By Diogo Britto, Paolo Pinotti, Breno Sampaio

We investigate the effect of job loss and unemployment benefits on criminal behavior, exploiting individual-level data on the universe of workers and criminal cases in Brazil over the 2009-2017 period. We match workers displaced upon plausibly exogenous mass layoffs with observationally-equivalent control groups to identify dynamic treatment effects of job loss while allowing for treatment effect heterogeneity. In our preferred specification, the probability of criminal prosecution increases by 23% upon job loss and remains approximately constant during the following years. Our unusually large dataset allows us to precisely estimate increases in almost all types of crimes - including offenses with no economic motivation - as well as spillover effects on other household members. The estimated effects remain robust when restricting to arrests "in flagrante", which are less subject to differential reporting by employment status. We then evaluate the mitigating effect of unemployment benefits leveraging on discontinuous changes in eligibility. Regression discontinuity estimates suggest that unemployment benefits covering 3 to 5 months after displacement completely offset potential crime increases upon job loss, especially for liquidity-constrained individuals, although this effect completely vanishes upon benefit expiration. Our findings point at liquidity constraints and psychological stress as main drivers of criminal behavior upon job loss, while substitution between time on the job and leisure does not seem to play an important role.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2020. 77p.

By Guillermo Vázquez del Mercado, Luis Félix and Gerardo Carballo

Extortion is one of the main crimes that negatively affect citizen security in the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador) and, to a lesser extent, Costa Rica and Panama. Given the widespread presence of this crime in the region, the availability, relevance and reliability of data on extortion are essential to understand its magnitude, as well as to develop evidence-based public policies to contain it and build community resilience. However, unlike for other crimes such as homicides, public institutions in the countries of the region have not yet developed a specific methodology to collect, produce and disseminate up-to-date, reliable, relevant and high-quality data on extortion. This shortcoming hampers the analysis and research needed to measure the real magnitude of this crime and to generate evidence-based public policies. Furthermore, the dynamics of cooperation and territorial disputes between organized crime groups and the lack of knowledge about the variables involved in establishing an extortion rate are additional factors that merit further investigation, as they make it difficult for public institutions to measure extortion.1 This report analyzes the availability of public data on extortion and the transparency mechanisms for accessing it. To do so, the authors reviewed the availability and accessibility of data on extortion from official sources in the countries concerned, particularly the websites of national police forces and prosecutors' offices.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021.

By R. Evan Ellis

With its 128 million people and GDP of $1.26 trillion, Mexico is strongly connected to the United States through geography, commerce, and family. What happens in Mexico directly affects the security and prosperity of the United States, and vice versa. Mexico, not China, is the United States’ largest trading partner, with $614 billion in bilateral commerce in 2019. That interchange is now reinforced by the implementation of the United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA), which feeds and is fed by enormous U.S. investment—$101 billion in 2019, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Those commercial ties sustain the presence of 1.5 million U.S. citizens living in Mexico. The performance of the Mexican economy, local conditions, and the effectiveness of its governance thus affect American jobs, investment, security, and lives. Beyond commerce, activities related to illegal drugs—ranging from the movement of cocaine to the production of opioids and synthetics to the distribution of fentanyl (although originating in China)—involve, at least in part, Mexico-based drug gangs and Mexican territory, just as Mexicans are victimized by weapons illegally smuggled into the country from the United States. The United States depends substantially on the efforts by and cooperation with the Mexican military and law enforcement to help combat narcotraffickers and organized crime in all of its forms.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020. 11p.

By Norbert Elias.

The Civilizing Process stands out as Norbert Elias' greatest work, tracing the 'civilizing' of manners and personality in Western Europe since the Middle Ages, and showing how this was related to the formation of states and the monopolization of power within them. It comprises the two volumes originally published in English as The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization, now, in a single volume, the book is restored to its original format and made available world-wide to a new generation of readers.

