By Pete Simi

A hypothetical “lone gunman” walks into a reproductive health care clinic spraying bullets from his assault rifle screaming that “abortion is murder!” and “the Army of God seeks revenge for the unborn fetuses murdered every year!” The shooting rampage leaves three individuals dead and 11 others injured. Additional weapons and explosives are discovered in the shooter’s van parked outside the clinic. Inside the van, a slew of literature explains how abortion is part of a liberal, feminist initiative to “enslave white Americans.” During the shooter’s interview with law enforcement later that day, he explains his motive was to “intimidate the general public by enforcing God’s law while sending a message to any other abortion killers that they might want to find another line of work.” In the days following the attack, scattered media coverage describes the gunman as “deranged,” “crazed,” and “unstable.” Few, if any, note the clear political and religious motivation nor do any of the articles describe the incident as “terrorism” or the shooter as a “terrorist.” What should we conclude about this scenario? The fact that the shooter was driven by ideological concerns seems obvious, yet the response suggests the link is apparently not so obvious. Understanding the relationship between ideas and violence presents several substantial challenges. These challenges are magnified given our tendency toward employing a highly inconsistent assessment of when and how ideas influence violence.

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  We tend to perceive a close connection between ideas and violence when the incident involves a Muslim perpetrator, while relying on a far different metric when the perpetrator is not Muslim. And the consequences are tremendous with major differences in terms of public perceptions and legal treatment.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 12.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Blyth Crawford, Valentin Wutke

Salafi-jihadism and right-wing white supremacist extremism are two of the most visible, active, and threatening violent extremist movements operating in the West today, responsible for dozens of attacks throughout North America and Western Europe. With the increased threat of white supremacist terrorism in the West have also come questions about its relationship to jihadist terrorism. This study provides an assessment of the ideological similarities between the two movements, concluding that they share key traits and political outlooks, some of which have become increasingly widespread over recent years in the Western world and beyond. Firstly, these forms of extremism are the most violent iterations of their respective movements. Jihadists are the ideological fringe of the wider Islamist movement, while white supremacist extremists emerge from more mainstream, right-wing white identity and supremacist politics. They are both reactionary political movements. They treat any form of social or political progress, reform, or liberalization with great suspicion, viewing these chiefly as a threat to their respective ‘ingroups’. In this sense, jihadists too are extreme right-wing actors even if they are rarely referred to in such terms. Both movements share a similar underlying diagnosis for the ills of their respective societies, placing blame primarily on the forces of liberal progress, pluralism, and tolerance.  

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 103p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

The boogaloo movement has risen to national prominence as a new and dangerous subset of the extreme right in the United States. Boogalooers focus on and fantasize about a supposedly imminent second civil war, referred to as the “boogaloo,” wherein the corruption they see in the political system will be overthrown. This is still an emergent movement, but its ideological core centers around guns and distrust of authority, whether that be the government, police, or political institutions. The movement originated on the internet forum 4chan, and adherents to the boogaloo movement continue to be active online in various forums and social media platforms. Many media portrayals have focused on the seemingly quixotic traits of boogalooers, like their habit of wearing Hawaiian shirts, communicating via internet memes, or their name being derived from the 1984 break-dancing movie Breakin’ 2: Electric Boogaloo. But make no mistake, the boogaloo movement is inherently violent, well armed, and organized around preparations for a civil war purportedly coming to America’s streets. Individuals tied to the boogaloo movement have already plotted attacks and committed violence, and intelligence and law enforcement agencies have pointed to a growing threat emanating from the movement. As previous research from Everytown has demonstrated, an entire extreme-right ecosystem serves as a breeding ground for individuals aliated with far-right movements such as the boogaloo, providing both inspiration and motivation—whether political, conspiratorial, or racist—for them to act.

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2021.   10p.

