By Kristina Amerhauser and Audrey Thill with support from Martin Thorley, Louise Taylor and Matt Herbert

Cyber scam operations have surged across Southeast Asia since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, evolving into a transnational organized crime crisis of staggering proportions. In this report, we expose the inner workings of scam compounds and the sophisticated criminal ecosystem sustaining them.

Repurposed hotels, casinos, and private compounds across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines have become centres of global fraud. These compounds are operated by organized criminal networks that exploit hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom are trafficked and forced to perpetrate online scams. Victims include not only those defrauded online but also the scam workers themselves, subjected to threats, violence, sexual exploitation and extreme working conditions.

The report details how cyber scams —including ‘pig-butchering’ romance-investment scams, crypto fraud, impersonation and sextortion— now generate tens of billions of dollars annually.

These illicit operations thrive due to weak rule of law, widespread corruption, and complicity from powerful figures who operate as ‘role shifters’ —individuals who blur the lines between government, business and crime. Scam compounds often enjoy protection from local elites and security forces, and rely on global money laundering networks, including cryptocurrencies and high-risk financial services providers.

This in-depth analysis, based on extensive fieldwork and case studies, highlights the devastating economic, human rights and security implications of cyber scam operations.

The report calls for urgent, coordinated responses, including better victim identification systems, crackdowns on enablers, and reforms to protect vulnerable communities.

Geneva, SWIT: 5 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 68p.

By James C. Wo, Ethan M. Rogers

Urban greenspace (UGS) has been recently linked to public safety. Criminologists, however, have been largely absent from the discussion about this association, despite having important theoretical tools and empirical findings to contribute. In the current study, we review the prominent criminological perspectives that may be used to explain the association between UGS and crime. Furthermore, we draw from prior work to extend beyond the question of whether UGS affects crime to the more crucial question of when it does. Using a sample of block groups in Washington, D.C., we examine the association between two measures of UGS—tree canopy coverage and noncanopy vegetation coverage—and violent and property crime. We also assess the moderating effects of antecedents to social disorganization (poverty and homeownership) on the association between UGS and crime. Our results suggest that both types of UGS are associated with fewer crimes, even while controlling for a range of criminogenic factors. The effects of tree canopy coverage appear to be crime general, while the effects of noncanopy vegetation coverage only apply to violent crime. The effects of tree canopy, however, are weaker in communities characterized by high levels of poverty and low levels of homeownership.

Criminology, Volume62, Issue 2, May 2024, Pages 236-275

By Carly Lightowlers, Lucy Bryant

COVID-19 restrictions significantly altered alcohol availability across England, at times with on-trade premises closed, presenting a novel opportunity to examine the efects of of-trade alcohol availability on violence. Police recorded violent crime data were used to examine changes in the level and proportion of (i) violence as well as (ii) domestic violence, which was alcohol-related during this period. On-trade closures saw the proportion of violent incidents recorded as alcohol-related fall only subtly (by 3 percentage points in months of closure) and did not lead to a significant difference in the proportion of domestic violence, which was recorded as alcohol-related. Tis suggests of- and on-trade alcohol availability may be comparable contributory factors to levels of violence and domestic violence

Te British Journal of Criminology, 2025, XX, 1–18

By David Jinkins, Elira Kuka, Claudio Labanca

Research on the social safety net examines its effects on recipients and their families. We show that these effects extend beyond recipients’ families. Using a regression discontinuity design and administrative data, we study a Danish policy that cut welfare benefits for refugees, increasing crime among affected individuals. Linking refugees to neighbors, we find increased crime among non-Danish neighbors, with spillovers persisting even after direct effects stabilize. Accounting for these spillovers raises the marginal value of public funds by 20%. We explore several mechanisms and find evidence consistent with peer effects among young individuals from the same country of origin.

IZA DP No. 17958

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2025. 85p.