NY. Pantheon (1978) 325p. CONTAINS MARK-UP

By Hayden Crosby

Right-wing extremism has been the subject of many studies over the years, especially in contemporary times in which many commentators have argued there is a global resurgence in support for the extreme-right. Despite this, very few studies have been conducted on the extreme-right in New Zealand and previous studies are very outdated. Of the international studies that have been conducted on right-wing extremism only a small minority are empirically based as most scholars prefer to avoid the many challenges and difficulties which accompany empirical inquiry in the subject. Furthermore, only a minority of previous empirical studies have focused on lives of the individuals who come to join the extreme-right. This thesis examines why and how individuals come to join extreme-right groups, what motivates them to stay within these groups, and why many of them eventually come to leave. These questions were investigated by conducting a qualitative method of inquiry into the life histories of six former New Zealand right-wing extremists. A number of social factors were identified as having influenced the participants to join, stay within, and eventually leave extreme-right groups in New Zealand. These social factors were not uniform across all the participants who were also determined to be generally influenced by a combination of factors rather any singular factor. The influencing affect that these social factors had on the participants can be understood with several theoretical explanations which were applied to the findings. Furthermore, the study gave rise to some new theoretical ideas which can improve upon how involvement in right-wing extremism is understood and aid future inquiry into the subject. Overall the study enhances our understanding of individual involvement in right-wing extremism and provides insight into the extreme-right scene in New Zealand.

Auckland, NZ: University of Auckland, 2017. 170p.

By George Washington University, Program on Extremism

This report evaluates violent extremism inspired by or connected to the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement. Black Hebrew Israelites ascribe to the idea that modern-day African Americans are the descendants of the Israelites in the Old Testament of the Bible. However, an extremist fringe within the movement takes this idea one step further, arguing that white Europeans are the descendants of Satan and that white Jews are impostors. Situating the role of extremist interpretations of BHI ideology within domestic violent extremist incidents during the past several years, this report finds: ● Like other domestic violent extremist movements in the contemporary American landscape, Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremism has undergone a transformation over the past twenty years. The predominant threat today is from individuals loosely affiliated with or inspired by the movement rather than by groups, organizations, or institutions. ● Today’s violent extremists with a nexus to Black Hebrew Israelite extremism are usually not formal participants in any Black Hebrew Israelite organization, church, or group. They usually interpolate aspects of Black Hebrew Israelite ideology—particularly the idea that white Jews are impostors—into a personally-curated mix of viewpoints and ideologies that inspire violence. ● Despite ongoing controversy about how to classify domestic violent extremists who are motivated by racial ideologies but are not white supremacists, the “racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism” (RMVE) category used by federal law enforcement in the U.S. remains an apt descriptor for Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremists. ● Using the RMVE label for Black Hebrew Israelites yields important comparisons between this movement and other RMVE actors, particularly white supremacist violent extremists. Notably, Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremists and their white supremacist counterparts often share similar ideologies and core conspiracy theories, are examples of the role of religious ideas in domestic violent extremist movements, and often choose similar targets for attacks due to their mutual anti-Semitism.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 21p.

By Stuart Macdonald, Kamil Yilmaz, Chamin Herath, J.M. Berger, Suraj Lakhani, Lella Nouri, & Maura Conway

Focus on violent and non-violent activities and content in online spaces has yielded valuable insights into the evolution of extremist exploitation of social media and the internet. Over the past decade, much attention has been dedicated to understanding jihadist—particularly the so-called Islamic State’s—use of popular social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps to spread propaganda and entice followers. In recent years, however, attention to far-right extremist exploitation of online spaces has been growing. 1: As Conway, Scrivens, and Macnair have comprehensively documented, 2: right-wing extremist (a subset of the broader far-right) online communities have a lengthy history, transitioning from dial-up bulletin board systems; to static websites and online forums; to social media platforms, messaging and other communication “apps.” While far-right online communities were and still are largely decentralized, these communities can be considered loosely interconnected, their online interdependence tracing back to the “hot-links” page on the original Stormfront internet forum where outlinks to like-minded websites and forums were posted. Far-right, including right-wing extremist, online communities have since been described as an “ecosystem,” consisting of various types of online spaces or “entities” (e.g., websites, social media platforms). 3: Still, the actual extent to which these networks are interdependent or overlapping, as opposed to largely insulated groupings, platforms, and activities, remains to be fully interrogated. Doing so requires more localized research efforts, focused on identifying the nature of content shared and platforms used in far-right communities and ecosystems online to more fully examine interconnections between them.

