By Alex R. Piquero, John K. Roman

In 2020, the US experienced the largest 1-year increase in homicide since 1960. The spike began in the first few months of the year, accelerating during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency measures, the murder of George Floyd, and social protests.1 Three additional observations are relevant. First, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that the homicide increase in 2020 was due to firearm injuries. While the overall homicide rate increased 28.4%, the firearm homicide rate increased 34.6%.2 Second, the spike in violence was concentrated within certain demographic groups. CDC researchers found 19 384 victims of firearms homicide in 2020.3 Of those victims, 61% were Black individuals, and they experienced firearm homicide at 14 times the rate of White indviduals in 2020. This racial disparity does not exist for other types of violence.4 Third, the largest increases in death by firearm homicide were for Black men aged between 10 and 44 years old

JAMA Network Open. 2024;7(5):e2412946. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.12946

By The U.S. Surgeon General

Since 2020, firearm‑related injury has been the leading cause of death for U.S. children and adolescents (ages 1–19), surpassing motor vehicle crashes, cancer, and drug overdose and poisoning (Figure 1). In 2022, 48,204 total people died from f irearm‑related injuries, including suicides, homicides, and unintentional deaths. This is over 8,000 more lives lost than in 2019 and over 16,000 more lives lost than in 2010 .

Washington, DC: Office of the U.S.Surgeon General, 2024. 40p.

By Rosanna Smart

Background

Despite growing evidence about how state-level firearm regulations affect overall rates of injury and death, little is known about whether potential harms or benefits of firearm laws are evenly distributed across demographic subgroups. In this systematic review, we synthesized available evidence on the extent to which firearm policies produce differential effects by race and ethnicity on injury, recreational or defensive gun use, and gun ownership or purchasing behaviors.

Main body

We searched 13 databases for English-language studies published between 1995 and February 28, 2023 that estimated a relationship between firearm policy in the USA and one of eight outcomes, included a comparison group, evaluated time series data, and provided estimated policy effects differentiated by race or ethnicity. We used pre-specified criteria to evaluate the quality of inference and causal effect identification. By policy and outcome, we compared policy effects across studies and across racial/ethnic groups using two different ways to express effect sizes: incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and rate differences. Of 182 studies that used quasi-experimental methods to evaluate firearm policy effects, only 15 estimated policy effects differentiated by race or ethnicity. These 15 eligible studies provided 57 separate policy effect comparisons across race/ethnicity, 51 of which evaluated interpersonal violence. In IRR terms, there was little consistent evidence that policies produced significantly different effects for different racial/ethnic groups. However, because of different baseline homicide rates, similar relative effects for some policies (e.g., universal background checks) translated into significantly greater absolute differences in homicide rates among Black compared to white victims.

Conclusions

The current literature does not support strong conclusions about whether state firearm policies differentially benefit or harm particular racial/ethnic groups. This largely reflects limited attention to these questions in the literature and challenges with detecting such effects given existing data availability and statistical power. Findings also emphasize the need for additional rigorous research that adopts a more explicit focus on testing for racial differences in firearm policy effects and that assesses the quality of race/ethnicity information in firearm injury and crime datasets.

Inj Epidemiol. 2023; 10: 67.

By Glenn L. Pierce; David Lambert; Daniel Trovato; and Peter Gagliardi

This study examines the innovative use of firearms related evidence to enhance violent crime investigations in New Jersey. This effort changed the use of firearms forensic evidence from a sole evidential focus to one that also incorporates a premonitory focus required to generate investigative leads. This project demonstrated the critical importance of fusing firearms forensic evidence such as ballistics imaging with locally available information, such as arrest and incident data on a statewide basis. This study further demonstrated the value of ballistics imaging to connect previously unconnected incidents, individuals, and weapons particularly when combined with other law enforcement data sets. This project demonstrated the critical importance of fusing firearms forensic evidence such as ballistics imaging with locally available information, such as arrest and incident data on a statewide basis. This study further demonstrated the value of ballistics imaging to connect, previously unconnected incidents, individuals, and weapons particularly when combined with other law enforcement data sets. It illustrated the critical need of information sharing across forensic, criminal intelligence (such as fusion and real time crime centers), and investigative entities across all levels of government – local, state, and federal - in supporting violent crime suppression efforts. The study is a mixed methods approach to policy analysis using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The researchers’ analyzed ballistics imaging submissions over a multi-year period in addition to examining open source and agency documents that tracked many of the crime reduction projects the New Jersey State Police incorporated into their crime gun intelligence effort.

