By David Blake Johnson, Joshua J. Robinson, Daniel Semenza, and Alexi Thompson

We test the effectiveness of several common gun prevalence proxy variables against what are arguably the best measures of gun prevalence: firearm sales and concealed carry permits. With a comprehensive count of gun sales and concealed carry permits (by county and year) in the states of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, we make two main observations: First, gun sales/concealed carry permits are positively correlated with federal firearm licenses (gun dealers) per mile. Second gun sales/concealed carry permits are not significantly positively correlated with federal firearm licenses per capita or the proportion of gun suicides to total suicides. We then discuss why this occurs and the limitations of using legal gun sales as a gun prevalence measure. Last, we show how the competing measures differ in terms of their associations with gun homicide. We find our preferred measure to have a strong positive association with gun homicides while many others do not. Consequently, we advise researchers to use gun dealers as a measure of gun prevalence and specifically in a way that considers markets bleeding over arbitrary lines (e.g., county, city, or neighborhood).

Unpublished Paper, (May 25, 2022), 41p,

By Rod Campbell, Skye Predavec, Alice Grundy

Almost 30 years after the Port Arthur massacre, there are more guns in Australia than ever before, and the Howard Government’s landmark National Firearms Agreement (NFA) is falling short of its stated aims. There is no National Firearms Register and minors can use firearms in every state. This paper outlines the status of the NFA and the number of guns and gun deaths in Australia.

On 28 of April 1996, one man killed 35 people and wounded another 23 with semiautomatic rifles at Port Arthur, Tasmania. It remains the deadliest massacre in modern Australian history.

Just 12 days after the massacre, the Howard Government announced the National Firearms Agreement (NFA), a suite of measures from the federal, state and territory governments designed to strengthen Australia’s gun control laws.

The NFA was reconfirmed by all jurisdictions in 2017, however some of its resolutions remain unimplemented including the creation of the National Firearm Registry. Others have been implemented inconsistently across Australia’s states and territories, such as under 18 firearm use, hampering their effectiveness.

The paper concludes that Australians needs gun laws that live up to the Howard Government’s bravery, and right now Australia does not have them

Canberra: The Australia Institute, 2025. 9p.

By Sydney Litterer, Ryan Scrivens,Thomas W. Wojciechowski &Richard Frank

Researchers, practitioners, and policymakers are increasingly interested in examining online posting behaviors in virtual communities known to facilitate violent racially and ethnically motivated extremism. However, little is empirically known about how such behaviors develop over time, and even less is known about how the content of posts is related to other posting behaviors. This study used group-based multi-trajectory modeling to explore how users’ online posting behaviors (i.e., posting frequency and use of offensive language) evolved as they engaged with other users on Stormfront, the largest and most well-known white supremacist forum, relative to typical user behaviors. Overall, several noteworthy posting behaviors were identified in the data. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis, its limitations, and avenues for future research.

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2025, 21p.

By Arthur Bradley and Galuzzi, O.

