Open Access Free Library
TERRORISM.jpeg

TERRORISM

Terrorism-Domestic-International-Radicalization-War-Weapons-Trafficking-Crime-Mass Shootings

Posts in Violence and Oppression
'Gotta Make Your Own Heaven' : Guns, Safety, and the Edge of Adulthood in New York City

By Rachel Swaner, Elise White, Andrew Martinez, Anjelica Camacho, Basaime Spate, Javonte Alexander, Lysondra Webb, and Kevin Evans

Despite a significant decline in violent crime nationally over the last 15 years, high rates of gun violence persist among youth in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods (Children’s Defense Fund 2019). In New York City, gun violence has been increasing in specific communities, with many attributing the increase to youth gang conflicts (Sandoval 2019; Watkins 2019). Efforts to prevent young people from acquiring guns must address the reasons why they are getting guns, not just the logistics of how they are doing so. This is especially true given that young people acquire them almost exclusively through the informal economy (Webster, Meyers & Buggs 2014), likely eluding traditional policy interventions. This project investigated the experiences of New York City youth ages 16-24 who were at high risk for gun violence (e.g., carried a gun, been shot or shot at). Youth participants were recruited from three neighborhoods with historically high rates of gun violence when compared to the city as a whole—Brownsville (Brooklyn), Morrisania (Bronx), and East Harlem (Manhattan). We explored the complex confluence of individual, situational, and environmental factors that influence youth gun acquisition and use. This study is part of a broader effort to build an evidence-based foundation for individual and community interventions, and policies that will more effectively support these young people and prevent youth gun violence. Through interviews with 330 youth, we sought to answer these questions: 1. What are the reasons young people carry guns? 2. How do young people talk about having and using guns? 3. What are young people’s social networks like, and what roles do guns play in these networks? Youth were recruited through respondent-driven sampling, with initial interviews accessed through outreach at Cure Violence programs (gun violence prevention programs with credible messengers on staff), observation at outdoor public housing project “hot spots,” and ethnography at indoor gang spaces. These initial interview participants then helped recruit other eligible youth from their social networks. Participatory Methods  Participatory methods and trust-building were vital to accessing these youth. Early in the study, we faced challenges in gaining trust and candid responses from these heavily streetinvolved youth—unsurprising given the sensitive nature of our questions regarding guns, gangs, and violence. Accordingly, it was critical to employ field researchers—the people conducting the interviews and the public face of the project—with significant personal experience in the social networks of the target population. Some of our team members reflected the demographic composition of the neighborhoods and had connections to the street in such a way that research participants could, as these field researchers explain, “feel your gangsta.” Beyond merely ensuring access, this approach also led to more honest engagement from the interviewees. It further yielded more accurate analysis and interpretation, as field researchers not only conducted many of the interviews, but also helped to code and analyze the data, draw study conclusions, and develop recommendations. The importance of building trust with 16- to 24-year-olds at risk for gun violence cannot be overstated. The processes for gaining trust in each neighborhood differed significantly; this geographic specificity further played out on the micro level within specific housing developments and indoor gang spaces. New approaches had to be identified in each location. Researchers collected data in the areas gangs or housing developments “controlled,” since that was where the participants felt the most comfortable. To undertake this networking, researchers had to be consistently present and visible in spaces important to participants, showing respect for local gang politics, and acknowledging interpersonal and social trauma. The necessity of a street ethnography/participatory approach and ongoing trust-building meant the team consistently put in long hours on activities not immediately connected to the project deliverables, such as helping neighborhood youth create resumes and apply to jobs, navigate housing issues, and connect to services; providing food; and attending holiday parties and community events. Further, our research team had countless spontaneous interactions with community members such as basketball games and informal conversations about hip-hop or politics. We also found it essential to engage gang leadership in each new neighborhood we worked in. This involved our field researchers identifying and meeting with the heads of local gangs to discuss the research and answer any questions they had. During these meetings, field researchers disclosed their own past street involvement and familiarity with gang culture. Once these relationships were solidified, gang leaders gave our team permission to conduct interviews with members of their gang in the physical spaces they controlled. We would not have gotten access to the high number of young gun carriers without this engagement and relationship building with gang leaders. As we release this report, sweeping national protests against the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Rayshard Brooks by police officers, specifically, and continued police violence against people of color more broadly are pushing many jurisdictions to reexamine traditional approaches to public safety. This research—arguably the most ambitious of its kind—into why some young New Yorkers carry guns can be used to inform new strategies for keeping communities safe. This summary outlines our study findings, and the implications for policymakers. Major Findings Analysis of interview data revealed findings across five areas: participants’ neighborhoods, guns and violence, gangs, alternative-economy survival strategies, and the police. Key findings from each of these areas are below. Participants and Their Neighborhoods • Demographics The 330 youth in the study overwhelmingly were men (79%), living in public housing (78%), and Black or Latinx (94%). On average, participants were 21 years old. A higher percentage of the women interviewed had children (58%, v. 31% for men). • Neighborhood Perceptions Most reported it was easy to get drugs (83%), there was a lot of crime (78%), and there were regular gunshots (70% said at least monthly) in their neighborhood. Over a third (36%) reported hearing weekly about someone threatened with a gun. • Lack of Neighborhood Safety Lack of safety was reported as a major driver of gun carrying. Participants reported feeling unsafe because of beefs between rival gangs or housing projects affecting how they could “move”—i.e., where they could safely walk or go; police harassment for small infractions but lack of responsiveness for serious crime; and fear of being shot by a police officer. • Violent Victimization Violence was a near universal experience among the young people we interviewed. Eighty-one percent had been shot or shot at. Experiences with violent victimization often related to being in the wrong place at the wrong time, having fights related to romantic relationships, and getting caught up in gang-related altercations. Some participants made explicit connections between their victimization, attendant decrease in trust of others, and feeling that carrying a weapon was the only choice left to them. • Gun Carrying Practices Most participants (87%) had owned or carried a gun at some time. Participants reported being more likely to carry at nighttime. Those who carried all the time—i.e., night and day—identified the gun as central to their strategies for selfpreservation. • Carrying for Protection These communities’ lengthy histories of violent victimization at the hands of other residents and the police—whether or not participants had themselves been injured—were repeatedly cited as the backdrop against which decisions around weapons-carrying were made. Some youth reported carrying guns because of their pervasive sense of neighborhood mistrust and a feeling that they could be victimized at any time—a kind of generalized fear. Other participants felt a more localized fear— needing protection from people seeking retaliation. Finally, many participants felt a sense of overarching fear of the state, primarily in the form of law enforcement. “You gotta protect your life because the cops might shoot you.” (Black man, 24) • Gender Nuances Self-protection took on further nuances for female participants who were involved in traditionally male street activities. The women in our study indicated that their gender did not exempt them from retaliation and in some cases even increased  (continued) 