By Daniel M. Gerstein

his report is one in a series of analyses on the effects of emerging technologies on U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions and capabilities. As part of this work, the research team was charged with developing a technology and risk assessment methodology for evaluating emerging technologies and understanding their implications in a homeland security context. The methodology and analyses provide a basis for DHS to better understand the emerging technologies and the risks presented.

This report describes the implications that the metaverse could have on digital crimes that involve the targeting and exploitation of children. These digital crimes are already occurring and have affected and endangered many victims and families. In an immersive online environment, such as the metaverse, opportunities for criminal activity and exploitation aimed at children could expand further.

Key Findings

Metaverse technologies — which encompass artificial intelligence systems, immersive technologies, and enabling digital technologies — will likely continue to become more available, have greater capabilities, and cost less to obtain and use. As has been the case with other digital technologies, metaverse technologies likely will have few policy, legal, ethical, or regulatory impediments constraining their development or use.

The metaverse concept is at an inflection point. How it will expand, how large it will become, and whether will it become an expansive virtual world that directly competes with the physical world remain unanswered questions. The timelines for expansion of the metaverse also remain speculative and will largely depend on use case, demand, and market forces.

Both non-metaverse and metaverse platforms have been and will continue to be used effectively to target children. Furthermore, an overlap exists between non-metaverse and metaverse platform use in luring and victimizing children, which makes it impossible to delineate the share of these abhorrent behaviors ascribable to each.

The lack of legal frameworks for crimes involving the targeting and exploitation of children in online applications will likely continue to be an issue. Clear definitions for what constitute attacks in the metaverse are not available as they are in the physical world, which hinders investigations and prosecutions. Despite the known vulnerabilities and consequences, these platforms continue to be aggressively marketed to children.

As the metaverse grows, the potential of these platforms for targeting, luring, exploiting, and victimizing children through targeted criminal activity or child exploitation will likely also grow.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025. 24p.

By Vaclav Prusa

Liberia’s mining sector accounts for a significant amount of its GDP, but its economic potential is undermined by bribery and political interference in licensing and the granting of concession agreements. While data on illicit financial flows (IFFs) derived from or enabled by corruption is limited, bribery cases involving foreign companies, the prevalence of trade mispricing and existence of a professional enabler industry, suggest vulnerabilities. Corruption and IFFs in the sector create fiscal losses, lead to environmental degradation and foster instability. Best practices for mitigation include robust legal frameworks, enhanced transparency and accountancy mechanisms, greater regional collaboration and community engagement.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen InstituteU4 HELPDESK ANSWER 10 2025. 30p.

By Mathias Bak and Matthew Jenkins

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) undermine economic growth by weakening institutional quality, state legitimacy, facilitating corruption and discouraging foreign and domestic investment. Empirical studies that have explicitly assessed the links between IFFs and economic growth, either on a regional scale or at the national level, generally find that illicit financial outflows have a negative and significant impact on core determinants of economic growth, notably domestic investment. Evidence suggests that IFFs not only hinder growth in source countries but also distort investment patterns in destination countries, particularly in real estate markets.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2025: 2. 44p.

By Human Rights Watch

Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are inherently discriminatory, denying equality before the law to non-Muslims and facilitating violence against anyone accused of the crime. Blasphemy is an offense officially punishable by death in Pakistan, and while no one has been executed for blasphemy, the laws have long been used to carry out personal vendettas and prosecute members of minority religious communities with grave consequences. A mere accusation of blasphemy can be a death sentence: in the past decade, vigilantes have killed dozens of people in mob violence following blasphemy accusations.

This report focuses on an additional widespread abuse: people making blasphemy accusations often do so for economic motivations, including forced evictions to acquire land that belongs to another. While the targets of blasphemy accusations and the violence fostered by the law belong to all socio-economic and religious groups in Pakistan, most of the victims have been from marginalized groups.