Boston: Northeastern University, 2023. 120p.

By V A Pear , J P Schleimer , A J Aubel , S Buggs , C E Knoepke , R Pallin , A B Shev , E Tomsich , G J Wintemute , N Kravitz-Wirtz

Extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs) provide a civil mechanism to temporarily remove firearm access from individuals at high risk of harming themselves or others. Evidence and theory suggest that ERPOs can prevent firearm-related harm, but the policy's impact on racial/ethnic equity is largely unknown. To examine potential inequities by race/ethnicity in public perceptions and use of California's ERPO law, we drew on two complementary data sources: 1) a 2020 state-representative survey of California adults, and 2) ERPO court documents for the first 3 years of policy implementation (2016-2018). Majorities (54-89%) of all racial/ethnic groups reported that ERPOs are at least sometimes appropriate, and 64-94% were willing to ask a judge for an ERPO for a family member. However, Black and Hispanic/Latinx survey participants less often perceived ERPOs as appropriate and were less willing to serve as petitioners, with Black participants citing lack of knowledge about ERPOs and not trusting the system to be fair as their top reasons for unwillingness. Similarly, review of ERPO court documents revealed that no family or household members served as petitioners for Black and Hispanic/Latinx ERPO respondents. Additionally, Black respondents were the least likely to have documented access to a firearm and legal representation in court. Racial/ethnic equity in ERPO use may be improved by reducing barriers to petitioning, incorporating non-law enforcement intervention professionals like behavioral health specialists into the ERPO process, providing legal assistance to respondents and petitioners, and investing in the social safety net.

Prev Med. 2022 Dec;165(Pt A):107181. doi: 10.1016/j.ypmed.2022.107181. Epub 2022 Aug 6. PMID: 35940474.

By Rachel Martin

Gun violence is widely considered a serious public health problem in the United States, but less understood is what this means, if anything, for evolving Second Amendment doctrine. In New York Pistol & Rifle Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Supreme Court held that laws infringing Second Amendment rights can only be sustained if the government can point to sufficient historical analogues. Yet, what qualifies as sufficiently similar, a suitable number of jurisdictions, or the most important historical eras all remain unclear. Under Bruen, lower courts across the country have struck down gun laws at an alarming pace, while scholars and jurists continue debating the so-called true meaning of centuries-old firearm restrictions at times when slavery existed, women could not vote, and it took Thomas Jefferson longer to travel from Washington, D.C. to Williamsburg, VA than it currently takes to fly to the other side of the planet. This approach ignores the historical relevance of the government’s authority, if not outright duty, to respond to public health crises even if constitutional rights were implicated. The lack of historical laws related to mass shootings, large capacity magazines, and bullets designed to expand inside the body reflects the drastic evolution of gun violence rather than an impenetrable Second Amendment scope. Indeed, while state police powers to protect public health and safety preexist the Constitution, gun violence would have hardly been a priority for elected officials historically. Thus, the absence of robust, widespread gun regulations hardly reflects a consensus understanding of Second Amendment protections. Instead, examining accepted government restrictions for public health crises such as infectious diseases may provide better insight into the scope of authority to limit constitutional rights to protect the public. A public health law lens also helps to clarify that cementing policy options to emerging public health problems lacks historical pedigree.

Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2023, 20pg

By F. Lee Francis

This article is the culmination of a yearlong research project, and it is the first to address addiction and drug use in the area of Second Amendment Law. I argue that addicts may be disarmed, if they are dangerous. My dangerousness test centers on illicit use and imminent danger. That is, do the facts and circumstances prove that an individual is in fact a danger. To put it another way, disarmament is appropriate when there exists demonstrable evidence that a person poses a significant and imminent risk of causing public injury. The article develops and expands upon some themes and arguments that were first sketched out in my articles, Armed and Under the Influence: The Second Amendment and the Intoxicant Rule After Bruen (Forthcoming in the Marquette Law Review (2024) and Defining Dangerousness: When Disarmament is Appropriate (Forthcoming Texas Tech Law Review 2024).