New York: Center for Court Innovation . 2020. 68p.

Terrorist Propaganda

By Travers Barclay Child, Kai Gehring, Sarah Langlotz, Austin Wright, and Rossella De Sabbata

This paper leverages granular survey data from within the conflict theater of Afghanistan to investigate how plausibly exogenous exposure to Islamic State (IS) propaganda in-fluences views towards local and international forces. We study two mediums of ter-rorist propaganda, exploiting high-frequency time variation in global distribution of IS videos and plausibly exogenous signal penetration of a prominent IS radio tower in Afghanistan. Our findings suggest violent video and radio content undermines public support for IS and its key opponents, while increasing demand for international forces to remain in the country. By contrast, videos depicting a capacity for IS governance boost their support.

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2024-121
Chicago: University of Chicago, The Becker Friedman Institute for Economics (BFI) , 2024. 59p.

American Indian/ Alaska Native Victims of Lethal Firearm Violence in the United States 

By Terra Wiens

Gun violence impacts all communities in the United States, though each in different ways. Communities of color are especially impacted by fatal gun violence.a While substantial research has described the disproportionate impact gun violence, specifically firearm homicide, has on Black communities, less research has been done to describe the impact on the American Indian or Alaska Native (AI/AN) community in the U.S. This study examines the impact of lethal firearm violence in the AI/AN community in the U.S. by analyzing mortality data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)b and Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) data submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While CDC mortality data capture more homicides in the U.S. compared to crime data, FBI SHR data provide additional details about homicide deaths not available in the CDC data used for this report. Therefore, this report includes CDC mortality data to describe victim demographics and the use of firearms for both homicide and suicide, while FBI SHR data describe the victim and offender relationship and circumstances for homicides  

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2024. 19p.

Firearms and Violent Deaths in Europe: An Exploratory Analysis of the Linkages Between Gun Ownership, Firearms Legislation and Violent Death

Nils Duquet & Maarten Van Alstein

On a regular basis, news stories appear in the media about public shootings where shooters use their guns to open fire and kill people in shopping malls or on school campuses. Mostly these stories deal with incidents in the United States. Over the last years, however, a number of European countries have experienced similar public shooting incidents. Notable cases were the shootings at Tuusula and Kauhajoki in Finland (2007 and 2008), the killings in Cumbria in the UK (2010), the Utøya attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway (2011), and the shootings at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands and Liège in Belgium in 2011. Public shootings draw a high level of media attention. Less striking in the public eye, but not less significant – not least in quantitative terms –, are the numbers of people in Europe killed by firearms in the context of gun-related crime or in domestic shootings. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010, over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter were killed by firearms in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). Every year, over 4000 suicides by firearm are registered in the EU. This means that, on average, there are 0.24 homicides and 0.9 suicides by firearm per 100,000 population in Europe every year.

