edited by Kacper Rekawek, Thomas Renard and Bàrbara Molas

Russia’s influence over far-right/ racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) milieus in Europe is multi-faceted and complex. It involves direct activities, such as financing or political support, as well as indirect activities, such as disinformation campaigns. In some cases, Russia was associated, albeit remotely, with some far-right violent incidents in Europe, including the alleged coup attempt by the sovereign movement Reichsburger, in Germany. Recognising the increasingly confrontational policy of Russia vis-à-vis Europe, and the growing threat from far-right extremism in Europe, this book thoroughly and systematically reviews Russia’s relationship with diverse far-right actors in ten European countries over the past decade. The countries covered in this book include Austria, The Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, and Sweden. The chapters are authored by some of the world’s most authoritative experts on extremism and Russian influence.

Overall, this edited volume is the first such comprehensive attempt at mapping the scope and depth of Russian influence over far-right extremism in Europe, resulting in the identification of key patterns of influence and offering some possible recommendations to counter it. This book is both a leading scholarly work, as well as a wake-up call and guide for action for European policy-makers.

By Suraj Lakhani, Jessica White and Claudia Wallner

The intersection between (violent) extremism and video-gaming – spanning across jihadist, farright, and other types of ideologies – is long-standing, though is an area that is under-researched. As part of this, particularly scant attention has been paid to the concept of ‘gamification’; i.e. the application of gaming and game-design principles within non-gaming environments (Lakhani and Wiedlitzka, 2022). The primary objective of this paper is to provide an understanding of how (violent) extremism can be (and has been) gamified, what emerging trends and future scenarios might be, and the potential influence (or lack thereof) that gamification has within (violent) extremism. On the basis of this understanding, this paper will outline relevant concepts of action through preventing and countering (violent) extremism (P/CVE) considerations and offer policy (and broader) recommendations on how to account for the element of gamification and potential actions to prevent and counter the phenomenon. Through existing literature and open-source materials – including academic articles, research reports, policy documents, newspaper articles, investigative journalism, government inquiries and previous relevant Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Policy Support (PS) deliverables, etc. – this paper will investigate the following key questions: what is gamification of (violent) extremism, what are the current and future threats it presents to the European Union (EU), and how can it be countered? In order to address this, the paper is organised into the following sections. SECTION 1 (‘CONCEPTUALISATION OF GAMIFICATION’) Section 1 (‘Conceptualisation of gamification’) will provide a conceptual overview of gamification, including outlining a working definition, in order to provide a foundation for the remainder of the paper. This section will also outline the concept’s origins and examine how these can be applied to the context of (violent) extremism. There will additionally be a contextualisation of the phenomenon in regard to the threat of (violent) extremism within EU Member States (MS) overall. SECTION 2 (‘CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS’) Section 2 (‘Current and future threats’) will discuss the potential ways in which (violent) extremism can be gamified, predominantly through outlining a range of current examples. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but do provide a sufficient overview regarding the types of gamification approaches taken within this context, by both (violent) extremist organisations and individuals. This section will conclude by considering the emerging trends and conceivable future scenarios in this field. SECTION 3 (‘ADDRESSING GAMIFICATION WITH P/CVE’) Section 3 (‘Addressing gamification with P/CVE’) outlines how gamified (violent) extremism can be addressed in P/CVE programming and whether or not it requires specifically tailored responses. This section will also inform discussions on whether current responses are fit for purpose and how these approaches potentially need to be tailored or evolve in order to deal with the threat posed by the gamification of (violent) extremism more effectively. SECTION 4 (‘POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS’) Section 4 (‘Policy and recommendations’) will then consider any current policy which relates to the gamification of (violent) extremism across EU MS. This will be followed by a number of relevant recommendations for policymakers stemming from existing research and literature. This includes providing recommendations for P/CVE based on promising approaches. This section will also discuss the current state of work in this area of study and make relevant research-related recommendations. CONCLUSIONS Finally, a ‘Conclusions’ section will discuss the potential value and limitations of gamification as a concept in relation to (violent) extremism. This is underpinned by the consideration of whether gamification is purposeful or relates to actions undertaken by those familiar with a particular subculture, i.e. gamers.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 25p.

by Linda Schlegel

The concept of gamification is increasingly applied as a framework to understand extremist online subcultures and communications. Although a number of studies have been conducted, the theoretical and empirical basis to understand the role of gamification in extremist contexts remains weak. This article seeks to contribute to the development of a gamification of radicalization theory by exploring how Marczewski’s HEXAD, a user typology for gamified applications, may facilitate our understanding of individual variations in engagement with gamified extremist content. Five user types, named after their core motivational drivers for engagement, are discussed: Socializers, Competitors, Achievers, Meaning Seekers, and Disruptors. This typology may support future studies by providing a preliminary understanding of how different game elements may appeal to different users and increase their engagement with and susceptibility to extremist content in cyberspace.

