By Martin Thorley

Under the concept of Community of Common Destiny for Mankind, the People’s Republic of China (henceforth referred to as ‘China’) has brought together a suite of initiatives that represent a new international relations framework, through which it aims to reform global governance. These include the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which is the most tangible manifestation of a wider development: China’s evolving engagement in international crime prevention. Framed in a way that encompasses both traditional and non-traditional security, China’s international promotion of the GSI has implications for global crime prevention norms. While China’s capacity to shape these norms should not be overstated, the GSI has already achieved a degree of uptake beyond countries commonly grouped as the ‘West’, including in global pariah states such as Syria. At the same time, analysis that looks predominantly at the impact of the GSI in liberal democratic states, or that considers the parameters most useful in analyzing liberal democratic legal systems, risks overlooking broader shifts in security norms. The GSI and associated Chinese party-state endeavours use familiar terms (for example, ‘rule of law’) in ways that are different from their more commonly understood meanings in the context of the socalled liberal international order. In addition to issues of meaning and language, there are fundamental differences between the GSI and existing norms related to accountability and power that demonstrate vast divergence between the existing order and what is proposed, creating potential hazards for those working on global crime prevention. The characteristics of the GSI are best understood in the context of China’s domestic approach to crime prevention, in which the party-state is vested with vast powers and the law is best seen as a tool utilized by the political elite. This suggests that substantive international cooperation with China on crime prevention would be possible only where it aligns with the interests and principles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beginning from the perspective that all proposals with the capacity to shape global crime prevention norms merit scrutiny, this report explores the broader implications of China’s proposals before detailing two case studies that allow for deeper examination of potential risks associated with the approach. By revealing previously unknown networks and relationships, the findings suggest there could be a gap between principle and practice. A pushback by China against cybercrime hubs in South East Asia, for example, includes instances where the party-state appears to demonstrate a high tolerance for organized crime. These cases raise questions about whether the Chinese party-state is prepared to associate with serious criminals when doing so would enable it to further its objectives abroad, for example as part of its cultivation of political elites. The findings of this report, within the context of a growing body of evidence, suggest that use of the term ‘geocriminality’, may be useful in explanation and conceptualization of state-crime nexus phenomena. The term here refers to a state’s use of criminal actors to achieve objectives in target countries, in the same way as the term geoeconomics describes the manipulation of economic tools in target countries to the same ends. This report is intended as an exploratory assessment of this issue and concludes that further research is merited

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 35p.

By Shiying Zhang, Ao Huang

There have been numerous debates regarding the educational practice of grade retention and social promotion. This study analyzes the effect of an exogenous policy reform in China that abolishes grade retention during the compulsory education period. We exploit the staggered introduction of the reform across provinces and estimate a flexible difference-in-differences model that can capture the effect of exposure to the reform in different grades. The results indicate that abolishing grade retention significantly decreases the probability of junior high school completion, and most of these negative impacts are concentrated among students exposed to the reform in early grades. Moreover, rural children and boys are more likely to be negatively affected by the reform. Finally, we find that the reform increases the likelihood of later criminal behavior in early adulthood.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By Jinmei Feng, Hong Ma, Mingzhi Xu, Wei You

This study estimates the causal impact of the massive installation of surveillance cameras on crime, using novel data from China between 2014 and 2019. Using the number of preexisting local camera producers as the instrument for the density of camera installation, we find that cities with denser surveillance networks experienced significantly faster declines in crime. The reduction is more pronounced for publicly visible crimes. Enhanced surveillance is associated with higher satisfaction with the government and a greater sense of security, leading to longer hours worked, especially for women. A back-of-envelope calculation shows preventing a crime costs approximately $5,922, which is highly cost-effective.

Unpublished paper, 2024 

By Asian Racing Federation

This report examines Mainland China’s crackdown on illegal betting from 2018 to mid-2021, its background, purpose and impact. It is based on official announcements and statistics, 315 Mainland Chinese media articles related to illegal betting, and English-language reports. The report details:

·         Why China is so concerned about illegal betting

·         Insights into the scale of the problem

·         The crackdown’s impact on wider illegal betting in Asia

·         Notable shared characteristics of illegal betting operations

·         Why China’s crackdown is relevant to other jurisdictions

Hong Kong: Asian Racing Federation, 2021. 14p.