The abuse of digital technologies by violent extremists is keeping pace with the exponential growth of new technologies, and poses multifaceted challenges to national and global security. Cyber-enabled threats manifest for example in terrorist-operated websites, the shift to alternative or fringe social media platforms, the use of the decentralised web, the exploitation of gaming and adjacent platforms, and the abuse of live-streaming technologies to amplify terrorist and violent extremist attacks. In addition to these online activities, there are concerns also around more disruptive or destructive cyber operations, such as Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks and the hacking of critical infrastructure to cause civilian casualties. In all the research on the diverse range of malicious actors behind these threats, there is comparatively little on the online activity of violent extremist movements, whether right-wing or left-wing, in the Global South. This report forms part of UNICRI’s effort to investigate the threats stemming from the complex interplay between terrorism, violent extremism and cybercriminality – threats that are often overlooked, owing to the difficulty of gathering evidence and attributing offensive cyber operations, and to the prioritisation of more pressing security threats in diverse geographic locations. UNICRI strives to shed light on the online presence, activities and trends of right- and left-wing violent extremist movements and the cyber-enabled threats they may consequently pose to global security. The report was compiled following a three-part research methodology consisting of a literature review, expert interviews and open-source investigations conducted in order to analyse the online activities of right- and left-wing violent extremist movements in South America, Africa and Asia, and examining both their intent and ability to mount offensive cyber-attacks. The report includes particular case studies within these regions, including in Brazil, South Africa, India and Maritime South-East Asia. The case studies were selected because of the availability of public information online, the known presence of active non-state violent extremist actors with right- and left-wing ideologies, the similarities and differences these actors present, and their geographic diversity. These factors, and consequently the choice of case studies, demonstrate the global nature of the phenomenon which still requires contextually relevant solutions. The selection of these case studies does not imply that similar threats in other geographies are not considered relevant to international peace or development, and conversely, the omission of any movements is merely the result of restricted resources and time. The groups and movements presented within this report are not necessarily referenced as violent extremists either by the United Nations or by the Member States mentioned, however, their alignment, proximity, and connection with right- and left-wing violent extremist ideologies, as well as their use of violent extremist tactics, justify mention in this report to ultimately reflect on the global dimension of the abuse of digital technologies by violent extremists . This report finds widespread exploitation of digital platforms by right- and left-wing violent extremists based in South America, Africa and Asia. Groups and their affiliated networks use a wide variety of platforms and services for a range of different purposes, and they often seem to face fewer restrictions in terms of content moderation by technology companies, many of which are based in the United States or European countries. In particular, it found: As in Europe, North America, and Australasia, the online activities of right- and leftwing violent extremist groups in South America, Africa and Asia are increasingly superseded by more disparate, horizontal online networks. In many of the case studies, for example in Brazil and India, physical attacks have increasingly been carried out by lone actors or small cells, some of which may have had previous engagement with organised groups. This dynamic has implications for the ability of technology companies and law enforcement agencies to counter the threat, as planned attacks and their perpetrators may be more difficult to prevent or identify. * Violent extremist networks and individuals are increasingly using a more diverse range of online platforms and services to further their goals. This is in line with the increase in the number of online platforms and services used by broader populations generally, but it may also be part of a concerted effort by these networks to reach a broad audience and mitigate the impact of the potential removal of their accounts or groups by technology companies. Violent extremist networks continue to exploit multiple platforms simultaneously, using outlinking between platforms to evade detection or enforcement by specific companies. Violent extremists comprise the minority of the perpetrators delivering cyber-attacks globally, most of which are believed to be carried out by state-backed actors, hacktivist collectives, or financially motivated criminals. Interviews with a group of 31 experts consulted as part of this research, however, indicate that the threat from cyber-attacks motivated by a belief system and delivered by individuals or groups affiliated with violent extremist movements is likely to increase in the coming years, and is likely to be particularly high in countries believed to have less developed cybersecurity defences. This report suggests that international technology companies are not adequately fulfilling their content moderation policies as consistently in South America, Africa and Asia as in other countries in Europe, North America, and Australasia. Also, they do not appear to be allocating sufficient resources to ensuring platform safety in these regions, where they face significant challenges in effectively countering the exploitation of their services by violent extremist movements. Practical challenges are compounded by definitional challenges regarding contentious terms such as “violent extremism” and “terrorism”, neither of which has an internationally agreed definition. Also, technology companies, it seems, still struggle to detect and understand violent extremist content or communications effectively in languages other than English. This task is made more difficult by the challenge of interpreting and understanding local dynamics and the community-specific slang found in content, and by the efforts of malevolent networks to evade detection or enforcement by moderation teams. Evidence suggests that, to date, this – together with an imbalance in resource allocation – means that the capability of many technology companies to moderate content in languages other than English is comparatively ineffective. Often, a splintered regulatory landscape also makes it difficult for technology companies to apply their policies consistently across multiple jurisdictions around the world. Technology companies operating globally are subject to a variety of differing and often contradictory regulatory requirements, including those relating to designations, hate speech legislation and Internet-related laws, and companies can be under pressure from the political or cultural contexts in particular countries. This can make it difficult for these companies consistently and effectively to maintain a balance between removing violative content and upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms. The report focuses on a set of case studies diving into the online activities of right- and left-wing violent extremist groups in South America, Africa and Asia, and the ways in which they abuse digital technologies

Turin, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the VOX-Pol Institute. 2025. 88p.

