By American Immigration Council

In recent months, leading politicians and policymakers have renewed calls for mass deportations of immigrants from the United States. While similar promises have been made in the past without coming to fruition—during the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, Donald Trump pledged to create a “deportation force” to round up undocumented immigrants —mass deportation now occupies a standing role in the rhetoric of leading immigration hawks. To cite just one example, former U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) director Tom Homan has promised “a historic deportation operation” should a hawkish administration return to power.While some plans have envisioned a one-time, massive operation designed to round up, detain, and deport the undocumented population en masse, others have envisioned starting from a baseline of one million deportations per year.

Given that in the modern immigration enforcement era the United States has never deported more than half a million immigrants per year—and many of those have been migrants apprehended trying to enter the U.S., not just those already living here—any mass deportation proposal raises obvious questions: how, exactly, would the United States possibly carry out the largest law enforcement operation in world history? And at what cost?

Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) along with publicly-available data about the current costs of immigration enforcement, this report aims to provide an estimation of what the fiscal and economic cost to the United States would be should the government deport a population of roughly 11 million people who as of 2022 lacked permanent legal status and faced the possibility of removal. We consider this both in terms of the direct budgetary costs—the expenses associated with arrest, detention, legal processing, and removal—that the federal government would have to pay, and in terms of the impact on the United States economy and tax base should these people be removed from the labor force and consumer market.

In terms of fiscal costs, we also include an estimate of the impact of deporting an additional 2.3 million people who have crossed the U.S. southern border without legal immigration status and were released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from January 2023 through April 2024. We consider these fiscal costs separately because we don’t have more recent ACS data necessary to estimate the total net changes in the undocumented population past 2022, or the larger impact on the economy and tax base of removing those people, an impact that is therefore not reflected in this report.

In total, we find that the cost of a one-time mass deportation operation aimed at both those populations—an estimated total of is at least $315 billion. We wish to emphasize that this figure is a highly conservative estimate. It does not take into account the long-term costs of a sustained mass deportation operation or the incalculable additional costs necessary to acquire the institutional capacity to remove over 13 million people in a short period of time—incalculable because there is simply no reality in which such a singular operation is possible. For one thing, there would be no way to accomplish this mission without mass detention as an interim step. To put the scale of detaining over 13 million undocumented immigrants into context, the entire U.S. prison and jail population in 2022, comprising every person held in local, county, state, and federal prisons and jails, was 1.9 million people.

In order to estimate the costs of a longer-term mass deportation operation, we calculated the cost of a program aiming to arrest, detain, process, and deport one million people per year—paralleling the more conservative proposals made by mass-deportation proponents. Even assuming that 20 percent of the undocumented population would “self-deport” under a yearslong mass-deportation regime, we estimate the ultimate cost of such a longer operation would average out to $88 billion annually, for a total cost of $967.9 billion over the course of more than a decade. This is a much higher sum than the one-time estimate, given the long-term costs of establishing and maintaining detention facilities and temporary camps to eventually be able to detain one million people at a time—costs that could not be modeled in a short-term analysis. This would require the United States to build and maintain 24 times more ICE detention capacity than currently exists. The government would also be required to establish and maintain over 1,000 new immigration courtrooms to process people at such a rate.

Even this estimate is likely quite conservative, as we were unable to estimate the additional hiring costs for the tens of thousands of agents needed to carry out one million arrests per year, the additional capital investments necessary to increase the ICE Air Operations fleet of charter aircraft to carry out one million annual deportations, and a myriad of other ancillary costs necessary to ramp up federal immigration enforcement operations to the scale necessary.

Some of the report’s key findings include:

• A multi-year mass deportation campaign, which would expand the infrastructure needed to arrest, detain, process, and remove one million undocumented immigrants per year, would cost $88 billion on average per year or a total of $967.9 billion.

• This operation would take over 10 years. For the same costs, the U.S. government could build 2.9 million new homes, pay full tuition and expenses for 8.9 million people to attend an in-state public college for four years or even increase annual worldwide funding for cancer research 18-fold for every year of the operation.

• Mass deportation would also deal a devastating blow to the U.S. economy, shrinking our GDP between 4.2 to 6.8%, and hit key industries already struggling with chronic labor shortages.

Washington, DC> American Immigration Council, 2024. 54p.

By United Nations Task Force on Children Deprived of Liberty

IMMIGRATION DETENTION, IS NEVER IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND CONSTITUTES A CHILD RIGHTS VIOLATION.