By Faith Honor , Amanda Shaverand Devin Thorne

The trafficking of pangolins and their scales drives corruption, undermines the rule of law, creates public health risks, and even threatens local and regional security. Additionally, the illicit pangolin trade may have even played a role in onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 Critically, the trade—and all of its related challenges—appears to be growing: between 2015 and 2019, 253 tonnes2 of pangolin scales were confiscated, and the annual quantity of pangolin scales seized increased by nearly 400%. To expose the logistics of how these scales are trafficked internationally, Tipping the Scales uses publicly available seizure data and investigative case studies. The global plight of pangolins is increasingly well-known, but less understood are the opaque supply chains that enable pangolin trafficking. To trace this illicit system from consolidation hubs in West and Central Africa to China’s consumer markets, Tipping the Scales analyses 899 pangolin seizures. Drawing on C4ADS’ Wildlife Seizure Database, law enforcement partner seizure data, official government documents, corporate data, and expert interviews, the report details how traffickers nest their activities within licit systems of trade and commerce. To disrupt this trade, C4ADS identifies opportunities for intervention and capacity building.

In Section I, the report finds that pangolin scale traffickers have co-opted bushmeat supply chains and legal breeding programs for their illicit activities. Bushmeat scale trafficking supply chains are particularly prominent in Central and West Africa; 72% of African scale seizures over the last five years have come from those regions. Growing demand for pangolin meat and scales has made pangolins a dual-transaction good3 that relies on transport networks between rural areas and urban and coastal distribution hubs. Further, the report finds that pangolin breeding programs in sub-Saharan Africa obscure the lines between poaching, conservation, and science. In Section II, the report finds that bulk pangolin scale shipments often exit the continent through coastal countries in Central and West Africa. While 70% of intercontinental trafficking instances tied to Africa rely on the air transport sector, 81% of the total weight of pangolin scales are trafficked intercontinentally via the maritime transport sector. China and Hong Kong are the trade’s most prominent destinations. Since 2015, 42% of the 195 tonnes of pangolin scales seized throughout Asia originated in Africa and were seized in or bound for China or Hong Kong. In Section III, the report finds that there are more than 1,000 companies, hospitals, and other entities participating in China’s legal market for medicinal pangolin products. In this market, which allows companies to privately stockpile pangolin scales, traffickers exploit lax regulations to sell scales from Africa and Asia. Government-reported pangolin scale consumption quotas, geo-tagged company data, and seizures suggest that Guangdong and Hunan provinces have relatively high levels of exposure to both the legal pangolin market and pangolin trafficking. Based on these findings, Tipping the Scales makes 10 recommendations to increase detection of and improve enforcement against transnational criminal networks operating in Africa and Asia (see page 58).

Washington, D: C4ADS, 2020. 60p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

All eight pangolin species are facing an unprecedented threat from the transnational trafficking of their scales and meat by criminal networks. • Between 2017, when the Appendix I listing for all pangolin species entered force, and July 2021, at least 269 tonnes of pangolin scales were confiscated globally. • Pangolin scales are trafficked to China, often via Vietnam, and are primarily sourced from West, Central and East Africa. • Nigeria, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo are the top export hubs for pangolin scales trafficked from Africa to Asia. • Global pangolin trafficking is driven by consumer demand for traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) products containing pangolin scales. • In China, licenced hospitals and pharmaceutical companies can legally trade and utilise pangolin scales from privately held stockpiles. • In 2020, 56 pharmaceutical companies in China were confirmed to be advertising 64 manufactured medicines containing pangolin scales online. • It is very likely that demand for pangolin scales in China far exceeds the legally available supply from stockpiles. …

London; Washington DC: EIA, 2021. 18P.

By Alexander Kupatadze and Lakshmi Kumar

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes referred to as ‘Globalisation 2.0,’ is a global infrastructure development strategy that aims to fundamentally reshape global trade. The BRI is a key element of the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy,’ which intends to expand China’s leadership role in global affairs. The BRI covers 149 countries and promises increased connectivity between China and the rest of the world through infrastructure projects, policy coordination, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. Since its inception in 2013, China has already spent an estimated US$200 billion on renewing and modernising infrastructure along the sea and overland trade routes that make up the BRI. However, it is not clear whether the BRI will actually deliver on its promise of achieving deeply transformative economic growth. Much like the impact of the internet when global online connectivity transformed criminality (global cybercrime now generates over US$1.5 trillion per year), the rapid development of infrastructural linkages and logistical corridors has the potential to radically alter the illegal trade landscape. As with the inception of the internet, the BRI has not been designed and implemented with the aversion of crime in mind, which may lead to negative developments including the expansion of illicit supply chains. To understand the consequences of BRI connectivity, we convened a two-day-long workshop at King’s College London with the financial support of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), attended by leading experts on..…

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  illicit trade as well as representatives of both consumer industries (namely tobacco, pharmaceuticals, and fertilisers) and international organisations. This paper is an outcome of the discussion(s) that took place at that same workshop as well as the research of the two co-authors on the BRI and its implications for illicit trade.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2022. 38p.

