MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Kieran McConaghy

State Dynamics in Counter-Terrorism: The book challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, emphasizing the importance of intra-state dynamics and the individual identities of state personnel in shapingcounter-terrorism responses.

Case Studies: It provides comparative analyses of Spain, France, and theUnited Kingdom, highlighting how state responses to terrorism are influenced by historical and cultural contexts.

Emotional and Political Impetus: The book discusses how emotional reactions and political motivations of state personnel impact counter-terrorism strategies, sometimes leading to actions driven by revenge or political gain.

Recommendations for Future Research: It suggests that future studies on counter-terrorism should consider the complexities of the state and the emotional and organizational factors that influence stateactions.

Springer, Aug 22, 2017, 182 pages

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ozgur Nikbay & Suleyman Hancerli

Understanding TerrorismThis section delves into the psychological profiles of terrorists, theuse of the internet by terrorists, the potential threat of bioterrorism, and the socio-economic factors contributing to terrorism. It emphasizes the importance of education in combating terrorism and understanding the true motives behind terrorist acts.

Suicide Attacks, Radical Terrorism, and Case StudiesThis part examines the characteristics and motivations behind suicide attacks, the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet states, and includes case studies of terrorist incidents. It also explores the financing of terrorism through narcoterrorism and the spatial patterns of terrorist incidents.

Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings, andKidnappingsThis section discusses various strategies and tactics for handling terrorist hostage situations, including negotiation strategies, the psychological aspects of kidnappings, and the importance of proper training and preparation for law enforcement agencies.

Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the FutureThe final section explores different counter-terrorism policies and strategies, such as situational crime prevention, democratic policing, the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism, and the need for international cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining public trust and preventing the radicalization of individuals.

IOS Press, 2007, 431 pages

By Everytown Research and Policy

On average, more than once per day in the United States, a tragedy occurs where a perpetrator kills an intimate partner, and then dies by suicide themself. Of these incidents, 93 percent involved a gun, and 95 percent had women killed by their male partners. To document the circumstances and bring attention to the effects of these incidents, in 2024, Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund conducted focus groups with 43 survivors of intimate partner homicide-suicide. The focus group participants were people who survived an attempted intimate partner homicide-suicide, family members, and individuals closely involved with the incident. Through these survivor interviews, we show the importance of understanding the risk factors for intimate partner homicide-suicide and ensuring effective implementation of laws that disarm domestic abusers. The focus groups were approved by the Pearl IRB Institutional Review Board (IRB) to protect the rights, welfare, and confidentiality of participants. Participants in this study were recruited from Everytown for Gun Safety’s database of volunteers and through partner organizations that support survivors of gun violence. Participants received IRB-approved recruitment materials, such as the flyer with the study information, through email and text message. All participants signed a consent form, which included their rights, such as the ability to withdraw from the study at any time. In addition, the researchers provided mental health resources and a licensed clinician on staff with Everytown was on the call to provide emotional support for participants. Following the focus group, every participant received a $25 prepaid Mastercard gift card for their participation in the study. Before the focus groups, participants were asked to complete a survey with demographic and experience questions regarding their race, gender, sexuality, and geographic location in the United States. Participants then attended one of the five focus groups conducted by the researchers. Previous studies have shown that three focus groups are sufficient to capture nearly all themes. Thus, five focus groups provided an adequate sample size to identify a range of themes, and researchers documented theoretical saturation5 at this stage. A focus group methodology was chosen as the most appropriate means to explore gun violence survivors’ experiences and thoughts on trauma. This methodology involves asking a group of participants open-ended questions in a supportive environment that encourages people to share their experiences and views. There are many advantages to focus group research. The method can yield detailed, in-depth information to study social processes, provide insights into complex social phenomena, and facilitate openness among participants as they provide their language to describe their experiences—this is particularly relevant for survivors who share experiences of gun violence. Thus, the focus group approach was used to gain a deeper understanding of the intersections of gun violence and trauma. All focus groups were conducted by a trained researcher and a trauma-informed expert who has some training and experience in running focus groups. The focus groups were conducted and recorded on Zoom. Each participant was asked to rename themselves to protect their anonymity. Each session was also attended by an assistant who observed the focus group to aid in subsequent analysis. Focus groups lasted approximately one hour to one hour and 15 minutes. Data collected from the focus groups were professionally transcribed and then professionally analyzed using Nvivo qualitative coding software. A line-by-line analysis was completed to develop theoretical codes, and three to four focus groups were analyzed at a time to determine themes, categories, and connections across categories and themes. Following the approach of researchers Tiggemann, Gardiner, and Slater, each theme from the focus groups was rated on frequency, intensity, extensiveness, specificity, and level of agreement. These approaches subjected the data to a systematic analysis of themes and concepts.

