By Romi Sigsworth

Summary   Artificial intelligence (AI) offers innovative solutions for addressing a range of illegal activities that impact Africa’s environment. This report explores how AI is being used in Africa to provide intelligence on organised environmental crime, craft tools to assess its impact, and develop methods to detect and prevent environmental criminal activities. It discusses the challenges and opportunities AI poses for policing environmental crime in Africa, and proposes recommendations that would allow AI-powered policing to make a real difference on the continent. Recommendations • African governments and organisations should invest in gathering large, local data sets to allow AI models to produce appropriate and relevant solutions. • Investments in digital and communication infrastructure need to be made across Africa to improve and expand access to and affordability of AI solutions. • Police forces across Africa should include technology and AI skills capacity building into their basic and professional development training curricula. • Guardrails should be established through legislation to protect data, ensure privacy where necessary, and regulate the use of AI. • Public-private partnerships must be strengthened for law enforcement agencies across Africa to receive the technology and training they need to effectively embed AI tools into Research Paper their methodologies to combat environmental (and other) organised crime. 

ENACT Africa, 2024. 29[p.

By EUROPOL

 Europol’s Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2024, the most comprehensive yearly analysis of the latest threats posed by cybercrime in the EU. This edition marks 10 years since the release of Europol’s first IOCTA. Throughout this time, the threats posed by cybercrime have evolved dynamically in terms of volume, intensity and harm potential. The number of cybercriminals entering the market continued to grow steadily, thanks to the adoption of new technologies as well as the increasing complexity of digital infrastructures, which expands the potential attack surface. In 2023, millions of victims across the EU were attacked and exploited online on a daily basis. Small and medium businesses were increasingly popular targets for cyber-attacks, while e-merchants experienced the most digital skimming attacks. Adults were victimised through phishing, investment and romance frauds, and more and more minors were targeted by child sexual exploitation offenders and online sexual extorters. In parallel, a number of worldwide law enforcement actions shook the cybercriminal underground through continued arrests of ransomware affiliates IOCTA 2024 and operators. Law enforcement also carried out coordinated disruption operations against cybercriminals’ digital infrastructures. Notwithstanding the growing presence of law enforcement in the dark web, this environment continues to function as an enabler for cybercrime, allowing offenders to share knowledge, tools and services in a more concealed way. In addition, the use of cryptocurrencies in a wider variety of crime areas has become more noticeable in 2023, alongside the growing number of requests for investigative support in cryptocurrency tracing received by Europol. Cybercriminals are keen to leverage Artificial Intelligence, which is already becoming a common component in their toolbox and is very likely to see even wider application. Law enforcement agencies are expected to build a robust capacity to counter the growing threats stemming from this, both in terms of human resources and technical skills. An additional concerning aspect of cybercrime is the young age of the offenders. As cybercriminals appear to be in many cases underage, a greater focus on offender prevention could discourage young people from entering a criminal career.

  The Hague: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2024  38p.

By Pip McKnight, Jenny Phillimore and Dawn River with support from Rainbow Migration 

  Over the past six years, the SEREDA (Sexual and gender-based violence in the refugee crisis: from displacement to arrival) project has been examining the experiences and incidents of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) across the forced migration journey. Initial findings from SEREDA suggested that LGBTQI+ people who seek asylum face incidents of and vulnerability to SGBV that are distinct from heterosexual and cisgender populations, including in countries of sanctuary seemingly accepting of sexual and gender diversity. This project aimed to build on the initial findings of SEREDA to gain a more complete understanding of the current situation in the UK. Against an international backdrop of increasingly draconian anti-LGBTQI+ laws fuelled by fundamentalist religious and right-wing groups, this research sought to examine the experiences of queer people seeking asylum in the UK.  

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham and Rainbow Migration,2024. 28p.

 by Katy Swaine Williams with assistance from Jon Collins and Cassie Edmiston  

   This small study confirms that undertaking education, employment and other purposeful activity in prison is of fundamental importance for young women (aged 18–24) during their imprisonment and after their release. While in prison, having access to the right opportunities can offer satisfaction and a sense of pride and achievement; it can provide a distraction from worries and a valuable sense of purpose. Physical activity, including use of the gym, and purposeful social interaction are particularly valued. Education, employment and other purposeful activities for young women in prison can also help young women to envisage a positive future after their release and offer a practical stepping stone towards further study, employment, or simply development of a hobby that is beneficial to their wellbeing. Conversely, where young women in prison are denied opportunities for education or employment which they value, or indeed other purposeful or socially interactive activity, this is likely to be severely detrimental. The histories of several young women who took part in this study included childhood trauma, domestic abuse – including coercive control – and exploitation, which had had a direct impact on their engagement with education. Some of the young women identified lack of access to mental health assessment and support as a key barrier to their engagement in activities and overall well being, and a cloud over their present and future. Some complained they could not access education and work opportunities in prison until they had undertaken their Maths and English Level 1, which felt to them like an arbitrary barrier. Several women found inactivity and excessive time in their cell very difficult to cope with and wanted more opportunities for purposeful activity and social interaction, including through team sports. Others described the satisfaction they gained from purposeful activity in prison, including work. Each of the participants described past achievements in education, employment and family life of which they were proud, and aspirations for the future as well as worries and fears. Through this study we aim to help inform improvements to ensure that every young woman can experience the benefits of education, employment and other purposeful activity while in prison. We hope it will also be of interest to education providers in the community. We urge the Ministry of Justice to renew its efforts to develop a Young Women’s Strategy, to do so through co-production with young women, and to include a distinct focus on education, employment and other purposeful activity. The aim should be to develop tailored support which is gender-specific, age-specific, and is accessible to all young women – including Black, minority ethnic and migrant young women.  