Blasphemy accusations against Christians and Ahmadis in particular have often forced entire communities to flee their homes and neighborhoods. Because many minority communities in Pakistan live in informal, low-income settlements without titles to the land, their forced exodus leaves their property up for easy seizure. Those alleging blasphemy have also benefitted financially by targeting business rivals and businesses owned and run by religious minorities. This exploitation of the blasphemy law, in particular the ease with which anyone can make an accusation as part of a personal dispute or for economic gain, has instilled fear among those at risk.

An entrenched bias in the criminal justice system results in miscarriages of justice against people accused of blasphemy. The authorities almost never hold those who commit violence in the name of blasphemy to account, while those accused under discriminatory and vague laws—generally without evidence—suffer long pretrial detention, lack of due process, and unfair trials that may result in years of imprisonment. In cases of vigilante attacks, police seldom take action to protect those targeted, and those who do may themselves face threats of violence. As a result, perpetrators of mob violence who enjoy the patronage and protection of politicians or religious leaders avoid arrest or are acquitted.

Human Rights Watch calls on the government of Pakistan to repeal the blasphemy law and safely release all those held or imprisoned on blasphemy charges. The authorities should investigate all attacks and threats based on blasphemy accusations, with particular concern for those targeting religious minorities and other marginalized groups and those that result in forced evictions and large-scale forced displacement. The authorities should also institute safeguards to prevent the coerced transfer and sale of properties of those accused following such incidents.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2025. 34p.

By John Jenkins, Andrew Gilligan and Paul Stott

A new report from Policy Exchange calls for the Government to suspend the working group chaired by Rt Hon Dominic Grieve — that is developing a definition of Islamophobia — with immediate effect.

Former top UK diplomat Sir John Jenkins, the ex-Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and co-author of the report, has refused to engage with Grieve’s group. In a letter to Grieve — published for the first time today — he warns that any official definition of Islamophobia “will almost certainly turbocharge ‘cancel culture’” and would “be an undeniable act of two-tier policy, creating special status and protection for members of one faith alone."

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 39p.

By Jeselyn and Danielle Lynn Goh

Transnational crime networks in Cambodia and Indonesia have been responsible for heinous cybercrime, including illegal online gambling and scams. These networks target vulnerable populations and undermine human security. Addressing these challenges requires stronger law enforcement cooperation, regulatory reforms, and coordinated regional and national strategies to dismantle the criminal networks. COMMENTARY In Southeast Asia, transnational crime has long posed a significant challenge. These include illicit drugs, human trafficking, cyber scams, and illegal gambling. Cybercrime has surged in recent decades with technological advancements and increasing global connectivity. In particular, operators of illicit gambling networks have expanded their operations into countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, and the border regions of Myanmar. Many of these centres are not limited to illegal gambling alone – they also function as cyber scam hubs. These scam centres engage in a wide range of online fraudulent activities, including investment scams, romance scams, and phishing operations. The current landscape of organised crime in Southeast Asia thus reflects a convergence of illicit gambling and sophisticated cyber scamming operations, often managed by the same transnational criminal networks. 

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore , 2025. 6p.

By STEVEN BYERS, MITCH MORRISSEY & JOHN KELLNER

The last year has brought some relief to Colorado’s fentanyl overdose problem, but some measures may still be needed to erase the drug’s explosive fatality growth in the last decade. Colorado state legislators implemented stricter penalties for fentanyl possession and distribution in 2022, though those reforms have been criticized by law enforcement as not going far enough. Since the legislation’s passage, fentanyl deaths have been declining. There is evidence that similar measures in other U.S. states are producing similar results. In the Common Sense Institute’s drug overdose competitiveness index, Colorado’s ranking decreased through the early 2020s and remained at 2023 levels in 2024. This suggests Colorado’s declining drug overdose rates are falling less than in other states. Local drug seizure figures have declined since 2022. At the federal level, policy changes correlate to declining overdose rates as well. The southwestern border has seen fentanyl seizures fall since the fall of 2024. Officials should take note that fentanyl overdose rates have moved in the right direction following policy implementation. As fentanyl overdoses remain highly elevated, leaders should consider whether additional policies could press the overdose rate down even further.