There is growing confusion within the lower courts regarding when an individual, particularly those who have a history of drug use or addiction, may have their Second Amendment rights restricted. This paper intends to clarify the appropriate standard. The goal of this article is to aid in determining when an individual should be permanently disarmed.

Part I surveys the history of addiction. This section examines the commonness of addiction around the time of the founding to the early twentieth century. Furthermore, Part I also reviews the relevant legislative action relating to firearm possession, use, and control and addiction. The essential claim of Part I contends that modern laws restricting the possession of a firearm due to addiction are unconstitutional. Following an examination of the relevant history and legislation, Part II considers the arguments in favor of prohibiting addicts from possessing firearms. Part III focuses on the modern and developing controversies surrounding criminalizing the possession of firearms because of an individual’s history of addiction. Part IV, then, examines when an addict may be disarmed.

Francis, F. Lee, The Addiction Restriction: Addiction and the Right to Bear Arms. 2024, 48pg

By Elinore J. Kaufman; Douglas J. Wiebe; Ruiying Aria Xiong

Importance  Firearm injury research in the US has focused on fatal injuries. The incidence and epidemiologic factors associated with nonfatal firearm injuries are less understood.

Objective  To evaluate estimates of incidence and trends over time of fatal and nonfatal firearm injuries.

Design, Setting, and Participants  A cross-sectional, ecologic study was conducted using data throughout the US from 2009 to 2017. Data on fatal injuries from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were combined with national data on emergency department visits for nonfatal firearm injury from the Nationwide Emergency Department (ED) sample. Data analysis was conducted from August 2019 to September 2020.

Exposures  Firearm injuries identified with International Classification of Diseases external cause of injury codes and categorized by intent of injury, age group, and urban-rural location.

Main Outcomes and Measures  Incidence, case fatality rate, and trends over time of firearm injury according to intent, age group, and urban-rural location.

JAMA Intern Med. 20210 181(2): 1–8

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By  Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin and Matt Schroeder

Calibres typically associated with handguns and widely available commercial brands of ammunition usually represent the bulk of the illicit firearm ammunition seen in the countries studied.

Illicit firearms ammunition is not necessarily trafficked from abroad, as shown by the misuse of domestically produced cartridges in the five surveyed countries. Moreover, cartridges produced legally within the European Union (EU) have been recovered the same year at crime scenes.

A large percentage of illicit hand grenades and other factory-produced explosive munitions seized in the European countries under review were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The seizures are consistent with media reports and government statements indicating that the Balkans are a major source of illicit grenades acquired and used by criminals in the EU.

The number of illicit grenades documented in the Netherlands and Sweden has decreased significantly in recent years, possibly owing to Covid-19-related travel and shipping disruptions, an increased reliance on other types of explosives by criminals, and national and regional counter-trafficking efforts.

Brussel, Belgium: Flemish Peace Institute. 2024, 24pg

By R. Blake Brown  

This report provides a legal history of firearm regulation to help understand the current debate over gun control policy in Canada, particularly regarding semi-automatic firearms. Debate over the regulation of such guns has been particularly heated since 1 May 2020, when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that the federal cabinet had issued an Order in Council (PC 2020-298) to ban several models of semi-automatic firearms. 1 This report describes some of the key technological developments in handguns and long guns that have spurred debates about the kinds of firearms that should be available for certain uses in Canada. It identifies weapons employed in mass casualty events in Canada with reference to specific examples and notes the policy response to those events. The report explains the legislative tools used to address the dangers associated with semi-automatic firearms and considers the public policy debates about these regulatory approaches. It also identifies the strengths and shortcomings of past legislative approaches and considers policy options concerning the availability of semi-automatic weapons. This report demonstrates that the federal government has used a somewhat piecemeal approach to regulating handguns and semi-automatic firearms. Governments have historically sought to balance public safety and the interests of gun collectors, hunters, and target shooters. Efforts to limit the availability of some kinds of firearms have often resulted from their use in domestic and international mass shootings. Changes in firearm technology have contributed to attempts to limit the ownership or use of firearms deemed especially dangerous. The federal government has prohibited some semi-automatic rifles, declared others to be restricted firearms,   and left others as non-restricted firearms. This has complicated the enforcement of Canada’s gun laws. It has also permitted firearms with the capability to cause substantial harm to remain in circulation. Similarly, the federal government has prohibited some handguns but left many others available for purchase, thus contributing to the movement of firearms from the legal market to those wanting handguns for illegal purposes.