London: Prisoners Education Trust, 2024. 38p.

By Lauren Smith

  The current research was commissioned by the Commission on Crime and Gambling Related Harms in response to a lack of existing literature about the lived experiences of gambling and crime, particularly in England and Wales. The research sought to illuminate the following: • Early engagement in gambling and the escalation into crime; • Experiences of the criminal justice system; • How gambling and gambling related crime affects key relationships such as employment, social and family networks; • Whether, and how, interventions or treatments for gambling are sought or utilised; • The perspectives of people with lived experience of gambling and crime about what needs to happen in the future to aid prevention and better support people impacted by crime and gambling harm. Research and legislative context Gambling is prevalent across Great Britain with 24 per cent of people reporting gambling online in the past four weeks (Gambling Commission, 2021a). A variety of gambling methods are used, with online gambling becoming particularly dominant during more recent years. Disordered gambling is classified within the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) as a mental health disorder and, more specifically, as maladaptive, behavioural addiction which leads to family, social, personal or recreational pursuits being compromised, disrupted or damaged by continuing the gambling behaviour (Delfrabbro, 2013). For some people, recreational gambling escalates into problem gambling, defined as gambling behaviour that creates negative consequences for the gambler or those around them (Ferris and Wynne, 2001), or gambling addiction, defined as a progressive addiction. Gambling addiction is an impulse control disorder that has many psychological, physical and social repercussions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Problem gambling has been linked to health and social problems, including suicide, homelessness, and other addictions (Lorains et al., 2011; Sharman et al., 2015; Petry, 2007). Within the current research there was some stigma around the phrase ‘problem gambling’, and therefore gambling harms was suggested instead (see also Saxton and Eberhardt, 2021). Gambling harms can extend beyond the individual, affecting families and the broader community (Langham et al, 2016).

Crimes committed by people experiencing gambling harms are typically, but not always, financial crimes, driven by an instrumental need to commit crime as a result of gambling harms (Turner et al., 2009). Prevalence rates of crime committed as a result of gambling are difficult to ascertain, with an estimated prevalence of problem gambling in prisons of 12 per cent, significantly higher than in the general population (May-Chahal, 2017). The government Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) is responsible for gambling policy and legislative framework. The key legislation in the UK for gambling is the Gambling Act (2005) which is currently undergoing a review. The Gambling Commission, an executive non-departmental public body, regulates all commercial gambling in the UK and seeks to prevent gambling from being a source of crime and disorder, to ensure that gambling is conducted in a fair and open way, and to protect children and vulnerable people from being harmed by gambling.      

London: Howard League for Penal Reform, 2023. 93p.

 by Penal Reform Solutions   

This research was commissioned by the Commission on Crime and Gambling Related Harms in response to a lack of existing literature about the role and impact of gambling within prison, particularly in England and Wales. The research aims were: • To understand how gambling is conceptualised in prison by residents and staff. • To understand how gambling is experienced within the cultural context of a prison by residents and staff. • To understand the role of gambling in prison, both positive and negative. • To understand the impact of gambling in prison on residents, staff and affected others and the support needed to address associated harm. • To assess how aware staff and residents are of the role gambling plays within prison culture and its impact on the rehabilitative environment. This research examined how gambling was understood and experienced in prison through the lens of culture, and the impact gambling has on people, both inside and outside of prison. A range of qualitative methods were adopted to promote engagement. The findings of this research highlighted that gambling played a significant role within prison culture. The role of gambling generated a sense of meaning and stimulation, acting as a form of escapism from boredom and was perceived as a tool to aid survival. The impact and experience of gambling were dependent on the subculture the person belonged to and where they were positioned within the hierarchy of the prison. This report outlines key recommendations that aim to address the harms associated with gambling within prison. While the findings and recommendations based on this study may not be uniformly applicable to the whole male prison estate in England and Wales, it is hoped that this research will assist prisons in creating meaningful strategies, to address the issues relating to gambling in prison.   