Perspectives on Terrorism , August 2021, Vol. 15, No. 4 (August 2021), pp. 54-64 .

By Linda Schlegel

The livestreaming of attacks, the use of Call of Duty footage in propaganda videos, the modification of popular video games to support extremist worldviews, and the development of games and playful apps by extremist organizations have all contributed to an increasing focus on the so-called ‘gamification of terror’. Since the live-streamed attack in Christchurch and the realization that subsequent perpetrators in Pittsburgh, El Paso and Halle not only copied the mode and style of attack but were embedded in and sought to appeal to similar online communities, in which gamified language and references to gaming were part of the subcultural practice, journalists, academics, and practitioners have begun to analyze the role games and gamified applications may play in radicalization processes. Understandably, as the Christchurch shooting has taken place less than two years ago, the analysis into the potential role of gamification in radicalization processes has only just begun and much confusion persists on both terminology and the exact mechanisms by which gamification may influence extremist thought and action. The fact that gamification itself is a fairly new concept, which has only been seriously researched for around ten years, complicates matters further. A large part of this report is therefore dedicated to organizing the current state of knowledge and to provide readers with a baseline of knowledge on gamification in extremist contexts. After a discussion on gamification as such and how it may or may not be differentiated from other gaming appeals, an overview of the current evidence of gamified radicalization processes is provided. Then, research findings on the psychological mechanisms of gamification are applied to the issue of radicalization. Lastly, the report flashlights some preliminary possibilities of applying gamification to preventing and/or countering extremism (P/CVE). Readers must be aware that this final part of the report lacks robust empirical grounding and is not meant to be taken as evidence of what should or should not be done. Rather, it is meant as an invitation to explore and discuss the implications of gamification for P/CVE.

MODUS | Working Paper 1/2021. Germany: MODUS, 2021. 20p.

By The Violence Prevention Network and the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy

Anti-feminist and anti-gender ideologies - and their basis in hostility and hatred towards women and LGBTQI* people - have long been an overlooked factor in analysing radicalisation and violent extremism. Both ideologies strongly appeal to groups organised around exclusionary principles because they provide language and a framework for the defence of hierarchical structures in society (Denkovski et al., 2021, 18). This trend is increasingly manifesting itself across a spectrum of violence. Despite a striking prevalence of anti-feminism and anti-gender attitudes within extremist worldviews, these motives have been considered at best secondary when analysing extremist attacks and groups (Wolf 2021). Yet, for extremist actors, they constitute a core element of their ideologies, a relevant area of recruitment within and outside extremist scenes, and an opportunity for strategic alliances. Throughout right-wing attacks in the past decade, such as those in Christchurch, Hanau, and Halle, a clear pattern of anti-feminist and misogynistic beliefs can be detected. Within such attacks, the ideological basis for mass public violence is formed by adherence to multiple, overlapping exclusionary attitudes. For instance, one conspiracy theory that finds popularity among right-wing actors is that of the “Great Replacement”. According to this idea, feminism was invented by Jewish elites to lower birth rates and advance mass migration, with the goal of replacing white European populations with non-European, non-white people, specifically Muslims (Fedders 2018). The Christchurch attacker had uploaded an online “manifesto” titled “the Great Replacement” before the attack on two mosques that killed 51 people - illustrating how anti-feminism is often intricately interwoven with racist and anti-Semitic thinking. The issue of overlapping ideological codes, elements, and groups is becoming increasingly important as we witness growing complexity in the right-wing landscape of radicalisation and violence. However, misogyny and anti-feminism are also integral to violent attacks outside of right-wing scenes. Several terrorist attacks by members of the incel1 community, such as those in the Californian city of Isla Vista in 2014, as well as the 2018 Toronto and 2019 Tallahassee attacks, have led to an increased awareness of the incel threat and the beginning of its consideration as a security threat in Western countries (see, for instance, Moonshot 2021). While embedded in a much broader online misogynist scene, misogynist incel ideologies promote particularly extreme misogyny, anti-feminism, and sexism. Misogynist incels see women as depriving them of their natural entitlement to sex. The use of dehumanising and aggressive language – and, in parts, open calls to violence Anti-feminist and anti-gender ideologies - and their basis in hostility and hatred towards women and LGBTQI* people - have long been an overlooked factor in analysing radicalisation and violent extremism. Both ideologies strongly appeal to groups organised around exclusionary principles because they provide language and a framework for the defence of hierarchical structures in society (Denkovski et al., 2021, 18). This trend is increasingly manifesting itself across a spectrum of violence. Despite a striking prevalence of anti-feminism and anti-gender attitudes within extremist worldviews, these motives have been considered at best secondary when analysing extremist attacks and groups (Wolf 2021). Yet, for extremist actors, they constitute a core element of their ideologies, a relevant area of recruitment within and outside extremist scenes, and an opportunity for strategic alliances. Throughout right-wing attacks in the past decade, such as those in Christchurch, Hanau, and Halle, a clear pattern of anti-feminist and misogynistic beliefs can be detected. Within such attacks, the ideological basis for mass public violence is formed by adherence to multiple, overlapping exclusionary attitudes. For instance, one conspiracy theory that finds popularity among right-wing actors is that of the “Great Replacement”. According to this idea, feminism was invented by Jewish elites to lower birth rates and advance mass migration, with the goal of replacing white European populations with non-European, non-white people, specifically Muslims (Fedders 2018). The Christchurch attacker had uploaded an online “manifesto” titled “the Great Replacement” before the attack on two mosques that killed 51 people - illustrating how anti-feminism is often intricately interwoven with racist and anti-Semitic thinking. The issue of overlapping ideological codes, elements, and groups is becoming increasingly important as we witness growing complexity in the right-wing landscape of radicalisation and violence. However, misogyny and anti-feminism are also integral to violent attacks outside of right-wing scenes. Several terrorist attacks by members of the incel1 community, such as those in the Californian city of Isla Vista in 2014, as well as the 2018 Toronto and 2019 Tallahassee attacks, have led to an increased awareness of the incel threat and the beginning of its consideration as a security threat in Western countries (see, for instance, Moonshot 2021). While embedded in a much broader online misogynist scene, misogynist incel ideologies promote particularly extreme misogyny, anti-feminism, and sexism. Misogynist incels see women as depriving them of their natural entitlement to sex. The use of dehumanising and aggressive language – and, in parts, open calls to violence provides the framework in which attacks, as mentioned above, occur. The most well-known incel attacker, for instance, just weeks before the attack in Isla Vista called upon incels to “realise their true strength and numbers”, “overthrow this oppressive feminist system”, and “start envisioning a world where WOMEN FEAR YOU” (Glasstetter 2014). These attacks were broadly referenced and discussed within incel and misogynist scenes and the extreme right more specifically. In Halle, the right-wing extremist who killed two people and tried to enter a local synagogue was listening to music that makes explicit references in name and content to the incel attack in Toronto in 2018.

Berlin: Violence Prevention Network, 2021. 15p.

By Barney Afako, Orzala Nemat, Emadeddin Badi, Mary Fitzgerald, Ronald C.Slye and Srinjoy Bose

Transitional justice is a well-known area of theory and practice, but rarely are its central teachings applied as part of a negotiated conflict resolution strategy vis-à-vis “violent extremist” or jihadist groups. This new IFIT publication encompasses three original case studies on the issue. The case studies cover: 1) peace talks between the the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); 2) pre-2011 negotiations between the regime of Muammar Gaddafi and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG); and 3) post-2001 transitional justice and peace efforts in Afghanistan in relation to the conflict with the Taliban. Our research on “violent extremism” and transitional justice also involved the development of an original policy framework that draws on these three cases as well as earlier research published in partnership with UNU-CPR. Overall, this research underscores why negotiation cannot be discounted as an option with “violent extremist” groups, and how creative applications of transitional justice have the potential to make any negotiated deal not only more achievable, but also more legitimate.

Barcelona: Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2020. 204p.