By Jason Xidias 

In the past two years, Spain’s far-right party Vox has gone from no representation in the Spanish parliament to 52 seats, making it the third most representative political force nationally behind the People’s Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE). This has radically transformed Spanish politics, leading to a level of polarization not seen since the Spanish Second Republic (1931-9). Until Vox’s recent electoral success, Spain was considered immune to the far right because of its Francoist past and relatively favorable attitude toward globalization, the EU, and immigration. However, as this article shows, Franco has never completely gone away—Vox is both a modernized version of Spain’s ultraconservative past and a condition and manifestation of international neoliberal and authoritarian trends. The article analyzes Vox’s ideological roots, emergence, political program, voter base, and influence in Spanish politics in relation to key events—notably the Great Recession, the success of far-left party Podemos, corruption scandals in mainstream politics, and Catalonia’s pursuit of independence—and speculates about the party’s future against the backdrop of COVID-19.   

 London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, 2020. 23p.

By Jason Xidias

While 85 years have now passed since the end of the Spanish Civil War, and 46 since the end of the Franco Dictatorship, historical memory continues to be a great source of political and social tension in Spain today. In comparison to nations such as Germany and Greece, the country remains an outlier insofar as it transitioned to democracy without ever achieving legal justice. This is due to deeply-embedded myths of reconciliation and equal accountability created and maintained by the ruling class, the royal family, the education system, the judiciary, and the mainstream media. Since the 1990s, the Socialist Party, motivated by political opportunism and pressure from the far left, regional parties, and domestic and international human rights organizations, has fractured “the pact of forgetting”; however, as the article argues, its own ideological shortcomings and institutional constraints have prevented a full rupture. As such, while the newly-proposed Law of Democratic Memory, which the current leftist coalition government (PSOE-Unidas Podemos) foresees passing this year, does represent significant progress, the Socialist Party’s own limitations prevent justice—in the form of an independent truth commission and the prosecution of Francoist crimes—and contribute to promoting a cultural of impunity, which is one of Spain’s principal deficiencies in terms of democracy.

 London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, 2021. 29p

By Gary LaFree

In this overview, we report on the purpose of the grant, the data collected, the project design and methods, the data analysis, the findings and the implications for criminal justice policy in the United States. The grant proposal included three data analysis sections: (1) a large-N analysis of extremist hate offenders and other political extremists from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and the Profiles of Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) data; (2) a set of original case studies on individuals either connected to hate crime or politically motivated extremism; and (3) the social media experiences of more than 25 offenders who have engaged in violent and non-violent activities in hate groups and more than 25 offenders who have engaged in either violent or non-violent activities in extremist political groups. We review the contributions of each before closing with a brief set of conclusions.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2019. 13p.

By Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

While there are almost certainly more, the following is an inventory of white supremacist prison gangs that the ADL Center on Extremism has created by working with correctional institutions and law enforcement, reviewing case files and news stories and tapping its own extensive body of information of white supremacist prison gang activities. Key Points: ■ For nearly four decades, white supremacist prison gangs have constituted one of the primary segments of the white supremacist movement, though they are different in many ways from “traditional” white supremacist groups. ■ Though they typically originate and are active in jails and prisons, most of these gangs are just as active on the streets as behind bars—including involvement in violence and other criminal acts. ■ Though they are white supremacist in nature, these prison gangs are usually a form of organized crime and frequently prioritize profit over ideology. ■ Most white supremacist prison gangs allow only men as full members, but women play important roles in most such gangs, including in criminal activity. ■ There are currently more than 75 different white supremacist prison gangs in at least 38 states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, as well as in major county jails. They range from relatively small local gangs all the way to multi-state gangs with a thousand or more members. ■ The crimes committed by white supremacist gang members include traditional criminal activities such as running major drug dealing operations as well as ideologically motivated crimes such as hate crimes. Most white supremacist gangs also

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  have a high association with violence—which includes violence directed even at their own members and associates.

 New York: Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism, 2022. 46p.