By Lauren Greenwood and Kevin Fashola

The issue brief examines the evolution of China’s role in global illicit fentanyl trade. China placed all forms of fentanyl and its analogues on a regulatory schedule in 2019, but the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assesses China remains the primary country of origin for illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances trafficked in the United States. While Mexican drug cartels have always been a critical node for smuggling illicit fentanyl into the United States, this brief finds that the links between Chinese and Mexican actors in the fentanyl trade has grown in complexity, including the development of sophisticated money laundering operations. Finally, the brief concludes that while cooperation between the United States and China remains limited, there are opportunities for the United States to work with other countries on counter-narcotic enforcement.
 Washington, EC:  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,   

By EMS Foundation and Ban Animal Trading

The wild animals within the borders of South Africa are part of the heritage of every South African and we have the right to demand that our government protects wild animals against exploitation and to demand accountability from government as to what it does in this regard. Government is empowered by a cogent body of laws to perform this function and it is obliged to do so by international treaties. It is urgently necessary for government to comply with its responsibilities not only because of the ethical, moral and legal compunction to do so but also because the export of our wild animals for the financial gain of a few has become big business.

South Africa has become the largest exporter of live wild animals to Asia, where many wild animals are killed to extract potions from their carcases and are eaten as delicacies. Some are sent to languish in atrocious zoos. Some are inserted into the murky world of the illegal wildlife trade. The reality is that the South African government fails to apply its strong regulatory powers and by design or neglect allows strikingly large numbers of animals to be exported.

South Africa: EMS Foundation and Ban Animal Trading, 2020. 123p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Wildlife trafficking from Mexico to China receives little international attention, but it is growing, compounding the threats to Mexican biodiversity posed by preexisting poaching for other markets, including the United States. Since Mexican criminal groups often control extensive territories in Mexico which become no-go-zones for government officials and environmental defenders, visibility into the extent of poaching, illegal logging, and wildlife trafficking in Mexico is limited. It is likely, however, that the extent of poaching and trafficking, including to China, is larger than commonly understood.

Preventing far greater damage to Mexico’s biodiversity from illegal harvesting and poaching and wildlife and timber trafficking requires urgent attention in Mexico with far more dedicated resources, as well as meaningful international cooperation, to identify and dismantle smuggling networks and retail markets.

Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at The Brookings Institution, 2022. 50p.

By Jiang Nan

The illegal ivory trade fuels illegal elephant poaching in both Africa and Asia. The illegal ivory trade in China is considered a key threat to the survival of the elephant species: since 2009, China has become the largest illegal ivory market in the world. Although China has uncovered a great number of cases of illegal ivory trade with the seizure of illegal ivory in the past decade, this trade is still growing. A deeper understanding of the nature and patterns of illegal ivory trade through an analysis of ivory seizure data should improve the efficiency of efforts to prevent the illegal ivory trade in China. This paper analyses data on 106 seizures of illegal ivory that was collected from Chinese news reports between 1999 and 2014, with a particular focus on its frequency and illegal trade ‘hotspot’ locations in China. The analysis found three illegal ivory trade cycles (2001–2005, 2006–2010, and 2011–2014) and four hotspots. Preventing the illegal ivory trade will require more international cooperation and coordination between China and other countries,

Canberra: Transnational Environmental Crime Project, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2015. 17p.

By Environmental Investigation Agency, Inc. (EIA).

The illegal trade in precious “rosewoods” is the world’s most valuable form of wildlife crime. Hundreds of people have been killed around the world trying to protect these rare trees from the gangs seeking to profit from the rapidly growing demand for luxury furniture in China. Having decimated most rosewood species in Southeastern Asia and Central America, this rapacious industry has now turned to Africa, and a dry forest species called “kosso” (Pterocarpus erinaceus) . EIA’s investigators have spent two years exploring this booming illegal trade, including undercover meetings with more than 30 actors in the supply chain, from the arid forests in Nigeria to the sophisticated retail shops in China. Our investigation reveals that almost all the kosso coming from and through Nigeria for the past three years has been illegal. Most shockingly, EIA’s investigation has revealed that thousands of documents from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) have been used in contravention of the core objectives of the Convention.