Compared with the US or other countries around the globe, the rates of gun-related violent death in Europe are rather low, certainly where the homicide rates are concerned. This does not mean, however, that the problem of gun violence has not appeared on the European policy radar in recent years. On the contrary, the attention devoted to the problem by law enforcement agencies and policy-makers has been growing. Reacting not only to shooting incidents such as those mentioned above, but also to warnings by police and law enforcement agencies that criminals are increasingly willing to use (heavy) firearms and that illegal trafficking in firearms is on the rise, a number of European countries have announced policy interventions targeted at reducing levels of gun-related violence and crime. The European Commission has also become an active actor in firearms policy. In October 2013 it announced a plan to reduce gun violence in Europe, in which it defined the misuse of firearms, whether legally-owned or illicitly manufactured or acquired, as “a serious threat to the EU’s security from both an internal and external perspective”. One of the major problems the Commission identified in its initial policy papers was the problem of a lack of sound and adequate knowledge about firearms in Europe. The commission noted that “a lack of solid EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy and operational responses”.. One of the ambitions of the EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy is, therefore, to address the gaps in knowledge concerning gun violence.

An additional problem is that the lack of reliable and comprehensive information on firearms in Europe is not limited to the sphere of law enforcement and policy-making. European scholarly research focusing specifically on firearms availability, gun control and gun-related violence is scarce. There is a research community in Europe focusing on small arms and light weapons (SALW), but it is predominantly concerned with the export of firearms and the connections between these arms flows and violence in developing, transitional or fragile states outside Europe. Scientific research on firearms and gun-related violence in the domestic European context is much less advanced. The scanty research efforts made in this field by epidemiologists, criminologists and legal scholars remain fragmented, and suffer from the fact that there is no integrated scholarly community dealing with gun-related issues. Language barriers, moreover, often prevent the wider dissemination of research results. Given this relative lack of European firearms research, American studies are still clearly dominant at present in research on the links between the availability of firearms and gun-related violence. Greene and Marsh have calculated that out of the 665 studies on firearms and violence that they reviewed, 64% were about the USA. Of the remaining studies not on the USA, 13% concerned cross-national comparisons or articles in which the geographical focus was unspecified (such as reviews), while 8% were about developing countries. Only 15% concerned other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, the UK and Germany. Given the particularities of the American context, and more specifically the fact that the US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths and crime among industrialized democracies, simply transposing the results of American research to the European context is problematic.

What are the levels of firearms availability in Europe? Are there links between the levels of gun ownership in European countries and these countries’ rates of violence and violent death? And what is the impact of European gun laws on public safety and health? The absence of evidence specifically for the European context makes it difficult for policy-makers and researchers to find impartial and unbiased answers to these questions. Hence the pressing need for research that specifically focuses on gun-related violence in the European context: and with the present report, we would like to make a contribution to that effort. As we are moving into largely uncharted territory, our analysis of the European situation will necessarily be exploratory. Our primary ambition is to collect and take stock of the fragmented evidence that is available on gun-related violence in Europe. Our geographical coverage will be broader than the EU and encompasses a group of approximately 40 European countries, although in some instances we will limit our analyses to the EU28.

In the report’s first chapter, we briefly dwell on one of the most crucial variables in research on gun control and violence: the level of gun ownership in society. Although the prevalence or availability of firearms is a key variable, collecting adequate data on levels of gun ownership can be troublesome. In chapter 1 we therefore devote some space to a critical assessment of the available statistics for Europe. Next, in chapter 2, we look at gun-related violence in Europe. Given the absence of good data on gun-related violence in general, including information not only on mortality but also on injuries and other forms of firearms-related victimization, we will focus exclusively on violent deaths – which seems a legitimate methodological choice for exploratory purposes. We urge the reader, however, to keep in mind that gun-related violence is a much more complex phenomenon than this focus might suggest. As is normal in research dealing with gun control not only from a public safety but also a public health perspective, we shall look both at gun-related homicides and at suicides. Taking the analysis further, we then ask in chapters 3 and 4 whether rates of gun possession and violent death in Europe are correlated: do high levels of gun possession in European countries correlate with high levels of homicide and suicide? The results of probing that question lead us to suggest that research into gun possession and violent death should also factor in the effects of firearms legislation. Specific European research into this question is scarce, which makes it difficult at the moment to arrive at conclusions for the whole of Europe. In chapter 5 we therefore focus on the results of three recent studies on the effects of stricter gun legislation on violent death rates in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland.