Washington, DC: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024.

By James Black, Mattias Eken, Jacob Parakilas, Stuart Dee, Conlan Ellis, Kiran Suman-Chauhan, Ryan J. Bain, Harper Fine, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Melusine Lebret, et al.

Artificial intelligence (AI) holds the potential to usher in transformative changes across all aspects of society, economy and policy, including in the realm of defence and security. The United Kingdom (UK) aspires to be a leading player in the rollout of AI for civil and commercial applications, and in the responsible development of defence AI. This necessitates a clear and nuanced understanding of the emerging risks and opportunities associated with the military use of AI, as well as how the UK can best work with others to mitigate or exploit these risks and opportunities.

In March 2024, the Defence AI & Autonomy Unit (DAU) of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) jointly commissioned a short scoping study from RAND Europe. The goal was to provide an initial exploration of ways in which military use of AI might generate risks and opportunities at the strategic level – conscious that much of the research to date has focused on the tactical level or on non-military topics (e.g. AI safety). Follow-on work will then explore these issues in more detail to inform the UK strategy for international engagement on these issues.

This technical report aims to set a baseline of understanding of strategic risks and opportunities emerging from military use of AI. The summary report focuses on high-level findings for decision makers.

Key Findings

One of the most important findings of this study is deep uncertainty around AI impacts; an initial prioritisation is possible, but this should be iterated as evidence improves.

The RAND team identified priority issues demanding urgent action. Whether these manifest as risks or opportunities will depend on how quickly and effectively states adapt to intensifying competition over and through AI.

RAND - Sep 6, 2024

By: KELSEY DAVENPORT

From the document: "This report makes several assessments. [1] Structural factors in the existing array of organizations and treaty bodies focused on disarmament have prevented bold, creative action to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These factors include inadequate or overly broad membership, overreliance on consensus-based decision-making, and limited high-level political engagement. [...] [2] The NSS [nuclear security summit] process offers a model for creating a new series of disarmament summits designed to inject momentum into current efforts to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear arsenals. Certain characteristics of the NSS process contributed to its success. [...] [3] A nuclear disarmament summit process modeled off the NSS process could provide a forum better suited to address new challenges that the existing forums have struggled to tackle in the current geopolitical environment. Like the NSS process, states would be encouraged to make national commitments ('house gifts') and work in partnership to make multinational commitments ('gift baskets') that exceed least-common denominator, consensus-based decision-making. Reporting within the summit process could drive accountability, and high-level political participation could create pressure for leaders to make ambitious but achievable commitments that advance disarmament. This report also argues how a high-level disarmament summit process would complement, not replace, existing initiatives and treaties that form the disarmament architecture."

Sep 2024 ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

By Lieba Faier 

 In The Banality of Good, Lieba Faier examines why contemporary efforts to curb human trafficking have fallen so spectacularly short of their stated goals despite well-funded campaigns by the United Nations and its member-state governments. Focusing on Japan’s efforts to enact the UN’s counter-trafficking protocol and assist Filipina migrants working in Japan’s sex industry, Faier draws from interviews with NGO caseworkers and government officials to demonstrate how these efforts disregard the needs and perspectives of those they are designed to help. She finds that these campaigns tend to privilege bureaucracies and institutional compliance, resulting in the compromised quality of life, repatriation, and even criminalization of human trafficking survivors. Faier expands on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the “banality of evil” by coining the titular “banality of good” to describe the reality of the UN’s fight against human trafficking. Detailing the protocols that have been put in place and evaluating their enactment, Faier reveals how the continued failure of humanitarian institutions to address structural inequities and colonial history ultimately reinforces the violent status quo they claim to be working to change.

Durham, NC; London:  Duke University Press,  2024

By Mitchell L. Doucette, Cassandra K. Crifasi, Alex D. McCourt, Julie A. Ward, Rebecca L. Fix, Daniel W. Webster

Research Summary: We utilized the synthetic difference-in-difference method to estimate the impact of adopting a permitless Concealed Carry Weapons (CCW) law on rates of assaults, robberies, and homicides committed with a firearm and by other means, as well as weapons arrests, from 1981 to 2019. We stratified permitless CCW laws by whether they previously prohibited violent misdemeanants from obtaining a CCWpermitorpreviouslyrequiredlive firearm training to obtain a permit prior to law adoption. Findings robust to sensitivity analyses suggest that states that lost a training requirement to obtain a CCW permit had 21 additional gun assaults per 100,000 population (SE =5.2) (32% increase). Policy Implications: In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, states should implement CCW permitting law provisions that may reduce the risk of firearm violence. Requiring live firearm training prior to carry aconcealedweaponmayattenuatenegativehealth impacts of deregulation associated with permitless CCW laws. 

