By Matt Schroeder

Since 1970, armed groups have hit dozens of civilian aircraft with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), killing more than 1,000 civilians. The international community has taken numerous steps to reduce illicit proliferation, but armed groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continue to acquire and use these systems.

Persistent Perils: Illicit MANPADS in the MENA Region—a new Report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment In North Africa (SANA) project—provides an in-depth analysis of the proliferation of MANPADS in North Africa and the Middle East from 2015–23. Drawing on imagery and data collected since 2015 to identify the type, model, generation, and country of design/manufacture of illicit MANPADS in the region, the Report assesses the implications of recent proliferation patterns for regional security and international norms and agreements.  

Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 68pg

By Gary Klein

In light of the difficulty achieving consensus about gun violence prevention at the federal level in the current political climate, leadership and innovation on gun violence prevention must come at the state and local levels. State legislators, law enforcement leaders, and state attorneys general must take the lead to find the pathway that most effectively protects their residents in collaboration with concerned communities. There is substantial evidence that states with comprehensive and effective gun laws have fewer incidents of gun homicides, gun suicides, and unintentional shooting deaths. These 50 proposals for state or local action have demonstrated success where they have been enacted and are a starting point for states interested in promoting public safety by addressing preventable gun violence.  

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2022. 24p.

By The Violence Policy Center

Large capacity ammunition magazines are the common thread running through most mass shootings in the United States. Since 1980, there have been at least 106 mass shootings (three or more fatalities not including the shooter) where the shooter used large capacity ammunition magazines containing more than 10 rounds. A total of 959 people were killed in these shootings, and 1,309 were wounded. This number is likely a significant undercount of actual incidents as there is no consistent collection or reporting on this data. Even in many high-profile shootings, information on magazine capacity is neither released nor reported. The Violence Policy Center has compiled this list of incidents by analyzing news reports and follow-up investigative reports on mass shootings. Only shootings in which there is specific information that large capacity magazines were used are included.  ( This document was last updated on January 11, 2024.

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2024. 17p. 

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; 

  On January 6, 2021, thousands of demonstrators surrounded the U.S. Capitol Building. Demonstrators attacked and injured law enforcement officers and eventually breached the building. The Capitol Police is responsible for protecting the Congress, its Members, staff, visitors, and facilities. The Capitol Police Board oversees the Capitol Police. GAO was asked to review the Capitol Police’s physical security efforts for January 6. This report addresses the Capitol Police and the Board’s: (1) physical security planning for January 6; (2) response to that day’s events, including the procedures for obtaining outside assistance; and (3) process for assessing and mitigating physical security risks. GAO reviewed Capitol Police plans, procedures, hearing statements, timelines, and other documents related to the planning and response on January 6 and how the Capitol Police assesses security risks. GAO also interviewed officials from the Capitol Police Board, the Capitol Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and other federal, state, and local agencies. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations to the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police, including finalizing and documenting procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency, addressing security risks, and considering security recommendations. The Capitol Police Board did not take a position on GAO’s recommendations. The Capitol Police agreed with GAO’s recommendations.  