By Nicole J. Johnson ,Caterina G. Roman

This study examines changes in gun violence at the census tract level in Philadelphia, PA before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Piecewise generalized linear mixed effects models are used to test the relative impacts of social-structural and demographic factors, police activity, the presence of and proximity to drug markets, and physical incivilities on shooting changes between 2017 and June, 2021. Model results revealed that neighborhood structural characteristics like concentrated disadvantage and racial makeup, as well as proximity to drug markets and police activity were associated with higher shooting rates. Neighborhood drug market activity and police activity significantly predicted changes in shooting rates over time after the onset of COVID-19. This work demonstrates the importance of understanding whether there are unique factors that impact the susceptibility to exogenous shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic. The increasing risk of being in a neighborhood with an active drug market during the pandemic suggests efforts related to disrupting drug organizations, or otherwise curbing violence stemming from drug markets, may go a long way towards quelling citywide increases in gun violence.

. PLoS ONE 17(2):, 2022. e0263777

By John R. Lott and Carlisle E. Moody

The FBI tracks active shooting cases—where individuals attempt to kill people in public places, excluding those tied to robberies or gang violence. This study is the first to systematically compare how uniformed police and civilians with concealed handgun permits perform in stopping these attacks. Civilians with permits stopped the attacks more frequently and faced a lower risk of being killed or injured than police. Officers who intervened during the attacks were far more likely to be killed or injured than those who apprehended the attackers later. We also provide evidence that these numbers significantly underestimate the advantages of civilians over officers in stopping these attacks. We explore the implications of two possible identification problems. Lott, John R. and Moody, Carlisle E., Do Armed Civilians Stop Active Shooters More Effectively Than Uniformed Police?

Salt Lake City, UT: Crime Prevention Research Center, 2025. 36p.

By John J. Donohu, Samuel V. Cai, Matthew V. Bondy, Philip J. Cook

While the recent state panel data literature has broadly concluded that “right-to-carry” (RTC) concealed handgun regimes increase violent crime, there is little empirical evidence on the precise mechanisms that drive this increase. Using data from 217 US cities, we find that the effect of RTC on violent crime is concentrated to large urban centers. In cities with an average population of over 250,000 between 1979 and 2019, we find that the introduction of RTC increases violent crime by 20 percent. We then present novel estimates that RTC increases gun theft by 50 percent and lowers violent crime clearance rates by 9 percent in these large cities. Leveraging city-level heterogeneity in RTC-induced violent crime effects, we demonstrate that these two mechanisms explain a substantial portion of the RTC-induced increase in violent crime.

Working Paper 30190, 2023, 21p.

By John R. Lott, and John E Whitley

It is frequently assumed that safe storage gun laws reduce accidental gun deaths and total suicides, while the possible impact on crime rates are ignored. However, given existing work on the adverse impact of other safety laws, such as safety caps for storing medicine, even the very plausible assumption of reduced accidental gun deaths cannot be taken for granted. Our paper analyzes both state and county data spanning nearly twenty years, and we find no support that safe storage laws reduce either juvenile accidental gun deaths or suicides. Instead, these storage requirements appear to impair people?s ability to use guns defensively. Because accidental shooters also tend to be the ones most likely to violate the new law, safe storage laws increase violent and property crimes against low risk citizens with no observable offsetting benefit in terms of reduced accidents or suicides. During the first five full years after the passage of the safe storage laws, the group of fifteen states that adopted these laws faced an annual average increase of over 300 more murders, 3,860 more rapes, 24,650 more robberies, and over 25,000 more aggravated assaults. On average, the annual costs borne by victims averaged over $2.6 billion as a result of lost productivity, out-of-pocket expenses, medical bills, and property losses.