By George Washington University, Program on Extremism

This report evaluates violent extremism inspired by or connected to the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement. Black Hebrew Israelites ascribe to the idea that modern-day African Americans are the descendants of the Israelites in the Old Testament of the Bible. However, an extremist fringe within the movement takes this idea one step further, arguing that white Europeans are the descendants of Satan and that white Jews are impostors. Situating the role of extremist interpretations of BHI ideology within domestic violent extremist incidents during the past several years, this report finds: ● Like other domestic violent extremist movements in the contemporary American landscape, Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremism has undergone a transformation over the past twenty years. The predominant threat today is from individuals loosely affiliated with or inspired by the movement rather than by groups, organizations, or institutions. ● Today’s violent extremists with a nexus to Black Hebrew Israelite extremism are usually not formal participants in any Black Hebrew Israelite organization, church, or group. They usually interpolate aspects of Black Hebrew Israelite ideology—particularly the idea that white Jews are impostors—into a personally-curated mix of viewpoints and ideologies that inspire violence. ● Despite ongoing controversy about how to classify domestic violent extremists who are motivated by racial ideologies but are not white supremacists, the “racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism” (RMVE) category used by federal law enforcement in the U.S. remains an apt descriptor for Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremists. ● Using the RMVE label for Black Hebrew Israelites yields important comparisons between this movement and other RMVE actors, particularly white supremacist violent extremists. Notably, Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremists and their white supremacist counterparts often share similar ideologies and core conspiracy theories, are examples of the role of religious ideas in domestic violent extremist movements, and often choose similar targets for attacks due to their mutual anti-Semitism.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 21p.

By Beka Parsadanishvili, Ana Leladze

Recent events in Georgia - including the acts of violence committed against media representatives in July 2021 at a street rally organised by Georgian far-right groups and the arrest of 5 young people upon charges of joining a terrorist organisation in the Pankisi Gorge on 24 August - indicate that not only is violent extremism actively disseminated in the territory of Georgia, but it also endangers the national security architecture. This research report provides a detailed description of the key characteristics of the jihadist and far-right narratives disseminated in Georgia. It is noteworthy that this document does not study far-left narrative as it has been less violent and fairly infrequent in Georgia. In order to study violent extremist narrative disseminated in the territory of Georgia, semi-structured interviews were conducted with subject-matter experts, content and language of the disseminated narrative were intensively studied through qualitative and quantitative, relevant literature as well as secondary and tertiary data were researched and processed.

Tbilisi; Georgian Center for Strategy and Development, 2022. 74p.

By Manuela Brunero, Matthew Burnett Stuart, Olivier Guiryanan, Danielle Hull, Alice Robert

The report Perceptions of climate change and violent extremism: Listening to local communities in Chad has been produced by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in partnership with SWISSAID. Building upon UNICRI’s previous research it explores the lived experiences of community members and their perceptions on the role climate change and degradation of natural resources have in exacerbating local conflicts, as well as the impact of climate change on violent extremist groups’ recruitment narratives. The research is based on primary data collected through more than 100 in-depth interviews across four provinces of Chad — Hadjer-Lamis, Lac, Logone Occidentale and Mandoul. The report specifically analyses the effects of climate change at two interconnected levels: the direct consequences as experienced on productive activities such as agriculture, herding, and fishing, and the indirect consequences affecting coping mechanisms, social cohesion, and recruitment and propaganda by violent extremist groups. In doing so, this initiative elevates the often unheard voices of those most vulnerable and directly affected by the dual interacting threats of climate change and violent extremism. This report represents a crucial preliminary step in laying the groundwork for further research and for the development of local initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism that take into consideration overlapping climate and security challenges.

Torino, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2022. 104p.

By The Small Arms Survey; Nicolas Florquin, Hafez S. AbuAdwan, Gergely Hideg and Alaa Tartir

The Sahel is home to a number of marginalized borderlands—such as Libya’s southern border region—characterized by the movement and activities of various armed groups, the absence of strong state institutions, and the prevalence of disparaged communities. Potentially, the combination of these factors makes the subregion more exposed to risk and individuals raised in such borderlands can be especially vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups.

Perceptions, Vulnerabilities, and Prevention: Violent Extremism Threat Assessment in Selected Regions of the Southern Libyan Borderlands and North-Western Nigeria—a report by the Small Arms Survey's SANA project and UNDP—seeks to better understand the dynamics of these risk factors in southern Libya and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Sudan, as well as Nigeria.

