Final Report of the Independent Commission to Investigate the Facts of the Tragedy in Lewiston

By The Independent Commission to Investigate the Facts of the Tragedy in Lewiston

At 6:54 p.m. on October 25, 2023, 40-year-old Army Reservist Robert Card II (Card) entered the Just-In-Time Recreation Facility in Lewiston, Maine, armed with a .308 Ruger SFAR4 rifle with a scope and laser. Over 60 patrons and employees, including 20 children, were present. In 45 seconds, Card fired 18 rounds, killing eight people and wounding three others. Additional people suffered injuries while trying to hide or escape. Card then drove about four miles to Schemengees Bar and Grille. He left his car running outside the main entrance and entered the building at 7:07 p.m. In 78 seconds, he fired 36 rounds, killing ten more people and wounding ten others. Additional individuals suffered other injuries during the chaos. In total, Card killed 18 people and wounded 13 in less than two minutes inside those businesses. Card is solely responsible for his conduct. He caused the deaths and injuries inflicted that night. Although he might still have committed a mass shooting even if someone had managed to remove Card’s firearms before October 25, 2023, there were several opportunities that, if taken, might have changed the course of events. The Commission affirms its earlier unanimous finding that in September 2023, the Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO) had sufficient probable cause to take Card into protective custody under Maine’s yellow flag law5 and to initiate a petition to confiscate any firearms he possessed or over which he had control. Several law enforcement officials testified that the yellow flag law is cumbersome, inefficient, and unduly restrictive regarding who can initiate a proceeding to limit a person’s access to firearms. Further, the SCSO is justified in pointing out that the Army Reserve (AR) did not share all the relevant information it had about Card’s behavior. Nevertheless, under the circumstances existing and known to the SCSO in September of 2023, the yellow flag law authorized the SCSO to start the process of obtaining a court order to remove Card’s firearms. The Commission further finds that the leaders of Card’s (AR) Unit failed to undertake necessary steps to reduce the threat he posed to the public. His commanding officers were well aware of his auditory hallucinations, increasingly aggressive behavior, collection of guns, and ominous comments about his intentions. Despite their knowledge, they ignored the strong recommendations of Card’s Army mental health providers to stay engaged with his care and "make [e] sure that steps are taken to remove weapons” from his home. They neglected to share with the SCSO all the information relating to Card’s threatening behavior and actually discounted some of the evidence about the threat posed by Card. Had they presented a full and complete accounting of the facts, the SCSO might have acted more assertively in September. While the AR leaders correctly point out that their authority over a reservist like Card is not as broad as the authority the military has over their active-duty service members, they failed to take advantage of the available opportunities to exercise their authority over him. Finally, we find that the challenges faced by law enforcement in responding to the shootings were unprecedented in Maine: two active shooting sites with dozens killed and injured, multiple reports of other active shooting sites, gathering and preserving evidence for possible criminal prosecution, and a simultaneous state-wide manhunt. Many law enforcement officers demonstrated bravery and professionalism in the face of danger. While the first hours were, at times, “utter chaos” as hundreds of law enforcement officers poured into Lewiston and were dispatched or self-dispatched to numerous scenes, the actions of law enforcement ultimately resulted in the discovery of Card’s body within 49 hours without further loss of life. While the Commission makes some findings about the actions of law enforcement following the shooting, we anticipate that the Maine State Police (MSP) will conduct a full after-action review with an independent evaluation by an entity with policing expertise. The MSP has already completed a "Manhunt Operations After Action Review" focused on tactical operations with an independent evaluation by the Pennsylvania State Police. Not only would a full after-action review allow for professional recommendations about policy, protocol, and other policing improvements, it would likely confirm what this Commission recognizes as positive and successful examples of the law enforcement response.    

Lewiston, ME: The Commission, 2024. 215p.