London: Howard League for Penal Reform, 2023. 64p.

By  Heidi Beirich

  IN JUNE 2020, THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT announced that white supremacist terrorism is “a serious challenge for the global community.” That same conclusion has been reached by other American government agencies including the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Counterterrorism Center, as well as foreign security organizations such as Europol. DHS has specifically pointed to the propaganda pushed by the international white supremacist network Generation Identity, the subject of this report, as motivating white supremacist violence. At this point, it is well accepted that white supremacy is as significant a threat for generating mass casualty terrorist acts internationally as other forms of extremism. Yet, there is a double standard when it comes to how online platforms treat content produced by white supremacists compared to content by Islamic extremist groups like ISIS or Al-Qaeda. For the latter, deplatforming is the accepted and, actually, demanded strategy, one pushed by the American government, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, and the major technology platforms. Not so for white supremacist groups. Enforcement of bans on these groups and their acolytes is much more haphazard, despite their proliferation of propaganda such as the Great Replacement, which similarly inspires terrorism and argues that white people are being genocided in their home countries. Groups that push this idea, in particular Generation Identity (GI), are rampant on Twitter and YouTube, even though such propaganda has inspired six mass attacks since October 2018. These included the mosque attacks in Christchurch, NZ, and attacks staged at two American synagogues, an El Paso Walmart, a synagogue in Halle, Germany, and two shisha bars in Hanau, Germany, where the shooter is believed to have been targeting Muslim immigrants. It would be inconceivable for social media platforms to allow ISIS propaganda to spread and grow unchecked, but that is exactly what is happening with Identitarianism (the ideology that underpins Generation Identity). Research by the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (GPAHE) found 67 Twitter accounts for Generation Identity chapters in 14 countries with nearly 140,000 followers. Those numbers do not include the accounts of individual Identitarians, such as GI’s unofficial leader and head of the Austrian chapter Martin Sellner, who has nearly 40,000 followers on Twitter, or accounts for GI coordinated activity, like Defend Europe, which has 27,000 followers. GPAHE found 25 such accounts totaling more than 400,000 followers. (All data available on request.) On YouTube, GPAHE found at least 12 countries represented by 31 GI chapters with about 86,000 subscribers. These numbers do not include the large Identitarian presence of individuals like Sellner who has 69,000 subscribers, the hundreds of videos posted. by GI adherents, or the number of times Identitarian proponents have appeared on other channels. For example, Identitarians made frequent appearances on the American Renaissance channel (135,000 subscribers) until it was banned in June 2020. It is impossible to determine how quickly the material is proliferating because we have no comprehensive baseline data from prior years. However, even in the weeks leading up to publication, the accounts summarized in this report have gained followers. This analysis certainly undercounts the number of Identitarian accounts thriving on Twitter and YouTube. Disturbingly, these platforms push viewers toward similar content on Twitter and YouTube and toward even more extreme content on unregulated platforms such as Telegram. Because Identitarianism is very much a youth movement, Twitter and YouTube serve as important gateways to further radicalization of young white people, particularly males, into white supremacy. The growth in the number of white supremacists worldwide can be laid at the feet of tech companies who allow this material to thrive on their platforms. It is time for this to end.    

Montgomery, AL: Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, 2024. 22p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

   Countries across the Near and Middle East have registered an escalation in both the scale and sophistication of drug trafficking operations over the past decade. The destabilizing risks posed by illicit drugs have become increasingly prominent on the regional agenda. Of particular concern for governments and societies across the region is the rising production, trafficking and consumption of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), in particular, tablets containing amphetamine sold under the name “captagon”, and methamphetamine. Iraq and neighbouring countries have documented a sharp increase in the trafficking and use of “captagon” over the past five years. “Captagon” seizures in Iraq increased by almost 3,380 per cent in Iraq from 2019 to 2023. Iraq reported the seizure of over 4.1 tons of “captagon” tablets between January and December 2023 alone. Seizures of amphetamine (mainly in the form of “captagon”) in the Near and Middle East doubled from 2020, reaching a record high of 86 tons in 2021. In parallel to “captagon” trafficking, a methamphetamine market is quickly developing in the Near and Middle East, as shown by a rise in seizures. UNODC research has found that Iraq is at risk of becoming an increasingly important node in the drug trafficking ecosystem spanning the Near and Middle East. Iraq lies near the intersection of a complex global drug trafficking ecosystem spanning Southwest Asia, Africa, and Europe, notably the Balkan and Southern routes associated with opiate smuggling from Afghanistan to Europe, through Southeastern Europe, and towards the Indian Ocean and Eastern Africa, including through the Arabian Peninsula. Within Iraq, drugs are trafficked along three key internal corridors, in the north, central and southern regions of the country. There are distinct territorial, ethnic, economic, and political factors and differentiated drug market dynamics connected to each route. The main categories of drugs trafficked through Iraq include opium, heroin, hashish and especially, methamphetamine and “captagon”. While Iraq is not necessarily the most affected country in the region in terms of volumes of drugs seized, there are risks that the situation could deteriorate if drug trafficking, in particular of methamphetamine and “captagon”, keeps intensifying. A particular challenge facing countries across the Near and Middle East are armed groups with cross-border affiliations and transborder economic interests. Alongside a recent history marked by armed conflict and corruption, this situation has contributed to cross-border trafficking.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024. 46p.