It is a form of violence that impacts a country’s capacity to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially targets 10.7 and 16.2.4,5 All children, regardless of their legal or migratory status or that of their families, have the right to be cared for and protected from violence, abuse and exploitation. At least 77 countries have laws and policies that allow children to be detained based on their legal or migratory status, and at least 330,000 children globally per year are deprived of their liberty based on their (or their parents’) legal or migratory status.6 Lack of accurate data means this is likely to be a significant under-estimate. While many countries have committed to end child immigration detention, the reality is that even in some countries where legislation does not support immigration detention, it continues to remain in use.7 In 2022, the United Nations Task Force on Children Deprived of Liberty8,9 under the leadership of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children, made a joint pledge10 at the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF):

1. To conduct evidence-based advocacy and to mobilize all key stakeholders at all levels to scale up child rights-based protective solutions to end the detention of children in the context of migration.

2. To support Member States to harmonize their national legal frameworks with international human rights standards to explicitly prohibit detention of children based on their migration status or that of their families.

3. To involve and amplify the voices of migrant children in determining their best interests in all issues concerning children in legislation, policies, practices, including those related to integration, return and family reunification; as well as access to services, to justice and to remedies for violations of their rights.

4. To support data collection and the dissemination of promising practices on child rights-based protective solutions as alternative measures to end the detention of children in the context of migration.
   This advocacy brief provides an overview of promising practices and lessons learned to end child immigration detention and sets out a range of policy actions needed to scale up efforts to end this form of violence

New York: UNICEF, 2024. 15p.

By Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner, Stephen Yale-Loehr, Kathleen Bush-Joseph and Christopher Levesque

With a backlog of nearly 2 million cases, the U.S. immigration court system is in crisis. Many cases now take years to adjudicate, with asylum seekers, for example, waiting four years on average for their initial hearing and longer for a final decision. Serious concerns have also been raised about the quality of court decisions.

These twin issues of caseload quantity and decision quality have wide-ranging roots, from long-standing operational challenges in the courts to new crises in the Americas that have intensified humanitarian protection needs and other migration pressures. The courts' dysfunction has had severe knock-on effects for other parts of the nation’s immigration infrastructure, including notably the immigration enforcement and asylum systems.

This report takes stock of the many challenges facing the immigration courts and outlines recommendations that would advance the goal of delivering decisions that are both timely and fair. It explores issues including court caseload and personnel levels, docket management strategies, the use of technology in the courts, and access to representation. Importantly, the report focuses on changes that can be accomplished administratively—a necessity in a time when Congress has proven itself unlikely to tackle significant immigration matters.

Washington, DC:Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 51p.

By The United States Government Accountability Office; Rebecca Gambler, et al.

In fiscal year 2021, Border Patrol reported about 1.7 million apprehensions of noncitizens between ports of entry—a 300 percent increase over fiscal year 2020. This included approximately 451,000 apprehensions of family unit members. Compounding this increase were continued concerns related to COVID-19 and physical distancing protocols that imposed space limitations on facilities. To address these concerns and reduce time in custody, Border Patrol and ICE initiated two new processes in 2021, referred to as NTR and parole plus ATD. Border Patrol released family units into the U.S. without first issuing them a charging document—generally a Notice to Appear—which places them into immigration court removal proceedings. Instead, Border Patrol instructed them to report to an ICE field office. ICE officials are to further process family unit members who report to field offices, such as issuing them a Notice to Appear. GAO was asked to review Border Patrol’s and ICE’s implementation of the NTR and parole plus ATD processes. This report describes (1) Border Patrol and ICE implementation of the NTR and parole plus ATD processes, and (2) ICE’s efforts to initiate removal proceedings for family unit members processed with NTRs or under parole plus ATD. GAO analyzed Border Patrol and ICE policies, guidance, and data on individuals processed with an NTR or under parole plus ATD and who reported to ICE as required. GAO also interviewed officials in Border Patrol and ICE headquarters and selected field locations.

Washington, DC: GAO, 2022. 58p.