Resolve Network, 2022. 48p.

By Maura Conway, Ryan Scrivens, Logan Macnair

This policy brief traces how Western right-wing extremists have exploited the power of the internet from early dial-up bulletin board systems to contemporary social media and messaging apps. It demonstrates how the extreme right has been quick to adopt a variety of emerging online tools, not only to connect with the like-minded, but to radicalise some audiences while intimidating others, and ultimately to recruit new members, some of whom have engaged in hate crimes and/or terrorism. Highlighted throughout is the fast pace of change of both the internet and its associated platforms and technologies, on the one hand, and the extreme right, on the other, as well as how these have interacted and evolved over time. Underlined too is the persistence, despite these changes, of rightwing extremists’ online presence, which poses challenges for effectively responding to this activity moving forward.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 24p.

By Beka Parsadanishvili, Ana Leladze

Recent events in Georgia - including the acts of violence committed against media representatives in July 2021 at a street rally organised by Georgian far-right groups and the arrest of 5 young people upon charges of joining a terrorist organisation in the Pankisi Gorge on 24 August - indicate that not only is violent extremism actively disseminated in the territory of Georgia, but it also endangers the national security architecture. This research report provides a detailed description of the key characteristics of the jihadist and far-right narratives disseminated in Georgia. It is noteworthy that this document does not study far-left narrative as it has been less violent and fairly infrequent in Georgia. In order to study violent extremist narrative disseminated in the territory of Georgia, semi-structured interviews were conducted with subject-matter experts, content and language of the disseminated narrative were intensively studied through qualitative and quantitative, relevant literature as well as secondary and tertiary data were researched and processed.

Tbilisi; Georgian Center for Strategy and Development, 2022. 74p.

By Manuela Brunero, Matthew Burnett Stuart, Olivier Guiryanan, Danielle Hull, Alice Robert

The report Perceptions of climate change and violent extremism: Listening to local communities in Chad has been produced by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in partnership with SWISSAID. Building upon UNICRI’s previous research it explores the lived experiences of community members and their perceptions on the role climate change and degradation of natural resources have in exacerbating local conflicts, as well as the impact of climate change on violent extremist groups’ recruitment narratives. The research is based on primary data collected through more than 100 in-depth interviews across four provinces of Chad — Hadjer-Lamis, Lac, Logone Occidentale and Mandoul. The report specifically analyses the effects of climate change at two interconnected levels: the direct consequences as experienced on productive activities such as agriculture, herding, and fishing, and the indirect consequences affecting coping mechanisms, social cohesion, and recruitment and propaganda by violent extremist groups. In doing so, this initiative elevates the often unheard voices of those most vulnerable and directly affected by the dual interacting threats of climate change and violent extremism. This report represents a crucial preliminary step in laying the groundwork for further research and for the development of local initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism that take into consideration overlapping climate and security challenges.

Torino, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2022. 104p.

By The Small Arms Survey; Nicolas Florquin, Hafez S. AbuAdwan, Gergely Hideg and Alaa Tartir

The Sahel is home to a number of marginalized borderlands—such as Libya’s southern border region—characterized by the movement and activities of various armed groups, the absence of strong state institutions, and the prevalence of disparaged communities. Potentially, the combination of these factors makes the subregion more exposed to risk and individuals raised in such borderlands can be especially vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups.

Perceptions, Vulnerabilities, and Prevention: Violent Extremism Threat Assessment in Selected Regions of the Southern Libyan Borderlands and North-Western Nigeria—a report by the Small Arms Survey's SANA project and UNDP—seeks to better understand the dynamics of these risk factors in southern Libya and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Sudan, as well as Nigeria.