London: Environmental Investigation Agency, Inc. 2017. 40p.

By Tian Yanfang

Since the end of the 1990s, the Sino-Russian border regions have witnessed a dramatic, unprecedented increase in cross-border timber trade that has made Russia the largest log supplier for China's expanding wood industry sector. Driving factors include: severe constraints in China's domestic wood supplies, the availability of rich forest resources in the Russian Far East and Siberia, liberalised trade policies and demand from both domestic and European, Japanese and US markets for low cost Chinese wood products. This study provides a contextual description and analysis of the cross-border timber trade boom and the actors involved. It examines the current challenges faced by a largely inefficient Russian forestry sector and decentralised Russian forest administration in the context of illegal logging and unsustainable forestry practices, both widely viewed as having reached serious dimensions.

This study focuses on the involvement and role of Chinese actors throughout the supply chain. Chinese companies have entered the Russian forestry sector, introduced greater efficiency and proved competitive. This involvement has also opened doors for Chinese actors to inadvertently or intentionally participate in illegal activities throughout the supply chain. In addition to timber harvesting, Chinese actors are involved as intermediaries in the commercial log depots and control the wholesale timber market in some parts of Russia. Chinese actors have also increasingly invested in wood processing in Russia, partly in response to the adjustment of the Russian export tax on logs. Most recently, there has been a trend towards vertical integration for Chinese companies, with intermediaries and wood importers attempting to extend their business to every node of the trading network. On the Chinese side of the border, preferential tax policies and infrastructure investment have spurred a rapid development of the timber processing industry with private sector processing mills replacing state-owned timber processing factories.

Hayama, Japan, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2008. 58p.

By Anatoly Lebedev

The preservation and sustainable use of Siberian and Russian Far East (RFE) forests is of global importance for a number of reasons. Yet, these forests, which are the traditional environments of many endangered species and indigenous tribes, are now supplying timber to nearby regions and countries that have largely destroyed their own forests. The vast forests of Asian Russia act as reservoirs for oneseventh of the global carbon pool. Russia holds 75 percent of the carbon stored by all of the world’s boreal forests, such that deforestation, after fossil fuel combustion, is the second largest source of carbon dioxide emissions in Russia, as it is worldwide. Properly conserved, Russian forests act as a critical green “lung” for the Earth, second to Brazil’s Amazon. The atmospheric carbon sink process, however, occurs much more slowly in taiga than in the tropical rainforest, as does the process of carbon exportation from organic changes. As a result, this source of carbon storage, after broad-scale commercial logging or forest fires, will also be more slowly restored to its initial function than would be tropical forests.. All across Russia, the past five years have witnessed a revival in domestic timber production, following the collapse of the 1990s, and a drive to achieve the level of volumes extracted during the Soviet period. In the RFE's Primorye Krai (Province), for example, roundwood production rose from 2.2 million cubic meters in 1998 to 3.3 million cubic meters in 2002 and to 3.7 million cubic meters in 2003, and seems to be increasing further under the pressure of growing Chinese and domestic demand. The same trend is exhibited in Khabarovski Krai. Its roundwood production grew from 5 million cubic meters in 1999 to approximately 6.5 million cubic meters in 2002. Iin both Krais there is a clear trend to harvest in formerly reserved, inaccessible, or roadless areas. Not only is the industry, then, launching a sort of "last attack" on formerly used, exhausted, and burnt forests, it is also aggressively pursuing the intact ones, which are already suffering from illegal operations. Expansion of logging and processing capacity over the last 3 to 4 years has not demonstrated a new and improved strategy, but, rather, has resulted in the poor condition found in the remaining commercially available forests and in the constant reduction of timber quality and price.

Washington, DC: Forest Trends, 2005. 48p.

