as well as its environmental impact, with major implications for the shipping industry and maritime security at a global scale.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11077, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo , 2024. 72p.

By David Weisburd, Clair V. Uding, Kiseong Kuen, Beidi Dong

Criminologists have long known that crime is highly concentrated—in most cities, approximately 50% of crime happens on only 5% of streets. As a result, many cities have effectively reduced crime by concentrating police resources in extremely high-crime “hot-spots.” Despite calls for defunding the police, policing is necessary for public safety on hot-spot streets, and people who live on these streets recognize that. Indeed, in one survey in Phoenix, Arizona, the majority of residents of hot-spots streets said they wanted the amount of police on their block to be increased. But ultimately, the bedrock of social control of crime is not the police, but citizens who exercise informal social control. The practice of community policing—which emphasizes building relationships with members of the community and allowing them to have a voice in defining which problems police should focus on—attempts to leverage this fact to enhance public safety. However, it is often assumed that high-crime hot spots are simply so chaotic and disordered that the residents are incapable of playing a key role in crime prevention.

We examined this assumption through a multiyear study of more than 300 hot-spot streets in Baltimore, Maryland (all of which were in the top 3% in rates of violent or drug crime in the city), as well as almost 50 “cold” streets, which had little to no crime, and 100 “cool” streets, which fell in the middle. We found that common assumptions about hot spots—which we shared at the outset—are not accurate. Residents of hot-spot streets in Baltimore have strong social and network ties with their neighbors, and they exercise meaningful levels of informal social control. Even on the most crime ridden blocks, there is potential for collaboration between residents and police. Our findings suggest that it is time to think about how both informal and formal social control can work interactively to reduce crime. Hot-spots policing is an important first step, because the level of danger in these places can simply make it too dangerous for residents to exercise the type of informal social control that they would like. But residents of these streets, contrary to stereotypes of academics, policymakers, and practitioners, form an important resource for reducing crime on these streets through informal social control.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 18p,

By Ingri Bøe Buer

This article reconsiders peace and security from the perspectives of community leaders, educators and activists in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2019–2020. Through a critical lens, it argues that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro resembles a form of new wars where the state is a major producer of insecurity. It questions the meaning of peace and top-down pacification processes in a city where the favelas, since their origin, have been considered dangerous areas needing to be pacified and controlled. The article introduces favela peace formation as a concept to describe alternative processes working to reduce the inter-sectional forms of violence in these communities: non-violent, locally legitimate peace processes working to slowly construct a positive, sustainable peace. To conclude, it discusses how favela peace formation presents a way of imagining peace as ‘care’ instead of ‘order’ in response to the state’s violent peace as ‘control’

Peacebuilding, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2024.2354083