Greenwood Village, CO:Common Sense Institute, 2025. 22p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Ten years of crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) have fostered new dynamics in the livestock sector, exacerbating conflict between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers. The government, which has treated transhumance primarily as a security problem, has been unable to curb the violence. So have NGO and UN initiatives. Why does it matter? Reducing herder-farmer violence is essential for long-term stability in CAR. Bangui now has an unprecedented opportunity to scale it back, as the state gets re-established in rural areas, non-state armed groups weaken there and CAR’s relations warm with neighbouring Chad. What should be done? To contain herder-farmer violence, Bangui should reassume the regulatory role it abandoned in the 1990s. With the support of international partners, CAR’s authorities should rehabilitate pastoral services they once provided, combat army predation upon herders and revive cross-border cooperation with Chad.

Bangui/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, ICG, 2025. 39p.

By Meghan Benton, Susan Fratzke and Nurbanu Hayır

When it left the European Union, the United Kingdom lost its participation in the EU system for managing which country is responsible for which asylum seekers. This change has been a major, though not the sole, factor in burgeoning numbers of people attempting to reach UK shores in small boats, some dying in the process. The UK government and its European counterparts recently announced progress on cooperation in trade, security, and youth mobility, but addressing the politically corrosive Channel crossings will depend on whether the United Kingdom and its EU partners sign a readmissions deal— an issue that has proved much more thorny. Under the contemplated deal, the United Kingdom would accept transfers of certain asylum seekers from the European Union in return for an agreement by France and/or other Calais Group countries (Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands) to readmit asylum seekers who have reached the United Kingdom by sea. Such an agreement could be a bilateral readmission agreement, which would be easiest to stand up but holds political risks for the French if it lacks the European Union’s blessing. Alternately, an agreement could be reached with the European Union itself to facilitate the readmission of small boat arrivals directly to the EU country responsible for them, in line with rules set out by the EU Pacton Migration and Asylum—an option that could take longer to negotiate but also reduce the risk of simply shifting irregular migration routes to a neighboring country. The architects of the deal will need to balance the need to quickly deliver an agreement and proof of concept with the longer-term goal of creating a system that will significantly bring down dangerous Channel crossings and improve how countries share responsibility for the asylum seekers involved. This deal is an opportunity to test a more managed approach to asylum and migration.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2025. 16p.

By Michelle Kendler-Kretsch

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) appears to have a renewed interest in a sanctions tool first used in 2001: blocking individuals and entities pending investigation. Used in two recent sets of listings, the tool offers the agility and speed necessary to quickly and efficiently dismantle financing networks and sanctions evasion tactics. Its strategic application warrants closer attention from financial institutions, who must be responsive to their compliance obligations. Non-government organizations (NGOs) may be aware of opportunities where they can advocate for OFAC to take greater advantage of this option, particularly in cases related to sanctions evasion and conflict financing. In parallel, NGOs can also play a vital role by sharing information that supports implementation and, where applicable, reinforces the credibility of these provisional designations.

Washington, DC: The Sentry, 2025. 22p.