Criminology and Public Policy, 2023

By Eli Ben-Michael , Mitchell L. Doucette , Avi Feller , Alexander D. McCourt, and Elizabeth A. Stuart

Gun violence is a critical public health and safety concern in the United States. There is considerable variability in policy proposals meant to curb gun violence, ranging from increasing gun availability to deter potential assailants (e.g., concealed carry laws or arming school teachers) to restricting access to firearms (e.g., universal background checks or banning assault weapons). Many studies use state-level variation in the enactment of these policies in order to quantify their effect on gun violence. In this paper, we discuss the policy trial emulation framework for evaluating the impact of these policies, and show how to apply this framework to estimating impacts via difference-in-differences and synthetic controls when there is staggered adoption of policies across jurisdictions, estimating the impacts of right-to-carry laws on violent crime as a case study. 

Unpublished paper 2024.

By Brittni Lambing, Ron Frandsen, Jennifer Karberg, and Joseph Durso

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) requires a background check on an applicant for a firearm purchase from a dealer who is a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL). During the permanent Brady Act period, from 1999 through 2018, background checks were conducted on over 237 million applicants for firearm transfers or permits. During this period, nearly 3.5 million applications for firearm transfers or permits were denied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or by state and local agencies. This report summarizes the number of applications for firearm transfers and permits, denials that resulted from background checks, reasons for denial, rates of denial, appeals of denials, and arrests of denied persons during the permanent Brady Act period. Statistics are presented at the FBI, state, and local levels. The report also provides a summary of significant changes in federal and state laws and regulations related to firearm sales. Statistical highlights are presented in the body of the report, and complete details are included in an appendix.

St. Louis, MO: Regional Justice Information Service (REJIS), 2024. 29p.

By Kerry Mulligan and Daniela Gilbert

 Vera’s Redefining Public Safety initiative works with local governments and community leaders to build community-centered and coordinated approaches to creating safety. This includes expanding non-police response to 911 crisis calls, investing in civilian-led approaches to violence prevention and intervention, and building and institutionalizing public safety infrastructures outside the criminal legal system. To be sustainable and effective, these infrasctructures should adopt a public health framework, leverage data-informed decision-making, and focus on community-centered strategies. Gun violence problem analysis (GVPA) can be an important component of this work. Traditionally, GVPA refers to the analysis of data on fatal and non-fatal shootings to establish a common understanding of local violence dynamics and inform the development and implementation of violence reduction strategies.1 Although there is variability in the scope and process of GVPA, it generally involves identifying the characteristics of, and relationships between, people involved in recent fatal and non-fatal shootings. People involved in shootings are, by definition, at greatest risk of future interpersonal violence and gun violence. Therefore, jurisdictions generally use GVPA to inform near-term violence intervention strategies— including group violence intervention strategies, focused deterrence, and fellowship/mentorship programs that focus on people at highest risk of violence.2 This concept paper proposes an expanded version of GVPA that can inform the system changes and strategies necessary for more comprehensive and sustained improvements in public safety. Like a traditional GVPA, this expanded approach analyzes data to guide the development. Expanded gun violence problem analysis can help develop interventions to reduce gender-based violence and violence associated with economic and housing insecurity, inform prevention and system transformation, and prioritize capacity building for sustainability. of community violence reduction strategies. However, unlike traditional GVPA, the expanded approach also illuminates the social-structural factors that drive violence, such as economic and housing insecurity. While traditional GVPA is designed to inform strategies for near-term community violence intervention, this expanded approach can help develop longer-term strategies to support violence prevention efforts. These include strategies to improve access to economic opportunity, housing, and healthcare. It also prioritizes comprehensive strategy development and capacity-building for sustainability.  

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2024. 4p.

By Vaughn Crandall, et al.