Trends in violence affecting children in England and Wales over the last 10 years.

 By The Youth Endowment Fund   

   Serious violence affecting children and young people in England and Wales is now higher than it was a decade ago. The mid-2010s showed a sharp increase in serious violence, particularly knife crime. More recent years show violence is falling: homicides, hospitalisations for knife assault and violent offending by children are all below their pre-Covid-19 levels. But it remains too high, and certain children – particularly Black children, boys and those living in the poorest areas – remain disproportionately affected. And the sectors that support children are struggling. Most crimes go unsolved by the police. Growing numbers of children are missing education or taken into care. Children’s mental health is worsening, and many don’t get the support they need. Services for young people have seen funding fall over the past decade. The number of children in absolute poverty increased in 2022/23. However, despite these difficulties, there is growing evidence about what works to prevent violence.  

Here’s a look at five key stats:

1. Homicide: In the year ending 2022/23, 99 young people aged 16 to 24 in England and Wales were victims of homicide, up from 87 in 2012/13.

2. Hospital admissions: The number of 10 to 17-year-olds in England admitted to hospital for injuries caused by knives or sharp instruments surged from 2015/16 and reached its decade peak in 2018/19. The number of incidents recorded has declined year-on-year since, but at the end of 2022/23 was 47% higher than compared to 2012/13.

3. Disproportionality: In 2022/23, 91% of young people admitted to hospital with knife injuries were male. Black children were over six times more likely to be homicide victims compared to their share of the population. And children living in the most deprived police areas experienced 2.5 times more violent crime than those in the least deprived areas.

4. Signs of improvement: The latest figures in 2022/23, show a year-on-year fall in both homicides of young people and hospital admissions. Over the last ten years, the number of 10 to 17-year-olds cautioned or convicted for violent offences in England and Wales has nearly halved (46%).

5. Struggling sectors: In the last academic year, 1 in 5 pupils in England were persistently absent, referrals to NHS mental health services rose by 11% in 2022/23, and the number of children under the care of local authorities in England has increased over the decade. 

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024. 95p.

By Steven Chermak; Joshua Freilich; Arun Ross; Noah Turner

Understanding the pathways that lead to politically and/or religiously motivated violence or terrorism remains a pressing concern. Despite extraordinary commitment and effort to better understand the threat of terrorism and respond more effectively to it, there is considerable empirical evidence that domestic terrorists continue to pose a significant danger to public safety. This project is the first study to comparatively examine the presence/absence of risk and protective factors across three groups: (i) extremist individuals who committed ideologically motivated violent (fatal and non-fatal violent attacks) and nonviolent (financial) crimes, (ii) extremists who did not break the law and only engaged in legal extremist activities, and (iii) persons who committed non-ideological motivated homicides and other violent attacks. In addition, the project is methodologically unique in that although case-control is widely used to study public health and medical problems, no prior study has used this approach to compare violent and nonviolent criminal extremists to nonoffending extremists and regular violent offenders. Although there has been a good amount of radicalization and risk assessment-related research on risk and protective factors, the researchers in this project expand this work with comparative analyses that have not been previously explored, comparing violent or nonviolent criminal extremists to nonoffending extremists or other types of violent offenders. The case-control approach used in this project provides an empirically robust understanding of categorical differences across groups that have not yet been achieved.

East Lansing Michigan. Michigan State University,

2023. 94p.

By Human Rights Watch 

  Police and soldiers in El Salvador arrested Carolina González (pseudonym), a 17-year-old student from a rural town in Sonsonate state, on July 1, 2022, without showing her a warrant. Security forces accused Carolina of collaborating with gangs. She recalls they held her with adult women, for seven days, at a police station, where an officer tried to coerce her into identifying a gang member, whom she did not know, in exchange for being released. Two weeks later, the police transferred Carolina to a juvenile detention center where she was held in a small, unsanitary cell with 25 other girls. Months later, a judge pressured Carolina and seven other children to jointly plead guilty to collaborating with the MS-13 gang, which she denies doing. Carolina and three other girls recall the judge saying that if one of them refused the plea deal, they would all serve sentences that were twice as long. They pleaded guilty and were sentenced to a year in prison. “We did not have an option,” Carolina said, “we all wanted to see our moms.” Carolina is one of roughly 3,000 children who have been arrested in what witnesses often describe as indiscriminate sweeps since, in March 2022, President Nayib Bukele declared a state of emergency as part of a “war on gangs.” She is also one of 1,000 children who have been convicted during the state of emergency, primarily on charges of gang membership. Security forces have subjected many of these children to a range of serious human rights violations during their arrest, in detention, and even after release. This report, based on interviews with more than 90 people, documents these human rights violations against children who security forces have accused of being connected to gangs. Human Rights Watch visited, in September and December 2023, San Salvador, Sonsonate, and Cuscatlán states and interviewed victims of abuse, their relatives and lawyers, witnesses, judges, police officers, security experts, teachers, former government officials, journalists and civil society members. We also requested information from several government offices and reviewed relevant case files, as well as medical, educational, and criminal records.