By Daniel L. Byman and Mark Pitcavage

White supremacists have been a leading source of terrorist violence in the United States in the last decade, responsible for 40 plots or attacks from 2011 to 2020. We argue that the threat is dangerous but also that the white supremacist movement as a whole has many weaknesses, some of which can be exploited. In contrast to jihadist groups like al-Qaida at its peak, American white supremacists lack a haven from which to operate; their international ties are also weaker than those of jihadist organizations. The white supremacist movement is also highly divided, and members disagree as to who their primary enemies are and how they should attack them. In addition, they enjoy little public support, and their violence usually backfires, making the movement less popular. Overall, the movement’s capabilities are low, unable to match its grandiose ambitions. These weaknesses hinder recruitment and operations, make movement members vulnerable to prosecution and disruption, and otherwise limit their strength. Many of these weaknesses stem from existing counterterrorism and civil society pressure; continued and at times increased efforts by government, technology companies, and civil society officials is vital. Political leaders of both parties must also consistently condemn white supremacy, ensuring that the movement remains marginalized.  

Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2021. 12p.

By Blyth Crawford, Florence Keen, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil

Several violent far-right attacks in recent years have revealed an apparent connection with ‘chan culture’, not just in the tangible examples of attackers uploading manifestos, final messages, and live streams to chan sites themselves, but in the widespread community support exhibited in some corners of this online subculture where violence is both trivialised and glorified. Commonly, this is manifested in the visual culture present on chan sites, particularly memes, which may be used to promote extreme or even violent narratives under the guise of humour and irony.

We sought to understand how the visual culture of chan sites was contributing to, and/or encouraging violent discourse. To do this, our team combined quantitative data scraping, ethnography, and visual analysis across 12 chan sites ranging in popularity between March and June 2020, in addition to conducting 12 interviews with experts over this period.

London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR),2020. 50P.

By Hernan Mondania and Tina Askanius, etc.

Women have generally been treated as “side shows” in the literature on war, terrorism and violent extremism and have thus been given scant scholarly attention. In mainstream media discourse, when the role of women is in fact raised, they tend to be framed as unwitting, passive agents or brainwashed victims pulled into violent extremist movements only through the relations of their husbands, boyfriends, or fathers. The lack of attention to female actors in violent extremism limits our ability to understand these movements and deforms theoretical understandings of the processes whereby individuals become radicalized. Ultimately this undermines efforts to design effective strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism. This report presents a quantitative assessment of women in violent extremism in contemporary Sweden. Specifically, we study women in violent Islamic extremism, violent far-right extremism, and violent far-left extremism. The analyses are based on data compiled from Swedish governmental registers on crime, mental health, education, child welfare intervention, labor market attachment, and information from the Swedish Police and Swedish Security Service about known affiliation to violent extremist milieus. The longitudinal data covers the period 2007–2016 and affiliation data from the Swedish Police and Swedish Security Service is a cross-section from 2017. We use descriptive statistics and network analysis to compare women in violent extremism to three reference groups: biological sisters, men that belong to the three violent extremist milieus, and women that belong to other antagonistic milieus.

Copenhagen: Nordisk Ministerråd, 2021. 53p.

By R. Evan Ellis

With its 128 million people and GDP of $1.26 trillion, Mexico is strongly connected to the United States through geography, commerce, and family. What happens in Mexico directly affects the security and prosperity of the United States, and vice versa. Mexico, not China, is the United States’ largest trading partner, with $614 billion in bilateral commerce in 2019. That interchange is now reinforced by the implementation of the United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA), which feeds and is fed by enormous U.S. investment—$101 billion in 2019, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Those commercial ties sustain the presence of 1.5 million U.S. citizens living in Mexico. The performance of the Mexican economy, local conditions, and the effectiveness of its governance thus affect American jobs, investment, security, and lives. Beyond commerce, activities related to illegal drugs—ranging from the movement of cocaine to the production of opioids and synthetics to the distribution of fentanyl (although originating in China)—involve, at least in part, Mexico-based drug gangs and Mexican territory, just as Mexicans are victimized by weapons illegally smuggled into the country from the United States. The United States depends substantially on the efforts by and cooperation with the Mexican military and law enforcement to help combat narcotraffickers and organized crime in all of its forms.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020. 11p.