A study on the factors behind rising gun violence in the Bay Area & our recommended approach for tackling it. Three primary factors are contributing to the Bay Area’s gun violence challenge: the impact of gentrification, a poorly understood regional violence problem, and a lack of formal mechanisms to support regional coordination across public safety departments and service providers. Cities can effectively reduce this violence in the near term. To do so, we recommend that regional leaders: 1. Develop a Regional Intervention Strategy by identifying a convener who can incubate a regional community violence intervention approach. 2. Formalize Communication and Information Sharing Between Oakland & San Francisco Public Safety Providers by having each department systematically share information. 3. Improve Cross-City Coordination to understand and address cross-city violence issues. 4. Utilize Existing Infrastructure by leveraging the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. 5. Monitor California Highway Patrol Capacity to ensure they can investigate freeway homicides and shootings. 1 2 In recent years, there has been a sustained increase in shootings and gun homicides - with an increase in highway shootings in particular - in the Bay Area. This has implications for the cities of Oakland, Stockton, San Francisco, and Antioch. However, there has been little public study conducted to-date into these increases. This report analyzes the Bay Area’s regional violence dynamics from a variety of data sources to provide crucial information about the factors behind this growing public safety concern. Using this data, it provides recommendations to regional leaders on how best to tackle this issue and improve public safety in the near-term. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT:  In recent years, there has been a sustained increase in shootings and gun homicides - with an increase in highway shootings in particular - in the Bay Area. This has implications for the cities of Oakland, Stockton, San Francisco, and Antioch. However, there has been little public study conducted to-date into these increases. This report analyzes the Bay Area’s regional violence dynamics from a variety of data sources to provide crucial information about the factors behind this growing public safety concern. Using this data, it provides recommendations to regional leaders on how best to tackle this issue and improve public safety in the near-term 

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 13p.

 By Vaughn Crandall, et al.

Bakersfield is a large and rapidly growing city in the Central Valley that has an exceptionally high need for effective violence intervention and prevention strategies. This is supported by crime and violence data; health, social and economic indicators. Gun violence in particular is a serious, long-term problem in Bakersfield, with rates double of those of the state and national overall. In many neighborhoods, a homicide or non-fatal injury shooting takes place almost every day and has a significant negative impact on community health and wellbeing. Based on homicide records from 2014-2019, as well as the problem analysis undertaken as part of this project, high risk social networks (gangs, crews, high risk street groups, etc.) appear to play a major role in community violence. The risk of violence; poor health, educational and economic indicators; and strengthening community-police relations have been real concerns in Bakersfield for many years. While Bakersfield has a higher poverty rate than many California cities; it has a somewhat lower overall violent crime rate but a particular problem with gun and gang violence. The State of California’s CALVIP Grant program presented a much-needed opportunity to take on this difficult challenge in a more comprehensive and evidence-informed way. This opportunity allowed Bakersfield city and community leaders to analyze the dynamics of violence in Bakersfield, and the needs of young people at highest risk of involvement in violence, so they could more effectively intervene and break the cycle of violence. Bakersfield’s CalVIP-funded GVRS strategy combines concepts from several evidence-informed strategies: the group violence reduction strategy (also known as focussed deterrence) is a primary framework, with elements of police-community trust building (through procedural justice) and significant investment in building community violence intervention (CVI) capacity. Focussed deterrence is supported by a significant body of research evidence; while community violence intervention and procedural justice are also supported by growing research evidence (Abt 2017, Braga 2018, Buggs 2022). This combined strategy seeks to reduce violence citywide while providing support and opportunities for community members at highest risk of violence. Together, the city and community partners also work to strengthen community-police relations with residents and neighborhoods who are directly impacted by violence

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 11p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Reygan Cunningham, and Robin Campbell