Flemish Peace Institute Report June 2015

The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: The Mass Killing that Changed the World

By Ivan Katchanovski

This open-access book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Maidan massacre in Ukraine. It uses a theoretical framework of rational choice, moral hazard, state-repression backfire, and Weberian ideas about rational action to explore the massacre. The book draws on publicly available videos, photos, and audio recordings of the massacre in English, Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and other languages, along with several hundred individual testimonies and revelations from the Ukrainian investigation and a trial and its verdict. By examining which parties were responsible for the massacre, the book analyses its implications for not only Russia’s war on Ukraine but also political developments across the globe.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 266p.

Russian State Terrorism and State Sponsorship of Terrorism

By Kacper Rekawek  

The field of terrorism studies has traditionally been focused on non-state perpetrators of violence, such as different jihadi organizations which have been active in the West in the last three decades. Things looked different, however, during the Cold War, when state actors actively involved themselves in terrorism by, for example, supporting terrorist organizations operating abroad. This report takes stock of Russia's return to such a paradigm in the 21st century in general and after 2022, the onset of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine, in particular. Russia not only terrorizes its population into submission but also uses homegrown terrorists for Vladimir Putin's regime's domestic ends, deploys terrorist tactics while fighting against Ukraine, and seems increasingly willing and able to use those tactics as part of its foreign policy toolbox in its "political warfare" against the broader West. For this reason, it is argued that one could seriously consider labeling Russia a "state terrorist" or a "state sponsor of terrorism." The report concludes that this might prove challenging in 2024, but also offers a way forward for prosecuting, sentencing, and arresting individuals involved in Russian state terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)    2024. 27p.

Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness

Edited by Alex P. Schmid

This document compiles 35 chapters and over 1000 pages and thereby aims to provide an authoritative resource on terrorism prevention and preparedness. The Handbook is structured into five parts, comprising 32 chapters, next to the two introductory chapters and a concluding chapter by the editor followed by a comprehensive bibliography as follows: Part I: Lessons for Terrorism Prevention from the Literature in Related Fields (4 chapters); Part II: Prevention of Radicalization (6 chapters); Part III: Prevention of Preparatory Acts (7 chapters); Part IV: Prevention of, and Preparedness for, Terrorist Attacks  (10 chapters); Part V: Preparedness and Consequence Management (5 chapters

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) , 2020.1312p.

Perpetrator Characteristics and Firearm Use in Pediatric Homicides: Supplementary Homicide Reports - United States, 1976 to 2020

By Mark T. Berg, Ethan M. Rogers and Hannah Rochford

Background

Describe trends in perpetrator characteristics and firearm use in pediatric homicides across the United States.

Methods

Multiply-imputed data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1976–2020 Supplementary Homicide Reports were used to estimate perpetrator characteristics (sex, age, and relationship to victim) and firearm use in pediatric homicides. Descriptive analyses were stratified by victim age group, sex, race, and five-year periods.

Results

Family members were the most common perpetrators of infant and toddler (ages 0–4) and child (ages 5–12) homicides, whereas acquaintances accounted for the majority of adolescent (ages 13–19) homicides. Perpetrator characteristics vary across victim sex and race, particularly among adolescents. Despite overall stability, there were changes in perpetrator characteristics from 1976 to 2020. There was a sustained increase in the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm. In 2016–2020, the proportion of firearm-involved homicides was an all-time high for infants and toddlers (14.8%), children (53.1%), and adolescent victims (88.5%).

Conclusions

Policy interventions that improve family stability and well-being may be most effective at preventing infant, toddler, and child homicides, whereas programs that target peer and community relationships, as well as policies that focus on firearm access, maybe more crucial for preventing adolescent homicides.

Injury Epidemiology volume 11, Article number: 37 (2024) 

Crime Gun Intelligence : An Evidence-Based Approach to Solving Violent Crime 

By The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

The National Crime Gun Intelligence (CGI) Governing Board leverages the collective experience of Federal, State, and local experts working in forensics, law enforcement, and criminal law to ensure that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) receives valuable input on national programs relating to CGI. As part of this mission, the Governing Board created this best practice guide to help our law enforcement partners successfully use a CGI model to reduce violent crime.

Washington, DC:  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Firearms Operations Division, 2020. 77p.  