By Debbie Banks and Julian Newman

This report is a call to action to stop the international illegal trade in tiger and other endangered Asian big cat skins. It draws together information from India, Nepal and China, as source, transit and destination countries. It also highlights the urgent need for governments to improve wildlife crime investigation, analysis, enforcement, communication and cooperation. Parties to the United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) need to demonstrate greater political commitment and treat wildlife crime more seriously. Key range, transit and destination countries need to establish specialised enforcement units capable of combating the organised criminal networks controlling the trade. Professional enforcement agencies need to be involved in ensuring greater cross-border communication and coordination and the international community, both government and non-government, needs to provide adequate technical and financial assistance in mobilising new enforcement initiatives. There can be no doubt that the skin trade is spiralling out of control. On a remote road in the west of the Tibet Autonomous Region (hereafter referred to as Tibet), in October 2003, customs officers at a temporary checkpoint made a startling discovery that lifted the lid on the true scale of the illegal trade in tiger and leopard skins. In a single consignment officers recovered the skins of 31 tigers, 581 leopards and 778 otters. The skins came from India and were on route to Lhasa, capital of Tibet, a major hub for the trade.

London; New York: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2004. 24p.

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By Yunbo Jiao

The central goal of this study is to produce an in-depth understanding of the nature and dynamics of China-related transnational environmental crime (TEC). To that end, this study takes the GreaterKaoem Telapak Kaoem Telapak China – including mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan – as the specific geographic focus for its investigation into three key TEC sectors (illegal trade in wildlife, forest products, and ozone depleting substances (ODS)). Overall, this study seeks to achieve the central goal in a four-step sequence. First, it builds a network-centric conceptual framework based on the idea of “networked threats require networked responses” advocated by many influential scholars. This framework focuses on addressing two puzzles: what essentially constitutes a network threat; and what forms a networked response. Second, it applies the concept of networked threats to the study of China’s global trade in illegal wildlife, forest products, and ODS. Third, it examines China’s TEC-related legal frameworks and enforcement responses and identifies key challenges that China has encountered in each of the three selected TEC sectors. Fourth and finally, it combines the above three lines of understandings – the accounts of networked responses, the empirical findings of China’s illegal trade, and the key regulatory and enforcement challenges identified – to develop practical suggestions on how can China apply the notion of networked responses to the formulation of regulatory and enforcement strategies for addressing the identified key challenges. This study makes two broad arguments: one theoretically oriented and one empirically directed. First, this study argues that while the concept of networked threats can be approached along the dimensions of transaction networks and directed networks, networked responses are not a standard, formatted mode of regulatory or enforcement responses. Instead, networked responses should be understood as a special way of thinking and acting: a way that sees a bright-side actor (e.g., enforcement agencies) as operating in an environment occupied by various networks and entities, which simultaneously present challenges in terms of amplified (networked) threats, as well as opportunities in terms of power amplifiers for the bright-side actor, in the sense that they could potentially be leveraged for tackling these threats. Second, China’s global trade in environmental contraband is typified by the substantial scale of China’s black markets and the deep embeddedness of China in the international and regional illicit trade chains. These two features, on the one hand, pose a serious challenge to the Chinese government in tackling its TEC; while on the other hand, they imply that Chinese effort and progress made toward addressing its illegal internal trade will likely have a substantive, positive overflowing effect on the whole of the international and regional illegal trade.

Canberra: Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, 2016. 306p.

By Lucy Vigne

In much of tropical Africa a breakdown in law and order, corruption and an influx of firearms led to heavy rhino and elephant poaching, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. I collected and analysed data to reveal the collapsing numbers of rhinos in Africa. Although we had general trade information, we needed more understanding of the soaring smuggling and consumption in order to combat it. I carried out extensive fieldwork in the main market at the time: North Yemen (Yemen from 1990). From the 1980s I regularly monitored the trade in rhino horn used for prestigious curved dagger (jambiya) handles, updating information on smuggling routes, prices, and demand. I worked with Yemenis on education campaigns, encouraged substitutes, and assisted policy makers, with Esmond Martin, who was to become my longterm research colleague. In the Indian subcontinent, home to most Asian rhinos, we also worked with officials and local people on strategies to fight rhino poaching and smuggling. And in eastern Asia we surveyed consumer markets for rhino horn used in traditional Oriental medicine to close down illegal trade. Around 2010 demand escalated once again causing serious rhino poaching, this time mainly in South Africa for customers in China and Vietnam, but again information was lacking. I surveyed illegal markets and collected prices of rhino horn, in order to strengthen legislation and enforcement. Demand for elephant ivory also rocketed from about 2010 onwards and we learned newly moneyed undiscerning Chinese consumers were eager to acquire mass-produced ivory items. We carried out market surveys in key illegal African and Asian markets to alert decision makers to control the surge in trafficking and unregulated retail sales, mostly for mainland Chinese. A new Chinese diaspora and the internet encouraged this lucrative trade, fuelled by corruption, mismanagement and apathy in many regions. Human population pressure on valuable natural resources is rising, resulting in climate change and wildlife crime increasing, and biodiversity in wild habitats more threatened, plus spreading zoonotic diseases. Compared with the 1980s there is at last growing attention to these challenges, including wildlife crime, in search of securing nature for a healthier, safer planet.

