Human smuggling and trafficking in North Africa and the Sahel: CHAD

By: Alice Fereday

Over the past four years, the human smuggling ecosystem in Chad has continued to evolve and change. The Chadian government, for its part, has increasingly sought to tighten controls on the northbound movement of migrants, perceiving the flow of people as contributing to instability, rebel activity, and organized crime in the north as well as in southern Libya.

Movement north has remained robust, despite – and in some cases because of – conflict and instability, the COVID-19 pandemic, and government enforcement. The changed security landscape, however, has driven smuggling networks to adopt increasingly clandestine approaches to movement and operations. All of these dynamics remained salient in 2023. However, mobility in Chad was also substantially shaped by the outbreak of war in Sudan. The conflict led to a mass arrival of refugees in eastern Chad and, more broadly, posed significant risks to the stability of the country. The enormous influx of refugees into Chad further strained the limited assistance capacities in the Ouaddaï, Sila and Wadi Fira regions, triggering a large-scale humanitarian crisis in these areas, and negatively affecting the prices and availability of basic commodities. While most refugees remain in refugee camps in eastern Chad, some have begun to leave, intending to travel to northern Chad, Libya and Tunisia, often with the help of smugglers. The conflict initially reduced the number of Sudanese travelling to northern Chad, but movements picked up towards the end of the year. Human smuggling from western Chad, while less affected by the conflict in Sudan, continues to be suppressed, although there has been some relaxation of law enforcement efforts. Meanwhile, artisanal mining at the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield has flourished since its reopening in late 2022, with most operations now formalized. Efforts by the Société Nationale d’Exploitation Minière et de Contrôle (National Society for the Exploitation and Control of Mining – SONEMIC) to formalize and regulate activities caused tensions among gold miners, but security at the goldfield has reportedly improved. Mid-2023 also saw renewed rebel incursions into northern Chad and clashes between rebel groups and the Chadian military. However, pressure on rebel groups from the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in Libya and the surrender of significant numbers of rebels in northern Chad have weakened key groups such as the Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République (Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic – CCMSR) and the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for Change and Concord in Chad – FACT). As a result, the risk of rebel incursions into Chad, while not permanently eliminated, appears to be largely contained for the time being. Chad also entered the next phase of its transition process, preparing for the elections, which were held in May 2024. This was a crucial period for the transitional authorities to consolidate their power and credibility, given the high level of opposition to the largely controversial transition process. However, following a contested constitutional referendum in December 2023, which enshrined the principle of a unitary state pushed for by the transitional authorities, political violence escalated in early 2024. In February, following the announcement that presidential elections would be held on 6 May, a key opposition figure, Yaya Dillo Djérou, was killed by security forces amid clashes at the headquarters of his party, the Parti Socialiste sans Frontières (Socialist Party Without Borders – PSF).1 The Chadian government claimed that its forces were in fact involved in a shootout at the PSF’s headquarters, after an attack on government security forces the night before. This raised fears that there would be further violence and repression of opposition and civil society voices after the May elections. While the elections were in fact relatively peaceful, there are still ongoing concerns related to the contraction of civil society space and democratic process.

Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 37p..