Yale Law School, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 237, 72p.

By Carlisle E. Moody, John R. Lott

A review of the literature studying the effect of right-to-carry laws shows that the weight of evidence indicates that such laws reduced violent crime. However, more recent studies, using more recent data, tend to find that these laws cause increases in various kinds of violent crime, raising the possibility that circumstances have changed since 2000, causing these laws to become detrimental. We suggest that these recent studies, which do not use all the available data, are seriously compromised because they compare states that only recently have adopted right-to-carry laws with states that have had these laws for many years, instead of comparing against states with more restrictive laws. Early adopting states experienced relatively large reductions in crime corresponding to large increases in the number of right-to-carry permits. Late adopting states passed rules making it difficult to obtain permits and exercise the right to carry concealed weapons. Ignoring the fact that these late adopting states with stricter rules on obtaining permits issue relatively few permits can produce perverse results where coefficients imply an increase in crime even though the opposite is true. We demonstrate this effect with a simple statistical test.

Academia Letters, February 2022, 6p.

By David C. Pyrooz, James A. Densley, Jillian K. Peterson

Mass shootings, defined as incidents where 4 or more people are shot with a firearm, have become a significant public health concern in the US.

OBJECTIVE - To estimate the prevalence of direct exposure to mass shootings among US adults and identify the socio-demographic groups most affected.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - A survey was administered in January 2024 to a sample of 10 000 respondents (18 years or older) designed to be representative of US adults using a multistage matched sampling design. In addition to exposure to mass shootings, the survey also collected sociodemographic information, including age, gender, self-reported race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

EXPOSURE - Survey respondents were asked about their lifetime presence at the scene of a mass shooting, any physical injuries sustained (including being shot or trampled or experiencing a related physical injury), and the features of such incidents.

MAIN OUTCOME AND MEASURES - Multivariable logistic regression was used to generate adjusted odds ratios (AORs) of the associations between sociodemographic measures and being present on the scene of and injured in a mass shooting. All analyses undertaken to generate population and relational inferences were weighted to achieve representativeness of US adults.

RESULTS - Of the 10 000 respondents included in the analysis, 51.34% (95% CI, 50.27%-52.40%) were female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 3.04% (95% CI, 2.71%-3.38%) were Asian, 12.46% (95% CI, 11.81%-13.12%) were Black, 16.04% (95% CI, 15.10%-16.98%) were Hispanic, 62.78% (95% CI, 61.73%-63.84%) were White, and 5.67% (95% CI, 5.23%-6.11%) were other race or ethnicity. The findings indicated that 6.95% (95% CI, 6.39%-7.50%) of respondents were present at the scene of a mass shooting, and 2.18% (95% CI, 1.85%-2.50%) sustained physical injuries, such as being shot or trampled, during such incidents. A total of 54.89% of mass shootings to which respondents were exposed occurred in 2015 or more recently, and 76.15% took place in respondents’ local communities. Mass shootings were most likely to occur in neighborhoods. Younger individuals (eg, AOR for Baby Boomer and Silent generations vs Generation Z, 0.12; 95% CI, 0.09-0.18) and males (AOR, 1.55; 95% CI, 1.29-1.85) were more likely to report exposure compared with those from older generations or female individuals, respectively. Black respondents reported higher rates of being present at mass shootings (AOR, 1.87; 95% CI, 1.49-2.34), while Asian respondents reported lower rates (AOR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.19-0.66), compared with White respondents, but there were no racial and ethnic differences in injuries sustained. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings from this survey study of US adults underscore the extensive and often overlooked regular exposure to mass shootings in this country. The demographic disparities in exposure highlight the need for targeted interventions and support for the most affected groups, particularly younger generations and males. Understanding these patterns is essential for addressing the broader impacts of gun violence on public health and community well-being.

