By David B. Wilson, Mark W. Lipsey

Research summary

The primary outcome desired for juvenile delinquency programs is the cessation of delinquent and related problematic behaviors. However, this outcome is almost always pursued by attempting to change intermediate outcomes, such as family functioning, improved mental health, or peer relations. We can conceptualize intermediate outcomes that are related to reduced delinquency as change levers for effective intervention. A large meta-analysis identified several school-related change levers, including school engagement (i.e., improved attendance and reduced truancy), nondelinquent problem behaviors, and attitudes about school and teachers. In addition, family functioning and reducing substance use were also effective change levers. In contrast, effects on youth getting/keeping a job, peer relationships, and academic achievement were not associated with reduced delinquency.

Policy implications

Only a small percentage of rehabilitative programs provided to youth involved in the juvenile justice system have been established as evidence based. Moreover, there are constraints on what local policy makers and practitioners can do regarding the selection, adoption, and implementation of programs from the available lists of evidence-based programs. Adopting programs that focus on effective change levers and avoiding those that concentrate on ineffective ones has the potential to increase the likelihood that a local agency is engaged in effective programming. Based on our data, programs known to improve family functioning, attachment to and involvement in schooling, and reducing substance use are justified by the change lever evidence, even if these programs’ effectiveness in reducing delinquency has not been directly proven. In contrast, programs focusing on vocational skills, academic achievement, and peer relations are less likely to be beneficial. Furthermore, a change lever perspective can help frontline staff select appropriate programs for different juvenile offenders and focus their quality control efforts on those aspects of a program that are likely to be essential to maintaining effectiveness.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume23, Issue2. May 2024.

By InSight Crime

President Maduro’s plan to help governors fund their states by gifting them each a gold mine soon ran into trouble. In the sprawling state of Bolívar, this led to immediate conflict. The criminal gangs that ran Venezuela’s mining heartland would never surrender. One group, in particular, has led the resistance. On November 5, 2019, threatening pamphlets appeared on the streets of El Callao, a mining town in Venezuela›s eastern state of Bolívar. The town was already on edge. A week before, a severed head was found on a road in El Callao. The pamphlets contained a message from a local gang leader, Alejandro Rafael Ochoa Sequea, alias “Toto,” to the municipal mayor, Alberto Hurtado. “You handed over your land to the government,” they read. “Resign, you have 48 hours to pack your bags because there is going to be more death, and if you don’t go, I’m coming for your head.” That night, armed men on motorbikes raced around the streets, firing off their weapons and setting off a grenade. This investigation exposes how the Maduro regime’s attempts to control Venezuela’s mining heartland in the state of Bolívar has led to criminal chaos, as guerrilla groups, heavily armed gangs and corrupt state elements battle over the country’s gold. Toto’s message and his gang’s terror campaign came shortly after President Nicolás Maduro had announced an unusual new policy: He would give each state governor a gold mine to help fund their administrations. There was one problem. Bolívar’s gold mines were controlled by brutal criminal gangs known as sindicatos (unions). And the sindicatos such as Toto’s had no intention of giving up the mines without a fight.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2021. 31p.

By Scott H. Decker

This study identified and analyzed convergence and differences between gang membership and terrorist groups, with attention to organizational structure, group process, the use of social media, and imprisonment in the process of radicalization.

After identifying points of convergence and differences between terrorist groups and gangs, this review of relevant literature found little evidence that American street gangs are becoming increasingly radicalized or that their members are being actively recruited by terrorist groups. Most gang members are characterized by the lack of a political or religious orientation. … Prison is a place to look for signs of radicalization among gang members into terrorist commitments; however, while in prison, street-gang members tend to affiliate with prison gangs largely along racial and ethnic lines influenced by criminal codes, not religious or political ideologies that advocate ideologically based violence.

El Paso, TX: Center for Law & Human Behavior, The University of Texas at El Paso, 2016. 111p.