  Since March 2022, El Salvador has been under a “state of emergency” to fight heinous gang violence. The police and military report having arrested 80,000 people, including over 3,000 children. Homicides and extortions have significantly decreased, but security forces have committed widespread human rights violations. “Your Child Does Not Exist Here” documents human rights abuses against children, including arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and due process violations. Some have been held in detention alongside unrelated adults. Dozens have been convicted through unfair trials, often based on broad charges. Juvenile detention facilities have been overcrowded and unsanitary. The abuses have happened in a context of dramatic deterioration of the rule of law and government attacks on civil society and independent media. Many of the children arrested lived in low-income communities with constant gang violence. Social exclusion, and lack of opportunities left them vulnerable to both gang recruitment and stigmatization by security forces. The report urges the government to prioritize prosecution of those most responsible for gang violence and promptly release those detained without evidence, particularly children. It also provides recommendations for implementing a rights-respecting security policy that protects children from gang violence and abuses. The international community should urge the Salvadoran government to respect and protect children’s rights. Foreign governments and international financial institutions should suspend loans to entities involved in human rights violations. They should promote effective and rights-respecting security policies that ensure that Salvadorans are not forced to choose between gang violence and abuses by security forces.  

New York: HRW, 2024. 112p.  

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Across the region where Brazil, Colombia and Peru meet deep in the Amazon, an assortment of criminal organisations are exploiting the feeble reach of states, abundance of natural resources and poverty of local communities to grow, diversify and hatch new cross-border ventures. Why does it matter? Surging cocaine production in Peru and the spread of other rackets like gold dredging and illicit logging threaten Indigenous ways of life, spur deadly violence and harm the environment. Should these criminal ventures go unchecked, they could undermine the already tenuous state control of the world’s largest rainforest. What should be done? Following up on promises made in 2023, the three countries should bolster security cooperation and harness foreign assistance with a view to prosecuting and sanctioning those responsible for environmental crimes. Support for law-abiding livelihoods and stronger collaboration with Indigenous communities at the front lines of criminal expansion are vital.

Latin America Briefing No. 51

Brussels/Bogota, International Crisis Group, 2024. 28p.

By Lucía Salgado, Susan Fratzke, Lawrence Huang and Emma Dorst

National borders are one of the primary apertures through which publics perceive and judge migration trends and policy. Dysfunction at borders has implications that go well beyond national security, affecting commerce and trade as well as human mobility of various kinds. For asylum seekers, who generally must reach another country’s territory in order to seek protection, borders can represent the difference between danger and safety.

As publics in many countries become increasingly vocal in their dissatisfaction with the management of their nation’s borders, policymakers face the difficult task of designing border systems that prevent the outbreak (or perception) of chaos, even as major displacement crises and the complexities of mixed humanitarian, economic, and family reunification migration strain outmoded infrastructure.

This report—part of the Beyond Territorial Asylum: Making Protection Work in a Bordered World initiative led by MPI and the Robert Bosch Stiftung—examines the key elements of an effective and protection-sensitive border system. It begins with an overview of what makes border management challenging at the best of times, and particularly so amid acute displacement crises. It then explores the core features of border processes capable of responding to mixed migration while protecting the right to seek asylum, and what needs to be in place for these procedures to be successful.

 Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute 2024. 34p.

The review, led by Dame Vera Baird KC

  In August 2023, the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, commissioned me to carry out an independent Inquiry into the treatment of women and girls who have been arrested and taken into police custody in Greater Manchester. He asked me to do this following a Sky News investigation in July 2023 that reported distressing incidents regarding the cases of three women who were arrested and detained by Greater Manchester Police (GMP). The Mayor commissioned the Inquiry so that the people of Greater Manchester could have confidence in the custody arrangements of GMP and to ensure that people who are arrested and detained in the city-region are treated both lawfully and with dignity. He was particularly concerned with the confidence that the public had in the use of police custody, particularly relating to the treatment of women. The purpose of the Inquiry, as set out fully in the Baird Inquiry Terms of Reference (see Appendix A), was therefore to explore the experiences of people who are arrested and taken into police custody with a focus on women and girls, particularly in respect of how GMP applies the law, and to consider whether current police conduct and approach are compatible with maximising people’s rights, their safety and their dignity. I was asked to focus on the appropriate use, or otherwise, of strip searches and intimate searches, including the removal and replacement of clothing, as this was a key feature in the Sky News investigation. The task was to explore the above in connection with people who were arrested and detained in Greater Manchester beyond those involved in the initial Sky News investigation, to understand how widespread any similar experiences may be. My focus was always on women and girls. However, as some men approached the Inquiry to alert me to problems with their arrest and treatment, I have also sought to understand their experiences.