JAMA Network Open. 2025;8(3):e250283. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2025, 9p.

By Andrew Willinger

On October 4, 2024, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos. The case involves claims brought by the government of Mexico against a group of U.S. gun manufacturers seeking to recover for the costs of gun violence in Mexico that the Mexican government alleges are caused by the gunmakers’ sales and distribution practices that facilitate cross-border gun trafficking.

If the Supreme Court holds that Mexico failed to allege the type of violation contemplated in the predicate exception, that could narrow the scope of predicate-exception litigation substantially to instances where the gun manufacturer itself engages in illegal conduct (rather than aiding and abetting downstream illegal conduct). And such a decision would have major consequences for domestic PLCAA litigation because the new wave of state public nuisance statutes often specifically contemplate that a gunmaker’s distribution practices can give rise to liability even after the point of sale. Another avenue by which the Court could reverse is to focus on the unique causal chain in the case that includes cross-border gun trafficking and harm caused by foreign cartels with American-manufactured firearms. This route seems less likely to broadly unsettle things at the state level, as it is at least possible for the Court to write an opinion that emphasizes how unique the facts of this case are. In most domestic litigation, there simply will not be the same number of intervening actions because the harm caused will be closer to home. That said, it will be important to watch whether the Court seems receptive to the gunmakers’ argument that Mexico’s damages are merely derivative of the harm suffered by individual people harmed by gun violence in the country. That line of argument would presumably hamstring efforts by state attorneys general to pursue predicate-exception litigation against gunmakers based on harm to the public.

64 South Texas Law Review 97 (2025), 5p.

By Lily Robin, Josh Fording, Travis Reginal, Paige Thompson, Andreea Matei, Jerome Louison, Ramik Jamar Williams

Since the peak of violent crime in the early 1990s, New York City has experienced a sustained decline in violence but, like many cities across the country, has seen an increase in violent crime since 2019. In the 67th Precinct in particular, where the East Flatbush neighborhood is located, there were 34.5 shootings per 100,000 people in 2022. There are several community-led, government-led, and law enforcement–led initiatives in East Flatbush and surrounding areas to address violent crime and gun violence. This report examines gun violence and gun violence prevention and intervention initiatives in the 67th Precinct and surrounding neighborhoods.

WHAT WE FOUND

• Community organizations employ a holistic approach to violence prevention that addresses root causes of violence using a multifaceted approach to mitigate and address violence and diffuse tension between communities and law enforcement.

• Community members had negative views of criminal legal system actors and generally lacked awareness of community-based organizations involved in violence prevention work.

• Several barriers exist to community-led anti–gun violence, including limited funding, a lack of supports for staff, a lack of visibility in the community, and a lack of housing for people in crisis.

We make the following five recommendations:

• Rely on evidence to target research, funding, and initiatives to the areas most in need.

• Leverage and grow the existing strengths of communities.

• Identify and address drivers of gun violence.

• Develop funding opportunities for gun violence prevention and intervention programs that encourage collaboration and visibility in the community.

• Invest in community engagement and cultural competency for law enforcement and other criminal legal system actors.

HOW WE DID IT

With funding from the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ), Urban, in partnership with the Kings Against Violence Initiative (KAVI), investigated gun violence and gun violence prevention and intervention initiatives in the 67th Precinct and surrounding neighborhoods through a review of existing literature, analysis of crime and shooting data, and interviews and focus groups with gun violence prevention and intervention initiative staff and community members.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2025. 44p.