Halifax, NS: The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, 2022. 112p.

Nuclear Threat Initiative

From the document: "NTI [Nuclear Threat Initiative] convened a dialogue among nongovernmental U.S. and Russian cyber/information security and nuclear weapons policy experts. Following initial conversations in Moscow in 2019 about the findings from NTI's Cyber-Nuclear Weapons Study Group, the Track II dialogue was established and proceeded virtually in plenary and small-group sessions in 2020 and 2021. The participants are listed in Appendix 1. Expert participants built on a shared understanding that nuclear weapons systems must be protected from cyber threats, as well as other threats involving information and communications technologies (ICT), and that despite the current geopolitical environment, the unique U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship requires bilateral cooperation to maintain stability. They addressed topics including possible crisis scenarios and escalation pathways, opportunities for building confidence and predictability in the relationship, and bilateral cyber-nuclear norms that could mitigate the risks. The group generated ideas for joint and parallel actions to reduce cyber-nuclear weapons risks for both governments to consider and adopt. The following recommendations are designed to help avoid or mitigate the risks of a cyberattack prompting a nuclear crisis. The recommendations in this paper offer policymakers in Russia and the United States--and in other countries--options for reducing the risks of a cyber or information security attack that could lead to nuclear war." This record contains a Russian version following the English publication.

Nuclear Threat Initiative . 2023. 40p.

By Pew Research Center

In an era marked by deep divisions between Republicans and Democrats, few issues are as politically polarizing as gun policy. While a few specific policy proposals continue to garner bipartisan support, the partisan divisions on other proposals – and even on whether gun violence is a serious national problem – have grown wider over the last few years.

Today, just over half of Americans (53%) say gun laws should be stricter than they currently are, a view held by 81% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents but just 20% of Republicans and Republican leaners. Similarly, while nearly three-quarters of Democrats (73%) say making it harder to legally obtain guns would lead to fewer mass shootings, only 20% of Republicans say this, with most (65%) saying this would have no effect.

The new national survey by Pew Research Center, conducted from April 5-11, 2021 among 5,109 adults, finds that 73% of Democrats consider gun violence to be a very big problem for the country today, compared with just 18% of Republicans who say the same. The current partisan gap on this question is 11-percentage-points wider than in 2018 and 19 points wider than in 2016.

Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2021. 29p.

By The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform

In 2021, gun violence killed 20,984 people in the United States, more than any single year in the preceding two decades.1 Daily shootings in communities across the country are the most common form of gun violence. On average, 14,062 people are murdered every year by someone using a gun.2 Gun violence is disproportionately concentrated in urban centers, usually in underserved communities of color. Of the more than 13,000 firearm related homicide victims in the US in 2020, 55.8% were Black men.3 Although Black men and boys between the ages 15 and 34 make up just 2% of the nation’s population, they accounted for 37% of gun homicide victims in 2019,4 making homicide the leading cause of death for Black males in this age range.5 According to the American Journal of Medicine, US residents are 25 times more likely to be killed from gun violence than the citizens of any other developed country.6 In addition to its human toll, gun violence imposes a substantial economic cost on society. Direct costs include law enforcement and the criminal justice system, hospital and rehabilitation, incarceration, and victim support. Indirect costs include lost tax revenue, lost business opportunities, reduced property values, and neighborhood population decline and destabilization. When someone is shot, there is an immediate, multifaceted response from an array of government agencies. The fire department dispatches emergency medical technicians (EMTs), government-contracted ambulances respond, and several police department units as well as staff from a city’s office of violence prevention or contracted outreach workers descend on the scene. Investigators from the district attorney’s office also often arrive, and if the victim is declared dead on the scene, the coroner is called. And this is only the immediate aftermath of the shooting. Costs accumulate for many months, even years following a shooting. For surviving victims this includes hospitalization and, in the case of serious injury, rehabilitation–both of which are often paid for by tax dollars. This also includes victim compensation and a protracted investigation by the police department and prosecutors. When there are multiple victims and/ or multiple suspects, the cost of a single shooting incident will increase accordingly.