Washington DC: GAO. 2022, 68pg

By Holger Anders

  This Briefing Paper looks at sources and pathways through which al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked extremists in Mali obtain their arms, ammunition, and explosives. This review includes an analysis of the materiel’s origins, types, and ages. The Briefing Paper presents the author’s assessment of some 800 arms and 12,000 ammunition casings that national and international authorities recovered and granted access to following extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022. Introduction -  By 2022, Mali had faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by violent extremists. Since 2015, this violence has also spread from northern to central and southern parts of Mali, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. This Briefing Paper investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used by al-Qaeda- and IslamicState linked extremists (‘extremists’) as ‘tools of violence’ used in their attacks from 2015 to 2022. It provides an update on findings previously published by the Small Arms Survey concerning the proliferation and trafficking of illicit materiel in northern Mali prior to 2015. Specifically, this Briefing Paper focuses on military materiel legally produced and transferred by state actors before being diverted to extremist use in Mali.2 In so doing, the Briefing Paper examines three topics: 1. continuity in extremist procurement of their ‘tools of violence’; 2. changes in illicitly trafficked materiel and their sources; and 3. extremist network connections identified by the monitoring of this material. A confidential database maintained by the author provides the basis for the technical information concerning extremist-used arms and other material in this Briefing Paper.3 That database contains information about some 400 extremist attacks occurring across Mali between 2015 and 2022 from sites in which national and international authorities recovered extremist-used materiel that was made available for inspection by the author. The database also contains some 200 entries of extremist propaganda claims—documented in videos and texts on social media—relating to extremist attacks in Mali from 2012 to 2022. Interviewees included in this Briefing Paper are not uniformly identified for reasons of security and confidentiality. All information presented in graphs, illustrative maps, and tables is based on the author’s work and information contained within the database. The Briefing Paper first looks at security developments in Mali since 2015.5 It then looks at extremist-held armaments in Mali prior to 2015 and at continuity and change in these armaments after that. The discussion is supplemented with insights into network connections between extremist groups in Mali.6 Key findings Extremists continue to have access to arms and other materiel—including material of recent production— through capture from armed forces and illicit trafficking from the subregion. Libya remains a prominent source for illicitly trafficking military materiel to Mali; however, other sub-regional sources exist. These sources include components for commercial explosives used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mali. Established extremist groups use materiel to support the creation of new cells, which is a key mechanism in the spread of violent extremism in Mali.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 16pg

By F. Lee Francis

This article is the culmination of a yearlong research project, and it is the first to address addiction and drug use in the area of Second Amendment Law. I argue that addicts may be disarmed, if they are dangerous. My dangerousness test centers on illicit use and imminent danger. That is, do the facts and circumstances prove that an individual is in fact a danger. To put it another way, disarmament is appropriate when there exists demonstrable evidence that a person poses a significant and imminent risk of causing public injury. The article develops and expands upon some themes and arguments that were first sketched out in my articles, Armed and Under the Influence: The Second Amendment and the Intoxicant Rule After Bruen (Forthcoming in the Marquette Law Review (2024) and Defining Dangerousness: When Disarmament is Appropriate (Forthcoming Texas Tech Law Review 2024).

There is growing confusion within the lower courts regarding when an individual, particularly those who have a history of drug use or addiction, may have their Second Amendment rights restricted. This paper intends to clarify the appropriate standard. The goal of this article is to aid in determining when an individual should be permanently disarmed.

Part I surveys the history of addiction. This section examines the commonness of addiction around the time of the founding to the early twentieth century. Furthermore, Part I also reviews the relevant legislative action relating to firearm possession, use, and control and addiction. The essential claim of Part I contends that modern laws restricting the possession of a firearm due to addiction are unconstitutional. Following an examination of the relevant history and legislation, Part II considers the arguments in favor of prohibiting addicts from possessing firearms. Part III focuses on the modern and developing controversies surrounding criminalizing the possession of firearms because of an individual’s history of addiction. Part IV, then, examines when an addict may be disarmed.

Francis, F. Lee, The Addiction Restriction: Addiction and the Right to Bear Arms. 2024, 48pg

By: Vivian H. Lyons, Emma L. Gause, Keith R Spangler, et al.

Importance: Firearm violence is a leading public health crisis in the US. Understanding whether and how ambient temperature is associated with firearm violence may identify new avenues for prevention and intervention.

Objective: To estimate the overall and regional association between hotter temperatures and higher risk of firearm violence in the US.

Design, setting, and participants: This cross-sectional study used distributed lag nonlinear models, controlling for seasonality and long-term time trends by city and pooled results overall and by climate region. The most populous cities in the US with the highest number of assault-related firearm incidence (ie, shootings) from 2015 to 2020 were analyzed. Data analysis was performed from October 2021 to June 2022.

Exposures: Maximum daily temperature by city.

Main outcomes and measures: The primary outcome was the number of assault-related firearm shootings by city.