Mass Outcome or Mass Intent? A Proposal for an Intent-Focused, No-Minimum Casualty Count Definition of Public Mass Shooting Incidents

By Emily Ann Greene-Colozzi  and Jason R. Silva

In this commentary, we propose a unifying public mass shooting definition that captures the generally conceptualized phenomenon but also expands the inclusion to all incidents regardless of casualty count. We suggest that public mass shootings be broken down into four outcome categories – completed, attempted, failed, and foiled – which have unique incident outcomes but share a common thread of mass intent. We argue for the importance of a no-minimum casualty count definition (thus including zero casualties) that emphasizes mass intent rather than the completion of the shooting. We highlight the value of and rationale for this definition by discussing the limitations of current victim criteria, and we conclude with a proposed strategy that emphasizes objective indicators of mass intent.

Journal of Mass Violence Research, 2022 Volume: 1, Issue: 2, September 2022: Pages 27-41 

Mitigating the Harm of Public Mass Shooting Incidents through Situational Crime Prevention

By  Emily Ann Greene-Colozzi

This dissertation used environmental theoretical frameworks to understand how public mass shooting incidents are impacted by aspects of the crime situation and opportunity. Predatory, public shootings perpetrated by individuals with evidence of mass intent were examined in the United States between 1966 and 2019. This project progressed in several distinct steps with discrete aims: (1) establish an open source database of public mass shooting incidents meeting definitional criteria; (2) perform statistical analysis, including latent class analysis, regression modeling, and structural equational modeling to assess research questions; and (3) perform comparative case studies and crime script analysis to assess situational crime prevention failure or success in eight purposively selected cases. Two research questions, guided by pathway to violence literature, rational choice perspective, and situational crime prevention, were examined: (1) can public mass shooting perpetrators be sorted into meaningful classes according to preparatory and warning signs behaviors?; and (2) how do the built environment and situational guardianship structure of the public mass shooting location influence incident casualties and severity outcomes? Results from this mixed methods study indicate that public mass shooting perpetrators fall into three distinct behavioral classes characterized by different probabilities of warning signs behaviors. Next, there is a protective role of holistic situational crime prevention for mitigating harm of public mass shooting incidents. Protective environmental design exerted a contradictory effect on incident outcomes, mediated by perpetrator and victim behaviors during the shooting. Case studies revealed that failure is often due to human error in implementation of established SCP protocols, rather than a lack of SCP protocols. Implications for prevention and harm mitigation are discussed.

New York: CUNY, 2022. 365p.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: TECHNOLOGICAL PROMISES AND PRACTICAL REALITIES

By: Vladislav Chernavskikh

Recent advances in the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have increased state interest in leveraging AI for military purposes. Military integration of advanced AI by nuclear-armed states has the potential to have an impact on elements of their nuclear deterrence architecture such as missile early-warning systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), as well as related conventional systems.

At the same time, a number of technological and logistical factors can potentially limit or slow the adoption of AI in the nuclear domain. Among these are unreliability of output, susceptibility to cyberattacks, lack of good-quality data, and inadequate hardware and an underdeveloped national industrial and technical base.

Given the current and relatively early stage of military adoption of advanced AI, the exploration of these factors lays the groundwork for further consideration of the likely realities of integration and of potential transparency measures and governance practices at the AI–nuclear nexus.

SIPRI Background Paper, September 2024

Homeland Threat Assessment 2025

By: Office of Intelligence and Analysis

The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats.

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland.

In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types.

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target v U.S. Department of Homeland Security ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law.

The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process.

BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises.

ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2024

Firearm Justifiable Homicides and Non-Fatal Self-Defense Gun Use.  An Analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation and National Crime Victimization Survey Data  