By Christopher Levesque , Jack DeWaard, Linus Chan, Michele Garnett McKenzie, Kazumi Tsuchiya, Olivia Toles, Amy Lange, Kim Horner, Eric Ryu and Elizabeth Heger Boyle

Examining what we call “crimmigrating narratives,” we show that US immigration court criminalizes non-citizens, cements forms of social control, and dispenses punishment in a non-punitive legal setting. Building on theories of crimmigration and a sociology of narrative, we code, categorize, and describe third-party observations of detained immigration court hearings conducted in Fort Snelling, Minnesota, from July 2018 to June 2019. We identify and investigate structural factors of three key crimmigrating narratives in the courtroom: one based on threats (stories of the non-citizen’s criminal history and perceived danger to society), a second involving deservingness (stories of the non-citizen’s social ties, hardship, and belonging in the United States), and a third pertaining to their status as “impossible subjects” (stories rendering non-citizens “illegal,” categorically excludable, and contradictory to the law). Findings demonstrate that the courts’ prioritization of these three narratives disconnects detainees from their own socially organized experience and prevents them from fully engaging in the immigration court process. In closing, we discuss the potential implications of crimmigrating narratives for the US immigration legal system and non-citizen status.

Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , May 2023 , pp. 407 - 436

By Kim Voss, Fabiana Silva & Irene Bloemraad

Activists do not just ‘name’ problems faced by migrants; they ‘frame’ them, constructing a particular meaning of the social world. Activists in the United States are especially likely to use rights language. Some appeal to human rights; others call on the history and resonance of civil rights. Those who contest immigrant inclusion often instead evoke ‘American values’. Are these competing frames persuasive? Drawing on a survey experiment of California voters, we examine whether these frames affect support for undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens in need. We find that although respondents agree that food insecurity, sexual harassment, and inadequate health care violate the human rights of citizens and noncitizens equally, a human rights frame does not equalise support for government action to address the situation. Indeed, overall, respondents are much less supportive of government action for undocumented immigrants than citizens; neither rights nor value frames mitigate this inequality. The civil rights frame, relative to the American values frame, actually decreases respondents’ support for government action, for citizens and noncitizens alike. The type of hardship also matters: in scenarios concerning sexual harassment, legal status is not a barrier to claims-making. These findings reveal some limits of rights language for mobilisation around immigration.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2019.

By Valeria Gomez

Using the procedural due process framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, I argue that the current geographic distribution of immigration courts violates respondents’ rights to procedural due process by inhibiting their ability to appear, present evidence, and secure counsel. In so doing, I highlight the detrimental effects that geography has on remote communities, such as their ability to build pipelines towards access to counsel. Finally, I weigh and propose alternative solutions that balance the government’s interests in efficiency with the respondents’ interests in having a meaningful opportunity to avoid the harsh consequences of deportation.

Wisconsin Law Review, 2023. 45p.

By Donald Kerwin and Evin Millet

The US immigration court system seeks to “fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly administer and interpret US immigration laws” (DOJ 2022a). It represents the first exposure of many immigrants to due process and the rule of law in the United States, and occupies an integral role in the larger US immigration system. Yet it labors under a massive backlog of pending cases that undermines its core goals and objectives. The backlog reached 1.87 million cases in the first quarter of FY 2023 (Straut-Eppsteiner 2023, 6). This paper attributes the backlog to systemic failures in the broader immigration system that negatively affect the immigration courts, such as:

• Visa backlogs, United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) application processing delays, and other bottlenecks in legal immigration processes.

• The immense disparity in funding between the court system and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that feed cases into the courts.

• The failure of Congress to pass broad immigration reform legislation that could ease pressure on the enforcement and court systems.

• The lack of standard judicial authorities vested in Immigration Judges (IJs), limiting their ability to close cases; pressure parties to “settle” cases; and manage their dockets.

• The absence of a statute of limitations for civil immigration offenses.

• Past DHS failures to establish and adhere to enforcement priorities and to exercise prosecutorial discretion (PD) throughout the removal adjudication process, including in initial decisions to prosecute.

• The location of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which oversees US immigration courts, within the nation’s preeminent law enforcement agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ).

• The misconception of many policymakers that the court system should primarily serve as an adjunct to DHS.

• A past record of temporary judge reassignments and government shutdowns.

The paper supports a well-resourced and independent immigration court system devoted to producing the right decisions under the law. Following a short introduction, a long section on “Causes and Solutions to the Backlog” examines the multi-faceted causes of the backlog, and offers an integrated, wide-ranging set of recommendations to reverse and ultimately eliminate the backlog. The “Conclusion” summarizes the paper’s topline findings and policy proposals.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityOnlineFirst, May 25, 2023