The report finds that hardship and deprivation, the combination of discrimination and marginalization along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, and a comparatively limited access to basic services, are of particular concern from a prevention of violent extremism (PVE) perspective. The report also notes that perceptions of small arms varied significantly across the case studies, with respondents in Nigeria and Sudan reporting the highest levels of proliferation. The sources of weapons cited by respondents included the illegal market, the legal market, craft production, inheritance, state authorities, and employers.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey; New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2022. 138p.

By Anne Speckhard

In recent years, violent extremist activities have escalated dramatically. Around the world, such groups increasingly target women and women’s rights. Using sexual and gender-based violence, they terrorize communities and destroy the social fabric. Different UN Security Council resolutions have recognized that violent extremism has gender dimensions. These lead to varying consequences for women and girls, men and boys. Women are frequently seen only as victims of violent extremism. But in reality, women play multiple roles. They are on the frontlines of prevention and response. They lead civil society organizations and bolster community resilience. Promoting women as agents of peace recognizes their contributions to peacebuilding and prevention of violence and upholds respect for the human rights of everyone in areas afflicted by violent extremism. Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is more effective, sustainable and meaningful if it includes the participation and perspectives of women. This training manual is designed for actors involved in P/CVE in Europe and Central Asia, including state officials, members of non-governmental organizations, community activists, staff of UN agencies, international and regional organizations, to help them understand violent extremism’s gender dimensions. It is designed as a training guide for staff and trainers who are working with different counterparts engaged in P/CVE and want to help create more effective and gender-sensitive responses. The five modules in this guide include learning objectives, explanatory text, warm-up activities, practical exercises, references for further reading, and empirical experiences from Europe and Central Asia.

Istanbul: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) 2021. 122p.

Edited by Shirley Leitch and Paul Pickering

Terrorism, global pandemics, climate change, wars and all the major threats of our age have been targets of online extremism. The same social media occupying the heartland of our social world leaves us vulnerable to cybercrime, electoral fraud and the ‘fake news’ fuelling the rise of far-right violence and hate speech. In the face of widespread calls for action, governments struggle to reform legal and regulatory frameworks designed for an analogue age. And what of our rights as citizens? As politicians and lawyers run to catch up to the future as it disappears over the horizon, who guarantees our right to free speech, to free and fair elections, to play video games, to surf the Net, to believe ‘fake news’?

Rethinking Social Media and Extremism offers a broad range of perspectives on violent extremism online and how to stop it. As one major crisis follows another and a global pandemic accelerates our turn to digital technologies, attending to the issues raised in this book becomes ever more urgent.

Canberra: Australian University Press, 2022. 194p.

By Daniel Koehler

Counterterrorism has, in the last ten years, come to the fore of international relations, and remains in the news almost daily. This is due in large part to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, which in turn have also prompted something of a backlash against such military or “hard” approaches to countering terrorism. Partly in response, states and civil society have sought out softer, often preventive, measures to deal with violent extremism, many of which have been deemed more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists. However, problems remain. “Deradicalization” programs, which are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism, have grown both in popularity and in scope of late, even in just the past five years. While these programs vary widely, with differing subjects (e.g., prisoners, potential terrorists, convicted criminals, repentant extremists), aims (e.g., abandonment of extreme views, disengagement from terrorism, rehabilitation into society), sizes (from just a handful of participants to hundreds), and forms (from arranging jobs, marriages, and new lives for participants, to merely educating them on nonviolent alternatives to their methods), common themes and problems can be discerned. With recent high-profile cases of recidivism by supposedly “deradicalized” individuals, questions are being raised about the efficacy of these programs and about how best to design them

New York: International Peace Institute, 2010. 20p,

By Kris Christmann

The purpose of this systematic review is to examine the scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The review was undertaken to inform the national evaluation of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales’ (YJB) preventing violent extremism programmes within the youth justice system, and as such, represents one of the research outputs from that study. The full evaluation report, Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, is to be published by the YJB alongside this review….The review found that the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited. Despite a prolific output of research, few studies contained empirical data or systematic data analysis.

Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. London. 2012. 77p.