By Mohamed Bin Ali and Rafillah Rapit

The increasing involvement of women in terrorism challenges traditional perceptions and necessitates a shift in counterterrorism strategies. Recent cases in Singapore illustrate how women are radicalised through online propaganda, familial influence, and ideological indoctrination, leading to their participation in extremist activities. Addressing this evolving threat demands gender-sensitive prevention and rehabilitation efforts, community engagement, digital counterterrorism, and tailored intervention programmes to counter radicalisation at its roots. COMMENTARY The recent detention of a 15-year-old self-radicalised female student in Singapore highlights the growing vulnerability of young individuals, especially women, to extremist influences online. Her case, the first involving a female minor under the Internal Security Act (ISA), signals an alarming shift in radicalisation trends, where even adolescents are being drawn to violent ideologies. This underscores the urgency of addressing radicalisation at its early stages, particularly in digital spaces where extremist propaganda thrives. Just months earlier, the case of a 56-year-old radicalised housewife demonstrated that women are no longer confined to passive roles in extremist networks. These developments challenge traditional assumptions about gender and radicalisation, reinforcing the need for targeted intervention efforts across different demographic groups.

In many cases, women were often involved as facilitators of terrorism, providing logistical support, acting as recruiters, or serving as symbols of ideological purity. However, recent trends show a growing number of women assuming leadership roles, engaging in combat, and even carrying out suicide attacks. Several factors drive this shift, including ideological indoctrination, social and economic disenfranchisement, and extremist organisations' strategic exploitation of gender norms. Terrorist groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda have actively sought to recruit women, recognising their potential to evade security measures and access targets that male operatives might struggle to reach. Extremist groups have used women as suicide bombers, assassins, and enforcers of their doctrine. In some instances, they have also taken on prominent roles in radicalisation efforts, using online platforms to spread extremist propaganda and recruit new members.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore 2025. 4p,

By Oluwole Ojewale and Raoul Sumo Tayo

This study presents evidence on the dynamics of cattle rustling in border regions of Cameroon and Chad. It identifies the drivers and enablers of the phenomenon and the networks of actors engaged in the criminal economy. The ungoverned spaces of border regions pose security challenges and accentuate the illicit economy of cattle rustling. Addressing cattle rustling in southern Chad and northern Cameroon requires a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach due to the complex interplay of economic, social and security dynamics in the regions. Key findings • The primary enablers of cattle rustling include transhumance and child labour, multiple conflicts, failure of governance, environmental factors, porous borders, cultural perception and social acceptance, corruption and ineffective justice system. • The link between cattle rustling and other forms of organised crime manifests through terrorism financing, cross-border smuggling, arms trafficking, abduction and money laundering. • In addition to the traditional cattle rustlers, the dominant actors perpetrating cattle rusting are ISWAP (71.4%), Boko Haram (9.5%), separatist groups (8.1%) and unidentified armed groups (5.4%).

ENACT, 2025. 36p.

   By John Lindsay-Poland. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton and Giffords  

  The iron river of weapons transiting from the United States to Mexico and Central America that empowers criminal organizations and accelerates forced migration originates from hundreds of gun manufacturers and passes through thousands of local U.S. gun dealers, every year. In reaction to the flow of illicit weapons, a firearms race has developed, in which gun companies export more and increasingly militarized weapons to Mexican police and military forces. But the number of lives lost or disappeared through violence in Mexico continues to increase, while migrants fleeing through Mexico have become understandably more desperate to get to safety. Political discourse focuses on the U.S.-Mexico border. But the unregulated, massive and militarized U.S. gun market that feeds the violence, drug trafficking, and displacement is growing – and often ignored. The Stop US Arms to Mexico project obtained finely grained data, never before disclosed, on the origins of guns trafficked and exported to Mexico and Central America from the United States since 2015. We are publishing this data, in conjunction with this report, at stopusarmstomexico.org/iron-river  Gun violence in Mexico has spiraled in the last two decades since the expiration of the U.S. federal assault weapons ban in 2004 and the 2007 declaration of the drug war in Mexico with U.S. support. A modest decline in gun homicides since 2019 has not reduced violence even to the elevated levels of 2010-2011. Moreover, the growing number of forced disappearances, primarily carried out by criminal organizations armed with U.S. weapons and sometimes with collusion of Mexican security forces, has nullified the modest decline in gun homicides

San Francisco, CA:  Stop US Arms to Mexico, 2024. 12p.