The Inquiry asked me to: examine the fitness of current policy and procedures, alongside an assessment of GMP’s compliance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and associated codes of practice and notes for guidance; and have regard to other legislation as well as to National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) policy and Authorised Professional Practice from the College of Policing. Ultimately the Inquiry was set up to guide the future practice of GMP to: • maximise people’s rights, safety, care and dignity, with a focus on women and girls who are arrested and detained, in particular those whose first contact with GMP was in order to report a crime or in relation to a crime they had reported themselves. • enhance the confidence of people, especially women and girls, in GMP generally and particularly in reporting crime.   

Manchester, UK: Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2024. 210p.

By Jamie MacColl, Pia Hüsch, Gareth Mott, James Sullivan, Jason R C Nurse, Sarah Turner and Nandita Pattnaik  

   Ransomware incidents remain a scourge on UK society. Based on interviews with victims and incident responders, this paper outlines the harm ransomware causes to organisations, individuals, the UK economy, national security and wider society. • The research reveals a wide range of harms caused by ransomware, including physical, financial, reputational, psychological and social harms. • We set out a framework of: ◦ First-order harms: Harms to any organisation and their staff directly targeted by a ransomware operation. ◦ Second-order harms: Harms to any organisation or individuals that are indirectly affected by a ransomware incident. ◦ Third-order harms: The cumulative effect of ransomware incidents on wider society, the economy and national security. • Building on an existing taxonomy of cyber harms,1 this framework will enable policymakers, practitioners and researchers to categorise more case studies on ransomware incidents and to better explain new and existing types of harm to the UK and other countries. • Ransomware is a risk for organisations of all sizes. The findings from this paper highlight that ransomware can create significant financial costs and losses for organisations, which in some cases can threaten their very existence. Ransomware can also create reputational harm for businesses that rely on continuous operations or hold very sensitive data – although customers and the general public can be more forgiving than some victims believe. • The harms from ransomware go beyond financial and reputational costs for organisations. Interviews with victims and incident responders revealed that ransomware creates physical and psychological harms for individuals and groups, including members of staff, healthcare patients and schoolchildren. • Ransomware can ruin lives. Incidents highlighted in this paper have caused individuals to lose their jobs, evoked feelings of shame and self-blame, extended to private and family life, and contributed to serious health issues. • The harm and cumulative effects caused by ransomware attacks have implications for wider society and national security, including supply chain disruption, a loss of trust in law enforcement, reduced faith in public services,

and the normalisation of cybercrime. Ransomware also creates a strategic advantage for the hostile states harbouring the cyber-criminals who conduct such operations. • Downstream harm to individuals from ransomware is more severe when attacks encrypt IT infrastructure, rather than steal and leak data. There is no evidence from this research that the ransomware ecosystem is exploiting stolen or leaked personal data in a systemic way for fraud or other financially motivated cybercrimes. At present, exploiting stolen data for other activities is less profitable than extortion-based crime that takes away victims’ access to their systems and data. This finding may inform victim decision-making on when they should and should not consider paying a ransom demand. • The next paper from this project will outline what kinds of measures can reduce or mitigate many of the harms described in this paper    

  London: The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2024. 71p.   

A Storytelling Legal and Empirical Analysis of Human Trafficking Risks in Home Office Hotels Compared to Other Accommodation for Unaccompanied Children and Young People Seeking Asylum in the UK