By Kevin Fredy Hinterberge

‘Combatting’ irregular migration is one of the key challenges to migration management at EU level. The present book addresses one of the most pressing structural problems regarding the EU’s return policy: the low return rate of irregularly staying migrants. In this regard the EU Return Directive obliges Member States to issue a return decision, yet only 40% of such decisions are enforced annually. Moreover, despite the political and legal efforts, the EU is not making any significant progress in enforcing the rules it has laid down in the Return Directive. The legislation of EU Member States may, however, serve as a source for possible solutions to ‘combat’ the problem of irregularly staying migrants. This is why the book compares the system of regularisations in Austria, Germany and Spain. Regularisations constitute an effective alternative to returns because they terminate the irregular residence of migrants, not through deportation, but rather by granting a right of residence. Regularisation is therefore understood as each legal decision that awards legal residency to irregularly staying migrants. As is shown by the examination and comparison of regularisations in Austria, Germany and Spain, differentiated systems of regularisation exist at national level. However, EU regularisations supplementing the present return policy would be more effective at ‘combatting’ irregular migration at EU level.

 Baden-Baden: Nomos; Hart Publishing, 2023. 398p.

By Evan J. Criddle

For generations, the United States has grappled with high levels of illegal immigration across the U.S.-Mexico border. This Article offers a novel theoretical framework to explain why legal order remains elusive at the border. Drawing inspiration from Lon Fuller’s “interactional view of law,” I argue that immigration law cannot attract compliance unless it is general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, and stable; obedience with its rules is feasible; and the law’s enforcement is congruent with the rules as enacted. The flagrant violation of any one of these principles could frustrate the development of a functional legal order. Remarkably, U.S. immigration law violates all of these principles in its treatment of asylum seekers. As the number of asylum seekers pursuing entry to the United States has risen sharply in recent years, these legality deficits have become increasingly salient. No wonder, then, that even the most aggressive deterrent measures — from mass prosecution to family separation to the construction of steel border walls — have failed to solve the United States’ border crisis. The United States faces an urgent dilemma: it may preserve the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) in its current form, denying protection to too many forced migrants and reserving broad discretion to the Executive Branch, or it may establish a functional legal order at the border. It cannot have both.

If lawmakers were serious about establishing legal order at the border, there are measures they could take to strengthen the immigration system’s structural integrity. They could eliminate the Attorney General’s discretionary authority over asylum. They could clarify ambiguities in the INA to promote greater consistency, stability, and congruence in immigration adjudication and enforcement. They could extend protection to all forced migrants who face a serious risk of death, torture, rape, or other serious harm abroad, including victims of gang violence and gender-based violence. In short, they could enact laws that asylum seekers could rationally obey. To the extent that lawmakers are unwilling to take these steps, it is fair to question their commitment to establishing a functional legal order at the border.

UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 53; 2003.

By Rebecca Gambler; et al.

Each year, EOIR issues decisions for hundreds of thousands of cases of foreign nationals charged as removable under U.S. immigration law. EOIR is facing a significant and growing backlog of cases pending before the immigration courts. At the start of fiscal year 2023, EOIR’s backlog was about 1.8 million pending cases—more than triple the number of pending cases at the start of fiscal year 2017. In 2017, GAO reported on EOIR’s management practices, including how it manages and oversees workforce planning and immigration judge hiring. GAO was asked to review various EOIR management functions, including actions taken since GAO’s 2017 report. This report assesses, among other things, EOIR’s (1) workforce planning practices; (2) judge performance appraisal program; and (3) policies and procedures for reporting quality data to the public. GAO analyzed EOIR staffing data from fiscal years 2017 through 2022—the most current data available. GAO reviewed EOIR documentation and interviewed officials from headquarters and four immigration courts selected to include different caseloads, among other factors. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations to improve, among other things, EOIR’s workforce planning, judge performance appraisal program management, and data quality practices. EOIR identified ongoing and planned steps to address these recommendations.   

Washington, DC: GAO, 2023. 61p.  

By Tom K. Wong, Karina Shklyan, Anna Isorena and Stephanie Peng

How does interior immigration enforcement affect the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants? Although there is some evidence that points to a broad range of “chilling effects” that result when local law enforcement officials work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on federal immigration enforcement, the academic literature is surprisingly sparse. In this study, we embedded an experiment in a survey (n = 594) drawn from a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants in order to better understand how the behaviors of undocumented immigrants are affected when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement. When respondents are told that local law enforcement officials are working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, they are 60.8 percent less likely to report crimes they witness to the police, 42.9 percent less likely to report crimes they are victims of to the police, 69.6 percent less likely to use public services that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, 63.9 percent less likely to do business that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, and are even 68.3 percent less likely to participate in public events where the police may be present, among other findings.

La Jolla, CA: U.S. Immigration Policy Center, University of San Diego, 2019. 24p.