Gun violence inflicts a grim toll on our nation. Every single day, 120 Americans are killed with guns and more than 200 are shot and wounded. Gun violence is the leading cause of death of children and teens in the U.S. Homicide is the leading cause of death for Black men under 44 and the second leading cause of death for Latino men. Both African American and Latinx communities are impacted by gun violence at rates that far exceed those of white communities. The economic consequences have been calculated to exceed $550 billion annually. Gun violence inflicts a grim toll on our nation. Every single day, 120 Americans are killed with guns and more than 200 are shot and wounded. Gun violence is the leading cause of death of children and teens in the U.S.1 Homicide is the leading cause of death for Black men under 44 and the second leading cause of death for Latino men.23 Both African American and Latinx communities are impacted by gun violence at rates that far exceed those of white communities.4 The economic consequences have been calculated to exceed $550 billion annually.5 California’s 2023 passage of the Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Act, colloquially referred to as AB 28, represents the first time that a US state resolved to tax the gun industry in order to fund programs that would address community gun violence. By imposing a modest 11% excise tax on gun sellers and manufacturers, this historic policy will channel nearly $160 million per year to a range of programs supported by the state’s Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Fund. The largest share of this funding, $75 million, is for the California Violence Intervention and Prevention (CalVIP) grant program, focused on community violence intervention, an increasingly effective field of public safety work that engages people who are most likely to be victims or perpetrators of gun violence to reduce their risk of harm. AB 28 was an audacious idea. It was also a longshot for California, because the state requires a two-thirds majority on any legislation that would increase taxes. This report is an overview of how a diverse coalition of advocates, local practitioners, and policy organizations (The CalVIP Coalition) conceived of, and passed, transformative legislation to establish community violence intervention (CVI) as a permanent part of the state’s public safety infrastructure, including a permanent and dedicated source of public funding. A case study for others interested in pursuing similar strategies, this report concludes with a summary of key elements that contributed to this landmark initiative’s success.  

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2024. 18p.

By Mitchell L. Doucette, Alexander D. McCourt, Cassandra K. Crifasi, and Daniel W. Webster

The United States faces rapidly rising rates of violent crime committed with firearms. In this study, we sought to estimate the impact of changes to laws that regulate the concealed carrying of weapons (concealed-carry weapons (CCW) laws) on violent crimes committed with a firearm.We used augmented synthetic control models and random-effects meta-analysis to estimate state-specific effects andtheaverageeffectofadoptingshall-issue CCW permitting laws on rates of 6 violent crimes: homicide with a gun, homicide by other means, aggravated assault with a gun, aggravated assault with a knife, robbery with a gun, and robbery with a knife. The average effects were stratified according to the presence or absence of several shall-issue permit provisions. Adoption of a shall-issue CCW law was associated with a 9.5% increase in rates of assault with a firearm during the first 10 years after law adoption and was associated with an 8.8% increase in rates of homicide by other means. When shall-issue laws allowed violent misdemeanants to acquire CCW permits, the laws were associated with higher rates of gun assaults. It is likely that adoption of shall-issue CCW laws has increased rates of nonfatal violent crime committed with firearms. Harmful effects of shall-issue laws are most clear when provisions intended to reduce risks associated with civilian gun-carrying are absent. 

American Journal of Epidemiology 192(3) 2023.   

By Cassandra K. Crifasi, Julie Ward, Alex D. McCourt,  Daniel Webster & Mitchell L. Doucette 

 Background

Fatal and nonfatal shootings by police are a public health issue that warrants additional research. Prior research has documented associations between fatal shootings by police and gun ownership, legislative strength scores, and lax concealed carry weapons laws. Despite research on other firearm-related outcomes, little is known about the impact of permit-to-purchase (PTP) laws on shootings by police. We generated counts of fatal and nonfatal OIS from the Gun Violence Archive from 2015 to 2020. We conducted cross-sectional regression modeling with a Poisson distribution and robust standard errors. In addition to PTP, we included several state-level policies that may be associated with shootings by police: comprehensive background check only (CBC-only) laws, concealed carry licensing laws, stand your ground laws, violent misdemeanor prohibitions, and extreme risk protection orders (ERPO). We controlled for state-level demographic characteristics and included a population offset to generate incidence rate ratios (IRR).

Findings

PTP laws were associated with a 28% lower rate in shootings by police [IRR = 0.72, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.64–0.81]. Shall Issue (IRR = 1.34, 95% CI 1.17–1.53) and Permitless (IRR = 1.61, 95% CI 1.35–1.91) concealed carry laws and CBC-only laws (IRR = 1.12, 95% CI 1.01–1.25) were associated with higher rates of shootings by police. Stand your ground, violent misdemeanor prohibitions, and ERPO laws were not associated with shootings by police.

Conclusions

Our study found that PTP laws were associated with significantly lower rates of shootings by police. Removing restrictions on civilian concealed carry was associated with significantly higher rates. State-level firearm policies may be a lever to address shootings by police.

Injury Epidemiology,  10, 28 (2023).