By The Violence Policy Center

 Guns are rarely used to kill criminals or stop crimes. In 2019, across the nation there were only 316 justifiable homicides involving a private citizen using a firearm reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program as detailed in its Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR). That same year, there were 9,610 criminal gun homicides tallied in the SHR. In 2019, for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 30 criminal homicides. And this ratio, of course, does not take into account the tens of thousands of lives ended in gun suicides or unintentional shootings that year. This report analyzes, on both the national and state levels, the use of firearms in justifiable homicides. It also details, using the best data available on the national level, the total number of times guns are used for self-defense by the victims of both attempted and completed violent crimes and property crimes whether or not the use of the gun by the victim resulted in a fatality. Key findings of this report, as detailed in its accompanying tables, include the following. JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES WITH A GUN COMPARED TO CRIMINAL GUN HOMICIDES n In 2019, there were only 316 justifiable homicides involving a gun. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, there were only 1,453 justifiable homicides involving a gun. [For additional information see Table One: Firearm Justifiable Homicides by State, 2015-2019. In In 2019, 17 states reported no justifiable homicides (Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). [For additional information see Table One: Firearm Justifiable Homicides by State, 2015-2019.] n In 2019 for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 30 criminal homicides. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, for every justifiable homicide in the United States involving a gun, guns were used in 34 criminal homicides. [For additional information see Table Two: Circumstances for Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RELATIONSHIP OF PERSON KILLED TO SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 40.5 percent (128 of 316) of persons killed in a firearm justifiable homicide were known to the shooter, 38.9 percent (123) were strangers, and in 20.6 percent (65) the relationship was unknown. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 37.6 percent (546 of 1,453) of persons killed in a firearm justifiable homicide were known to the shooter, 44.0 percent (640) were strangers, and in 18.4 percent (267) the relationship was unknown. [For additional information see Table Three: Relationship of Person Killed to Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] SEX OF SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, of the 316 firearm justifiable homicides, 87.0 percent (275) were committed by men, 10.8 percent (34) were committed by women, and in seven cases (2.2 percent) the sex of the shooter was unknown. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, of the 1,453 firearm justifiable homicides, 88.2 percent (1,282) were committed by men, 10.0 percent (145) were committed by women, and in 26 cases (1.8 percent) the sex of the shooter was unknown. [For additional information see Table Four: Sex of Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] SEX OF SHOOTER AND PERSON KILLED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, of the 316 firearm justifiable homicides, 96.8 percent (306) of the persons shot and killed were men and 3.2 percent (10) were women. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, of the 1,453 firearm justifiable homicides, 97.1 percent (1,411) of the persons shot and killed were men and 2.9 percent (42) were women. [For additional information see Table Five: Sex of Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] In 2019, 98.2 percent (270) of the persons killed by a male with a gun in a justifiable homicide were male and 1.8 percent (five) were female. For the five year period 2015 through 2019, 97.4 percent (1,249) of the persons killed by a male with a gun in a justifiable homicide were male and 2.6 percent (33) were female. [For additional information see Table Six: Sex of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 85.3 percent (29) of the persons killed by a female with a gun in a justifiable homicide incident were male and 14.7 percent (five) were female. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 94.5 percent (137) of the persons killed by a female with a gun in a justifiable homicide incident were male and 5.5 percent (eight) were female. [For additional information see Table Six: Sex of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RACE OF SHOOTER IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 48.7 percent (154) of the shooters who committed justifiable homicides were white, 47.5 percent (150) were Black, 0.6 percent (two) were Asian, and 3.2 percent (10) were of unknown race.7 For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 46.5 percent (676) of the shooters who committed justifiable homicides were white, 48.0 percent (697) were Black, 2.5 percent (37) were Asian, 0.5 percent (seven) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 2.5 percent (36) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Seven: Race of Shooter in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] RACE OF PERSON KILLED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY FIREARM n In 2019, 41.1 percent (130) of persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide were white, 57.6 percent (182) were Black, 0.9 percent (three) were Asian, and 0.3 percent (one) were of unknown race. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 37.4 percent (543) of persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide were white, 60.8 percent (884) were Black, 1.0 percent (15) were Asian, 0.6 percent (eight) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 0.2 percent (three) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Eight: Race of Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 70.1 percent (108) of the persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide by a white shooter were white, 28.6 percent (44) were Black, 0.6 percent (one) were Asian, and 0.6 percent (one) were of unknown race. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 67.0 percent (453) of the persons killed by white shooters were white, 30.3 percent (205) were Black, 1.5 percent (10) were Asian, 0.7 percent (five) were American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 0.4 percent (three) were of unknown race. [For additional information see Table Nine: Race of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] n In 2019, 10.7 percent (16) of the persons killed with a gun in a justifiable homicide by a Black shooter were white, 88.7 percent (133) were Black, and 0.7 percent (two) were Asian. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, 9.0 percent (63) of the persons killed by Black shooters were white, 90.7 percent (632) were Black, and 0.3 percent (two) were Asian. [For additional information see Table Nine: Race of Shooter and Person Killed in Justifiable Homicides by Firearm, 2015-2019.] TYPES OF FIREARMS USED IN JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES n In 2019, firearms were used in 86.1 percent of justifiable homicides (316 of 367). Of these: 72.2 percent (228) were handguns; 1.9 percent (six) were shotguns; 4.4 percent (14) were rifles; 21.2 percent (67) were firearms, type not stated; and, 0.3 percent (one) were other gun. For the five-year period 2015 through 2019, firearms were used in 84.2 percent of justifiable homicide incidents (1,453 of 1,725). Of these: 74.4 percent (1,081) were handguns; 3.2 percent (47) were shotguns; 2.9 percent (42) were rifles; 19.1 percent (277) were firearms, type not stated; and, 0.4 percent (six) were other gun. [For additional information see Table Ten: Weapon Used in Justifiable Homicides, 2015-2019 and Table Eleven: Type of Firearms Used in Justifiable Homicides, 2015-2019.]    