NICJR has calculated the costs of shootings in numerous cities across the country, deliberately using conservative estimates and only counting documentable direct costs.7 Using these studies as a starting point, this report aggregates the city-specific data and combines it with other data sources to model the direct unit costs and the direct average costs of gun violence nationwide.8 Unit costs reflect all of the potential costs of a single incident of gun violence, while average costs take into account the fact that certain costs are not incurred for every incident. For example, this report estimates the costs that gun violence imposes on the courts, district attorney, and public defender when a suspect is charged and goes to trial. However, because many incidents of gun violence do not result in prosecution or a trial, these estimates, or unit costs, are deflated to calculate the average cost per shooting

NICJR calculates that the unit cost of a single gun-related homicide is just over $1.2 million, while the average cost, or the cost per homicide, is approximately $625,000. This means that, on average, the total direct cost of gun-related homicides in the United States is more than $8.7 billion each year. For non-fatal injury shootings, NICJR calculates the unit cost at almost $700,000, with an average per-shooting cost of about $337,000, for an annual total of $11.7 billion.9 Combined, the total cost of gun homicides and non-fatal shootings is over $20 billion per year. If indirect expenses were included, the total cost of shootings would be much higher.

National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform, 19p.

By The Small Arms Survey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically over the last decade. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict areas in West and Central Africa, and their designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the region—helping to increase their use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians.

Out of Control: The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa—a new report from the Small Arms Survey’s Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in West Africa project—analyses data from more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, and stresses the importance of coordinated regional approaches in eliminating illegal IED use in West and Central Africa.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 124p.

By Patrick Sharkey and Megan Kang

Background:

The recent rise of gun violence may lead to the perception that the problem of gun mortality in the United States is intractable. This article provides evidence to counter this perception by bringing attention to the period spanning from 1991 to 2016 when most US states implemented more restrictive gun laws. Over this period, the United States experienced a decline in household gun ownership, and gun-related deaths fell sharply.

Methods:

The main analysis examines the conditional association between the change in gun regulations at the state level and the change in gun mortality from 1991 to 2016. We include a range of robustness checks and two instrumental variable analyses to allow for stronger causal inferences.

Results:

We find strong, consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that restrictive state gun policies reduce overall gun deaths, homicides committed with a gun, and suicides committed with a gun. Each additional restrictive gun regulation a given state passed from 1991 to 2016 was associated with −0.21 (95% confidence interval = −0.33, −0.08) gun deaths per 100,000 residents. Further, we find that specific policies, such as background checks and waiting periods for gun purchases, were associated with lower overall gun death rates, gun homicide rates, and gun suicide rates.

Conclusion:

State regulations passed from 1991 to 2016 were associated with substantial reductions in gun mortality. We estimate that restrictive state gun policies passed in 40 states from 1991 to 2016 averted 4297 gun deaths in 2016 alone, or roughly 11% of the total gun deaths that year.

More Americans were killed by gunfire in 2021 than in any previous year on record.1 This single statistic encompasses several social problems and challenges, including violent crime, the rise of suicides, mass shootings, intimate partner violence, and police shootings. But all of these problems are connected to each other by a common feature: guns.

Epidemiology 34(6):p 786-792, November 2023.

By Connor Brooks

This report is the 18th in a series produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. It details the number of applications for background checks for firearm transfers and permits received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state and local checking agencies. It also describes the types of permits or checks used by each state, the number of denials issued by these agencies, and the reasons for denial.

Highlights

• The FBI and state and local checking agencies received about 16.7 million applications for firearm transfers and permits in 2019 and 25.0 million applications in 2020.

• About 243,000 (1.5%) applications for firearm transfers and permits were denied in 2019, and 398,000 (1.6%) were denied in 2020.

