By Alice Fereday

Niger’s location at the crossroads of key trans-Sahelian routes has positioned it at the heart of migratory flows for decades. The country’s role as a transit hub for migrants heading north towards Libya with the aim of reaching Europe has also attracted the focus of extensive international efforts to curb irregular migration. In 2023, however, it was the major political and security developments at national and regional levels that had the greatest impact on human smuggling in Niger. On 26 July, a military coup overthrew the president, Mohamed Bazoum, and transitional authorities were formed under the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland – CNSP). The military takeover resulted in the closure of the country’s borders with Benin and Nigeria, further complicating movement into Niger, which was already severely affected by growing insecurity in Burkina Faso and south-west Niger. Rather than preventing movement, however, the border closures led to an increased demand for smuggling services, particularly at the Benin border, from both migrants and those transporting commodities. By March 2024, the Nigerian border had reopened, while the Benin border remained closed at the time of writing. An even more significant change came in November, when the CNSP repealed the 2015 anti-smuggling law that had caused the collapse of the industry in northern Niger. This led to one of the most profound shifts in the dynamics of human smuggling since 2015. Since the repeal of the law, passeurs – the colloquial name in the Sahel for transporters involved in human smuggling – across the country have been able to transport foreign migrants legally. The effects were immediately felt in Agadez, which had been the main focus of anti-smuggling operations, resulting in the demise of its human smuggling economy in 2016. With the repeal of the law, departures to Libya have risen steadily since November, as have departures to Algeria. Rather than a sharp spike in foreign movements, the repeal appears to have caused steady, though not exponential, growth since November. Some of the key factors that influenced human smuggling before the legislation change remain in place, such as a preference for routes to Algeria and persistent challenges on regional routes to reach Niger. As a result, the migration landscape in the country is unlikely to return to what it resembled pre-2015. In particular, the westbound displacement of routes, which led to the increased use of Algeria as a transit country to reach Tunisia and to a lesser extent Morocco, is now firmly established and unlikely to shift back. Insecurity linked to the expansion of violent extremist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and south-west Niger also remains a major constraint on regional mobility, and could further deteriorate amid continued political and security upheaval in the Sahel.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 38p.

By: Alice Fereday

Over the past four years, the human smuggling ecosystem in Chad has continued to evolve and change. The Chadian government, for its part, has increasingly sought to tighten controls on the northbound movement of migrants, perceiving the flow of people as contributing to instability, rebel activity, and organized crime in the north as well as in southern Libya.

Movement north has remained robust, despite – and in some cases because of – conflict and instability, the COVID-19 pandemic, and government enforcement. The changed security landscape, however, has driven smuggling networks to adopt increasingly clandestine approaches to movement and operations. All of these dynamics remained salient in 2023. However, mobility in Chad was also substantially shaped by the outbreak of war in Sudan. The conflict led to a mass arrival of refugees in eastern Chad and, more broadly, posed significant risks to the stability of the country. The enormous influx of refugees into Chad further strained the limited assistance capacities in the Ouaddaï, Sila and Wadi Fira regions, triggering a large-scale humanitarian crisis in these areas, and negatively affecting the prices and availability of basic commodities. While most refugees remain in refugee camps in eastern Chad, some have begun to leave, intending to travel to northern Chad, Libya and Tunisia, often with the help of smugglers. The conflict initially reduced the number of Sudanese travelling to northern Chad, but movements picked up towards the end of the year. Human smuggling from western Chad, while less affected by the conflict in Sudan, continues to be suppressed, although there has been some relaxation of law enforcement efforts. Meanwhile, artisanal mining at the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield has flourished since its reopening in late 2022, with most operations now formalized. Efforts by the Société Nationale d’Exploitation Minière et de Contrôle (National Society for the Exploitation and Control of Mining – SONEMIC) to formalize and regulate activities caused tensions among gold miners, but security at the goldfield has reportedly improved. Mid-2023 also saw renewed rebel incursions into northern Chad and clashes between rebel groups and the Chadian military. However, pressure on rebel groups from the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in Libya and the surrender of significant numbers of rebels in northern Chad have weakened key groups such as the Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République (Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic – CCMSR) and the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for Change and Concord in Chad – FACT). As a result, the risk of rebel incursions into Chad, while not permanently eliminated, appears to be largely contained for the time being. Chad also entered the next phase of its transition process, preparing for the elections, which were held in May 2024. This was a crucial period for the transitional authorities to consolidate their power and credibility, given the high level of opposition to the largely controversial transition process. However, following a contested constitutional referendum in December 2023, which enshrined the principle of a unitary state pushed for by the transitional authorities, political violence escalated in early 2024. In February, following the announcement that presidential elections would be held on 6 May, a key opposition figure, Yaya Dillo Djérou, was killed by security forces amid clashes at the headquarters of his party, the Parti Socialiste sans Frontières (Socialist Party Without Borders – PSF).1 The Chadian government claimed that its forces were in fact involved in a shootout at the PSF’s headquarters, after an attack on government security forces the night before. This raised fears that there would be further violence and repression of opposition and civil society voices after the May elections. While the elections were in fact relatively peaceful, there are still ongoing concerns related to the contraction of civil society space and democratic process.

Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 37p..