By ENACT Africa

In West and North Africa, a variety of criminal actors, geographically scattered from origin to destination countries, benefit from the sex trafficking process. Available information suggests that transnational trafficking is controlled by networks of cells operating in synergy from origin to destination country. Traffickers tend to have the same nationality as their victims. In West Africa, a wide diversity of nationalities of offenders are represented and there is a relatively equal distribution of men and women among offenders. Women offenders, whose role has been expanded through the digitalization of the sex trafficking process, are sometimes depicted as heads of organized crime groups (OCGs). However, it is essential to nuance this representation. While some women do hold leadership positions, others are likely to be working under the control of male-dominated criminal networks. European countries have requested the publication of most INTERPOL Notices and Diffusions targeting West and North African offenders involved in sex trafficking, with a majority of these targeting Nigerian nationals. This suggests strong linkages between OCGs from these countries, notably Nigeria, and sex trafficking in Europe. Information also suggests a possible recent decrease in activity of Nigerian OCGs involved in sex trafficking. However, this apparent decline may also be attributed to the crime becoming more clandestine, making it harder for law enforcement to detect. In West Africa, it is likely that the majority of sex trafficking victims are from Nigeria and other West African countries. To a lesser extent, victims also come from Central Africa and Asia. Due to cultural taboos, informal resolution mechanisms, and underreporting, there are likely more victims of sex trafficking in West Africa. Information indicates that minor victims are trafficked alongside adult victims for sexual exploitation. The West and North Africa regions are characterized by a complex network of domestic, intra-regional and inter-regional flows. Most victims are exploited within their home country and domestic sex trafficking can be considered as a precursor to international sex trafficking. Domestically or internationally, the victims are transported from rural areas to wealthier urban areas or locations of relative economic prosperity such as mines, agricultural sites, and commercial centers. Within West Africa, most countries are identified as either source, transit, or destination countries. Outgoing flows of victims from West Africa are primarily oriented towards North Africa. North and West African victims are also moved to Europe, transiting via countries such as Niger, Mali, Cabo Verde, Mauritania, Senegal, Libya, Algeria, and Morocco to reach Europe. Most West African victims of sexual exploitation identified in Europe are from Nigeria and reportedly transited via Niger and Libya to Italy. There is also a significant flow of victims from West Africa to the Middle East, or towards Central and South African regions. The modus operandi for recruiting victims almost always involves false promises of a better life abroad disseminated online through mainstream social media platforms. Technology also facilitates the control and sexual exploitation of the victims.

Lyon, France, INTERPOL/Impact Africa, 2025. 42p.

By The Interrnational Organization for Migration

The Regional Counter-Trafficking Learning Note aims to enhance the emulation of good practices and cross-border coordination on victims of trafficking assistance across North Africa, West and Central Africa key migratory routes. The learning note explores some of the promising practices in counter-trafficking interventions currently occurring in North Africa (Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), the Niger and Mauritania. It also explores promising practices across four key areas of counter-trafficking programming: (1) safe and preliminary victim identification, (2) safe referral and formal identification, (3) assistance and protection; and (4) long-term and sustainable solutions. Alongside the discussion of promising practices in each of these four sections, the note explores associated lessons learned and provides recommendations to counter-trafficking actors for strengthening the response to trafficking in persons.

Geneva, SWIT: International Organization for Migration, 2025. 76p.

By Audrey M. Baumgartner

The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution abolished slavery.1 However, this same amendment makes an exception to the general rule prohibiting slavery, “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”2 Ratified by the states in 1865, this loophole has resulted in over 150 years of what is known as “convict leasing.”3 Convict leasing was a system in which Southern States leased out prisoners for various forms of manual labor.4 While many thought convict leasing to be a thing of the past, it has reemerged through the privatization of prisons and the consistent denial by courts to ascribe any worker rights to prisoners. Flaws in the institutions that provide agricultural labor have resulted in large amounts of produce left unpicked, increased costs for consumers, and decreased investment in agricultural industries.5 Instead of solving problems plaguing the immigration system or fixing flawed worker protection laws for agricultural laborers, convicts are being used to cover these labor shortages. This Note will first walk through the evolution of convict leasing followed by a discussion of the United States prison system’s problematic history. Next, this Note will address the role immigrants play in the American agricultural industry. Lastly, this Note will focus on convicts as laborers; specifically, the positives and negatives associated with using incarcerated individuals to cover the agricultural labor shortage in the United States. This Note’s ultimate conclusion follows that convict leasing in agriculture can be a rehabilitative and positive solution to the labor shortage so long as inmates are treated with the same respect as other workers in these industries.