By Daniel Koehler

Counterterrorism has, in the last ten years, come to the fore of international relations, and remains in the news almost daily. This is due in large part to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, which in turn have also prompted something of a backlash against such military or “hard” approaches to countering terrorism. Partly in response, states and civil society have sought out softer, often preventive, measures to deal with violent extremism, many of which have been deemed more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists. However, problems remain. “Deradicalization” programs, which are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism, have grown both in popularity and in scope of late, even in just the past five years. While these programs vary widely, with differing subjects (e.g., prisoners, potential terrorists, convicted criminals, repentant extremists), aims (e.g., abandonment of extreme views, disengagement from terrorism, rehabilitation into society), sizes (from just a handful of participants to hundreds), and forms (from arranging jobs, marriages, and new lives for participants, to merely educating them on nonviolent alternatives to their methods), common themes and problems can be discerned. With recent high-profile cases of recidivism by supposedly “deradicalized” individuals, questions are being raised about the efficacy of these programs and about how best to design them

New York: International Peace Institute, 2010. 20p,

By Kris Christmann

The purpose of this systematic review is to examine the scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The review was undertaken to inform the national evaluation of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales’ (YJB) preventing violent extremism programmes within the youth justice system, and as such, represents one of the research outputs from that study. The full evaluation report, Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, is to be published by the YJB alongside this review….The review found that the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited. Despite a prolific output of research, few studies contained empirical data or systematic data analysis.

Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. London. 2012. 77p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Bullying has long been tolerated as a rite of passage among children and adolescents. There is an implication that individuals who are bullied must have "asked for" this type of treatment, or deserved it. Sometimes, even the child who is bullied begins to internalize this idea. For many years, there has been a general acceptance and collective shrug when it comes to a child or adolescent with greater social capital or power pushing around a child perceived as subordinate. But bullying is not developmentally appropriate; it should not be considered a normal part of the typical social grouping that occurs throughout a child's life.

Although bullying behavior endures through generations, the milieu is changing. Historically, bulling has occurred at school, the physical setting in which most of childhood is centered and the primary source for peer group formation. In recent years, however, the physical setting is not the only place bullying is occurring. Technology allows for an entirely new type of digital electronic aggression, cyberbullying, which takes place through chat rooms, instant messaging, social media, and other forms of digital electronic communication.

Composition of peer groups, shifting demographics, changing societal norms, and modern technology are contextual factors that must be considered to understand and effectively react to bullying in the United States. Youth are embedded in multiple contexts and each of these contexts interacts with individual characteristics of youth in ways that either exacerbate or attenuate the association between these individual characteristics and bullying perpetration or victimization. Recognizing that bullying behavior is a major public health problem that demands the concerted and coordinated time and attention of parents, educators and school administrators, health care providers, policy makers, families, and others concerned with the care of children, this report evaluates the state of the science on biological and psychosocial consequences of peer victimization and the risk and protective factors that either increase or decrease peer victimization behavior and consequences.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2016. 361p.

By The Counter Extremism Project (CEP)

Key Points: • Some modern white supremacist groups, such as The Base, Hammerskin Nation, National Socialist Order (formerly Atomwaffen Division), and Nationalist Social Club subscribe to a National Socialist (neo-Nazi) ideology. These groups generally make no effort to hide their overt racist belief that the white race is superior to others. • Other modern white supremacist groups, however, propagate their radical stances under the guise of white ethno-nationalism, which falsely seeks to highlight the distinctiveness– –rather than the outright superiority––of the white identity. Such groups, like the League of the South and Patriot Front, usually claim that white identity is under threat from minorities or immigrants that seek to replace its culture, and seek to promote white ethnonationalism as a legitimate ideology that belongs in mainstream political spheres. • Many modern white supremacist groups eschew violent tactics in favor of using demonstrations and propaganda to sway public opinion and portray their ideologies as legitimate. However, their racial elitist ideologies have nonetheless spurred affiliated individuals to become involved in violent altercations. • White supremacist groups often target youth for recruitment through propaganda campaigns on university campuses and social media platforms. White supremacists have long utilized Internet forums and websites to connect, organize, and propagate their extremist messages.

New York; London; Etc.: Counter-Terrorism Project, 2018. 101p.