Results: A total of 116 511 shootings in 100 cities were included in this analysis. The pooled analysis estimated that 6.85% (95% CI, 6.09%-7.46%) of all shootings were attributable to days hotter than city-specific median temperatures. This equates to 7973 total shootings (95% CI, 7092-8688 total shootings) across the 100 cities over the 6-year study period, although the number of total persons injured or killed would be higher. Estimated risk of firearm incidents increased almost monotonically with higher temperatures, with a local peak at the 84th percentile of the temperature range corresponding to a relative risk of 1.17 (95% CI, 1.12-1.21) compared with the median temperature. However, even moderately hot temperatures were associated with higher risk of shootings. Although significant, there was low heterogeneity between cities (I2 = 11.7%; Cochran Q test, P = .02), indicating regional or climate-specific variation in the daily temperature and incident shootings relationship.

Conclusions and relevance: These findings underscore the importance of heat adaptation strategies broadly throughout the year to reduce shootings, rather than focusing on only the hottest days.

JAMA Netw Open. 2022 Dec 1;5(12):e2247207. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.47207. PMID: 36525273; PMCID: PMC9856408.

By Bàrbara Molas, Anne Craanen, Sabrina Tripodi, Kacper Rękawek, andThomas Renard

Anti-Government Extremism (AGE) presents a complex and evolving security challenge, particularly in the transatlantic space. AGE is characterised by anti-system sentiments, and adherents propagate notions of an evil elite controlling societal mechanisms, adapting global conspiracy theories to local grievances. While predominantly non-violent, it harbours the potential for violence, posing a significant policy challenge. This report contributes a comprehensive exploration of AGE by utilising original data, including interviews with security officials and an exploration of AGE spaces online, focusing on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Through thematic comparative analysis, it unveils the nature of anti-government groups and individuals, elucidating their transnational linkages both online and offline. By shedding new light on AGE’s manifestations, severity, and responses across jurisdictions, this research illuminates whether AGE constitutes a standalone security concern. Furthermore, it offers insights into practical strategies for addressing AGE, especially in the context of existing policies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The recommendations provided are tailored to the differing characteristics of AGE groups, individuals, and networks, ensuring a nuanced and effective response to this emerging threat, both online and offline.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). 2024, 48pg

By Ángel Gómez , Mercedes Martínez , Francois Alexi Martel , Lucía López-Rodríguez , Alexandra Vázquez , Juana Chinchilla , Borja Paredes , Mal Hettiarachchi , Nafees Hamid , and William B Swann 

We distinguish two pathways people may follow when they join violent groups: compliance and internalization. Compliance occurs when individuals are coerced to join by powerful influence agents. Internalization occurs when individuals join due to a perceived convergence between the self and the group. We searched for evidence of each of these pathways in field investigations of former members of two renowned terrorist organizations: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Study 1) and Islamist radical groups (Study 2). Results indicated that ex-fighters joined LTTE for reasons associated with both compliance and internalization but that ex-fighters joined Islamist radical groups primarily for reasons associated with internalization. When compliance occurred, it often took the form of coercion within LTTE but involved charismatic persuasion agents within Islamist groups. This evidence of systematic differences in the reasons why fighters enter violent groups suggests that strategies for preventing radicalization and fostering de-radicalization should be tailored to particular groups.

Front Psychol. 2021 Jan 7

By Dennis Mares

This document is part of the Response Guide series which is one of three series in the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. Response guides summarize knowledge about whether police should use certain responses to address various crime and disorder problems, and about what effects they might expect. This guide include examples and case studies as it covers the basic principles of gunfire detection and how it works; discusses the efficacy and police uses of acoustic gunshot detection systems, describing types of systems, experimental applications of the technology, and accuracy of acoustic gunshot detection systems; describes the analysis of acoustic gunshot detection system data; recommends best practices for responding to gunshots; and gives advice for implementing acoustic gunshot detection system, noting considerations such as coverage area, costs, personnel needs, interoperability with other systems, training requirements, and other factors that may impact decision-making.

PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE RESPONSE GUIDE SERIES NO. 14 Tempe, AZ: ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2022. 29p

By Daniel S. Lawrence, Nancy G. La Vigne, Paige S. Thompson

This publication represents a technical summary report of the Urban Institute’s evaluation of the implementation, use, and impact of Gunshot Detection Technology (GDT) by law enforcement agencies in three cities: Denver, CO; Milwaukee, WI; and Richmond, CA. The goal of this study was to conduct a rigorous process and impact evaluation of GDT to inform policing researchers and practitioners about the impact GDT may have. To achieve this goal, we implemented a mixed-methods research design. Qualitative data collection included 46 interviews with criminal justice stakeholders to learn implementation processes and challenges associated with iDT, and 6 focus groups with 49 community members to learn how residents feel about policing efforts to reduce firearm violence and its use of GDT. Quantitative data collection included administrative data on calls for service (CFS), crime, and GDT alerts, as well as comprehensive case file reviews of 174 crimes involving a firearm. Quantitative analyses examined the impact of GDT by (1) comparing counts of gunshot notifications for GDT alerts to shooting-related CFS, (2) comparing response times of GDT alerts to shooting-related CFS, (3) examining the impact GDT has had on CFS and crimes, and (4) conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the GDT. Evaluation findings suggest that GDT is generally but not consistently associated with faster response times and more evidence collection, with impact on crime more uneven but generally cost-beneficial. We also conclude that agencies should implement GDT sensors strategically, train officers thoroughly, ensure that GDT data are used and integrated with other systems, and engage with community members early and often. More detailed information from this study will be available in forthcoming journal articles.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute 2019. 15p.

By Dennis Mares and the Center for Crime Science and Violence Prevention

ShotSpotter’s gunshot detection system was deployed in Winston-Salem in August 2021. Since then, nearly 2,000 alerts received a response by Winston-Salem Police.

Results indicate: 

• Improved response to gunfire

  • The response to alerts is significantly quicker than those called in by residents (- 5 min.).

  • ShotSpotter calls received significantly more investigative time, which likely indicates improved evidence recovery.

  • Fewer than one in four ShotSpotter alerts also received a call from residents.

• ShotSpotter produces the following actionable results:

  • Shell casings were recovered in 581 incidents (37.1%)

  • Firearms were recovered in 47 (3%) of alerts.

  • Sixty-seven (3.4%) gun-related arrests are connected to alerts. 

• Deployment of ShotSpotter is related to a reduction in violent gun crimes:

  • Aggravated assaults are down 26% comparing before-after results in the ShotSpotter area.

  • Comparable area and overall city numbers indicate an increase in aggravated assaults during the same period. Comparatively assaults are down 38% in the ShotSpotter community.

  • In real numbers, there are between 51-75 fewer assaults annually in the ShotSpotter area than would be expected. 

• Cost-Benefits:

  • Our estimate suggests that ShotSpotter may save the Winston Salem community between $5 and $8 Million annually.

  • Average annual implementation cost is estimated between $230,000-350,000

  • This indicates a $15-25 return for each dollar spent.

Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University, Center for Crime Science and Violence Prevention, 2024. 27p.

By Eric L. Piza, Rachael A. Arietti, Jeremy G. Carter & George O. Mohler

Objectives

This study tests whether (1) shots fired calls for service in the gunshot detection technology (GDT) target area are more likely to be classified as unfounded; (2) police responses to shootings in the GDT target area are more likely to recover ballistic evidence or firearms; and (3) shootings in the GDT target area are more likely to be cleared.

Methods

Entropy balancing created a weighted control group that equaled the treatment group across a range of covariates. GDT effect was tested through logistic regression models with entropy balancing weights set as probability weights.

Results

Shots fired occurring in the GDT target area were 15% more likely to be classified as unfounded compared to control cases. GDT did not significantly influence the likelihood of evidence collection or case clearance in shooting incidents.

Conclusions

GDT may not add investigative value to police responses to shooting incidents and may increase patrol workload.