Oxford, UK: Oxford Brookes University. 2020. 80p.

By Esmond Martin and Lucy Vigne

China is the largest importer by weight of illegal ivory in the world (Milliken, et al. 2009). In response the government of China took steps to reduce this illegal ivory trade in 2004 by introducing an official identification card for each ivory item sold in registered shops. China was then approved by CITES to buy tusks from the southern African ivory auctions in 2008; Chinese traders bought 62 tonnes. In January 2011 we surveyed ivory factories and retail outlets in Guangzhou, the largest city in southern China and an important ivory centre, and in Fuzhou, a city famous for carving. According to a factory owner in Fuzhou, in 2010 he paid on average USD 455/kg for government-owned 1-5kg tusks with a range of USD 303- 530/kg. Similarly, privately-owned raw ivory in 2010 was USD 750/ kg, according to various sources. Siberian mammoth high quality tusks were around USD 400/kg in 2010 wholesale in China.

London: Elephant Family, The Aspinall Foundation and C Woking, Surrey Woking, Surrey olumbus Zoo and Aquarium, 2011. 20p.

By Wong, R. and Krishnasamy, K

The present report is the fourth iteration of TRAFFIC’s analysis on the illegal trade in Tigers Panthera tigris looking at an overall 19-year trend from 2000 to 2018. Previous analyses reviewed seizures from the 2000–2010, 2000–2012 and 2000–2015 periods. This analysis involved largely Tiger Range Countries (TRCs), while information opportunistically gathered from outside TRCs has also been included to provide a more comprehensive picture of the illegal trade in Tigers. Beyond highlighting the statistics, this report provides insights into trends and the most current and urgent threats facing Tigers. Nineteen years is a considerable time frame for data aggregation, and admittedly numerous changes have occurred in the wildlife protection and management regimes, including of Tiger habitats in a number of TRCs. With the large dataset spanning almost two decades, various considerations emerge involving TRCs and issues concerning the protection of wild Tigers, as well as those arising from captive facilities implicated with illegal Tiger trade. Overall, a conservative estimate of 2,359 Tigers were seized from 2000 to 2018 across 32 countries and territories globally. These occurred from a total of 1,142 seizure incidents, with 95.1% (or 1,086 incidents) occurring in the 13 Asian TRCs1 , accounting for a minimum of 2,241 Tigers seized. On average, 60 seizures were recorded annually, accounting for almost 124 Tigers seized each year. The top three countries with the highest number of seizure incidents were India (463 or 40.5% of total seizures) and China (126 or 11.0%) closely followed by Indonesia (119 or 10.5%).

Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC International, 2019. 52p.

By Wander Meijer, Dr. Daniel Bergin, Timothy Cheng, Crystal Yang, and Dr. Eugene Kritski .

The large-scale consumption of wildlife parts, products, and derivatives across the globe is increasingly being recognized as a driving factor toward substantial declines in populations for many species. Mainland China (hereafter referred to as ‘China’ in this report) is thought to be one of the largest markets, leading conservation professionals to explore the potential for targeted advocacy, social marketing, and multi-media campaigns to deliver real and rapid impact in reducing this demand. WWF have implemented several behavior change interventions in recent years to reduce demand for illegal wildlife products like ivory, pangolin scales, rhino horn, and tiger bones. Consumers including outbound tourists, persistent buyers, collectors, businessmen, and traditional medicine users have been targeted in those behavior change interventions. Within this context, a “game-changing” ban on commercial processing and trade in elephant ivory was implemented by the State Council, China’s Cabinet on 31 December 2017. TRAFFIC and WWF commissioned GlobeScan before the ban became effective in 2017 to conduct the largest-ever ivory consumer research in China. This research seeks to discover the nature of ivory consumption in 15 major cities in China, to understand consumers’ perception toward the ivory ban, and to assess effective messaging and mechanisms for demand reduction based on a pre- and a post-ban surveys, conducted in September – October 2017 (pre-ban), May – June 2018 (post-ban), May – July 2019 (post-ban) and October 2020 - January 2021 (postban). The research will also serve as the foundation of WWF’s future behavior change strategies and interventions.

Beijing, China: World Wildlife Fund, 2021. 119p.