By John Lindsay-Poland

The U.S. firearms market is generating growing storms of violence in neighboring countries. From Mexico – where traffickers in fentanyl and other criminal businesses are armed with thousands of U.S.- sourced assault weapons and .50 caliber rifles – to Haiti, where gangs armed with rifles easily purchased and smuggled from Florida and Georgia dominate and terrorize broad swaths of territory – the permissive, militarized and enormous gun trade in the United States is driving thousands of families to flee their homelands, arming the men who disappear people and commit femicide, empowering traders in narcotics that take thousands more lives, and looting economies. The damage is not limited to Mexico and Haiti. Firearms homicides – just one indicator of gun harms – have grown in Jamaica, Barbados, Central America and other nations, in tandem with the retail proliferation of U.S. weapons. In Guatemala, the exponential growth of exports of U.S. pistols has fed weapons trafficking and homicide rates. The United States is not exempt, of course: there were more shootings in U.S. schools in the last three years than any prior year.1 The concept frequently used for this violence is that of a pandemic: the health consequences of gun violence are severe and growing, with firearms and bullets as vectors and agents, respectively.2 But gun violence also behaves like a storm system in its violence and shattering effects. And the islands in which people may imagine that they are safe from these storms of gun violence are shrinking.

San Francisco, CA Stop US Arms to Mexico, 2025. 9p

By William R. Slomanson

An estimated quarter- to half-million guns are smuggled from the U.S. into Mexico each year. Seventy percent of guns recovered at Mexican crime scenes are traced back to the U.S. Many of these weapons are military-styled assault rifles, shipped into Mexico by U.S. drug gangs. This pipeline endangers citizens of the four U.S. border states, many of the nation’s counties, and the police who are outgunned by cartels. According to the complaint, 'tens of thousands of Mexico’s citizens have been wounded and killed.'

The typical precursor is sloppy or illegal practices in the manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer-buyer distribution chain. Data available to the gun industry could be used by its members to substantially reduce sales of guns to 'bad apple' retailers.

Mexico’s unique law suit  is the first whereby a foreign government has sued American gun makers. If ultimately successful, the trial judge has hinted that this novel filing would encourage similar litigation−in the U.S. and other nations.

Estados Unidos Mexicanos is not a lawsuit against the Second Amendment. Mexico instead hopes to trigger an exception to the federal statute that generally bars such suits against the U.S. gun industry. The plaintiff relies on lower U.S. court cases that have either interpreted that immunity from suit−in a way that allows such suits to proceed−or have considered this federal statute unconstitutional.

Mexico filed in the U.S. for several presumptive reasons. It seeks stratospheric damages of 'billions of dollars each year'. A large recovery is more likely in an American court than in Mexico. Securing the appearance of these U.S. corporations in a Mexican venue would be beyond wishful thinking. Mexico’s other major hurdle is whether a U.S. court can exercise personal jurisdiction, when all of the alleged harm has occurred in Mexico.

The case is now in the trial court. After that result is appealed, and case-split certiorari is sought, the reviewing courts may dismiss this case because: (1) it does not trigger the key exception to federal immunity from suit; and/or (2) the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants.

56 Suffolk University Law Review (forthcoming 2022), 35p.

By Eugenio Weigend Vargas , Jason Goldstick, Laura Vargas

Background - Every year, thousands of people from Latin America and the Caribbean are migrating to the USA. Policy-makers have argued that US firearms are fuelling violence in these countries and are contributing to migration. The objective of this article is to examine the proportion of immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean arriving at the US border who have previously been threatened with a firearm. This article further explores sociodemographic factors associated with the likelihood of previous firearm-related threats, whether those threats are associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as the reasons behind those threats. Methods Data were obtained from a survey of migrants recruited at the southern US border from March 2022 to August 2023. To be selected, respondents had to be 18 years of age or older, had to speak English or Spanish and come from a Latin American or Caribbean country. We used descriptive statistics and a logistic regression. Results We analysed 321 cases. Roughly, 48% of respondents reported previous firearm-related threats. Males and respondents coming from Honduras, Venezuela and El Salvador were more likely to report previous firearm-related threats. There was a strong association between previous firearm-related threats and signs of post-traumatic stress disorder. Most threats occurred during robberies or extortions, but other threats were perpetrated by authorities, to prevent crime reporting, or by intimate partners. Conclusion Understanding the violence, particularly firearm-related violence, experienced by those migrating to the USA from Latin America and the Caribbean could help guide policy discussion and actions.