By Sonja Ayeb-Karlsson, Tyler Valiquette,  Ella Cockbain and Laura Durán

 A recent and controversial practice development is the use of Home Office commissioned hotels to house unaccompanied children claiming asylum in the UK. From July 2021 to January 2024, seven Home Office hotels were established and finally decommissioned after the High Court in 2023 deemed their regular operation (rather than acting as ‘emergency’ accommodation) unlawful. There were concerning indications that the establishment of Home Office hotels for unaccompanied children may exacerbate risks of trafficking and various forms of exploitation. This was strengthened by media reporting over 440 missing episodes (some as young as 12 years old) among the 5,400 unaccompanied children housed from July 2021 to June 2023. It is from this background that our study explored the lived experiences and perceptions surrounding the trafficking and exploitation risks among unaccompanied children placed in Home Office hotels while seeking asylum in the UK. The legal and empirical storytelling research provides a comparative analysis of risk and protective factors for children seeking asylum between Home Office hotels and local authority care settings. The research findings guide us toward what measures can be taken to prevent trafficking and exploitation, how we can mitigate trafficking and exploitation risks associated with these children’s accommodation environments, and how to improve early intervention for unaccompanied children seeking asylum in the UK   Key Findings 1. The empirical storytelling interviews and legal analysis showed that the use of Home Office hotel accommodation for unaccompanied children seeking asylum increased the risks of both trafficking and exploitation as well as re-trafficking risk for those children having been trafficked into the country. 2. The research findings link adultification and children being placed in adult accommodation for people seeking asylum, which remains a risk after the child hotels have closed. The empirical data revealed that children seeking asylum were not only placed in and trafficked from the children’s hotels, but an increasing number of children were reportedly incorrectly deemed as adults by the Home Office and thereby face similar and other associated risks (such as trauma, abuse, and exploitation by other adults) in adult hotels. 3. The research raised particular concerns about young unaccompanied Albanian people and trafficking. Our legal and empirical analysis drawing from professional experiences repeatedly indicated that Albanian children accommodated, and in particular Albanian boys, are especially vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation, as well as experiencing an increasingly precarious situation because of the relabelling of Albania as a ‘safe country’ for removal and Albanian boys as ‘criminals’ and ‘scapegoats’ in media as in the political discourse.

London: Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre , 2024. 62p.

By Adrian Usher, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO)

This learning lessons bulletin summarises the learning from Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) investigations into the deaths of those who died within 14 days of release from prison. Prison leavers often have multiple and chronic co-morbidities or risk factors, including substance misuse and mental health issues. This can present difficulties with release planning, especially when combined with external factors, such as a lack of available accommodation. Homelessness on release was a considerable issue in our investigations and has a detrimental impact on the individuals involved. Based on our period of research and reporting 32% of the prisoners who died within two weeks of release were homeless. When viewed in the context of other MOJ research, it seems that prisoners who are released homeless may be overrepresented in our post release death investigations. While we are seeing positive changes to policy and examples of positive practice, analysis of our investigations also found that of those who died within 14 days, just over 50% died within the first four days of being released. This stark finding demonstrates how acutely vulnerable prison leavers are, especially in those first few days after release. There is a desperate need for more joined-up and partnership working between HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and community services. More needs to be done to ensure that prisoners are released with suitable accommodation and that support measures (such as substance misuse or mental health services) are in place and readily available on release.