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

By Megan K. McBride, Kaia Haney, Michelle Strayer, and Jessica Stern

Despite the focus on suicide terrorism over the past 20 years—particularly by media outlets, policy-makers, and academics—scholarship regarding suicidality in domestic terrorism remains sparse. The post-9/11 research related to suicidality in terrorism has largely focused on the suicide terrorism of Islamist extremists. The research that touches on domestic terrorism, however, is both limited and inconclusive. Lankford, for example, has argued that suicidality is one of three key similarities between perpetrators of suicide terrorism and perpetrators of mass shootings. But a 2017 article by Freilich et al., whose research focused on far-right and jihadi attacks in the US, found that suicide attackers were no more likely than non-suicide attackers to have previously attempted suicide. By contrast, suicidality among those who carry out public shootings is well documented. Jillian Peterson and James Densley, leveraging The Violence Prevention Project’s (TVPP’s) Mass Shooter Database, found that 70 percent of the 197 individuals who committed mass shootings over the past 60 years either had a history of suicidality or intended to die carrying out their attack. Retrospective research by the US Secret Service on school shooters from 1974 to 2000 found that at least 78 percent had experienced suicidal thoughts or engaged in suicidal behavior before their attack. And an analysis leveraging the Columbia Mass Murder Database found that nearly half of all mass shooters died by suicide at the scene of their attack. Mass shootings, as Peterson and Densley have noted, may in fact be “crimes of despair.” We leveraged a new dataset—the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD)—to explore whether domestic terrorism attacks may also be crimes of despair. The database captures publicly available information (e.g., media reporting, court records) on the life histories of 320 individuals who carried out a non-Islamist terrorist attack in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Our data suggest that domestic terrorists in general may be more suicidal than the general population but significantly less suicidal than mass shooters except when domestic terrorists kill four or more people (notably, four is the number of deaths required for a shooting to meet the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of a mass shooting). DTOLD contains three variables relevant to the question of suicidality: history of suicidality (including suicide attempts and suicidal ideation), intention to die while committing a terrorist attack, and death by suicide during or immediately after a terrorist attack. Collecting data on suicidality is difficult, but 19.3 percent (62) of the individuals in DTOLD have been coded positively for at least one of the three indicators of suicidality. This rate is notably higher than the rate calculated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which is 4.37 percent for men (89 percent of those in DTOLD are men). This rate is still lower, however, than TVPP’s rate of 70 percent among mass shooters.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By Megan K. McBride and Monique Jenkins

Within the public violence literature—that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others—leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack.1 This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience.2 Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media.3 Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescents perpetrated mass murders,4 mass shootings,5 political and public figure assassinations,6 and domestic terrorism.7 For this reason, leakage—which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones—can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. For example, one study found that 40 percent* of violent extremists had engaged in a crime before their act of extremist violence.8 Another study reported differences in system contact for lone and group-affiliated actors among American far-right extremists who committed fatal attacks. Specifically, it found that 61.7 percent of lone actors, but just 51.1 percent of group-affiliated extremists had prior arrests.9 In addition, multiple case studies exploring the personal histories of small populations of violent extremists have included information on system contact.10 However, comprehensive research exploring previous contact between system stakeholders and individuals engaged in domestic terrorism is relatively scarce. We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be “catchable” in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By : Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

* Suicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U03, X60–X84, and Y87.0. Firearm-involved suicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes X72–X74.† Homicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U01–U02, X85–Y09, and Y87.1. Firearm-involved homicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U01.4 and X93–X95.

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In 2022, among persons aged ≥10 years, the percentage of suicide deaths involving a firearm was lowest among persons aged 25–44 years (47.4%) and highest among persons aged ≥65 years (70.6%). The percentage of homicide deaths that involved a firearm was highest among persons aged 10–24 years and then decreased with age, from 92.2% among those aged 10–24 years to 44.5% among those aged ≥65 years.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024;73:828. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7337a3

By Jennifer L. Behrens & Joseph Blocher

At a time when Second Amendment doctrine has taken a strongly historical turn and gun rights advocates have increasingly argued that gun regulation itself is historically racist, it is especially important that historical claims about race and guns be taken seriously and vetted appropriately. In this short article, we evaluate the often-repeated claim that the nickname “Saturday Night Special” derives from the phrase “[n___er]-town Saturday night.” Based on a review of newspapers, legislative debates, dictionaries, slang compendiums, and other sources, we find no historical support for this claim. It apparently appeared for the first time, unsourced, in a 1976 article and has been repeated in dozens of briefs and scholarly sources since. Advocates and scholars should stop invoking this unsupported origin story, which if anything serves as a cautionary example of how citations can cascade. The most plausible origin of the nickname as it related to cheap firearms stemmed from the turn of the century when the phrase “Saturday night special” was already in common usage with connotations of cheapness and convenience. 

108 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 283 (2024)