The report finds that hardship and deprivation, the combination of discrimination and marginalization along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, and a comparatively limited access to basic services, are of particular concern from a prevention of violent extremism (PVE) perspective. The report also notes that perceptions of small arms varied significantly across the case studies, with respondents in Nigeria and Sudan reporting the highest levels of proliferation. The sources of weapons cited by respondents included the illegal market, the legal market, craft production, inheritance, state authorities, and employers.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey; New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2022. 138p.

By Anthony Wayne IV Fontes

Everyday brutality in Guatemala City shocks and numbs a society that has suffered generations of war and bloodshed. Much of this violence is blamed on maras, gangs bearing transnational signs and symbols, that operate in prisons an poor urban communities. I will explore how the maras’ evolution in post-war Guatemala has made them what they are today: victim-perpetrators of massive and horrifying violence, useful targets of societal rage, pivotal figures in a politics of death reigning over post-war society. However, while maras and mareros play starring roles in this account of extreme peacetime violence, they are not the problem. They are a hyper-visible expression of a problem no one can name, a deafening scream, a smokescreen obscuring innumerable and diffuse sources of everyday brutality. The maras will be my entry-point into a world defined by mortal doubt, and my guides as I navigate the rumors, fantasies, fears, and trauma swirling about criminal violence in post-war Guatemala City.

• More.....

  The specter of violence has become so utterly entwined with the making of lived and symbolic landscapes that it cannot be extricated from the very fibers of everyday life. I will illuminate the myriad of spaces this violence infiltrates and reorders to expose the existential uncertainty haunting efforts to confront, contain, and overcome violence. In the process, I provide an alternative, intimate understanding of the violence and suffering for which maras speak, or are made to speak, and the ways this violence and suffering affects individual consciousness and communal life, orders urban space, and circulates in public discourse. Thus, I have arranged my arguments and stories in such a way as to capture the destabilizing psychological, affective, and visceral impact the conditions of extreme violation at work in post-war Guatemala City have on knowledge- and meaning-making. The veins of uncertainty fracturing this account are meant to rupture the pretense of knowing, and so break through into the treacherous and largely unmapped territory that is life lived in the shadow of constant violence.

Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, 2015. 222p.

By Katrine Rummelhoff

This thesis addresses the, now infamous, incel community. The term Incel is an abbreviation of “involuntary celibate”, and is defined by the incel community, as a person who desires, but is unable to obtain a romantic or sexual relationship. Over the last decade incels have gained notoriety due to the unabashed misogynistic rhetoric that is cultivated within the online communities they have created for themselves. Additionally several mass killers have been linked to the group, and as a whole the community is said to be responsible for a death toll of over 47. As such incels have been designated a domestic terrorism thereat by, among others, International Center for Counter Terrorism and The Texas Department of Public Safety. Yet, there is still much that remains unknown about incels and the online world they have created for themselves. In order to broaden this understanding I have performed a netnographic (Kozinets 2010, 2015) study of the website incels.co, an international forum site exclusively catering to self-proclaimed incels, and dedicated to the discussion of inceldom. Through daily observation of the site and an analysis of over 100 forum threads I have tried to determine the overarching values, beliefs, worldviews, and ideologies present within their discourse. Further, this study attempts to create an understanding of the appeal this community has to its members. The material collected in this study is first placed within its historical, cultural and material context, in order to understand the circumstances surrounding the resurgence of male supremacist ideology in online spaces. Subsequently the data from incels.co is analyzed using political, sociological and psychological theories on radicalization, evaluating the claim made by others that incel terrorism is a growing threat. Findings indicate however, that although the incels.co community is engaging in a radicalization of beliefs there is insufficient evidence to support a radicalization of behaviors. To make sense of the structure and organization that facilitates the radicalization of beliefs, the incels.co community is then examined through a subcultural lens. Finding that the site offers a succinct sense of subcultural belonging, providing a community of shared identity, shared meanings, countercultural values, and guidelines and justifications for behavior. Yet, it is also apparent that the notion of involuntary celibacy extends beyond this subculture, and as such I make the claim that not all incels are subcultural, but that a distinct incel subculture exists. Lastly, this study looks at the collectivist aspects of the incel community and makes the claim that incels.co functions as a platform for extremist beliefs to be cultivated and subsequently internalized by its users. With the help of Interaction Ritual Theory (Collins 2004) the interplay performed online is seen as a ritual engagement, where users will entrain around central ideas and objects, resulting in an experience of collective effervescence, emotional energy and group solidarity. Through such collective focus, ideas, beliefs, moral codes, myths and sacred objects pertaining to women, social hierarchies, and sexuality are cultivated and become part of the groups’ social reality. Overall, this thesis uses theories on radicalization, subculture and interaction ritual in order to make the claim that the incels.co platform is hosting an extremist collectivist subculture that experiences radicalization through a collective entrainment around sacred objects. In doing so this thesis provides new dimensions to work on radicalization as it places an emphasis on shared and collective processes in the cultivation of radical and extremist beliefs.