J Exp Criminol (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-023-09594-6

By Eric L. Piza, David N. Hatten, Jeremy G. Carter, Jonas H. Baughman, George O. Mohler

Gunshot Detection Technology (GDT) is expected to impact gun violence by accelerating the discovery and response to gunfire. GDT should further collect more accurate spatial data, as gunfire is assigned to coordinates measured by acoustic sensors rather than addresses reported via 9-1-1 calls for service (CFS). The current study explores the level to which GDT achieves these benefits over its first five years of operation in Kansas City, Missouri. Data systems are triangulated to determine the time and location gunfire was reported by GDT and CFS. The temporal and spatial distances between GDT and CFS are then calculated. Findings indicate GDT generates time savings and increases spatial precision as compared to CFS. This may facilitate police responses to gunfire events and provide more spatially accurate data to inform policing strategies. Results of generalized linear and multinomial logistic regression models indicate that GDT benefits are influenced by a number of situational factors.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paac097 , 2023 38p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) has gained ground in the intra-jihadist fighting in north-eastern Nigeria, halting the previous momentum of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). In the course of 2023, JAS took most of the islands in Lake Chad, which ISWAP had controlled. 

Why did it happen? Conflict between these Boko Haram splinters stems from differences in governance and treatment of civilians. JAS kills and steals from everyone; the more bureaucratic ISWAP generally spares Muslim non-combatants. Many JAS members surrendered to authorities or continued fighting instead of joining ISWAP after the death of JAS’s

leader in 2021. 

  Why does it matter? In the last two years, JAS and ISWAP may have visited more damage upon each other than the Lake Chad states have inflicted on the jihadists. Still, the splinters pose a significant threat. ISWAP is regrouping, while the revamped JAS is set to target civilians around the lake. What should be done? The Lake Chad governments will need to do more to prevail over the jihadists. They should mitigate risks to civilians by maintaining humanitarian assistance; expanding efforts to support defectors; improving airstrike precision; and reinvigorating regional security cooperation.    

Edited by Jeff Breinholt

Initially enacted in 1992, the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §2333, provides a legal remedy for American victims killed or injured by reason of international terrorism by creating a private cause of action, with treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Since then, some 150 lawsuits have been brought under the statute against such terrorist organizations as Hamas, Hizballah, and FARC, as well as the banks and companies alleged to have assisted them. These lawsuits have generated some 600 opinions.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism. 2024, 91pg

Edited By James Cuno and Thomas G. Weiss

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage has a long history. Contemporary examples include the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, mosques in Xinjiang, China, mausoleums in Timbuktu, Mali, and Greco-Roman remains in Syria. Cultural heritage destruction invariably accompanies assaults on civilians, making heritage attacks impossible to disentangle from the mass atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Both seek to eliminate people and the heritage with which they identify. Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities assembles thirty-eight experts from the heritage, social science, humanitarian, legal, and military communities. Focusing on immovable cultural heritage vulnerable to attack, the volume’s guiding framework is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a United Nations resolution adopted unanimously in 2005 to permit international intervention against crimes of war or genocide. Based on the three pillars of prevent, react, and rebuild, R2P offers today’s policymakers a set of existing laws and international norms that can and—as this book argues—must be extended to the protection of cultural heritage. Essays consider the global value of cultural heritage and document recent attacks on people and sites in China, Guatemala, Iraq, Mali, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. Comprehensive sections on vulnerable populations as well as the role of international law and the military offer readers critical insights and point toward research, policy, and action agendas to protect both people and cultural heritage. The table of contents along with a concise abstract of each chapter is offered online in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish to facilitate robust, global dissemination of the strategies and tactics offered in this pathbreaking call to action.

Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust, 2022. 649p.

By Elie Cavigneaux

Defeating terrorism and saving art: fighting the same battle

In a world where chaos and political instability plague many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a lesser-known crime has emerged: the trafficking of cultural goods. This phenomenon, often overshadowed by more prominent issues, poses a significant global threat. But why is the trafficking of art and antiquities so concerning?

1. Financing Terrorism: Cultural goods trafficking is not merely a trade—it’s a critical source of funding for terrorism. Security Council resolutions, UNESCO, the European Union, and financial investigation units have all documented this link. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” even institutionalized this trade, issuing excavation permits and organizing the sale of stolen pieces to market countries.

2. Hidden Threats: Although these looted artifacts may not flood the markets immediately, history shows that they can resurface years later. Works looted by the Nazis during World War II, for instance, have reappeared after decades of concealment.