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2023. 29p.

Terrorism and the State: Intra-state Dynamics and the Response to Non-State Political Violence

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Kieran McConaghy

State Dynamics in Counter-Terrorism: The book challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, emphasizing the importance of intra-state dynamics and the individual identities of state personnel in shapingcounter-terrorism responses.

Case Studies: It provides comparative analyses of Spain, France, and theUnited Kingdom, highlighting how state responses to terrorism are influenced by historical and cultural contexts.

Emotional and Political Impetus: The book discusses how emotional reactions and political motivations of state personnel impact counter-terrorism strategies, sometimes leading to actions driven by revenge or political gain.

Recommendations for Future Research: It suggests that future studies on counter-terrorism should consider the complexities of the state and the emotional and organizational factors that influence stateactions.

Springer, Aug 22, 2017, 182 pages

Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ozgur Nikbay & Suleyman Hancerli

Understanding TerrorismThis section delves into the psychological profiles of terrorists, theuse of the internet by terrorists, the potential threat of bioterrorism, and the socio-economic factors contributing to terrorism. It emphasizes the importance of education in combating terrorism and understanding the true motives behind terrorist acts.

Suicide Attacks, Radical Terrorism, and Case StudiesThis part examines the characteristics and motivations behind suicide attacks, the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet states, and includes case studies of terrorist incidents. It also explores the financing of terrorism through narcoterrorism and the spatial patterns of terrorist incidents.

Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings, andKidnappingsThis section discusses various strategies and tactics for handling terrorist hostage situations, including negotiation strategies, the psychological aspects of kidnappings, and the importance of proper training and preparation for law enforcement agencies.

Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the FutureThe final section explores different counter-terrorism policies and strategies, such as situational crime prevention, democratic policing, the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism, and the need for international cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining public trust and preventing the radicalization of individuals.

IOS Press, 2007, 431 pages

Dual Tragedies: Domestic Homicide-Suicides with a Firearm

By Everytown Research and Policy

On average, more than once per day in the United States, a tragedy occurs where a perpetrator kills an intimate partner, and then dies by suicide themself. Of these incidents, 93 percent involved a gun, and 95 percent had women killed by their male partners. To document the circumstances and bring attention to the effects of these incidents, in 2024, Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund conducted focus groups with 43 survivors of intimate partner homicide-suicide. The focus group participants were people who survived an attempted intimate partner homicide-suicide, family members, and individuals closely involved with the incident. Through these survivor interviews, we show the importance of understanding the risk factors for intimate partner homicide-suicide and ensuring effective implementation of laws that disarm domestic abusers. The focus groups were approved by the Pearl IRB Institutional Review Board (IRB) to protect the rights, welfare, and confidentiality of participants. Participants in this study were recruited from Everytown for Gun Safety’s database of volunteers and through partner organizations that support survivors of gun violence. Participants received IRB-approved recruitment materials, such as the flyer with the study information, through email and text message. All participants signed a consent form, which included their rights, such as the ability to withdraw from the study at any time. In addition, the researchers provided mental health resources and a licensed clinician on staff with Everytown was on the call to provide emotional support for participants. Following the focus group, every participant received a $25 prepaid Mastercard gift card for their participation in the study. Before the focus groups, participants were asked to complete a survey with demographic and experience questions regarding their race, gender, sexuality, and geographic location in the United States. Participants then attended one of the five focus groups conducted by the researchers. Previous studies have shown that three focus groups are sufficient to capture nearly all themes. Thus, five focus groups provided an adequate sample size to identify a range of themes, and researchers documented theoretical saturation5 at this stage. A focus group methodology was chosen as the most appropriate means to explore gun violence survivors’ experiences and thoughts on trauma. This methodology involves asking a group of participants open-ended questions in a supportive environment that encourages people to share their experiences and views. There are many advantages to focus group research. The method can yield detailed, in-depth information to study social processes, provide insights into complex social phenomena, and facilitate openness among participants as they provide their language to describe their experiences—this is particularly relevant for survivors who share experiences of gun violence. Thus, the focus group approach was used to gain a deeper understanding of the intersections of gun violence and trauma. All focus groups were conducted by a trained researcher and a trauma-informed expert who has some training and experience in running focus groups. The focus groups were conducted and recorded on Zoom. Each participant was asked to rename themselves to protect their anonymity. Each session was also attended by an assistant who observed the focus group to aid in subsequent analysis. Focus groups lasted approximately one hour to one hour and 15 minutes. Data collected from the focus groups were professionally transcribed and then professionally analyzed using Nvivo qualitative coding software. A line-by-line analysis was completed to develop theoretical codes, and three to four focus groups were analyzed at a time to determine themes, categories, and connections across categories and themes. Following the approach of researchers Tiggemann, Gardiner, and Slater, each theme from the focus groups was rated on frequency, intensity, extensiveness, specificity, and level of agreement. These approaches subjected the data to a systematic analysis of themes and concepts.