By Andrew Gilligan

   Westminster is the physical heart of the British state, a centre of the Christian faith, and the symbol of Britain to the world. Nowhere else in Europe, with the possible exception of the Eiffel Tower, is more famous, or more emblematic of its nation. Nowhere else combines those supreme symbolic qualities with being the place where actual power resides and the highest work of government is done. Yet what should be a showpiece has declined into a degree of squalor and disorder. Windows of the great public buildings, broken by protestors, are splintered or patched with duct tape. Anarchist and anti-police graffiti is painted on those buildings’ walls; some of it has been there for more than two years. Urine trickles from the corners. Protestors have privatised the pavement, illegally and for hours blasting out amplified music that hinders the often critical work being done in the offices along Whitehall. Skateboarders use the steps of the parliamentary building, Portcullis House, as a regular practice area. The experience for visitors is dispiriting and may include being cheated by con-men on Westminster Bridge. Crowds of people press round the entrances to Parliament, banging on the sides of MPs’ cars as they drive in. Parliament Square is a three and four-lane traffic roundabout. MPs are verbally abused, occasionally chased. Some parliamentarians say they feel physically afraid to leave the building. People coming to see their MPs, or keep appointments in government buildings, can’t always get in. “Broken windows” theory says that visible signs of vandalism, anti social behaviour and neglect encourage further crime and disorder. It appears to hold true amid the literally broken windows of Westminster. Between 2013/14 and 2021/22, this study finds, violent crime in the quarter-mile immediately around Parliament has risen by 168 per cent, against a 47 per cent rise in the borough of Westminster as a whole and a 67 per cent rise in London. Public order offences have risen by 252 per cent - three and a half times - versus 75 per cent in the borough as a whole and 93 per cent in London.1 Offences, particularly of violence, have fallen recently, but remain at very high levels. Even without becoming a victim of any of these crimes, someone taking the ten-minute walk from, say, Waterloo Station to Parliament could easily pass as many as half a dozen breaches of the law, from the illegal vendors and confidence tricksters on the bridge, to the pedicabs blocking the traffic, to the bellowing loudspeakers of the protestors, to the people camping in the shop doorways. None individually is serious, but  they have an important cumulative effect. The area is a mess because its governance is a mess. Control of the public spaces around Parliament is split between eight different bodies, often with different policies. Parliament Square alone is controlled by three different official agencies. The government publishes a map to show you which bits are whose, and where certain restrictions apply.2 Symbolising the muddle, key details on it are wrong, so no wonder the policing of the area is a little confused. But the area is also a mess because of a lack of confidence and consistency by those in charge. There is of course no right to urinate in the street, or cheat tourists, or vandalise, but the authorities often seem unwilling to challenge such practices. The law is often ignored around the very building where the laws are made. There is a right to protest - or rather, there are rights to freedom of speech and assembly, including around Parliament, which this paper supports. But there is an important, if not always recognised, distinction between protest that happens to cause disruption to others (for instance, because many people have gathered in the same place) and protest that aims to cause disruption to others as a principal objective (for instance, by a handful of people blocking a road, or using amplification to make it difficult or impossible to work nearby.) The disruption caused by demonstrations of thousands is part of the price of democracy. But we question the way in which much smaller numbers of people are regularly, repeatedly and illegally allowed to cause disproportionate disruption, sometimes risk, and sometimes fear to others. The right to protest has sometimes been privileged over other rights, such as the rights of others to move freely, to work, to speak, and even to be safe. The authorities should act more strongly against protest whose principal aim is to annoy, inconvenience or intimidate, rather than to convey a message. Yet if enforcement is inconsistent, another part of the problem is that decisions by the courts and Parliament have made consistent enforcement harder. Over the last two decades the law has vaccillated. The “controlled area” around Parliament - where, for instance, loudspeakers and structures are supposed to be banned - has been reduced, then enlarged, then cut to almost nothing, then gradually enlarged again. But it is still smaller than it was - it excludes, for example, the whole of Whitehall (Parliament Street, which joins Whitehall to Parliament Square, is included, however). The Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgement, which says that those obstructing the road should not be convicted if it was a disproportionate interference with their rights of protest, has made it more difficult for the police to act. Amendments currently in Parliament seek to deal with this issue. Many of these problems were raised in a report by Parliament’s own Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), more than three years ago, after high-profile mobbing incidents of MPs in the area.3 Some things have changed for the better. The protestor camps in the middle of Parliament Square went in 2013. In 2016, a new pedestrian crossing allowed the square to be reached, and reclaimed, by the public. More recently, there appears to be slightly more proactive policing in Westminster. But not enough has changed, as the crime figures show. The government took almost 18 months to respond to the JCHR report and much of its response is non-committal.4 There are plans to dramatically improve at least the physical environment, removing traffic from two sides of Parliament Square and making the Palace of Westminster safer from terrorist attack. But they have been drawn up almost in secret; and they are stalled because the various official bodies are quarrelling about who should pay for them. In all these ways, too, Westminster symbolises Britain.   

London: Policy Exchange, 2023. 37p.

By Nicole D. Porter, Alison Parker, Trey Walk, Jonathan Topaz, Jennifer Turner, Casey Smith, Makayla LaRonde-King, Sabrina Pearce and Julie Ebenstein 

  The United States is an outlier nation in that it strips voting rights from millions of citizens solely on the basis of a criminal conviction.2As of 2022, over 4.4 million people in the United States were disenfranchised due to a felony conviction. This is due in part to over 50 years of U.S. mass incarceration, wherein the U.S. incarcerated population increased from about 360,000 people in the early 1970s to nearly 2 million in 2022. While many U.S. states have scaled back their disenfranchisement provisions, a trend that has accelerated since 2017, the United States still lags behind most of the world in protecting the right to vote for people with criminal convictions. The right to vote is a cornerstone of democratic, representative government that reflects the will of the people. The international consensus on the importance of this right is demonstrated in part by the fact that it is protected in international human rights law. A majority of the world’s nations either do not deny people the right to vote due to criminal convictions or deny the right only in relatively narrow and rare circumstances.  

Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2024. 55p.

By Jacqueline M. Nowicki

  Why GAO Did This Study 

 The Departments of Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing certain federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination report for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review the role of policing in schools, including the effect on students of different races. This report addresses (1) what Education’s data show about the extent to which different student groups are arrested in K-12 schools and (2) whether police presence in schools is associated with student arrests. GAO analyzed two federal Education datasets for the two most recent school years before the pandemic (2015 2016 and 2017–2018) and 2019–2020. GAO also visited three school districts, selected for factors such as high rates of arrests; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and interviewed federal officials and representatives of national education and civil rights groups. What GAO Recommends GAO is making three recommendations that Education: (1) collect arrest and referral data, by race, for students with disabilities who receive services under Section 504; (2) disclose the limitations of its 2021 2022 arrest data; and (3) clearly inform school districts about future changes to arrest and referral data in its civil rights data collection. Education generally agreed with these recommendations.   

GAO-24-106294

Washington, DC:  United States Government Accountability Office, 2024. 67p.