3. Beyond Terrorism: Yet, the interest in this analysis extends beyond terrorism financing. The resale of “blood antiquities” reveals another dimension: money laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. This criminal activity affects not only the antiques market but also the broader art market.

4. Investing for Tomorrow: To combat this multifaceted threat, we must invest in detecting and preventing crimes related to cultural and art objects. Whether in times of war or peace, our ability to safeguard culture and heritage depends on proactive measures.

Working Paper. Paris: Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 2021. 13p

By Sonia L. Robinson, Christopher D. McCort, Colette Smirniotis, Garen J. Wintemute & Hannah S. Laqueur

Background

Firearm violence is a major cause of death and injury in the United States. Tracking the movement of firearms from legal purchase to use in crimes can help inform prevention of firearm injuries and deaths. The last state-wide studies analyzing crime gun recoveries used data from over 20 years ago; thus, an update is needed.

Methods

We used data for 5,247,348 handgun and 2,868,713 long gun transactions and law enforcement recoveries from California crime gun recovery (2010–2021) and California’s Dealer Records of Sales records. Covariates included characteristics of dealership sales, firearms and their transactions, and purchaser’s demographic characteristics, purchasing history, criminal history (from firearm purchaser criminal history records), and neighborhood socioeconomic status. Analyses for handguns and long guns was conducted separately. In multivariable analysis, we included correlates into a Cox proportional hazard model accounting for left truncation and clustering between the same firearm, purchaser, dealerships, and geographic location. Covariates that remained significant (P < 0.05) were retained. For handguns, we evaluated associations of violent and weapons crimes separately. In supplementary analyses, we examined interactions by purchasers’ race and ethnicity.

Results

In total, 38,441 handguns (0.80%) and 6,806 long guns (0.24%) were recovered in crimes. A firearm dealer’s sales volume, percent of transactions that were denials, pawns, pawn redemptions, and firearms that became crime guns were each positively associated with firearm recovery in crime. Handguns that were inexpensive, larger caliber, and that had been reported lost or stolen were positively associated with recovery in crimes. Purchaser characteristics associated with crime gun recovery included: being younger, female, Black, Hispanic, Native American or Pacific Islander, or other race/ethnicity (vs white), having previous arrests, living in close proximity to the firearm dealership, and living in a more socially vulnerable census tract. Associations with race and ethnicity were modified by previous infraction-only arrests.

Conclusions

This study confirms that many previously studied correlates of firearm recovery are still relevant today. We were able to expand on previous research by examining novel associations including purchasers’ criminal history and previous firearm transaction history. These results provide evidence that can be used to disrupt firearm use in crimes.

Injury Epidemiology volume 11, Article number: 8 (2024)

By Lauren Van Metre and Thomas Leo Scherer  

  The United States Institute of Peace seeks to advance the field of peacebuilding by evaluating the evidence base supporting its core practices, such as dialogue and conflict analysis, engagement with religious leaders, and the prevention and countering of violent extremism. These systematic reviews identify effective programming and new approaches for further exploration. This evidence review paper evaluates the evidence and practice of an evolving approach to preventing and countering violent extremism: understanding and strengthening community resilience. Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is unique among peacebuilding areas. The field was initially shaped and influenced by a frenzied national security response to a perceived imminent threat from a global religious radical movement that sought the destruction of the West and its secular governments. Thus, the problem of violent extremism and its countering strategy were neatly encapsulated in an ideological paradigm that facilitated crisis decision-making rather than purposeful action in support of an evidence-based policy and practice. Today, in promoting a community resilience approach to P/CVE, it is critical to steer away from earlier ideologically influenced forms of community engagement by acknowledging that ideological remnants persist and continue to do harm to frontline communities; these forms of community engagement scapegoat communities for attracting violent-extremist networks and target them as “threats” for security force responses. Instead, the P/CVE field needs to adopt a radically dif­ferent resilience approach that presumes and strengthens a community’s capacity to resist violent extremism.

Washington, DC:  The United States Institute of Peace , 2023. 72p.