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Posts in Criminolgy
A Forensic Without the Science: Face Recognition in U.S. Criminal Investigations,

By Clare Garvie

A report released by the Center on Privacy & Technology evaluates the reliability of face recognition as it is used by police in the United States. The report examines the myriad human and machine factors, and their interactions, that might lead to bias and error when law enforcement agencies use face recognition. As a biometric, forensic investigative tool, face recognition may be particularly prone to errors arising from subjective human judgment, cognitive bias, low-quality or manipulated evidence, and under-performing technology. These errors have real-world consequences — the investigation and arrest of an unknown number of innocent people and the deprivation of due process of many, many more. As the grassroots movement to ban police use of face recognition grows, invoking the many overarching ethical problems with this kind of surveillance technology, it is important to point out that face recognition doesn’t work well enough to reliably serve the purposes for which law enforcement agencies themselves want to use it. Relying on the vast wealth of research and knowledge already present in computer science, psychology, forensic science, and legal disciplines, its key findings are:

As currently used in criminal investigations, face recognition is likely an unreliable source of identity evidence.

The algorithm and human steps in a face recognition search each may compound the other’s mistakes.

Since faces contain inherently biasing: information such as demographics, expressions, and assumed behavioral traits, it may be impossible to remove the risk of bias and mistake.

Face recognition has been used as probable cause to make arrests despite assurances to the contrary.

Evidence derived from face recognition searches are already being used in criminal cases, and the accused have been deprived the opportunity to challenge it.

The harms of wrongful arrests and investigations are real, even if they are hard to quantify.

This report is meant to be a resource for researchers examining the potential risks of this new technology, defense attorneys whose clients were identified using face recognition, judges seeking to understand the scientific merit of face recognition-derived evidence, police departments seeking to minimize the harms its use, and advocates and organizers seeking to protect rights in an age of ever expanding police deployment of this technology.

It calls on these communities to question any and all assumptions that the current use of face recognition is adequately controlled and reliable. It warns that we have a narrow and closing window of time in which to repeat the mistakes of previous forensic disciplines and avoid judicial certification of fundamentally flawed or unreliable methods.

Washington, DC: Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law, 2022. 77p.

Bringing Together the Criminologies of Atrocity and Serious Economic Crimes

By Andy Aydın-Aitchison

The paper reflects on the value of linking criminological research on atrocity with that on serious economic crime. The two areas of criminological research are outlined briefly, before common challenges around complexity and interdependence are set out. An example of a criminal career encompassing both atrocity and serious economic criminality is put forward to support claims that atrocity and economic crime can usefully be studied together. Three further examples of research are discussed to show the possible merits of bringing together two criminological strands. Ultimately, studying the two forms of criminality together would respect the lived experience of victims, who see firsthand how atrocity and serious economic crime go hand in hand.

International Criminal Law Review (2023) 1–17

Illicit Finance: Agencies Could Better Assess Progress in Countering Criminal Activity

By Triana McNeil

 Criminal organizations generate money from illicit activities such as drug and human trafficking and launder the proceeds. Federal agencies investigate illicit activity and have developed several strategies and efforts to combat these crimes. GAO was asked to review efforts to counter illicit finance activities. This report addresses, among other things, (1) selected agencies’ roles and responsibilities in investigating and prosecuting illicit finance activities and (2) the progress made with selected strategies and efforts to counter illicit finance activities. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency documents and data, including those related to eight selected federal strategies and efforts on countering illicit finance activities. GAO compared four of these strategies and efforts—which represent long range, multi agency undertakings—to selected key practices for evidencebased policymaking and for interagency collaboration. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations, including that Treasury collect and assess performance information on implementing the Illicit Finance Strategy, and that the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development establish goals and assess progress for implementing the Initiative. Treasury disagreed with the recommendation, State agreed with the intent of the recommendation but believes it already addressed it, and USAID agreed.

The National Security Council did not provide comments. 2025. 94p.

Serious, Therefore Organised? A Critique of the Emerging “Cyber-Organised Crime” Rhetoric in the United Kingdom

By Anita Lavorgna, and Anna Sergi

This paper, based on discourse analysis of policy documents, departs from a critique of the juxtaposition of the terms “serious” and “organised” in policies against organised crime in the UK. The conceptualisation of organised crime as national security threat supports our hypothesis that a similar critique can be applied to the emerging narrative of cyber-organised crime in the country. We argue that, whereby organised crime has become essentially “serious” as consequence of its characterisation as a national security threat, cyber crime is becoming “organised” in the policy narrative because of its seriousness. The seriousness and organisation of cyber crime justifies its inclusion within the national security agenda, thus accessing the procedural benefits of criminal intelligence assigned to national security threats. The implications associated to the evolution of such narratives in policy-making need to be assessed while policies are still developing.

International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 2016, 18p.