Oslo: University of Oslo, 2020. 101p.

By John D. Gallacher and Jonathan Bright

Online hate speech is a growing concern, with minorities and vulnerable groups increasingly targeted with extreme denigration and hostility. The drivers of hate speech expression on social media are unclear, however. This study explores how hate speech develops on a fringe social media platform popular with the far-right, Gab. We investigate whether users seek out this platform in order to express hate, or whether instead they develop these opinions over time through a mechanism of socialisation, as they interact with other users on the platform. We find a positive association between the time users spend on the platform and their hate speech expression. We show that while some users do arrive on these platforms with pre-existing hate stances, others develop these expressions as they get exposed to the hateful opinions of others. Our analysis reveals how hate speech develops online, the important role of the group environment in accelerating its development, and gives valuable insight to inform the development of counter measures.

Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, Oxford Internet Institute, 2021. 47p.

By Stanford Law School and Policy Lab and Brennan Center for Justice

Even before racist political rhetoric around the coronavirus triggered a wave of hate crimes against Asian Americans, white supremacist incidents around the country had fueled a vigorous public debate about the proper responses to hate violence.In March 2020, Stanford Law School and the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School hosted a convening of experts in the fields of criminal law, civil rights, community advocacy, and restorative justice to assess the current hate crime enforcement model and explore alternative approaches that could more effectively redress the harm resulting from hate crimes.

Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Law School; New York: Brennan Center for Justice. 2021. 52p.

By Keir Monteith K, et al.

As Bobb-Semple highlights, the entrenched racism of the British establishment did not disappear post emancipation. Judicial racism in the criminal courts is pronounced when looking at sentencing practices. The Lammy Review comprehensively lays bare this truth, reporting the results of a 2016 Ministry of Justice review of Crown Court sentencing for three groups of offences – offences involving acquisitive violence, sexual offences and drugs offences. Confirming what many in affected communities had long since suspected, this review found that “[u]nder similar criminal circumstances the odds of imprisonment for offenders from self-reported Black, Asian, and Chinese or other backgrounds were higher than for offenders from selfreported White backgrounds.” Starkly, it also found that “[w]ithin drug offences, the odds of receiving a prison sentence were around 240% higher for BAME offenders, compared to White offenders.” The systemic inequality and biases in the legal profession are reflected in the make-up of our judiciary. Nationally, only 1% of judges are Black, while 5% are Asian and 2% are mixed ethnicity and 1% were individuals with ethnicity other than Asian, black, mixed or white.5 And there is a big difference: between the junior and senior judiciary. While the junior judiciary is slowly diversifying - I stress slowly - the senior judiciary is not, and remains overwhelmingly white, and overwhelmingly from privileged backgrounds. In fact, there are currently no Black judges in the High Court, Court of Appeal or Supreme Court. Not one.

2022. 40p.

By Michele St-Amant, David Jones, Michael King, & John McCoy

There have been significant changes in the three years since the Organization for the Prevention of Violence (OPV) published its first report about hate-motivated violence, extremism and terrorism in Alberta, Building Awareness, Seeking Solutions. The Covid-19 pandemic, protests against public health measures, tense elections in the United States, and the backlash to racial justice movements, among other events, have had broad social repercussions. Some of which have changed the composition and scale of the threat of extremism and terrorism – which has become more diffuse and comprised of a broader set of grievances and ideologies.