Injury Prevention, Epub ahead of print: . doi:10.1136/ip-2024-045369

By Kristen Rand. Additional research was provided by Kaya van der Horst

Fifty caliber sniper rifles are used by militaries around the world and can penetrate armor plating and shoot down aircraft on take-off and landing, but can be purchased under federal law in the U.S. as easily as a single-shot hunting rifle. The study’s release comes the day before the U.S Supreme Court will hear oral arguments by the government of Mexico in its lawsuit against gunmaker Smith & Wesson, another manufacturer of military bred weaponry utilized by the cartels.

VPC Government Affairs Director Kristen Rand states, “Fifty caliber sniper rifles are the guns most coveted by the cartels and most feared by Mexican law enforcement. The VPC has warned for years about the unique threat these anti-materiel guns present. Now they are being used to inflict maximum harm in Mexico. The U.S.-based manufacturers of these weapons must be held accountable.”

The VPC joined other gun violence prevention organizations in an amicus brief in support of the government of Mexico. The VPC has issued a wide range of studies on the threat posed by 50 caliber sniper rifles, including the risk they pose in the U.S. to infrastructure, civil aviation, and national security.

The study details the history of the Barrett, manufactured in Murfreesboro, Tennessee and the original 50 caliber sniper rifle, the gun’s unmatched combination of firepower and range, and the use of it and other 50 caliber rifles in numerous attacks and assassinations by Mexican cartels. Data contained in the study reveal that from 2010 to February 2023, the majority of 50 caliber sniper rifles (519 of 831) recovered by Mexican authorities were Barretts. Barrett and other 50 caliber sniper rifles have also been obtained by terrorists around the world, including Al Qaeda. In addition, the study:

• Cites numerous reports and research warning of the terror threat posed by the easy accessibility of 50 caliber sniper rifles, including: compromising command and control via assassination; the threat to aircraft (including civilian airliners); and, infrastructure.

• Offers numerous examples of terrorist and other criminal acts, including assassination, involving 50 caliber sniper rifles in Mexico, the U.S., and around the world.

• Details how the use of armor-piercing rifle rounds can further magnify the power – and the threat – of these deadly weapons.

• Includes profiles of companies manufacturing 50 caliber sniper rifles.

The study also puts forth policy recommendations including a federal ban in the United States of these uniquely destructive firearms.

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2025. 34p.

By The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS) at Northwestern University

Gun violence reduction initiatives that seek to engage individuals involved in violence must effectively identify and manage risk. Risk assessment informs participant recruitment, service provision, and program evaluation. Discussions around risk assessment often center quantitative metrics and researcher-designed assessment tools, deemphasizing the lived and professional experience of frontline professionals who work and often live in the communities they serve. The study outlined here analyzes the perspectives of frontline street outreach and victim services workers in Chicago on how they define, assess, and respond to gun violence risk on the job. The findings are based on a series of semi-structured focus group discussions and a participatory analysis session conducted in early 2021 by researchers at the Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS). These discussions sought to answer the following 1. How do frontline violence prevention workers define risk for gun violence? 2. How do violence prevention workers assess and respond to risk? 3. What role do/should formal assessment tools play in violence prevention? Seasoned staff from both street outreach and victim services programs shared their experience identifying when, where, and who is at risk of shooting or being shot. It also gathers perspectives on strategies to mitigate this risk.

Evanston, IL: The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS) at Northwestern University, 2022. 28p.