Washington, DC: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024.

Strategic competition in the age of AI: Emerging risks and opportunities from military use of artificial intelligence

By James Black, Mattias Eken, Jacob Parakilas, Stuart Dee, Conlan Ellis, Kiran Suman-Chauhan, Ryan J. Bain, Harper Fine, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Melusine Lebret, et al.

Artificial intelligence (AI) holds the potential to usher in transformative changes across all aspects of society, economy and policy, including in the realm of defence and security. The United Kingdom (UK) aspires to be a leading player in the rollout of AI for civil and commercial applications, and in the responsible development of defence AI. This necessitates a clear and nuanced understanding of the emerging risks and opportunities associated with the military use of AI, as well as how the UK can best work with others to mitigate or exploit these risks and opportunities.

In March 2024, the Defence AI & Autonomy Unit (DAU) of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) jointly commissioned a short scoping study from RAND Europe. The goal was to provide an initial exploration of ways in which military use of AI might generate risks and opportunities at the strategic level – conscious that much of the research to date has focused on the tactical level or on non-military topics (e.g. AI safety). Follow-on work will then explore these issues in more detail to inform the UK strategy for international engagement on these issues.

This technical report aims to set a baseline of understanding of strategic risks and opportunities emerging from military use of AI. The summary report focuses on high-level findings for decision makers.

Key Findings

One of the most important findings of this study is deep uncertainty around AI impacts; an initial prioritisation is possible, but this should be iterated as evidence improves.

The RAND team identified priority issues demanding urgent action. Whether these manifest as risks or opportunities will depend on how quickly and effectively states adapt to intensifying competition over and through AI.

RAND - Sep 6, 2024

Nuclear Disarmament Summits: A Proposal for Rejuvenating Progress Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

By: KELSEY DAVENPORT

From the document: "This report makes several assessments. [1] Structural factors in the existing array of organizations and treaty bodies focused on disarmament have prevented bold, creative action to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These factors include inadequate or overly broad membership, overreliance on consensus-based decision-making, and limited high-level political engagement. [...] [2] The NSS [nuclear security summit] process offers a model for creating a new series of disarmament summits designed to inject momentum into current efforts to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear arsenals. Certain characteristics of the NSS process contributed to its success. [...] [3] A nuclear disarmament summit process modeled off the NSS process could provide a forum better suited to address new challenges that the existing forums have struggled to tackle in the current geopolitical environment. Like the NSS process, states would be encouraged to make national commitments ('house gifts') and work in partnership to make multinational commitments ('gift baskets') that exceed least-common denominator, consensus-based decision-making. Reporting within the summit process could drive accountability, and high-level political participation could create pressure for leaders to make ambitious but achievable commitments that advance disarmament. This report also argues how a high-level disarmament summit process would complement, not replace, existing initiatives and treaties that form the disarmament architecture."

Sep 2024 ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

The Banality of Good: The UN's Global Fight against Human Trafficking

By Lieba Faier 

 In The Banality of Good, Lieba Faier examines why contemporary efforts to curb human trafficking have fallen so spectacularly short of their stated goals despite well-funded campaigns by the United Nations and its member-state governments. Focusing on Japan’s efforts to enact the UN’s counter-trafficking protocol and assist Filipina migrants working in Japan’s sex industry, Faier draws from interviews with NGO caseworkers and government officials to demonstrate how these efforts disregard the needs and perspectives of those they are designed to help. She finds that these campaigns tend to privilege bureaucracies and institutional compliance, resulting in the compromised quality of life, repatriation, and even criminalization of human trafficking survivors. Faier expands on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the “banality of evil” by coining the titular “banality of good” to describe the reality of the UN’s fight against human trafficking. Detailing the protocols that have been put in place and evaluating their enactment, Faier reveals how the continued failure of humanitarian institutions to address structural inequities and colonial history ultimately reinforces the violent status quo they claim to be working to change.

Durham, NC; London:  Duke University Press,  2024