This report is organized using the nomenclature developed by the Government of Canada to categorize different forms of extremist ideologies. As such, the findings related to ideologically motivated violent extremism and religiously motivated violent extremism are summarized first.i Next, we summarize our findings about conspiracy theories and hate incidents, including crimes, within Alberta and across Canada.

Alberta: Organization for the Prevention of Violence, 2022. 115p.

By Umar Butler

This report, commissioned by the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV), argues that the failure of social media platforms to improve their demonstrably ineffectual systems for the review of hateful material, coupled with the grave harms of online Islamophobia, necessitates government intervention.

While there are a number of competing approaches to the regulation of social media, the ICV’s preference is to reform the systems that have enabled and, indeed, at times encouraged the widespread and unchecked dissemination of hate speech, rather than attempt the practically impossible task of taking down hundreds of millions of individual pieces of anti-Muslim content.

To implement this approach, the ICV proposes that Australia place a statutory duty on platforms to take reasonable care to protect users from harm (the ‘eSafety duty of care’), similar to the regime set to be established by the UK’s Online Safety Bill 2021. Regardless of the particular regulatory response taken, however, this report makes clear that something must be done. If not to improve the mental wellbeing of Muslim users, then at least to ensure that the events of the Christchurch attacks are never repeated.

Melbourne:Islamic Council of Victoria, 2022. 23p.

By Beverly Powis, Louise Dison and Jessica Woodhams

Understanding the nature and drivers of prison groups and gangs and the impact they can both have on the prison environment is important for the management of establishments, safety of staff and prisoners and also for offender rehabilitation. The few UK studies exploring prison gangs suggest there is some gang presence but perhaps not to the same extent as that found in the US, where prison gangs are highly structured and organised with considerable control over the prison. Research in an English high security prison showed that Muslim gangs, formed for criminal purposes, can present both a management challenge due to criminal behaviour and also sometimes through the risk of radicalisation. However, prisoners who form into friendship groups for support, companionship and through shared interests should not be confused with gangs formed for criminal purposes. It is therefore important to understand the differences between prison group and gangs and distinguish between them. This study aims to further our knowledge in this area by defining and describing prisoner groups, exploring the presence and nature of prison gangs and the impact they have on prison life within three High Security prisons in England. A qualitative approach was used with interviews being conducted with 83 randomly selected adult male prisoners located on the main wings and 73 staff from a range of disciplines across the three establishments. Interviews were analysed using thematic analysis that was both inductive and deductive. The findings should be viewed with a degree of cautions as the views presented may not be representative of all prisoners or staff.

London: UK Ministry of Justice, 2019. 22p.

By Americans for Responsible Solutions Foundation; Law Center for Prevent Gun Violence

The evidence is clear: firearm access contributes greatly to suicide rates, with guns accounting for nearly half of all suicide deaths but just 5% of suicide attempts. As dispiriting as this statistic may be, beneath it lies hope—by taking steps to prevent suicidal people from accessing guns, the most lethal means of suicide, we can make a lifesaving difference. The solutions are already there. We just have to implement them. Confronting the Inevitability Myth represents the culmination of a yearlong project by the attorneys at the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence to study and analyze suicide in America. We took a hard look at the numbers and the harrowing stories behind them, and identified the smart gun laws and intervention programs that are most effective at saving lives from suicide. And when you ensure that a person in mental crisis doesn't get their hands on a gun, you really are saving a life. As you'll learn in the coming pages, most people who attempt suicide with methods other than a firearm survive, and most survivors never attempt suicide again, going on to live long lives and contribute positively to society. In other words, the idea that suicide is inevitable is a myth, and a deadly one at that. We hope that this report will help dispel this myth, spark conversation, and motivate lawmakers and community leaders to adopt the strategies proven to prevent gun suicide.

Americans for Responsible Solutions Foundation; Law Center for Prevent Gun Violence, 2017. 92p.