Duke Journal of Agricultural Law, 26(3): 2022

By Kate Seymour, Sarah Wendt,Sharyn Goudie

Family and domestic violence (FDV) is a widespread social issue in Australia with significant health, welfare, and economic consequences. While the FDV workforce is increasingly recognised, at both the Commonwealth and state/territory levels, as a key piece of the puzzle in addressing FDV in Australia, there remains limited understanding of the work itself. 

This report describes research exploring the domestic and family violence workforce in Australia and the work that it undertakes. It focuses specifically on how the work is done and experienced, why it is done in particular ways, and the structural and organisational contexts that shape this work.

The aims of the research were to: 

1. generate a coherent, qualitative evidence base on the nature and experiences of domestic and family violence work across three key domains: victim services, perpetrator services and Aboriginal specialist services

2. conceptualise the domestic and family violence workforce with reference to the nature of the work across these three domains

3. recommend workforce development strategies that are responsive to the context and needs of domestic and family violence work.

Key findings

• The diverse sociocultural and institutional contexts within which organisations operated shaped understandings of violence as well as perceptions of the skills and capacities that constitute, or are valued in, domestic and family violence work.

• DFV services (like other social welfare services) are subject to budget rationalisation, narrow funding models, and competition for government contracts and funding. This was evident across all organisations but was especially marked in victim services in the form of an intensified pace & volume of work, and accountability to funding bodies.

• Differences in work conditions were observed across the victim and perpetrator service sectors, suggesting a gendered demarcation between women’s work (victim support – caring work, femininised and devalued) and men’s work (perpetrator accountability – challenging, ‘man-to-man’).

• The weight of responsibility associated with managing risk was especially acute for workers in victim services but relatively absent in perpetrator services where ‘high risk’ matters (i.e. immediate safety concerns) were diverted to a designated partner contact worker.

• Community and social activism were central to the work in Aboriginal FDV services as workers dealt daily with the enduring and deeply entrenched impacts of colonisation.

Adelaide: Flinders University, 2025. 96p.

by Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Sandra Walklate, Ellen Reeves

This project represents the first study in Australia and New Zealand to examine the degree to which a DVDS provides an effective intervention for victim-survivors of intimate partner violence in enhancing their safety. The findings from this project are relevant to current policy discussions and evaluations of the DVDS in all Australian states and territories, as well as in comparable international jurisdictions, including New Zealand, Canada, United States, Scotland, England and Wales.

Monash University and University of Liverpool, 2024; 50p.

By The Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety ,

Parliament of New South Wales

Crime is a serious concern for many regional and rural communities in New South Wales (NSW). Since the COVID-19 pandemic, young people are increasingly involved in certain forms of crime, like motor vehicle theft. Participants in this inquiry emphasised that youth offending is a deeply complex social issue, and one that cannot be solved through increased policing alone. Early intervention is the most effective way to prevent young people from engaging in criminal behaviour. Smart, evidence-based strategies are required to deliver lasting change for communities.

There are excellent programs being delivered across NSW but there are also service gaps, inefficiencies in referral processes, and limitations around government funding that undermine the effectiveness of early intervention efforts.

The report makes a number of recommendations for improvement in areas such as supports for victims of crime; upskilling youth service providers; targeted early intervention programs; and partnering with community and educational organisations.

Key findings

While property crime in regional NSW has fallen over the two decades to 2023, it remains significantly higher compared to Greater Sydney.

Sensationalist media coverage of youth crime in rural and regional NSW heightens public anxiety and encourages negative perceptions of young people.

Youth crime is significantly impacting regional and rural communities, undermining community cohesion and adversely affecting the mental health of victims of crime and their families.

Use of violence is increasing in some cohorts of young people and is linked to offending behaviour.

Youth service providers need targeted training so they can work safely and constructively with young people who use violence.

Sydney: Parliament of New South Wales, 2025. 147p.