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Colin P. Clarke, Samuel Hodgson

Militia violent extremists (MVEs) pose a growing threat within the United States. MVEs were the most prominent and well-organised participants in the January 6, 2021 attack on the US Capitol and have plotted numerous acts of lethal violence against law enforcement, government officials, and civilians in the past decade. MVEs are motivated by a belief that private citizens must use violence to resist government overreach, combat purported tyranny, or maintain law and order. While participants in the broader militia movement embrace similar beliefs, MVEs are distinguished by their willingness to carry out violence.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, , 2022. 290p.

By Alex P. Schmid

In this Research Paper, Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid seeks to clarify some conceptual issues that tend to obscure the debate about how best to counter violent extremism. The main focus of this Research Paper is on obtaining a clearer understanding of what “Islamist extremism” entails in the context of the ongoing debate on allegedly “acceptable” non-violent extremists and “unacceptable” violent extremists. The author discusses a number of conceptualisations of religious extremism in the context of liberal democracies and also distinguishes, inter alia, between merely “not (yet) violent” militancy and principled non-violent political activism in the Gandhian tradition. The author argues that the distinction between “non-violent extremism” and “violent extremism” is not a valid one. The paper provides a set of twenty indicators of extremism that can be used as an instrument for monitoring extremist statements and actions, with an eye to challenging and countering such non-democratic manifestations.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014. 31p.

By Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve

This report is an effort to assess the state of knowledge about ‘counter-narrative’ efforts that aim to challenge the use of the Internet and social media by violent extremist groups. The review considers the use of online content to engage, proselytize, recruit and inspire acts of violence by movements ranging from Al-Qaeda and affiliated networks, to white supremacist communities. Emphasizing that government-led counter-narrative efforts were still quite new at the time of the review, the authors focus on examples primarily from the US and the UK, and provide lessons learned from both government and civil society efforts.

The review is organized around the three main categories of a ‘counter-messaging spectrum’. The first is Government Strategic Communications, which are actions to get the message out about what government is doing, as well as to support the building of relationships with key constituencies. The second, Alternative Narratives, involves actions that aim to undercut extremist narratives by focusing on what one stands ‘for’ rather than ‘against,’ such as principles of openness, freedom and democracy. The third category comprises Counter-Narratives, which are actions to directly challenge the content of extremist messaging, and include showing inconsistencies and contradictions of ideology or fact, or discrediting through ridicule. The authors note that there can be overlap between the three types of activities, and that there will be challenges for delivering messages to indented audiences.

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2013. 63p.

By The Soufan Center

The Atomwaffen Division (AWD) is a dangerous neo-Nazi extremist network with a rapidly growing international footprint. While AWD has roots in the United States and became notorious as a violent entity following its actions during the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, VA in 2017, the group has since established links and affiliates across Europe, including in the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, making its reach and potential to influence and plan violence global in nature.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2020. 33p.

By Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Håvard Haugstvedt

In this working paper, we argue that the conception of a wicked public policy problem offers a useful lens on the challenges faced by local government practitioners engaged with preventing violent extremism. Wicked problems are characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and contestation as to origin, definition and policy solutions. Based on extant wicked problem research, we propose a conceptual model of what we term “wicked problem governance capacity” – capacity to deal with wicked problems – and a research agenda for better understanding and assessing such policy capacity. We argue that empirical studies of Denmark and Norway, which have been among the frontrunners in local prevent work, offer an opportunity to refine wicked problem theory by grounding it more firmly in the experienced reality of practitioners.

Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, The Extreme Right, Hate Crime and Political Violence, University of Oslo , 2022 26p.

By Emily Winterbotham

Forming part of the Prevention Project, this paper examines the effectiveness of mentorship interventions.

Mentorships, as interventions targeted at the specific needs of individuals or groups of individuals and adapted to the local environment, are assumed to have a higher chance of tackling violent extremism than broad approaches targeting general populations. This paper demonstrates that evaluations of mentorship interventions are limited in number and scope – as with the wider P/CVE field. Existing evaluations often lack well-developed theories of change and are over-reliant on anecdotal evidence. It is therefore difficult to draw causal links between mentoring and positive P/CVE outcomes. This paper is, however, cautiously optimistic about the effectiveness of mentorship programmes.

For mentorship programmes to be successful, stakeholders with a thorough understanding of the target group’s social setting and context are crucial. Connections to local material and human resources and services are important for programme effectiveness and sustainability.

London: Royal United Services Institute, 2020. 64p.