• The FBI received about 12.8 million applications in 2020 and denied 185,000 (1.5%), while state and local checking agencies received more than 12.2 million applications and denied about 212,000 (1.7%).

• In 2020, state checking agencies denied 2.7% of purchase permits, 1.8% of instant checks, 1.2% of exempt carry permits, and 0.2% of other approvals.

Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2023. 33p.

By Sherry F. Colb

Most debates over gun rights are either interpretive, about the meaning of the Second Amendment, or empirical, about whether guns enhance or undermine safety. My goal in this essay is to introduce a third factor into the debate: the “imaginary narrative.” When I say “imaginary,” I mean to suggest a narrative that does not reflect typical or common experience. I use the context of guns and domestic violence to illustrate the phenomenon. The pro-gun imaginary narrative, when it comes to domestic violence, involves a victim confronting her abuser. Because she has a firearm, she is able to protect herself from him. But that fantasy does not comport with the reality of intimate partner abuse. I propose here that we acknowledge and interrogate imaginary narratives lest our laws and policies become disconnected from the true needs of our society.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 10p.

By Saul Cornell

A proper understanding of the founding era concept of police is essential to the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence. District of Columbia v. Heller never addresses the police power and its centrality to early American rights theory or antebellum jurisprudence. The omission is striking because Heller does devote considerable attention to antebellum southern cases addressing the issue of public carry, and this body of law was strongly influenced by police power jurisprudence. A genuinely historical treatment of founding era rights theory — including the right to keep and bear arms — provides scant support for Heller’s dismissal of the right of the people to regulate their internal police in the case of firearms. Nor does the antebellum southern case law that Heller highlights as the key to unlocking the meaning of the Second Amendment support such a claim. Reconstruction did not change these basic facts. If one applies Heller’s professed originalist methodology neutrally, and Justice Scalia is correct that rights are entrenched with the scope that they had when constitutionalized, then the right of the people to regulate their own police, including firearms, must be treated with the same originalist reverence. Judges, including originalist judges, must recognize the awesome power of the people: including the right to regulate arms.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 17p.

By Matthew J. Lacombe

The tumultuous year of 2020 may mark an important turning point in the political development of the National Rifle Association (NRA) and, as a result, the broader gun rights movement. This essay explores how the year’s events — and the role of guns and gun rights supporters in them — were in numerous ways a culmination of the NRA’s approach to politics over the course of several prior decades. This approach involves linking guns to a broader, right-wing populist worldview; mobilizing political action among gun rights supporters by portraying that worldview as deeply threatened by government and media elites; and building alliances with like-minded politicians, most notably Donald Trump. The essay then explores how the aftermath of the events of 2020 leaves the NRA in a difficult position. With Trump (the NRA’s close ally) out of office, some within the GOP looking to move on from his approach to politics following the failed January 6 insurrection, and Democrats more supportive of gun control than at any other point in recent history, the NRA may find itself somewhat politically alienated. Moreover, given its current organizational challenges and its position on the right wing of the GOP, the NRA may also struggle to recruit the many Americans who bought guns for the first time in 2020 — a group that could potentially diversify the gun owning community and renegotiate the sociopolitical meaning of guns in important ways. Only time will tell the NRA’s future, but what is clear now is that the tumultuous events of 2020 can be traced to the organization’s past and will surely impact both its future and the future of the gun debate.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2011. 8p.

By Darrell A. H. Miller

To an external observer, the moral and historical foundations of the insurrectionary Second Amendment must look bizarre. Instead of building an insurrectionist theory around the one group — enslaved Africans — who, by the framers’ own measure, had the most right to resist tyranny, we have a Second Amendment theory of righteous revolution built on the grievances of slave owners. But the peculiarity does not stop there. It must seem equally odd to outsiders that insurrectionist theory never adequately accounts for the fact that this one group, African Americans — with centuries of moral justification behind them — decided in the middle of the 20th century to reject violent political dynamism in favor of nonviolence. In short, what would Second Amendment insurrectionism look like if it started with the enslaved African and ended with the march across Edmund Pettus Bridge? This essay attempts to reckon with these twin paradoxes and reorient our thinking about the credibility of the insurrectionary Second Amendment.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 11p.